fix(auth): close the account pre-emption + wrong-account link holes (E1 S5, SEC-10/11)
SEC-10 (account pre-emption / "pre-hijack"): a password set on an account whose email was never verified is untrusted — whoever registered the address (to pre-empt the real owner) could have chosen it. Both the Google-adoption callback and admin activation (_activate_user_by_email) now drop that pre-set password and bump the session epoch when the account isn't email_verified, so a later Google login / admin approval can't hand the pre-set password a working login. No-op for a verified account (the legit no-SMTP flow). +2 tests. SEC-11 (link/upgrade bound to the session default): the OAuth link/upgrade GETs resolved to the session DEFAULT account, so a tab acting as a secondary account would link Google / the YouTube grant to the wrong account. The frontend now threads the active account through the navigation URL (withActiveAccount -> ?account=<active>), and _complete_link accepts any wallet account, not only the default, so the identity lands on the account that started the flow.
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@@ -90,3 +90,32 @@ def test_reset_confirm_is_single_use_and_kills_existing_sessions(client, make_us
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# The token is single-use: a replay is a clean 400, not a second reset.
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replay = client.post("/auth/password-reset/confirm", json={"token": raw, "password": "another pw!!"})
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assert replay.status_code == 400
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def test_activating_an_unverified_account_drops_its_preset_password(db, make_user):
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# SEC-10 (account pre-emption): an attacker registers victim@x with a password before the approved
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# owner arrives. The address was never verified, so admin approval must NOT hand that pre-set
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# password a working login — it is dropped and any session it minted is revoked.
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from app.routes.admin import _activate_user_by_email
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victim = make_user(
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email="victim@example.com", password="attacker-chosen", email_verified=False, is_active=False
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)
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epoch0 = victim.session_epoch or 0
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_activate_user_by_email(db, "victim@example.com")
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assert victim.is_active is True
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assert victim.password_hash is None
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assert (victim.session_epoch or 0) == epoch0 + 1
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def test_activating_a_verified_account_keeps_its_password(db, make_user):
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# A legit account whose email IS verified (e.g. a no-SMTP registration) keeps its password on
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# approval — the guard must not break the normal flow.
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from app.routes.admin import _activate_user_by_email
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user = make_user(
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email="legit@example.com", password="my own password", email_verified=True, is_active=False
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)
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_activate_user_by_email(db, "legit@example.com")
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assert user.is_active is True
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assert user.password_hash is not None
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