refactor(auth): one account per browser session

The session held a wallet of up to six accounts, and a request picked one by a header or an
?account= parameter. It now holds one: user_id and its epoch. A sign-in replaces whoever was
signed in, sign-out and account deletion end the session, and an account refused mid-session
(revoked, suspended, deactivated) clears it. /api/me/accounts and /api/me/switch are gone, and
with them their refusal codes and the UI copy for them.

A cookie the multi-account build wrote carries no single epoch and is refused: its holder signs
in once more. A Google link finishing in a browser now signed in as someone else is refused, as
before for an account outside the wallet. A test holds that no app code reads the wallet keys or
the account header again.
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-20 04:36:26 +02:00
parent dc4f4f5143
commit 59ec4a28ba
9 changed files with 151 additions and 300 deletions
+25 -92
View File
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ def operator_contact() -> str | None:
return next(iter(sorted(settings.admin_email_set)), None)
MAX_SESSION_ACCOUNTS = 6
# OAuth scope vocabulary — the atoms + the request bundles, kept together as core. has_*_scope check
# the atoms against a user's stored grant; the *_SCOPES bundles are what the login/callback endpoints
# request (imported by app/routes/auth.py).
@@ -253,94 +251,37 @@ def purge_user(db: Session, user: User, background: BackgroundTasks) -> None:
background.add_task(email_mod.send_account_deleted, email, lang, operator_contact())
ACTIVE_ACCOUNT_HEADER = "x-siftlode-account"
def session_user_id(conn: HTTPConnection) -> int | None:
"""The account this browser session signed in as, read from the signed cookie alone (no DB).
One account per session: signing in as another replaces it (`routes.auth._establish_session`)."""
return conn.session.get("user_id")
def resolved_user_id(conn: HTTPConnection, *, strict: bool = True) -> tuple[int | None, bool]:
"""Which account this connection acts as, and whether that's the session's default account.
Takes an HTTPConnection rather than a Request: it reads only the session and the headers.
The signed cookie holds the *wallet* (`account_ids`, every account signed into this browser)
plus a default `user_id`. A caller may name its account with the X-Siftlode-Account header (or
`?account=`), but ONLY an account in the wallet — so a tab can't impersonate an account that
never authenticated here. A connection that names no account acts as the cookie default.
A connection naming an account NOT in the wallet acts as nobody (`None`) — typically a tab still
pinned to an account that was signed out in another tab. It must not fall back to the default:
that tab would go on acting as an account it never showed, its player checkpoints and pref saves
landing there and its Sign out signing THAT account out. Only the bootstrap /api/me probe passes
`strict=False` and gets the default, which is how such a tab learns who it now is (the frontend
re-pins it and reloads). An account whose session ended while it stayed in the wallet (deleted,
suspended, revoked) leaves the wallet when it is refused (`_session_user`), so a tab pinned to it
takes the same way back.
"""
default_id = conn.session.get("user_id")
wallet = conn.session.get("account_ids") or []
# Header for normal XHR; ?account= for a context that can't set headers (a plain <a> file
# download). Both are wallet-gated below.
hdr = conn.headers.get(ACTIVE_ACCOUNT_HEADER) or conn.query_params.get("account")
if hdr:
try:
hid = int(hdr)
except ValueError:
# Under `strict` this becomes a 401 and the tab authenticates as nobody, which reads
# in the browser exactly like a session that expired. The value itself stays out —
# it came from a request, and `wallet` says which accounts were actually on offer.
log.debug(
"the active-account header could not be read as an id",
extra=logs.event("auth.account_header.invalid", accounts=len(wallet)),
)
hid = None
if hid is not None and hid in wallet:
return hid, hid == default_id
if strict:
return None, False
return default_id, True
def drop_from_wallet(session: dict, user_id: int) -> None:
"""Take one account out of this browser's wallet (`account_ids`); the session default is untouched."""
session["account_ids"] = [a for a in (session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != user_id]
def _end_account_session(request: Request, user_id: int, is_default: bool) -> None:
"""An account whose session here is no longer valid. Only nuke the whole session when it is the
SESSION DEFAULT; a per-tab account just leaves the wallet (other tabs' default may still be valid).
Leaving is what lets a tab pinned to it recover: its next /api/me names an account no longer signed
in here and gets the default. Left in, it answered "signed out" — the landing page, with the default
still signed in, and no way off it but closing the tab."""
if is_default:
request.session.clear()
else:
drop_from_wallet(request.session, user_id)
def stamp_session(request: Request, user: User) -> None:
"""Record the account's current `session_epoch` in the signed cookie, so `current_user` can later
reject the cookie once the epoch moves (password reset/change, or "log out everywhere")."""
request.session["epoch"] = user.session_epoch or 0
def current_user(request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -> User:
return _session_user(request, db, *resolved_user_id(request))
return _session_user(request, db, session_user_id(request))
def _session_user(request: Request, db: Session, user_id: int | None, is_default: bool) -> User:
def _session_user(request: Request, db: Session, user_id: int | None) -> User:
if not user_id:
raise refused(401, "not_authenticated")
user = db.get(User, user_id)
if user is None or not user.is_active or user.is_suspended:
# Suspended/deactivated mid-session → end it so the block takes effect at once.
_end_account_session(request, user_id, is_default)
request.session.clear()
raise refused(401, "not_authenticated")
# SA4: reject a cookie whose recorded epoch is behind the account's current one (revoked by a
# password reset/change or "log out everywhere"). A cookie with no recorded epoch (pre-SA4, or an
# account signed in before this shipped) is treated as epoch 0 — so the FIRST bump revokes it too.
epochs = request.session.get("epochs") or {}
if int(epochs.get(str(user_id), 0)) != (user.session_epoch or 0):
_end_account_session(request, user_id, is_default)
# A cookie whose epoch is behind the account's (revoked by a password reset/change or "log out
# everywhere") is refused — and so is one with no epoch at all, which only a build before the
# one-account session wrote: its holder signs in once more.
epoch = request.session.get("epoch")
if epoch is None or int(epoch) != (user.session_epoch or 0):
request.session.clear()
raise refused(401, "not_authenticated")
# Always keep the session default in the switchable list — covers sessions created before
# multi-session existed (their account_ids was never seeded), so the switcher isn't empty.
default_id = request.session.get("user_id")
accounts = request.session.get("account_ids") or []
if default_id and default_id not in accounts:
accounts.append(default_id)
request.session["account_ids"] = accounts[-MAX_SESSION_ACCOUNTS:]
# Attribute this request's log lines to the account. Here, not in the request middleware:
# this is the one place a session becomes an account, and the middleware runs outside both the
# session middleware and this task's context. `request.state` is shared across middleware layers
@@ -358,25 +299,17 @@ def _session_user(request: Request, db: Session, user_id: int | None, is_default
def optional_current_user(request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -> User | None:
"""Like `current_user` but returns None instead of raising 401 when there's no valid session.
Used by the bootstrap /api/me probe so the logged-out landing doesn't log a failed request to
the browser console (a non-2xx fetch is a console error no matter how the app handles it).
The one lenient resolution (`strict=False`): a tab naming an account no longer signed in here gets
the default account, which is how it learns who it now is — see `resolved_user_id`. That includes an
account refused right here, which `_session_user` has just taken out of the wallet."""
user_id, is_default = resolved_user_id(request, strict=False)
the browser console (a non-2xx fetch is a console error no matter how the app handles it)."""
user_id = session_user_id(request)
if user_id is None:
return None
try:
return _session_user(request, db, user_id, is_default)
# silent-ok: this is the anonymous case as much as the refused one — every landing page hit
# comes through here. The second attempt below is the handling, and it reports.
return _session_user(request, db, user_id)
except HTTPException:
if is_default:
return None
try:
return _session_user(request, db, *resolved_user_id(request, strict=False))
except HTTPException:
# Both the pinned account AND the default one were refused, so the tab is signed out
# without being told why — and it got here from a session that named a real account.
# A session that named an account, refused: the browser is signed out without being told
# why, so say it here.
log.info(
"a session was resolved to nobody: neither the named nor the default account held",
"a session was refused: its account no longer holds",
extra=logs.event("auth.session.probe_rejected", user_id=user_id),
)
return None
+19 -52
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ from app import sysconfig
from app.auth import (
_YOUTUBE_SCOPES,
BASE_SCOPES,
MAX_SESSION_ACCOUNTS,
PASSWORD_MIN_LEN,
READ_SCOPES,
WRITE_SCOPES,
@@ -37,7 +36,8 @@ from app.auth import (
is_allowed,
log,
operator_contact,
resolved_user_id,
session_user_id,
stamp_session,
)
from app.config import settings
from app.db import SessionLocal, get_db
@@ -361,13 +361,13 @@ async def callback(
token = await client.authorize_access_token(request)
except OAuthError as exc:
# The user cancelled or denied consent at Google — land back with a friendly notice instead
# of a raw 400 JSON error page. An already-signed-in user (adding another account via
# /auth/login, or linking/upgrading via /auth/link|upgrade) never sees the pre-auth login
# banner, so surface a neutral toast via ?oauth=cancelled; a fresh sign-in cancel lands on
# the login page with the oauth_cancelled banner instead. Keyed on the live session, not on
# link_uid, so the add-account path (no marker) is covered too.
# of a raw 400 JSON error page. An already-signed-in user (signing in again via /auth/login,
# or linking/upgrading via /auth/link|upgrade) never sees the pre-auth login banner, so
# surface a neutral toast via ?oauth=cancelled; a fresh sign-in cancel lands on the login page
# with the oauth_cancelled banner instead. Keyed on the live session, not on link_uid, so a
# sign-in started while signed in (no marker) is covered too.
log.info("Google OAuth cancelled/failed: %s", exc.error)
if request.session.get("user_id") is not None:
if session_user_id(request) is not None:
return RedirectResponse(url="/?oauth=cancelled")
return RedirectResponse(url="/?login=oauth_cancelled")
@@ -584,12 +584,9 @@ def _complete_link(
Google identity owned by another account, or to silently swap a different linked identity.
`explicit` (the popped oauth_link_explicit marker) distinguishes a "Connect Google" click from
a YouTube upgrade — the caller pops it up front so an aborted flow leaves nothing behind."""
# SEC-11: the marker must name an account signed into THIS browser — the session default OR any
# account in the wallet — not only the default. A tab acting as a secondary account links Google to
# ITSELF (the marker was set from current_user, which resolves the ?account= it navigated with), so
# accepting wallet membership stops the identity/token landing on the default account A instead of B.
accounts = request.session.get("account_ids") or []
if link_uid != request.session.get("user_id") and link_uid not in accounts:
# The marker must name the account still signed into THIS browser: a sign-in as someone else
# between the start and the callback replaced it, and the identity must not land on the newcomer.
if link_uid != session_user_id(request):
return RedirectResponse(url="/?link=error")
user = db.get(User, link_uid)
if user is None:
@@ -619,38 +616,17 @@ def _complete_link(
@router.post("/logout")
async def logout(request: Request):
"""Sign the requesting tab's active account out of this browser (removing it from the wallet).
Per-tab aware: the account is taken from the X-Siftlode-Account header when present, so logging
out in one tab doesn't disturb another tab running a different account. If the account being
removed was the session default, promote the most recent remaining account (or clear the
session when none remain)."""
# A tab still pinned to an account already signed out in another tab resolves to nobody, so it
# signs nobody out — it used to fall back to the default and sign THAT account out in its place.
active, is_default = resolved_user_id(request)
remaining = [a for a in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != active]
request.session["account_ids"] = remaining
if is_default:
if remaining:
request.session["user_id"] = remaining[-1]
return JSONResponse({"ok": True, "switched": True})
request.session.clear()
return JSONResponse({"ok": True, "switched": False})
# A non-default (per-tab) account signed out: it's gone from the wallet and the session default
# is untouched. The tab drops its own override and falls back to the default on reload.
return JSONResponse({"ok": True, "switched": False})
"""Sign this browser out: the session holds one account, and it ends."""
request.session.clear()
return JSONResponse({"ok": True})
def _establish_session(request: Request, user: User) -> None:
"""Sign `user` in for this browser session — the ONE sign-in path, shared by the Google callback
and password login, so both join the same account switcher and both stamp `last_login_at` (the
caller commits). Multi-session: every account that authenticated in this browser is remembered so
the user can switch between them; only accounts that actually proved themselves HERE land in that
wallet (it is the proof they may be switched to)."""
accounts = [a for a in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != user.id]
accounts.append(user.id)
request.session["account_ids"] = accounts[-MAX_SESSION_ACCOUNTS:]
and password login, so both stamp `last_login_at` (the caller commits). One account per session:
the sign-in replaces whoever was signed in here before."""
request.session["user_id"] = user.id
_remember_epoch(request, user)
stamp_session(request, user)
user.last_login_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
@@ -1135,15 +1111,6 @@ def password_reset_confirm(body: TokenPasswordIn, db: Session = Depends(get_db))
return {"ok": True}
def _remember_epoch(request: Request, user: User) -> None:
"""Record this account's current `session_epoch` in the signed cookie (SA4), so `current_user`
can later reject the cookie if the account's epoch was bumped (password reset/change, or
"log out everywhere"). Per-account so one account's revocation doesn't evict the others."""
epochs = dict(request.session.get("epochs") or {})
epochs[str(user.id)] = user.session_epoch
request.session["epochs"] = epochs
def bump_session_epoch(db: Session, user: User) -> None:
"""Invalidate every EXISTING signed cookie for this account by advancing its epoch (SA4). Cookies
minted before the bump carry a now-stale epoch and are rejected by `current_user`. The account's
@@ -1220,7 +1187,7 @@ def logout_others(
# session at a newer epoch than the DB (see set_password).
bump_session_epoch(db, user)
db.commit()
_remember_epoch(request, user)
stamp_session(request, user)
log.info("Logout-others: uid=%s (epoch=%s)", user.id, user.session_epoch)
return {"ok": True}
@@ -1272,7 +1239,7 @@ def set_password(
# can't leave the cookie at a newer epoch than the DB (which would wrongly 401 THIS session).
bump_session_epoch(db, user)
db.commit()
_remember_epoch(request, user)
stamp_session(request, user)
log.info("Password set/changed: uid=%s", user.id)
return {"ok": True}
+3 -80
View File
@@ -9,11 +9,9 @@ from app.auth import (
count_admins,
count_pending_activations,
current_user,
drop_from_wallet,
google_enabled,
has_read_scope,
has_write_scope,
is_allowed,
optional_current_user,
purge_user,
)
@@ -26,79 +24,10 @@ from app.db import get_db
from app.models import Invite, User
from app.utils import iso
from app.refusal import refused
from app.routes._common import not_found
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/me", tags=["me"])
@router.get("/accounts")
def my_accounts(
request: Request,
user: User = Depends(current_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
) -> list[dict]:
"""The accounts that have authenticated in this browser session (switchable without a
new Google sign-in). The active one is flagged."""
ids = request.session.get("account_ids") or [user.id]
rows = {u.id: u for u in db.execute(select(User).where(User.id.in_(ids))).scalars()}
out = []
for uid in ids: # preserve recency order from the session
u = rows.get(uid)
if u is not None:
out.append(
{
"id": u.id,
"email": u.email,
"display_name": u.display_name,
"avatar_url": u.avatar_url,
"active": u.id == user.id,
}
)
return out
class SwitchAccountIn(BaseModel):
user_id: int
@router.post("/switch")
def switch_account(
body: SwitchAccountIn,
request: Request,
user: User = Depends(current_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
) -> dict:
"""Switch the active account to another one already authenticated in this browser. No
Google round-trip — but only accounts present in the session list (proof they signed in
here) are allowed, and access is re-checked in case the invite was revoked since."""
target = body.user_id
if target not in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []):
raise refused(403, "not_your_account")
# An account `_session_user` would refuse — gone, deactivated, suspended, or its session revoked — is
# refused here too, and dropped from the switch list the way `_session_user` drops it. Made the session
# default instead, the next request's current_user would refuse it as the DEFAULT and clear the whole
# wallet session, logging out every account here. (B-core-9)
u = db.get(User, target)
if u is None:
drop_from_wallet(request.session, target)
raise not_found("account")
if not is_allowed(db, u.email):
raise refused(403, "account_no_access")
if not u.is_active:
drop_from_wallet(request.session, target)
raise refused(403, "account_no_access")
if u.is_suspended:
drop_from_wallet(request.session, target)
raise refused(403, "account_suspended")
# Revoked: a password reset/change or "log out everywhere" bumped the account's epoch.
epochs = request.session.get("epochs") or {}
if int(epochs.get(str(target), 0)) != (u.session_epoch or 0):
drop_from_wallet(request.session, target)
raise refused(403, "account_signed_out")
request.session["user_id"] = target
return {"ok": True, "user_id": target}
@router.get("")
def get_me(
user: User | None = Depends(optional_current_user), db: Session = Depends(get_db)
@@ -187,17 +116,11 @@ def delete_my_account(
surfaces)."""
if user.role == "admin" and count_admins(db) <= 1:
raise refused(400, "only_admin_delete")
user_id = user.id
# Full erasure (cascades) + access-request cleanup + Google-grant revocation; shared with the
# admin delete path. Capture the id first — `user` is detached once purge_user deletes the row.
# admin delete path.
purge_user(db, user, background)
# Drop this account from the browser session; switch to another signed-in account if any.
remaining = [a for a in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != user_id]
if remaining:
request.session["account_ids"] = remaining
request.session["user_id"] = remaining[-1]
else:
request.session.clear()
# The session's one account is gone: so is the session.
request.session.clear()
return {"deleted": True}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from fastapi.responses import FileResponse
from pydantic import BaseModel
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.auth import current_user, resolved_user_id
from app.auth import current_user, session_user_id
from app.db import SessionLocal, get_db
from app.models import User
from app.plex import imgcache, queries, service, subtitles
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ def _require_session(request: Request) -> int:
"""Lightweight auth for the high-fan-out image proxies: validate the signed session cookie WITHOUT
a DB user-load, so these endpoints never hold a pool connection for the auth. Poster images are
low-sensitivity; a valid session is enough."""
uid, _ = resolved_user_id(request)
uid = session_user_id(request)
if not uid:
raise refused(401, "not_authenticated")
return uid
+100 -62
View File
@@ -1,21 +1,25 @@
"""Auth / session security core (TEST-1), DB-lane.
The wallet impersonation gate, epoch-based session revocation, single-use tokens and the
enumeration-safe uniform 401 are the security mag, and had zero tests (only `_oauth_redirect_uri` was
covered). Starlette's SessionMiddleware round-trips the signed cookie under TestClient, so the whole
browser-less flow is exercisable. Uses the real auth stack via the `client` fixture (NO current_user
override) so login, the wallet gate and epoch revoke are the code under test.
One account per browser session, epoch-based session revocation, single-use tokens and the
enumeration-safe uniform 401 are the security mag. Starlette's SessionMiddleware round-trips the
signed cookie under TestClient, so the whole browser-less flow is exercisable. Uses the real auth
stack via the `client` fixture (NO current_user override) so login, the session and epoch revoke are
the code under test.
Note: `/api/me` is the bootstrap probe — it returns 200 `{authenticated: False}` when logged out, not a
401. A revoked session is therefore checked on a PROTECTED endpoint (`/api/feed`), which does 401.
"""
import base64
import json
from datetime import timedelta
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from itsdangerous import TimestampSigner
from app.auth import ACTIVE_ACCOUNT_HEADER
from app.config import settings
from app.main import app
_PW = "correct horse battery"
@@ -46,74 +50,48 @@ def test_wrong_password_and_unknown_email_give_a_byte_identical_401(client, make
assert wrong_pw.json() == unknown.json()
def test_a_non_wallet_account_header_falls_back_to_the_default(client, make_user):
# The X-Siftlode-Account header may only re-target an account already signed into THIS browser
# (in the session wallet). A header naming someone else must be ignored, not honored — otherwise
# it's an impersonation gate hole.
make_user(email="alice2@example.com", password=_PW)
mallory = make_user(email="mallory@example.com", password=_PW)
assert _login(client, "alice2@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
me = client.get("/api/me", headers={ACTIVE_ACCOUNT_HEADER: str(mallory.id)})
assert me.status_code == 200
assert me.json()["email"] == "alice2@example.com" # still Alice, not Mallory
def _cookie(payload: dict) -> str:
"""A session cookie signed the way SessionMiddleware signs one — for a cookie an older build wrote."""
data = base64.b64encode(json.dumps(payload).encode())
return TimestampSigner(str(settings.secret_key)).sign(data).decode()
def test_a_tab_pinned_to_an_account_signed_out_elsewhere_acts_as_nobody(client, make_user):
# Two accounts in one browser: a tab pinned to Alice, Bob the default. Alice signs out in another
# tab. The pinned tab used to go on acting as the default, Bob — its player checkpoints and pref
# saves landed in his account, and its own Sign out signed HIM out.
alice = make_user(email="alice3@example.com", password=_PW)
def test_signing_in_as_another_account_replaces_the_first(client, make_user):
# One account per browser session: a second sign-in is a fresh session, not a second account
# beside the first — so signing out leaves nobody signed in here.
make_user(email="alice3@example.com", password=_PW)
make_user(email="bob3@example.com", password=_PW)
assert _login(client, "alice3@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
assert _login(client, "bob3@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200 # Bob is now the default
tab = {ACTIVE_ACCOUNT_HEADER: str(alice.id)}
assert client.get("/api/feed", headers=tab).status_code == 200
assert client.post("/auth/logout", headers=tab).status_code == 200 # Alice signs out
assert _login(client, "bob3@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
assert client.get("/api/me").json()["email"] == "bob3@example.com"
assert client.get("/api/feed", headers=tab).status_code == 401
assert client.post("/auth/logout", headers=tab).status_code == 200
assert client.get("/api/feed").status_code == 200 # Bob is still signed in, the session intact
# The bootstrap probe still answers as the default: how the stale tab learns who it is now.
assert client.get("/api/me", headers=tab).json()["email"] == "bob3@example.com"
assert client.post("/auth/logout").status_code == 200
assert client.get("/api/feed").status_code == 401
assert client.get("/api/me").json() == {"authenticated": False}
@pytest.mark.parametrize("ended", ["revoked", "suspended"])
def test_a_tab_pinned_to_an_account_whose_session_ended_comes_back_as_the_default(
client, make_user, db, ended
):
# A tab pinned to Alice, Bob the default. Alice's session then ends while she is still in this
# browser's wallet ("log out everywhere" on another device, or an admin suspends her). The tab's
# bootstrap probe used to answer "signed out": the landing page with Bob still signed in, and no way
# off it but closing the tab (signing in as anyone else there kept the tab pinned to Alice).
def test_no_header_or_parameter_picks_another_account(client, make_user):
# Alice signed in here before Bob: nothing a request carries makes it act as her any more.
alice = make_user(email="alice4@example.com", password=_PW)
make_user(email="bob4@example.com", password=_PW)
assert _login(client, "alice4@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
assert _login(client, "bob4@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
tab = {ACTIVE_ACCOUNT_HEADER: str(alice.id)}
assert client.get("/api/feed", headers=tab).status_code == 200
if ended == "revoked":
alice.session_epoch = (alice.session_epoch or 0) + 1
else:
alice.is_suspended = True
db.commit()
me = client.get(f"/api/me?account={alice.id}", headers={"X-Siftlode-Account": str(alice.id)})
assert me.json()["email"] == "bob4@example.com"
assert client.get("/api/me", headers=tab).json()["email"] == "bob4@example.com"
assert client.get("/api/feed", headers=tab).status_code == 401 # still nobody, never Bob
assert client.get("/api/feed").status_code == 200 # Bob's session is intact
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", ["/api/me/accounts", "/api/me/switch"])
def test_there_is_no_account_list_or_switch(client, make_user, path):
make_user(email="alice5@example.com", password=_PW)
assert _login(client, "alice5@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
r = client.get(path) if path.endswith("accounts") else client.post(path, json={"user_id": 1})
assert r.status_code in (404, 405)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("ended", ["revoked", "suspended", "deactivated"])
def test_switching_to_an_account_whose_session_ended_refuses_it_and_drops_it_from_the_list(
client, make_user, db, monkeypatch, ended
):
# The account switcher lists this browser's wallet. A revoked account was dropped from it on a refused
# switch, but a suspended one stayed, refused on every click; a deactivated one was not refused at all —
# made the default, the next request found it inactive and signed every account here out.
monkeypatch.setattr("app.routes.me.is_allowed", lambda _db, _email: True) # both hold an invite
alice = make_user(email="alice5@example.com", password=_PW)
make_user(email="bob5@example.com", password=_PW)
assert _login(client, "alice5@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
assert _login(client, "bob5@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
def test_a_session_whose_account_ended_signs_the_browser_out(client, make_user, db, ended):
alice = make_user(email="alice6@example.com", password=_PW)
assert _login(client, "alice6@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
if ended == "revoked":
alice.session_epoch = (alice.session_epoch or 0) + 1
elif ended == "suspended":
@@ -121,10 +99,70 @@ def test_switching_to_an_account_whose_session_ended_refuses_it_and_drops_it_fro
else:
alice.is_active = False
db.commit()
assert client.get("/api/feed").status_code == 401
assert "user_id" not in _session(client) # the refusal ended the session, not just this request
assert client.get("/api/me").json() == {"authenticated": False}
assert client.post("/api/me/switch", json={"user_id": alice.id}).status_code == 403
assert [a["email"] for a in client.get("/api/me/accounts").json()] == ["bob5@example.com"]
assert client.get("/api/feed").status_code == 200 # Bob is still signed in
def test_a_cookie_from_the_multi_account_build_signs_in_again(client, make_user):
# The old session held a wallet and one epoch per account. It is not read: whoever holds one
# signs in once more.
alice = make_user(email="alice7@example.com", password=_PW)
old = {"user_id": alice.id, "account_ids": [alice.id], "epochs": {str(alice.id): 0}}
client.cookies.set("session", _cookie(old))
assert client.get("/api/feed").status_code == 401
assert client.get("/api/me").json() == {"authenticated": False}
def test_deleting_the_account_signs_the_browser_out(client, make_user):
make_user(email="alice8@example.com", password=_PW)
assert _login(client, "alice8@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
assert client.delete("/api/me/account").status_code == 200
# The cookie names nobody now: the probe answers signed out without looking the account up.
assert "user_id" not in _session(client)
def _session(client) -> dict:
"""The decoded payload of the client's session cookie."""
raw = client.cookies.get("session")
if not raw:
return {}
data = TimestampSigner(str(settings.secret_key)).unsign(raw.encode())
return json.loads(base64.b64decode(data))
@pytest.mark.parametrize("signed_in_as", ["starter", "someone_else"])
def test_a_google_link_lands_only_on_the_account_still_signed_in(db, make_user, signed_in_as):
# The link marker names who started it; a sign-in as someone else before the callback must not
# get that Google identity attached to the account that started it from the other person's session.
from starlette.requests import Request
from app.routes.auth import _complete_link
starter, other = make_user(), make_user()
session = {"user_id": starter.id if signed_in_as == "starter" else other.id}
request = Request({"type": "http", "session": session, "headers": []})
resp = _complete_link(request, db, starter.id, True, "sub-123", {"email": ""}, {"scope": ""})
db.refresh(starter)
if signed_in_as == "starter":
assert resp.headers["location"] == "/?link=ok"
assert starter.google_sub == "sub-123"
else:
assert resp.headers["location"] == "/?link=error"
assert starter.google_sub is None
def test_no_app_code_reads_a_second_account():
# The multi-account machinery is gone; a module reading its session keys or its header again
# would bring back a session that names more than one account.
app_dir = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "app"
hits = [
f"{path.relative_to(app_dir)}: {word}"
for path in app_dir.rglob("*.py")
for word in ("account_ids", '"epochs"', "x-siftlode-account", 'query_params.get("account")')
if word in path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").lower()
]
assert hits == []
def test_logout_others_revokes_the_other_session_but_keeps_the_caller(client, make_user):
+1 -1
View File
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ def _setup(db, make_user, monkeypatch, tmp_path) -> TestClient:
)
db.commit()
monkeypatch.setattr(app_state, "_configured_cache", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(playback, "resolved_user_id", lambda request: (user.id, True))
monkeypatch.setattr(playback, "session_user_id", lambda request: user.id)
monkeypatch.setattr(playback, "PlexClient", _FakePlex)
monkeypatch.setattr(imgcache, "CACHE_DIR", tmp_path)
_FakePlex.calls = []
+1 -1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ def test_a_suspended_account_cannot_drive_the_subtitle_extractor(
monkeypatch.setattr(app_state, "_configured_cache", True)
# A validly SIGNED cookie for that account — which is all the old gate looked at.
for mod in (auth, playback):
monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "resolved_user_id", lambda request: (user.id, True))
monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "session_user_id", lambda request: user.id)
monkeypatch.setattr(subtitles, "CACHE_DIR", tmp_path)
pool = _NoPool()
monkeypatch.setattr(subtitles, "_WIN_POOL", pool)