fix(auth): stop the address-bar mirror eating emailed auth tokens, and unlock revoked accounts

Two independent bugs made an email+password registration unrecoverable in prod.

The verification link did nothing. urlWithParams/clearParams rebuilt the URL as
pathname+query and dropped the fragment — but the one-time auth tokens ride the
fragment (#verify=/#reset=, SB3), and the providers that mirror nav params
(useUrlMirror in FeedFilters/Playlists/Plex/Channels) sit ABOVE the lazily-loaded
<App> in main.tsx. Their mount effect replaceState'd the token away before the auth
card's chunk had loaded, so the card read an empty hash: the link opened a bare
sign-in page, no request, no banner. Both helpers now carry the fragment over.

The account was then locked out for good. SEC-10 nulls password_hash when an
unverified account is attested (here: admin approval landing before the user could
verify — which the bug above made impossible). That is indistinguishable from a
Google-only account, and reset eligibility keyed off password_hash alone, so no
reset link was ever issued: no password to sign in with, and no way to get one.
users.password_revoked_at records the revocation, reset eligibility honours it, and
setting a password again (reset-confirm or set-password) clears it. An account that
never had a password stays ineligible on purpose — its owner adds one from Settings.

/auth/verify now also answers password_reset_required so the card can say why the
registered password stopped working, instead of leaving the user at the uniform
"Invalid email or password". Telling the holder of a valid verify token leaks
nothing: they have already proved they own the mailbox.

The 0078 migration backfills the stamp for rows carrying the exact lockout signature
(local, non-demo, no password, unverified), so existing victims recover unaided.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-02 01:28:45 +02:00
parent 94c62ca699
commit 3ac3d382e7
11 changed files with 282 additions and 14 deletions
+19 -1
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@@ -339,7 +339,10 @@ function AuthCard() {
verifyFired.current = true;
api
.verifyEmail(verifyToken)
.then(() => setVerify("ok"))
// "ok_reset": verified, but SEC-10 had dropped the password this account registered with (an
// admin approved it before it was verified). Sign-in would answer with the uniform credentials
// error, so point the user at the reset flow instead. Same value the legacy ?verify= redirect uses.
.then((r) => setVerify(r.password_reset_required ? "ok_reset" : "ok"))
.catch(() => setVerify("invalid"));
}, [verifyToken]);
@@ -392,6 +395,13 @@ function AuthCard() {
setMode("resend");
};
// Used by the "verified, but your password was revoked" banner — the only way back into that
// account is a reset link, so put the user one click from it.
const goForgot = () => {
reset();
setMode("forgot");
};
async function onSubmit(e: React.FormEvent) {
e.preventDefault();
reset();
@@ -465,6 +475,14 @@ function AuthCard() {
{/* One-time status banners from a redirect (Google-denied, email verification). */}
{verify === "ok" && <Banner tone="ok">{t("welcome.auth.verifyOk")}</Banner>}
{verify === "ok_reset" && (
<Banner tone="warn">
{t("welcome.auth.verifyOkReset")}{" "}
<button onClick={goForgot} className="font-semibold text-accent hover:underline">
{t("welcome.auth.verifyOkResetCta")}
</button>
</Banner>
)}
{verify === "invalid" && (
<Banner tone="warn">
{t("welcome.auth.verifyInvalid")}{" "}
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@
"forgotDone": "If that email has an account, we've sent a reset link. Check your inbox.",
"resetDone": "Your password has been set — you can sign in now.",
"verifyOk": "Email confirmed. Once an admin approves your account, you can sign in.",
"verifyOkReset": "Email confirmed. Your account was approved before you confirmed it, so the password you registered with was cleared for security — choose a new one to sign in.",
"verifyOkResetCta": "Set a new password",
"verifyInvalid": "That verification link is invalid or has expired.",
"resendCta": "Send a new link",
"resendDone": "If that email has an unverified account, we've sent a new verification link. Check your inbox.",
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@
"forgotDone": "Ha ehhez az e-mailhez tartozik fiók, elküldtük a visszaállító linket. Nézd meg a postafiókod.",
"resetDone": "A jelszavad be van állítva — most már beléphetsz.",
"verifyOk": "E-mail megerősítve. Amint egy admin jóváhagyja a fiókodat, beléphetsz.",
"verifyOkReset": "E-mail megerősítve. A fiókodat még a megerősítés előtt jóváhagyták, ezért biztonsági okból töröltük a regisztrációkor megadott jelszavadat — válassz újat a belépéshez.",
"verifyOkResetCta": "Új jelszó beállítása",
"verifyInvalid": "Ez a megerősítő link érvénytelen vagy lejárt.",
"resendCta": "Új link küldése",
"resendDone": "Ha ehhez az e-mailhez tartozik megerősítetlen fiók, elküldtünk egy új megerősítő linket. Nézd meg a postafiókod.",
+4 -1
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@@ -37,7 +37,10 @@ export const authApi = {
{ quiet: true },
),
// Confirm an email-verification token the SPA read from the URL fragment (SB3).
verifyEmail: (token: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean }> =>
// `password_reset_required` = SEC-10 dropped the password this account registered with (an admin
// approved it before it was verified), so signing in would fail with the uniform credentials error.
// The card sends the user to the reset flow instead of leaving them to guess.
verifyEmail: (token: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; password_reset_required?: boolean }> =>
req("/auth/verify", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify({ token }) }, { quiet: true }),
// Re-issue a verification link (the first one expired, or was lost). Uniform response — never
// reveals whether the email has a pending account.
+13
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@@ -64,6 +64,19 @@ describe("urlWithParams", () => {
setLocation("?page=channels");
expect(urlWithParams({ page: null })).toBe("/app");
});
it("carries the fragment over — the one-time auth tokens ride it", () => {
// Regression (prod, 2026-09-02): the providers that mirror nav params mount ABOVE the lazy <App>,
// so this URL was replaceState'd before the auth card's chunk loaded. Dropping the hash ate the
// #verify= token and the verification link opened a bare sign-in page.
window.history.replaceState(null, "", "/app?page=plex#verify=tok123");
expect(urlWithParams({ v: "show:1" })).toBe("/app?page=plex&v=show%3A1#verify=tok123");
});
it("carries the fragment over even when the query empties out", () => {
window.history.replaceState(null, "", "/app?page=channels#reset=tok456");
expect(urlWithParams({ page: null })).toBe("/app#reset=tok456");
});
});
describe("clearParams", () => {
+14 -6
View File
@@ -146,10 +146,16 @@ export function readPage(): Page {
return isPage(p) ? p : "feed";
}
/** Build a URL (path + query) from the CURRENT location's query with `updates` applied — a null value
* deletes that key, any other string sets it. Lets each provider own its own nav key(s) — page / chan /
* v / pl / the feed-filter keys — and update the address bar without clobbering the others (read-modify-
* write on the live query). The caller decides pushState vs replaceState with the returned string. */
/** Build a URL (path + query + fragment) from the CURRENT location with `updates` applied to the query —
* a null value deletes that key, any other string sets it. Lets each provider own its own nav key(s) —
* page / chan / v / pl / the feed-filter keys — and update the address bar without clobbering the others
* (read-modify-write on the live query). The caller decides pushState vs replaceState with the string.
*
* ⚠️ The FRAGMENT must be carried over. The one-time auth tokens ride it (`#verify=…` / `#reset=…`, SB3),
* and the providers that mirror nav params (useUrlMirror in FeedFilters/Playlists/Plex/Channels) sit ABOVE
* the lazily-loaded <App> in main.tsx — their mount effect replaceState's this URL before the auth card's
* chunk has even loaded. Dropping the hash here silently ate the token: the verification link opened a
* bare sign-in page and the account could never be verified. */
export function urlWithParams(updates: Record<string, string | null>): string {
const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(updates)) {
@@ -157,7 +163,7 @@ export function urlWithParams(updates: Record<string, string | null>): string {
else params.set(k, v);
}
const qs = params.toString();
return `${window.location.pathname}${qs ? `?${qs}` : ""}`;
return `${window.location.pathname}${qs ? `?${qs}` : ""}${window.location.hash}`;
}
/** Remove specific TRANSIENT params (one-time auth/admin links: ?link, ?oauth, ?admin, ?access, ?verify,
@@ -178,6 +184,8 @@ export function clearParams(...keys: string[]): void {
window.history.replaceState(
window.history.state,
"",
`${window.location.pathname}${qs ? `?${qs}` : ""}`,
// Same fragment rule as urlWithParams: this strips QUERY keys only, so a `#verify=…`/`#reset=…`
// token that has not been consumed yet must survive. Welcome's own cleanup is what clears it.
`${window.location.pathname}${qs ? `?${qs}` : ""}${window.location.hash}`,
);
}
+10
View File
@@ -48,4 +48,14 @@ describe("useUrlMirror", () => {
renderHook(() => useUrlMirror({ pl: "5" }));
expect(window.location.search).toBe("?page=playlists&pl=5");
});
it("leaves an unconsumed auth token in the fragment alone", () => {
// This hook's mount effect is what ran before <App> (and therefore before the auth card) had even
// loaded, so whatever it writes to the address bar is what the card later reads. It must not eat
// the #verify=/#reset= token that the emailed link carries.
window.history.replaceState(null, "", "/?page=playlists#verify=tok123");
renderHook(() => useUrlMirror({ pl: "5" }));
expect(window.location.hash).toBe("#verify=tok123");
expect(window.location.search).toBe("?page=playlists&pl=5");
});
});