diff --git a/backend/tests/test_auth_session.py b/backend/tests/test_auth_session.py
index 676e24cd..e5f9382d 100644
--- a/backend/tests/test_auth_session.py
+++ b/backend/tests/test_auth_session.py
@@ -99,10 +99,16 @@ def test_reset_confirm_is_single_use_and_kills_existing_sessions(client, make_us
 
 def test_approving_an_unverified_account_keeps_its_password(db, make_user):
     # E9.5 S1, inverting an earlier rule. Approval used to drop a password set while the email was
-    # unverified (SEC-10, account pre-emption). That was redundant: password_login refuses an
-    # unverified account BEFORE it reads is_active, so approval hands a pre-emptor's password nothing
-    # — see the pair of tests below. All it did was destroy the password a legitimate registrant had
-    # just chosen, in what is the NORMAL ordering (the admin decides before the user reads their mail).
+    # unverified (SEC-10, account pre-emption). It was dropped because it destroyed the password a
+    # legitimate registrant had just chosen, in what is the NORMAL ordering — the admin decides
+    # before the user reads their mail — making "your password was cleared for security" the default
+    # experience.
+    #
+    # S1 ALSO argued the revoke was redundant, because password_login refuses an unverified account
+    # before it reads is_active. The epic's closing review refuted that: the gate holds only while
+    # the address is unverified, and S6's approval mail exists to get the real owner to end that
+    # state. Do not restore that reasoning from this comment — the residual is SEC-16, and round 2
+    # of the review tried and reverted a guard for it (see test_review_round.py).
     from app.routes.admin import _activate_user_by_email
 
     user = make_user(
@@ -122,8 +128,10 @@ def test_approving_an_unverified_account_keeps_its_password(db, make_user):
 
 
 def test_an_approved_but_unverified_account_still_cannot_sign_in(client, make_user):
-    # Why dropping the approval-path revoke is safe: this is the gate that actually stops a
-    # pre-emptor, and it runs whatever the admin decided.
+    # The gate that stops a pre-emptor BEFORE the address is confirmed, whatever the admin decided.
+    # It is not the whole story — confirming the address opens it, which is SEC-16 — but it is the
+    # invariant this test owns, and a change that let an unverified account sign in would be a
+    # straightforwardly worse bug than the residual.
     make_user(
         email="notyet@example.com",
         password="attacker-chosen",
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_review_round.py b/backend/tests/test_review_round.py
index 9d7c81a0..5f1e6f39 100644
--- a/backend/tests/test_review_round.py
+++ b/backend/tests/test_review_round.py
@@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ def test_a_later_registration_leaves_a_link_already_in_flight_alive(db, client,
     db.expire_all()
     user = db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == "victim@example.com")).scalar_one()
     first = db.execute(select(AuthToken.id).where(AuthToken.user_id == user.id)).scalars().all()
+    # Not just a subset check below: `set() <= set()` is vacuously true, so without this the test
+    # would go green while asserting nothing the day registration stops issuing a token.
+    assert len(first) == 1
 
     client.post(
         "/auth/register", json={"email": "victim@example.com", "password": "the second password"}
@@ -130,7 +133,7 @@ def test_a_later_registration_leaves_a_link_already_in_flight_alive(db, client,
     db.expire_all()
     live = db.execute(select(AuthToken.id).where(AuthToken.user_id == user.id)).scalars().all()
     # The re-send adds a link; it must not invalidate the one the owner may already be holding.
-    assert set(first) <= set(live)
+    assert set(first) <= set(live) and len(live) == len(first) + 1
 
 
 def test_a_stripped_account_keeps_its_recovery_stamp(db, client, smtp_on, make_user):
@@ -244,11 +247,14 @@ def test_deleting_one_of_two_accounts_leaves_the_other_one_allowed(db, make_user
 # --- a button an admin pressed must not report a send that did not happen -------------------------
 
 
-def test_a_failed_invitation_is_not_recorded_as_written(
+def test_a_failed_invitation_changes_nothing_the_admin_was_told_about(
     db, make_user, as_user, smtp_on, monkeypatch
 ):
     monkeypatch.setattr(email_mod, "send_access_invitation", lambda *a, **kw: False)
     admin = make_user(email="admin@example.com", role="admin")
+    stranger = make_user(
+        email="stranger@example.com", password=_PW, email_verified=False, is_active=False
+    )
     inv = Invite(email="stranger@example.com", status="approved")
     db.add(inv)
     db.commit()
@@ -260,6 +266,9 @@ def test_a_failed_invitation_is_not_recorded_as_written(
     # The column exists to answer "did I already write to them?", and the UI dims the button and
     # warns about a second mail on the strength of it. A dropped send must not make it say yes.
     assert db.get(Invite, inv.id).invited_at is None
+    # And a request the UI reports as a failure must not have let somebody in behind the admin's
+    # back — the activation belongs after a mail that actually left.
+    assert db.get(User, stranger.id).is_active is False
 
 
 def test_a_failed_resend_says_so_instead_of_reporting_ok(