fix(auth): close the three leftovers E9.5 logged but kept out of its diff

DX-17, three one-liners the epic's canonical sweep did not reach:

`routes/setup.py::setup_admin` still resolved the wizard's admin by
literal `User.email ==`. The wizard can be re-run, and E9.5's premise is
that two spellings of one Gmail mailbox are one person — so a second run
under the other spelling would have created exactly the duplicate admin
row the epic exists to prevent.

`routes/admin.py::_decide` hand-rolled `db.get` + 404 where the file's
newer endpoints use `get_or_404`. There were TWO such sites, not the one
the review named; both are converted, per the house rule that a
principle gets fixed everywhere in one sweep.

`useVerifyEntry`'s `hashchange` listener recognised `#verify=` but not
`#reset=`, so pasting a reset link into a tab already running the app
was silently ignored — the same silence that made the verify half a bug.
It now notices, and says out loud that reset links need a signed-out
window; the fragment is still deliberately left in the address bar
(review round 4), so signing out from that tab recovers it.

DX-16: `.catch(() => setOutcome("invalid"))` could not tell a spent
token from a 502 mid-deploy or a dropped connection, and by then the
fragment is cleared — so a network blip was reported as "that link is no
longer valid", pushing the user to request a fresh one on the strength
of a false statement. Only a 400 carrying {code:"verify"} is the
server's verdict now; everything else gets its own outcome, with no
resend CTA, because the token is untouched and retrying it works. The
rule was already written one file away for the reset-link probe: "a
network blip must never be cached as 'this link is dead'".

Two existing tests asserted the old conflation by rejecting with a bare
Error("400"); they now reject with the real HttpError. The errors are
built inside the rejection, not hoisted: mountAt calls vi.resetModules(),
so an HttpError imported earlier is a different class identity and
`instanceof` would quietly miss.

Gate: vitest 671 -> 676, pytest 924 -> 925.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-05 01:35:09 +02:00
parent 0cc450d1c9
commit bc9e34d0ae
13 changed files with 198 additions and 22 deletions
+40 -5
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,26 @@
import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
import { api } from "./api";
import { HttpError } from "./api/core";
import { clearEntryUrl, entryHash } from "./entryUrl";
/** What confirming the emailed token produced. `ok_reset` means the address is confirmed but this
* account's password had been revoked (SEC-10), so signing in would only meet the uniform credentials
* error — the user has to set a new one. */
type VerifyOutcome = "ok" | "ok_reset" | "invalid";
* error — the user has to set a new one. `unreachable` is a TRANSPORT failure, kept apart from
* `invalid` on purpose (DX-16): the fragment is already cleared by the time we know, so telling
* someone their link is spent when the server was merely restarting sends them to request a fresh one
* on the strength of a false statement. The same rule is already written one file away, for the
* reset-link probe: "a network blip must never be cached as 'this link is dead'". */
type VerifyOutcome = "ok" | "ok_reset" | "invalid" | "unreachable";
export type VerifyEntry = {
outcome: VerifyOutcome | null;
/** The address that was confirmed, when the server named it. */
email: string | null;
/** A `#reset=` link opened in a tab that already holds a session. Only the signed-OUT auth card
* consumes a reset token, so nothing here can act on it — but silence is what made the verify half
* a bug, so this says out loud that the link needs a signed-out window. The fragment is deliberately
* left in the address bar (E9.5 review round 4), so signing out still recovers it. */
resetPending: boolean;
/** Dismiss the outcome — the banner is a one-time entry notice, not persistent state. */
dismiss: () => void;
};
@@ -38,12 +48,18 @@ export function useVerifyEntry(): VerifyEntry {
const [token, setToken] = useState<string | null>(() => entryHash.get("verify"));
const [outcome, setOutcome] = useState<VerifyOutcome | null>(null);
const [email, setEmail] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [resetPending, setResetPending] = useState<boolean>(() => !!entryHash.get("reset"));
const consumed = useRef(new Set<string>());
useEffect(() => {
const onHashChange = () => {
const next = new URLSearchParams(window.location.hash.replace(/^#/, "")).get("verify");
const hash = new URLSearchParams(window.location.hash.replace(/^#/, ""));
const next = hash.get("verify");
if (next) setToken(next);
// Both halves of the mailed pair arrive the same way — pasted into a running tab, which is a
// same-document navigation the import-time snapshot never sees. The verify half got this
// listener in E9.5 S2; the reset half was left out, so it stayed silent (DX-17).
if (hash.get("reset")) setResetPending(true);
};
// replaceState (how clearEntryUrl strips the fragment) does NOT fire hashchange, so this cannot
// feed itself.
@@ -67,8 +83,27 @@ export function useVerifyEntry(): VerifyEntry {
setOutcome(r.password_reset_required ? "ok_reset" : "ok");
setEmail(r.email ?? null);
})
.catch(() => setOutcome("invalid"));
// Only the server's own verdict on the token means "invalid". `/auth/verify` refuses a spent
// or expired token with a 400 carrying {code:"verify"}; a 502 during a deploy, or a dropped
// connection (no HttpError at all), says nothing about the token and must not be reported as
// if it did. The token itself is unspent in that case — but the fragment has already been
// cleared, so the honest message is "we could not reach the server", not "request a new link".
.catch((e: unknown) => {
const spent =
e instanceof HttpError &&
e.status === 400 &&
(e.detailData as { code?: string } | undefined)?.code === "verify";
setOutcome(spent ? "invalid" : "unreachable");
});
}, [token]);
return { outcome, email, dismiss: () => setOutcome(null) };
return {
outcome,
email,
resetPending,
dismiss: () => {
setOutcome(null);
setResetPending(false);
},
};
}