fix(e12): close what round one broke, and revert two fixes that overreached

Round two of the review loop, on round one's own diff. Two of its findings were
regressions the fixes themselves introduced, which is exactly what the loop is for:

**A per-user refusal was writing onto a shared row.** MediaAssets are deduped across
users, and the generic failure handler puts the message on the asset — right for an
upstream failure, wrong for "your storage is full". Two users queuing the same video share
one asset, so the first user hitting their cap failed the second user's job with the first
one's private reason, telling someone with an empty library to free up space. The refusal
now raises `_OwnerRefused`, caught separately: the job fails, the asset goes back to
`pending` for whoever else holds it. Pinned by a test that drives `_download` directly —
the refusal happens before extraction, so nothing needs stubbing.

**The restore scripts restarted the app, undoing the restore.** `docker compose start`
re-runs the container command, and that runs `alembic upgrade head` — so on the rollback
path this documents as recommended (restore the dump, THEN pin the older tag) the newer
image immediately re-applied the migrations the restore had just undone, and on a FAILED
restore it put the app back on a half-restored schema. Both are the opposite of why the
stop was added. Nothing is restarted automatically now; the scripts say what to run and
when, and the docs' snippets say the same.

**Reverted rather than patched:** the OnboardingWizard toast (the wizard already renders
that failure inline, next to a Retry button — three recoveries for one failure), and
`useVerifyEntry`'s "each new link clears the other". The latter blanked the signed-out
card's only banner, where nothing renders the reset flag to replace it. The two states are
independent again; what changes is that `dismiss` peels ONE layer, which is what the
original finding was actually about.

Also: `Stats` uses the YouTube helper rather than the bare one, so the route's English 403
detail no longer beats the translated fallback under a Hungarian UI; `urlparse` guarded
alongside `.port` (an unclosed bracket raised just as late), the reason renamed `malformed`
since "bad port" misdescribes it; three docstrings narrowed to what the code actually does
(the worker's byte check is per-job, not an aggregate ledger, and not on the edit path;
the redirect residual leaks a reachability oracle, which the note had denied; the
invalidation helper does not cover suspend); the pasted Windows recipe wrapped so `throw`
can stop it; the bash one-liner's failure branch no longer exits 0; and the tests that were
missing for the round-one fixes — the account panel's error paths, the invalidation set,
and the shared-asset case above.

Gate green: vitest 685, pytest 950.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-05 04:02:57 +02:00
parent fe38dfbcca
commit 358d722ce9
25 changed files with 443 additions and 125 deletions
+16 -13
View File
@@ -17,9 +17,12 @@ the connection itself with a custom socket factory inside yt-dlp, a much larger
with an internal address.
* HTTP redirects: a public host that answers 3xx with an internal ``Location``. yt-dlp follows it,
and only the URL the user TYPED was ever judged here. An attacker-controlled host or any public
open redirect reaches it, so this is the cheaper of the two — but it still buys only what a
media-shaped internal response yields, since a non-media body fails the mp4 remux and stores
nothing. Tracked as SEC-17.
open redirect reaches it, so this is the cheaper of the two. It does NOT usually yield the
response body — a non-media body fails the mp4 remux and stores nothing — but it does hand back
the readout above: the redaction in ``errors.user_error_text`` fires only for the ``network``
class, so a dead internal port (refused → ``network`` → redacted) is distinguishable from a live
one (an HTTP answer that is not media → ``unsupported_host``/``format_unavailable``, raw text
kept). Tracked as SEC-17.
The two checks here stop the straightforward case (typing ``http://127.0.0.1:6379`` or an internal
hostname into the box), which is the reachable one.
@@ -36,7 +39,7 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse
# vocabulary (frontend `localizeDetail`) — keep them stable.
REASON_SCHEME = "scheme" # not http(s)
REASON_NO_HOST = "no_host" # URL carries no hostname
REASON_BAD_PORT = "bad_port" # ":99999" / ":abc" — urlparse only raises on ACCESS, so guard it
REASON_MALFORMED = "malformed" # unparseable authority or port; urlparse raises late, so guard it
REASON_UNRESOLVABLE = "unresolvable" # DNS said nothing (honest: not the same as "blocked")
REASON_PRIVATE = "private" # resolves into a network the server must not fetch from
@@ -82,20 +85,20 @@ def check_url(raw: str) -> None:
"""Raise BlockedUrl unless ``raw`` is an http(s) URL whose host resolves only to addresses the
server is allowed to fetch from. A host with even ONE forbidden address is refused: a
round-robin answer must not become a coin flip."""
u = urlparse((raw or "").strip())
# `urlparse` itself raises ValueError on a malformed authority ("http://[::1/x" — an unclosed
# bracket), and `.port` raises on ":99999" / ":abc" when READ rather than at parse time. Both
# escape the caller's `except BlockedUrl` as a 500 unless caught here, which is the opposite of
# what this module exists to do: turn a bad URL into a structured, localizable refusal.
try:
u = urlparse((raw or "").strip())
port = u.port
except ValueError as exc:
raise BlockedUrl(REASON_MALFORMED) from exc
if u.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise BlockedUrl(REASON_SCHEME)
host = u.hostname
if not host:
raise BlockedUrl(REASON_NO_HOST)
# `.port` is a lazily-parsed property: it raises ValueError for ":99999" or ":abc" on ACCESS,
# not at urlparse() time, and `.hostname` above happily returns first. Unguarded, one typo
# escapes the caller's `except BlockedUrl` as a 500 instead of the structured 422 this whole
# module exists to return.
try:
port = u.port
except ValueError as exc:
raise BlockedUrl(REASON_BAD_PORT) from exc
for addr in _resolve(host, port):
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(addr)