refactor(auth): one account per browser session
The session held a wallet of up to six accounts, and a request picked one by a header or an ?account= parameter. It now holds one: user_id and its epoch. A sign-in replaces whoever was signed in, sign-out and account deletion end the session, and an account refused mid-session (revoked, suspended, deactivated) clears it. /api/me/accounts and /api/me/switch are gone, and with them their refusal codes and the UI copy for them. A cookie the multi-account build wrote carries no single epoch and is refused: its holder signs in once more. A Google link finishing in a browser now signed in as someone else is refused, as before for an account outside the wallet. A test holds that no app code reads the wallet keys or the account header again.
This commit is contained in:
+19
-52
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ from app import sysconfig
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from app.auth import (
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_YOUTUBE_SCOPES,
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BASE_SCOPES,
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MAX_SESSION_ACCOUNTS,
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PASSWORD_MIN_LEN,
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READ_SCOPES,
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WRITE_SCOPES,
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@@ -37,7 +36,8 @@ from app.auth import (
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is_allowed,
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log,
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operator_contact,
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resolved_user_id,
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session_user_id,
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stamp_session,
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)
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from app.config import settings
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from app.db import SessionLocal, get_db
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@@ -361,13 +361,13 @@ async def callback(
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token = await client.authorize_access_token(request)
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except OAuthError as exc:
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# The user cancelled or denied consent at Google — land back with a friendly notice instead
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# of a raw 400 JSON error page. An already-signed-in user (adding another account via
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# /auth/login, or linking/upgrading via /auth/link|upgrade) never sees the pre-auth login
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# banner, so surface a neutral toast via ?oauth=cancelled; a fresh sign-in cancel lands on
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# the login page with the oauth_cancelled banner instead. Keyed on the live session, not on
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# link_uid, so the add-account path (no marker) is covered too.
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# of a raw 400 JSON error page. An already-signed-in user (signing in again via /auth/login,
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# or linking/upgrading via /auth/link|upgrade) never sees the pre-auth login banner, so
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# surface a neutral toast via ?oauth=cancelled; a fresh sign-in cancel lands on the login page
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# with the oauth_cancelled banner instead. Keyed on the live session, not on link_uid, so a
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# sign-in started while signed in (no marker) is covered too.
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log.info("Google OAuth cancelled/failed: %s", exc.error)
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if request.session.get("user_id") is not None:
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if session_user_id(request) is not None:
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return RedirectResponse(url="/?oauth=cancelled")
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return RedirectResponse(url="/?login=oauth_cancelled")
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@@ -584,12 +584,9 @@ def _complete_link(
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Google identity owned by another account, or to silently swap a different linked identity.
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`explicit` (the popped oauth_link_explicit marker) distinguishes a "Connect Google" click from
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a YouTube upgrade — the caller pops it up front so an aborted flow leaves nothing behind."""
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# SEC-11: the marker must name an account signed into THIS browser — the session default OR any
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# account in the wallet — not only the default. A tab acting as a secondary account links Google to
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# ITSELF (the marker was set from current_user, which resolves the ?account= it navigated with), so
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# accepting wallet membership stops the identity/token landing on the default account A instead of B.
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accounts = request.session.get("account_ids") or []
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if link_uid != request.session.get("user_id") and link_uid not in accounts:
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# The marker must name the account still signed into THIS browser: a sign-in as someone else
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# between the start and the callback replaced it, and the identity must not land on the newcomer.
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if link_uid != session_user_id(request):
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return RedirectResponse(url="/?link=error")
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user = db.get(User, link_uid)
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if user is None:
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@@ -619,38 +616,17 @@ def _complete_link(
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@router.post("/logout")
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async def logout(request: Request):
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"""Sign the requesting tab's active account out of this browser (removing it from the wallet).
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Per-tab aware: the account is taken from the X-Siftlode-Account header when present, so logging
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out in one tab doesn't disturb another tab running a different account. If the account being
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removed was the session default, promote the most recent remaining account (or clear the
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session when none remain)."""
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# A tab still pinned to an account already signed out in another tab resolves to nobody, so it
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# signs nobody out — it used to fall back to the default and sign THAT account out in its place.
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active, is_default = resolved_user_id(request)
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remaining = [a for a in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != active]
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request.session["account_ids"] = remaining
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if is_default:
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if remaining:
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request.session["user_id"] = remaining[-1]
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return JSONResponse({"ok": True, "switched": True})
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request.session.clear()
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return JSONResponse({"ok": True, "switched": False})
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# A non-default (per-tab) account signed out: it's gone from the wallet and the session default
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# is untouched. The tab drops its own override and falls back to the default on reload.
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return JSONResponse({"ok": True, "switched": False})
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"""Sign this browser out: the session holds one account, and it ends."""
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request.session.clear()
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return JSONResponse({"ok": True})
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def _establish_session(request: Request, user: User) -> None:
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"""Sign `user` in for this browser session — the ONE sign-in path, shared by the Google callback
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and password login, so both join the same account switcher and both stamp `last_login_at` (the
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caller commits). Multi-session: every account that authenticated in this browser is remembered so
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the user can switch between them; only accounts that actually proved themselves HERE land in that
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wallet (it is the proof they may be switched to)."""
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accounts = [a for a in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != user.id]
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accounts.append(user.id)
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request.session["account_ids"] = accounts[-MAX_SESSION_ACCOUNTS:]
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and password login, so both stamp `last_login_at` (the caller commits). One account per session:
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the sign-in replaces whoever was signed in here before."""
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request.session["user_id"] = user.id
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_remember_epoch(request, user)
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stamp_session(request, user)
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user.last_login_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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@@ -1135,15 +1111,6 @@ def password_reset_confirm(body: TokenPasswordIn, db: Session = Depends(get_db))
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return {"ok": True}
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def _remember_epoch(request: Request, user: User) -> None:
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"""Record this account's current `session_epoch` in the signed cookie (SA4), so `current_user`
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can later reject the cookie if the account's epoch was bumped (password reset/change, or
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"log out everywhere"). Per-account so one account's revocation doesn't evict the others."""
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epochs = dict(request.session.get("epochs") or {})
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epochs[str(user.id)] = user.session_epoch
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request.session["epochs"] = epochs
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def bump_session_epoch(db: Session, user: User) -> None:
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"""Invalidate every EXISTING signed cookie for this account by advancing its epoch (SA4). Cookies
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minted before the bump carry a now-stale epoch and are rejected by `current_user`. The account's
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@@ -1220,7 +1187,7 @@ def logout_others(
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# session at a newer epoch than the DB (see set_password).
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bump_session_epoch(db, user)
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db.commit()
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_remember_epoch(request, user)
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stamp_session(request, user)
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log.info("Logout-others: uid=%s (epoch=%s)", user.id, user.session_epoch)
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return {"ok": True}
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@@ -1272,7 +1239,7 @@ def set_password(
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# can't leave the cookie at a newer epoch than the DB (which would wrongly 401 THIS session).
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bump_session_epoch(db, user)
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db.commit()
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_remember_epoch(request, user)
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stamp_session(request, user)
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log.info("Password set/changed: uid=%s", user.id)
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return {"ok": True}
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