fix(security): round 2 — the SEC-20 fix had four defects of its own

A second review round over the first round's fixes, which is where the remaining
real bugs usually are. All four are the same failure as the round it reviewed: a
claim stated in a comment that the code does not hold.

The middleware moved inside CORS, but the setup gate is registered LATER and is
therefore OUTSIDE it — so the comment's "the setup gate never runs for a body that
is already too large" was false the moment it was written. On an unconfigured
instance that gate opens a DB session per request, which is exactly the anonymous
pre-auth work SEC-20 exists to remove. The cap now sits between them, and the
order is asserted against `app.user_middleware` rather than described: prose about
a stack that `add_middleware` builds inside-out is how this got backwards.

The edge ceiling and the route's own cap were pinned EQUAL, but they measure
different things — the edge counts raw body bytes, the route counts the decoded
file. A file of exactly the advertised maximum was refused one layer before the
route that would have taken it. The edge now allows for the multipart envelope,
and the test asserts the relation and the gap instead of equality.

`sysconfig`'s new `max` was enforced on write only. That bound did not exist
before this epic, so a value that was legal when it was written can be sitting in
the database — served unclamped it produces exactly the drift the comment says is
impossible, with the admin page showing a number outside its own range. Int
overrides are clamped on read now, which also survives an env default being
lowered later.

And `DOWNLOAD_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=0` meant "no per-file cap" to the route but a hard
zero to the edge: every upload refused, including the admin page's own way back,
recoverable only by editing env and restarting. The setting takes `ge=1`.

Two test gaps from the same round: the header assertion that is the ONLY check of
the middleware's position was DB-gated and skipped on a host without Postgres, and
the headroom "ratio" the docblock calls load-bearing was held as `<=`, i.e. no
ratio at all. Both fixed, plus a sweep that every `capped_body` call site in the
routers is known and fits under its ceiling — the point of that list is the third
entry, not the two that exist today.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-21 23:59:45 +02:00
parent 378b7559e4
commit aa51644f5f
6 changed files with 164 additions and 48 deletions
+13 -4
View File
@@ -64,11 +64,20 @@ DEFAULT_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
# A route belongs here ONLY IF ITS OWN CAP IS LARGER THAN THE DEFAULT. That is why
# `POST /api/diagnostics/events` is absent: its `capped_body` limit is 512 KiB, already below the
# default, so listing it could only widen what it accepts.
# What a multipart envelope costs on top of the file itself: the boundary lines, the part headers
# and the sibling `display_name` field. The edge counts RAW BODY bytes while the upload route counts
# the DECODED file, so without this allowance a file of exactly the configured maximum — the number
# the admin page advertises, and the first thing anyone testing the limit reaches for — is refused
# one layer before the route that would have accepted it. Generous on purpose: its job is to keep
# the two layers from disagreeing at the boundary, not to be a second limit.
MULTIPART_ENVELOPE_ALLOWANCE = 64 * 1024
ROUTE_MAX_BODY_BYTES: dict[tuple[str, str], int] = {
# Ingesting a local video file. `sysconfig`'s `download_upload_max_bytes` is bounded by this
# same setting (see sysconfig.SPECS), so the admin knob can never ask for more than the edge
# will pass — the two numbers cannot drift into refusing a legitimate upload.
("POST", "/api/downloads/upload"): settings.download_upload_max_bytes,
# Ingesting a local video file. `sysconfig`'s `download_upload_max_bytes` is bounded so it can
# never exceed this (see sysconfig.SPECS), which is what stops an admin from raising the route's
# own cap past the edge and collecting 413s from a layer the admin page never mentions.
("POST", "/api/downloads/upload"): settings.download_upload_max_bytes
+ MULTIPART_ENVELOPE_ALLOWANCE,
("POST", "/api/debug-sessions/{sid}/screenshots"): debugsession.SCREENSHOT_MAX_BYTES,
}