fix(downloads): Retry and Re-download take a cookie added after the failure

The login-wall copy tells the user to add their cookies and press Retry, but
Retry kept the job on the shared asset the worker never attaches a cookie to,
so it failed on the same wall. Resume now moves a pending/errored job onto the
asset enqueue would pick with the cookie (never off a file or a download in
flight).

Re-download salted its fresh asset with the job's previous asset id, which the
cookie gate cannot recompute, so even a cookie download rebuilt without the
cookie. The rebuild salt is now the new asset's own id (plus the user's cookie
salt when one applies), and is_authed_asset recognises it.

backend/app/downloads/credentials.py

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
 """Per-user, per-host download cookies — the single source of truth for "does the acting user's
 cookie apply to this download, and how does that keep the result private".
 
-Two call sites depend on ONE consistent answer (house rule: an invariant lives in shared code, not
+Two sides depend on ONE consistent answer (house rule: an invariant lives in shared code, not
 in prose):
   * `enqueue` salts the MediaAsset cache signature with the user id WHEN a cookie applies, so the
-    authed download becomes a PRIVATE asset that is never cache-served to another user.
+    authed download becomes a PRIVATE asset that is never cache-served to another user. Retry
+    (`service.resume`) and Re-download (`service.redownload`) ask the same question again, so a
+    cookie the user added after a failure goes with the next attempt.
   * the worker attaches the cookie file to yt-dlp ONLY when a cookie still applies AND the asset it
     is downloading into is that private, salted identity — so a cookie can never poison a shared
     asset (the load-bearing cross-user privacy fix).
@@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
 
 from app.downloads import formats
 from app.downloads.adapters import _host_is
-from app.models import DownloadCredential
+from app.models import DownloadCredential, MediaAsset
 from app.security import decrypt_optional, encrypt
 
 log = logging.getLogger("siftlode.downloads.credentials")
@@ -104,12 +106,27 @@ def authed_format_sig(spec: dict, user_id: int, host_key: str) -> str:
     return formats.format_sig(spec, salt=cookie_salt(user_id, host_key))
 
 
-def is_authed_asset(asset_format_sig: str, spec: dict, user_id: int, url: str | None) -> bool:
+def rebuild_salt(asset_id: int, cookie: str | None) -> str:
+    """The salt of a Re-download's fresh asset: its OWN row id (so every rebuild is a new identity no
+    enqueue can ever compute), prefixed with the user's `cookie_salt` when a cookie applies. The id is
+    what makes it recognisable — the worker has the asset row, so `is_authed_asset` can recompute this
+    one, where a salt built from the job's previous asset id could not be."""
+    return f"{cookie}:rebuild:{asset_id}" if cookie else f"rebuild:{asset_id}"
+
+
+def is_authed_asset(asset: MediaAsset, spec: dict, user_id: int, url: str | None) -> bool:
     """Whether an asset is `user_id`'s private, cookie-salted identity for `url`'s host — the one
-    kind of asset a cookie is ever attached to. The worker's cookie gate asks it before a download,
+    kind of asset a cookie is ever attached to: the one enqueue creates (`authed_format_sig`), or a
+    Re-download's rebuild of it (`rebuild_salt`). The worker's cookie gate asks it before a download,
     and the failure diagnosis asks it after one (a failure on this asset happened WITH the cookie)."""
     host_key = host_key_for_url(url)
-    return host_key is not None and asset_format_sig == authed_format_sig(spec, user_id, host_key)
+    if host_key is None:
+        return False
+    if asset.format_sig == authed_format_sig(spec, user_id, host_key):
+        return True
+    return asset.id is not None and asset.format_sig == formats.format_sig(
+        spec, salt=rebuild_salt(asset.id, cookie_salt(user_id, host_key))
+    )
 
 
 def salt_for_enqueue(db: Session, user_id: int, url: str | None) -> str | None:
@@ -211,7 +228,7 @@ def resolve_cookiefile(
     db: Session,
     user_id: int,
     url: str | None,
-    asset_format_sig: str,
+    asset: MediaAsset,
     spec: dict,
     staging: Path,
 ) -> Path | None:
@@ -220,7 +237,7 @@ def resolve_cookiefile(
     The double gate that prevents cross-user leakage:
       1. a credential must still exist for `url`'s host (host-scoped via `host_key_for_url`), AND
       2. the asset being downloaded into must BE this user's private, salted identity
-         (`asset_format_sig == authed_format_sig(...)`).
+         (`is_authed_asset`).
 
     If (2) fails the asset is the SHARED (unsalted) one — attaching the cookie would poison the
     global cache with a private-group video, so we attach nothing. An unreadable blob (rotated key →
@@ -232,7 +249,7 @@ def resolve_cookiefile(
     cred = get_credential(db, user_id, host_key)
     if cred is None:
         return None
-    if not is_authed_asset(asset_format_sig, spec, user_id, url):
+    if not is_authed_asset(asset, spec, user_id, url):
         return None  # shared asset — never attach a cookie to a non-private identity
     raw = decrypt_optional(cred.cookies_enc)
     if not raw: