feat(downloads): per-user, per-host yt-dlp cookie/auth support (S6)

Each user stores their own login cookies (Netscape cookies.txt) for an
auth-walled download host (Facebook, Instagram, X, TikTok, Reddit) in
Settings; a download of an auth-walled link on that host is retried with
the acting user's cookie.

Two load-bearing security controls, both in downloads.credentials as the
single source of truth so enqueue and the worker can't drift:
- cache privacy: a cookie-authed download salts its MediaAsset format_sig
  with the user id, so the authed asset is private and never cache-served
  to another user. The worker attaches a cookie ONLY when the asset it is
  downloading into IS that private, salted identity.
- host scope (SEC-12): a cookie is resolved only for a URL whose netloc
  the credential owns (netloc-scoped _host_is); a look-alike/unrelated
  host gets none.

cookies_enc is Fernet-encrypted at rest, only decrypted in-worker into a
0600 file under staging/.auth/ (survives the retry wipe + _produced_file
scan) and unlinked in finally. The blob is never returned by a route,
logged, audited, or written to a job's error/snapshot. cookiefile is set
after the adapter's extra merge so an adapter can't clobber it. Settings
UI is write-only (host + set/updated only, never echoed). New
download_credentials table + migration 0074; per-user routes; HU+EN i18n.

Tests: host-scope, cache-privacy (no cross-user serve), encrypt-at-rest,
write-only API, worker attach-gate; FE dom test for the write-only field.

backend/app/audit.py

@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ class AuditAction:
     SYNC_RESUME = "sync_resume"
     # Scheduler job outcome / run-summary (actor_id set = a manual "run now"; NULL = automatic)
     JOB_RUN = "job_run"
+    # Per-user download cookie/auth credential set or removed (the value is NEVER recorded)
+    DOWNLOAD_CREDENTIAL_SET = "download_credential_set"
+    DOWNLOAD_CREDENTIAL_DELETE = "download_credential_delete"
     # The log itself was cleared (a single row survives the clear as tamper-evidence)
     AUDIT_CLEAR = "audit_clear"
 

backend/app/downloads/credentials.py

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+"""Per-user, per-host download cookies — the single source of truth for "does the acting user's
+cookie apply to this download, and how does that keep the result private".
+
+Two call sites depend on ONE consistent answer (house rule: an invariant lives in shared code, not
+in prose):
+  * `enqueue` salts the MediaAsset cache signature with the user id WHEN a cookie applies, so the
+    authed download becomes a PRIVATE asset that is never cache-served to another user.
+  * the worker attaches the cookie file to yt-dlp ONLY when a cookie still applies AND the asset it
+    is downloading into is that private, salted identity — so a cookie can never poison a shared
+    asset (the load-bearing cross-user privacy fix).
+
+Both go through `cookie_salt` / `authed_format_sig` / `host_key_for_url` here, so they can't drift.
+
+Security controls enforced here:
+  * **host scope (SEC-12)** — `host_key_for_url` matches the download URL's netloc against a curated
+    registry via the netloc-scoped `_host_is`, so a cookie is only ever offered to the exact site it
+    belongs to; an arbitrary `?url=` (or a look-alike host) resolves to no host_key and gets no
+    cookie.
+  * **secret handling** — cookies are Fernet-encrypted at rest; the blob is only ever decrypted
+    in-worker into a 0600 file that is unlinked in a `finally`, and is never returned by a route,
+    logged, or written to a job's error/snapshot.
+"""
+
+import logging
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
+
+from app.downloads import formats
+from app.downloads.adapters import _host_is
+from app.models import DownloadCredential
+from app.security import decrypt_optional, encrypt
+
+log = logging.getLogger("siftlode.downloads.credentials")
+
+
+class HostSpec:
+    """A supported cookie host: a short canonical `key` (stored on the credential + folded into the
+    cache salt), a human `label` for the UI, and the netloc `domains` it matches."""
+
+    __slots__ = ("key", "label", "domains")
+
+    def __init__(self, key: str, label: str, domains: tuple[str, ...]):
+        self.key = key
+        self.label = label
+        self.domains = domains
+
+
+# Curated registry (user's call: seed the common auth-walled hosts now). One `key` can cover several
+# domains of the same site. Add a host by adding a row — the FE dropdown, host-scope guard, and salt
+# all derive from this, so there is nothing else to wire up.
+SUPPORTED_HOSTS: tuple[HostSpec, ...] = (
+    HostSpec("facebook", "Facebook", ("facebook.com", "fb.watch")),
+    HostSpec("instagram", "Instagram", ("instagram.com",)),
+    HostSpec("twitter", "X (Twitter)", ("twitter.com", "x.com")),
+    HostSpec("tiktok", "TikTok", ("tiktok.com",)),
+    HostSpec("reddit", "Reddit", ("reddit.com",)),
+)
+
+_BY_KEY: dict[str, HostSpec] = {h.key: h for h in SUPPORTED_HOSTS}
+
+
+def is_supported_host(host_key: str) -> bool:
+    return host_key in _BY_KEY
+
+
+def host_label(host_key: str) -> str:
+    spec = _BY_KEY.get(host_key)
+    return spec.label if spec else host_key
+
+
+def host_key_for_url(url: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """The supported host_key whose domains own `url`'s netloc, or None. Netloc-scoped (via
+    `_host_is`), so a look-alike host ('myfacebook.com', 'facebook.com.evil') never matches. When
+    several specs could match, the most-specific (longest matched domain) wins so the result is
+    deterministic across the enqueue and worker call sites."""
+    if not url:
+        return None
+    from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+    host = urlparse(url).netloc.lower()
+    if not host:
+        return None
+    best_key: str | None = None
+    best_len = -1
+    for spec in SUPPORTED_HOSTS:
+        for dom in spec.domains:
+            if _host_is(host, dom) and len(dom) > best_len:
+                best_key, best_len = spec.key, len(dom)
+    return best_key
+
+
+def cookie_salt(user_id: int, host_key: str) -> str:
+    """The cache-signature salt for a cookie-authed download. Keyed by user id + host so the authed
+    asset is private to that user (never dedup-shared) and stable across that user's own re-adds."""
+    return f"cookie:{user_id}:{host_key}"
+
+
+def authed_format_sig(spec: dict, user_id: int, host_key: str) -> str:
+    """The salted `format_sig` an authed download for (user, host) resolves to — the private asset
+    identity. Both enqueue (to create it) and the worker (to recognise it) compute it HERE."""
+    return formats.format_sig(spec, salt=cookie_salt(user_id, host_key))
+
+
+def salt_for_enqueue(db: Session, user_id: int, url: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """At enqueue: the cache salt to apply if this user has a cookie for `url`'s host, else None (a
+    normal shared download). Returns the salt string so the caller passes it straight to
+    `format_sig(spec, salt=...)`."""
+    host_key = host_key_for_url(url)
+    if host_key is None:
+        return None
+    if get_credential(db, user_id, host_key) is None:
+        return None
+    return cookie_salt(user_id, host_key)
+
+
+# --- storage (CRUD) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def get_credential(db: Session, user_id: int, host_key: str) -> DownloadCredential | None:
+    return db.execute(
+        select(DownloadCredential).where(
+            DownloadCredential.user_id == user_id, DownloadCredential.host_key == host_key
+        )
+    ).scalar_one_or_none()
+
+
+class InvalidCookies(ValueError):
+    """The pasted cookies aren't a usable Netscape cookies.txt — surfaced as a 400 by the route."""
+
+
+def validate_cookies(raw: str) -> str:
+    """Sanity-check a pasted cookies.txt (Netscape format) and return the cleaned text. yt-dlp reads
+    the Netscape format: comment/`#` lines plus TAB-separated cookie lines (domain, flag, path,
+    secure, expiry, name, value). We don't fully parse — just reject obvious non-cookie paste (empty,
+    or no tab-separated data line) so a mistaken paste fails HERE with a clear message rather than
+    silently producing a cookie file yt-dlp ignores."""
+    text = (raw or "").strip()
+    if not text:
+        raise InvalidCookies("empty")
+    has_data_line = any(
+        line.strip() and not line.lstrip().startswith("#") and "\t" in line
+        for line in text.splitlines()
+    )
+    if not has_data_line:
+        raise InvalidCookies("format")
+    # Netscape cookie files must end with a newline for some parsers; normalise.
+    return text if text.endswith("\n") else text + "\n"
+
+
+def upsert_credential(db: Session, user_id: int, host_key: str, raw: str) -> DownloadCredential:
+    """Create or replace this user's cookie blob for `host_key`. Caller has validated host_key is
+    supported and `raw` via `validate_cookies`. Does NOT commit (the route commits with the audit
+    row so the trail can't drift). The blob is encrypted here; the plaintext never leaves this call."""
+    cred = get_credential(db, user_id, host_key)
+    enc = encrypt(raw)
+    if cred is None:
+        cred = DownloadCredential(user_id=user_id, host_key=host_key, cookies_enc=enc)
+        db.add(cred)
+    else:
+        cred.cookies_enc = enc
+    return cred
+
+
+def delete_credential(db: Session, user_id: int, host_key: str) -> bool:
+    """Delete this user's cookie for `host_key`. Returns whether a row existed. Does NOT commit."""
+    cred = get_credential(db, user_id, host_key)
+    if cred is None:
+        return False
+    db.delete(cred)
+    return True
+
+
+def status_list(db: Session, user_id: int) -> list[dict]:
+    """The supported hosts with this user's configured/updated state — the write-only Settings view.
+    Never includes the blob."""
+    have = {
+        c.host_key: c
+        for c in db.execute(
+            select(DownloadCredential).where(DownloadCredential.user_id == user_id)
+        ).scalars()
+    }
+    out = []
+    for spec in SUPPORTED_HOSTS:
+        cred = have.get(spec.key)
+        out.append(
+            {
+                "host_key": spec.key,
+                "label": spec.label,
+                "configured": cred is not None,
+                "updated_at": cred.updated_at.isoformat() if cred is not None else None,
+            }
+        )
+    return out
+
+
+# --- worker: resolve + write the cookie file --------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def resolve_cookiefile(
+    db: Session,
+    user_id: int,
+    url: str | None,
+    asset_format_sig: str,
+    spec: dict,
+    staging: Path,
+) -> Path | None:
+    """In the worker child: the cookies.txt to hand yt-dlp for this download, or None.
+
+    The double gate that prevents cross-user leakage:
+      1. a credential must still exist for `url`'s host (host-scoped via `host_key_for_url`), AND
+      2. the asset being downloaded into must BE this user's private, salted identity
+         (`asset_format_sig == authed_format_sig(...)`).
+
+    If (2) fails the asset is the SHARED (unsalted) one — attaching the cookie would poison the
+    global cache with a private-group video, so we attach nothing. An unreadable blob (rotated key →
+    InvalidToken) also yields None; the download then fails honestly on the login wall (S3's
+    `login_required`)."""
+    host_key = host_key_for_url(url)
+    if host_key is None:
+        return None
+    cred = get_credential(db, user_id, host_key)
+    if cred is None:
+        return None
+    if asset_format_sig != authed_format_sig(spec, user_id, host_key):
+        return None  # shared asset — never attach a cookie to a non-private identity
+    raw = decrypt_optional(cred.cookies_enc)
+    if not raw:
+        log.warning(
+            "download cookie for user %s host %s could not be decrypted (rotated key?) — "
+            "proceeding without it",
+            user_id,
+            host_key,
+        )
+        return None
+    return _write_cookiefile(raw, staging)
+
+
+def _write_cookiefile(raw: str, staging: Path) -> Path:
+    """Write the cookie blob to a private 0600 file under `staging/.auth/` and return its path.
+
+    Deliberately NOT in the staging root: the download retry loop unlinks every file it finds there,
+    and `_produced_file` picks the largest file there as the output — either would corrupt a
+    cookies.txt in the root. A `.auth` SUBDIR survives both (they skip directories) and is still
+    removed by the parent worker's staging cleanup on a hard kill. The caller unlinks it in a
+    `finally` on the normal/exception paths."""
+    auth_dir = staging / ".auth"
+    auth_dir.mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
+    path = auth_dir / "cookies.txt"
+    # Open with 0600 from the start (don't create world-readable then chmod).
+    fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
+    try:
+        os.write(fd, raw.encode("utf-8"))
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+    return path

backend/app/downloads/formats.py

@@ -98,12 +98,17 @@ def build_ydl_opts(
     outtmpl: str,
     progress_hook,
     extra: dict | None = None,
+    cookiefile: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
     """Assemble yt-dlp options for a single download to `outtmpl` (a full path template).
 
     `extra` is source-specific options contributed by the SourceAdapter (e.g. YouTube's
     `extractor_args` with the player-client set + bgutil PO-token base_url); it is merged onto the
-    generic options below. Everything here is source-agnostic."""
+    generic options below. Everything here is source-agnostic.
+
+    `cookiefile` is the acting user's per-host cookies.txt path (S6), attached ONLY by the worker
+    after the host-scope + private-asset gate in `downloads.credentials`. It is set AFTER the `extra`
+    merge so a source adapter can never clobber it."""
     s = normalize(spec)
     h = s["max_height"]
     opts: dict = {
@@ -132,6 +137,11 @@ def build_ydl_opts(
     if extra:
         opts.update(extra)
 
+    # The acting user's per-host cookie (S6). AFTER the adapter merge on purpose: an adapter must not
+    # be able to override the authenticated session the worker resolved for this specific user.
+    if cookiefile:
+        opts["cookiefile"] = cookiefile
+
     if s["mode"] == "a":
         opts["format"] = "bestaudio/best"
         opts["postprocessors"].append(

backend/app/downloads/pipeline.py

@@ -8,13 +8,14 @@ from datetime import date, datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
 
 import yt_dlp
+from sqlalchemy import select
 
 from app import sysconfig
 from app.config import settings
 from app.db import SessionLocal
 from app.downloads import edit as editmod
 from app.downloads import errors as dlerrors
-from app.downloads import adapters, formats, service, storage
+from app.downloads import adapters, credentials, formats, service, storage
 from app.downloads.jobdb import (
     _edit_staging_dir,
     _job_status,
@@ -304,10 +305,13 @@ def _media_info(info: dict) -> dict:
     return {**info, **chosen}
 
 
-def _extract_with_fallback(job_id, asset_id, url, spec, staging, adapter):
+def _extract_with_fallback(job_id, asset_id, url, spec, staging, adapter, cookiefile=None):
     """Download via yt-dlp using the source `adapter`'s client sets + options. For YouTube the adapter
     supplies the primary player-client set then a POT-backed fallback (retried on a bot/DRM/format
-    error); other sources make a single attempt. Returns the info dict of the successful attempt."""
+    error); other sources make a single attempt. Returns the info dict of the successful attempt.
+
+    `cookiefile` (S6) is the acting user's per-host cookies.txt, already gated by
+    `credentials.resolve_cookiefile`; passed to every attempt so the fallback stays authenticated."""
     client_sets = adapter.client_sets()
     outtmpl = str(staging / "%(id)s.%(ext)s")
     last_exc: Exception | None = None
@@ -317,6 +321,7 @@ def _extract_with_fallback(job_id, asset_id, url, spec, staging, adapter):
             outtmpl,
             _make_progress_hook(job_id, asset_id),
             extra=adapter.ydl_opts_extra(clients),
+            cookiefile=cookiefile,
         )
         opts["postprocessor_hooks"] = [_make_pp_hook(job_id)]
         _touch_job(job_id)  # stall-watchdog heartbeat: extraction writes no progress, so a slow /
@@ -397,8 +402,11 @@ def _ensure_browser_playable(job_id: int, produced: Path, spec: dict, info: dict
     return dest
 
 
-def _download(job_id: int, asset_id: int, source_kind: str, source_ref: str, spec: dict) -> None:
+def _download(
+    job_id: int, asset_id: int, source_kind: str, source_ref: str, spec: dict, user_id: int
+) -> None:
     staging = _staging_dir(asset_id)
+    cookiefile: Path | None = None
     try:
         if staging.exists():
             shutil.rmtree(staging, ignore_errors=True)
@@ -407,7 +415,27 @@ def _download(job_id: int, asset_id: int, source_kind: str, source_ref: str, spe
         _set_job(job_id, phase="downloading", progress=0)
         adapter = adapters.resolve_adapter(source_kind, source_ref)
         url = service.source_url(source_kind, source_ref)
-        info = _media_info(_extract_with_fallback(job_id, asset_id, url, spec, staging, adapter))
+        # S6: attach the acting user's per-host cookie ONLY when it's host-scoped to this URL AND
+        # this asset is that user's private, salted identity (the double gate lives in credentials).
+        with SessionLocal() as cdb:
+            asset_sig = cdb.execute(
+                select(MediaAsset.format_sig).where(MediaAsset.id == asset_id)
+            ).scalar_one_or_none()
+            if asset_sig is not None:
+                cookiefile = credentials.resolve_cookiefile(
+                    cdb, user_id, url, asset_sig, spec, staging
+                )
+        info = _media_info(
+            _extract_with_fallback(
+                job_id,
+                asset_id,
+                url,
+                spec,
+                staging,
+                adapter,
+                cookiefile=str(cookiefile) if cookiefile else None,
+            )
+        )
         # Re-resolve now that yt-dlp's info reveals the true source (a bare/redirected url only
         # identifies post-extraction) so the .nfo uniqueid type + uploader_url agree on one source.
         adapter = adapters.resolve_adapter(source_kind, source_ref, info)
@@ -517,6 +545,10 @@ def _download(job_id: int, asset_id: int, source_kind: str, source_ref: str, spe
             db.commit()
         log.warning("job %s failed: %s", job_id, msg)
     finally:
+        # Unlink the decrypted cookie file explicitly (the rmtree below removes the whole staging
+        # tree too, but never leave a plaintext session cookie on disk a moment longer than needed).
+        if cookiefile is not None:
+            cookiefile.unlink(missing_ok=True)
         shutil.rmtree(staging, ignore_errors=True)
 
 

backend/app/downloads/runner.py

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ def main() -> None:
         job_kind = job.job_kind
         spec = dict(job.profile_snapshot or {})
         source_kind, source_ref = job.source_kind, job.source_ref
+        user_id = job.user_id
     if asset_id is None:
         return
 
@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ def main() -> None:
     if job_kind == "edit":
         _process_edit(job_id, asset_id)
     else:
-        _download(job_id, asset_id, source_kind, source_ref, spec)
+        _download(job_id, asset_id, source_kind, source_ref, spec, user_id)
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

backend/app/downloads/service.py

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
 
 from app.config import settings
 from app.downloads import adapters
+from app.downloads import credentials
 from app.downloads import edit as editmod
 from app.downloads import formats, quota, storage
 from app.downloads.status import HOLDING, JobStatus
@@ -155,7 +156,12 @@ def enqueue(
     Raises quota.QuotaExceeded if the user is at their job-count or footprint cap."""
     quota.check_enqueue(db, user_id)
     spec = formats.normalize(spec)
-    sig = formats.format_sig(spec)
+    # If this user has a stored cookie for the download's host, salt the cache signature with their
+    # id so the cookie-authed result is a PRIVATE asset — never dedup-shared with, or cache-served
+    # to, another user (the load-bearing privacy fix; the worker attaches the cookie to exactly this
+    # salted identity). A normal download (no matching cookie) gets salt=None and shares as before.
+    salt = credentials.salt_for_enqueue(db, user_id, source_url(source_kind, source_ref))
+    sig = formats.format_sig(spec, salt=salt)
     asset = get_or_create_asset(db, source_kind, source_ref, sig)
     # Show a real title + thumbnail the moment it's queued (feed downloads are catalog videos).
     populate_from_catalog(db, asset)

backend/app/models.py

@@ -867,6 +867,35 @@ class DownloadLink(Base, TimestampMixin):
     view_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, default=0, server_default="0")
 
 
+class DownloadCredential(Base, TimestampMixin, UpdatedAtMixin):
+    """A user's stored login cookies for ONE auth-walled download host (Facebook, Instagram, …).
+
+    Per-user, per-host: each user pastes their OWN browser cookies.txt (Netscape format) for a host
+    where they're logged in (e.g. a closed Facebook group they belong to), and a download of a
+    yt-dlp-supported, auth-walled link on that host is retried with the ACTING user's cookie. The
+    blob is Fernet-encrypted at rest (`cookies_enc`) and is NEVER returned by any API/log/audit —
+    the routes are write-only (host + updated_at only). See `downloads.credentials`.
+
+    Two load-bearing security controls live around this row, NOT on it:
+      * **cache privacy** — a cookie-authed download SALTS its MediaAsset `format_sig` with the
+        user id, so the authed asset is private to that user and can never be cache-served to
+        another user (`downloads.credentials.cookie_salt`).
+      * **host scope (SEC-12)** — a cookie is attached ONLY when the download URL's netloc matches
+        this row's `host_key` (`downloads.credentials.host_key_for_url`), so an arbitrary `?url=`
+        can't exfiltrate the user's session to a look-alike host.
+
+    `host_key` is a short canonical key from the supported-host registry (e.g. "facebook"), not the
+    raw netloc — one credential can cover several domains of the same site (facebook.com/fb.watch)."""
+
+    __tablename__ = "download_credentials"
+    __table_args__ = (UniqueConstraint("user_id", "host_key", name="uq_download_credential"),)
+
+    id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(primary_key=True)
+    user_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), index=True)
+    host_key: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64))
+    cookies_enc: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)  # Fernet ciphertext — never returned/logged
+
+
 class MessageKey(Base, TimestampMixin):
     """A user's end-to-end-encryption key material for direct messaging (phase 2).
 

backend/app/routes/downloads.py

@@ -16,10 +16,11 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel
 from sqlalchemy import func, select
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
 
-from app import sysconfig
+from app import audit, sysconfig
 from app.auth import admin_user, require_human
 from app.config import settings
 from app.db import get_db
+from app.downloads import credentials as dlcreds
 from app.downloads import edit as editmod
 from app.downloads import links as linksmod
 from app.downloads import quota, service, storage
@@ -247,6 +248,65 @@ def delete_profile(
     return {"deleted": profile_id}
 
 
+# --- per-user download auth (cookies) ------------------------------------------------------
+# Write-only surface: the stored blob is NEVER returned — only the supported hosts + whether each
+# is configured + when. See downloads.credentials for the host-scope + cache-privacy guarantees.
+
+
+@router.get("/credentials")
+def list_credentials(user: User = Depends(require_human), db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -> dict:
+    return {"hosts": dlcreds.status_list(db, user.id)}
+
+
+class SetCredentialIn(BaseModel):
+    cookies: str
+
+
+@router.put("/credentials/{host_key}")
+def set_credential(
+    host_key: str,
+    body: SetCredentialIn,
+    user: User = Depends(require_human),
+    db: Session = Depends(get_db),
+) -> dict:
+    """Store (encrypted) this user's cookies.txt for one supported host. Write-only: the value is
+    never echoed back, logged, or audited — only the fact that it changed."""
+    if not dlcreds.is_supported_host(host_key):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Unknown host")
+    try:
+        cleaned = dlcreds.validate_cookies(body.cookies)
+    except dlcreds.InvalidCookies as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail={"code": "cookies", "reason": str(e)})
+    dlcreds.upsert_credential(db, user.id, host_key, cleaned)
+    audit.record(
+        db,
+        user.id,
+        audit.AuditAction.DOWNLOAD_CREDENTIAL_SET,
+        target_type="download_credential",
+        target_id=host_key,
+    )
+    db.commit()
+    return {"ok": True, "hosts": dlcreds.status_list(db, user.id)}
+
+
+@router.delete("/credentials/{host_key}")
+def delete_credential(
+    host_key: str, user: User = Depends(require_human), db: Session = Depends(get_db)
+) -> dict:
+    if not dlcreds.is_supported_host(host_key):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Unknown host")
+    if dlcreds.delete_credential(db, user.id, host_key):
+        audit.record(
+            db,
+            user.id,
+            audit.AuditAction.DOWNLOAD_CREDENTIAL_DELETE,
+            target_type="download_credential",
+            target_id=host_key,
+        )
+    db.commit()
+    return {"ok": True, "hosts": dlcreds.status_list(db, user.id)}
+
+
 def _resolve_spec(
     db: Session, user: User, profile_id: int | None, spec: dict | None
 ) -> tuple[dict, int | None]: