feat(messages): R4 S2 — forgotten-passphrase reset for E2EE

The set-once key guard made a lost passphrase a permanent wall (409 on re-setup,
KeyGate offered only unlock/setup). Add an escape hatch:

- POST /api/messages/keys/reset drops the user's MessageKey so a new passphrase
  can be set. Because every conversation key is derived from the keypair,
  replacing it orphans all stored ciphertext in both directions, so the now-dead
  `user` messages are deleted too (clean slate; system messages untouched).
  Password accounts must re-verify (a hijacked session must not silently reset
  messaging and read future messages); Google-only accounts rely on the session
  + the client danger-confirm. Rate-limited per user.
- KeyGate gains a "Forgot passphrase?" path in unlock mode → a danger reset view
  (spells out the permanent history loss; a current-password field for password
  accounts) → resets and returns to a fresh setup.
- e2ee.resetLocal wipes this device's key + derived conversation keys + the
  IndexedDB copy; api.resetMessageKey; HU/EN strings.

frontend/src/lib/e2ee.ts

@@ -85,6 +85,16 @@ export async function clearDevice(userId: number): Promise<void> {
   });
 }
 
+// Wipe this device's E2EE identity: forget the unlocked key + every derived conversation key,
+// delete the persisted copy, and notify observers so the gate re-appears. Used by the passphrase
+// reset, which also drops the server key so the next screen is a fresh setup.
+export async function resetLocal(userId: number): Promise<void> {
+  privKey = null;
+  convKeys.clear();
+  await clearDevice(userId);
+  emitUnlock();
+}
+
 // --- key derivation ---
 async function wrapKeyFrom(passphrase: string, salt: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {
   const base = await subtle.importKey("raw", bsrc(enc.encode(passphrase)), "PBKDF2", false, [