fix(files): ending every session ends every API token, and the share links hold their folder

- A password reset or change, "log out everywhere" and a revoked untrusted password revoke all of the
  account's API tokens too (audited): one minted from a stolen session no longer outlives the answer.
- A bearer token or link grant with a non-ASCII character is refused (401/403), not a 500.
- Making a token's grants or a folder link holds the folder, so a racing delete cannot fail the
  foreign key; a link's view count is one atomic UPDATE.
- A folder link's card counts exactly the files its page lists (one `links.folder_files`).
- A file with no extension is served without a trailing dot.
- 0106's downgrade names a Hub folder so it never collides with one of the user's folders.
- The speed baseline reads share tokens through the app (the database keeps them hashed/encrypted).
- Tests: the token scope on the real session stack, the folder poster, the Hub refused for a link,
  0106's downgrade data step, 0107 without a key; docs/comments follow (three folder kinds, folder
  links, key change, the cleanup job's token warnings).
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-15 04:58:16 +02:00
parent 86712b6b0e
commit 827df7494c
23 changed files with 399 additions and 96 deletions
+39 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
"""Public "share by link" helpers for the download center.
A DownloadLink is a capability URL: the unguessable token grants anyone read access to one
download's file on the login-free `/watch/{token}` page. So the token is never stored as written:
download's file, or to the files in one of its owner's own folders (`folder_files`), on the
login-free `/watch/{token}` page. So the token is never stored as written:
the link is found by its SHA-256, and the owner's copy is Fernet-encrypted — a database copy alone
opens nothing. Without that copy (no TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or a key since changed) the link still
opens; only its address cannot be shown again, and the owner makes a new link to share.
@@ -21,9 +22,14 @@ from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app import security
from app.config import settings
from app.models import DownloadLink
from app.downloads import storage
from app.downloads.status import JobStatus
from app.models import DownloadJob, DownloadLink, FileFolder, MediaAsset
_GRANT_TTL = 6 * 3600 # a watch session's grant is good for 6h, then the viewer re-unlocks
# The most files a folder link lists: as many as the owner's own Files list shows (`routes.files.
# MAX_LIST`; a test holds the two equal — this layer may not import that one).
FOLDER_MAX = 500
def new_token() -> str:
@@ -48,6 +54,34 @@ def recover(link: DownloadLink) -> str | None:
return security.decrypt_optional(link.token_enc)
def in_folder(folder: FileFolder) -> tuple:
"""Which jobs a link to `folder` reaches: the done files in it NOW, the folder owner's. A file
moved out stops opening through the link at its next request; one moved in starts."""
return (
DownloadJob.folder_id == folder.id,
DownloadJob.user_id == folder.user_id,
DownloadJob.status == JobStatus.DONE,
)
def folder_files(db: Session, folder: FileFolder) -> list[tuple[DownloadJob, MediaAsset]]:
"""What a link to `folder` shows — its page lists exactly these, and its link card counts them:
each file `in_folder` whose asset is ready and whose bytes are on disk (so the list never offers
a dead row), newest first, at most `FOLDER_MAX`."""
rows = db.execute(
select(DownloadJob, MediaAsset)
.join(MediaAsset, MediaAsset.id == DownloadJob.asset_id)
.where(*in_folder(folder), MediaAsset.status == "ready")
.order_by(DownloadJob.ready_at.desc().nulls_last(), DownloadJob.id.desc())
.limit(FOLDER_MAX)
).all()
return [
(job, asset)
for job, asset in rows
if storage.safe_abs_path(settings.files_root, asset.rel_path) is not None
]
def is_expired(link: DownloadLink) -> bool:
return link.expires_at is not None and link.expires_at <= datetime.now(timezone.utc)
@@ -81,7 +115,9 @@ def check_grant(token: str, grant: str | None, password_version: int) -> bool:
return False
if exp < datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp():
return False
return hmac.compare_digest(sig, _sign(f"{token}.{exp}.{password_version}"))
# As bytes: compare_digest refuses (TypeError, a 500) a str with anything non-ASCII in it, and
# `sig` is whatever the URL carried.
return hmac.compare_digest(sig.encode(), _sign(f"{token}.{exp}.{password_version}").encode())
# --- serialization -------------------------------------------------------------------------