fix(auth): address R4 S1 code-review findings

- link/upgrade OAuth cancel now redirects to /?link=cancelled (a channel App.tsx
  surfaces as a toast) instead of the pre-auth /?login=oauth_cancelled banner a
  signed-in user never sees; a plain sign-in cancel is unchanged
- the login banner (suspended / oauth_cancelled) is now state, cleared on the
  first deliberate action like the verify banner — no more stale lingering
- add a "Didn't get the verification email?" resend entry on the sign-in screen
  so a never-arrived verification mail isn't a dead end (was only reachable from
  the expired-link banner)
- unit-test _oauth_redirect_uri (dev-host derive, unknown-host fallback, prod
  ignores the Host header — the injection guard)
- collapse the 5-deep title/button ternaries into Record<Mode,string> maps

backend/tests/test_oauth_redirect.py

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+"""_oauth_redirect_uri decides where Google sends the OAuth code back. In production it must ALWAYS
+use the fixed configured URL and never trust the request Host (a forged Host must not be able to
+redirect the code); in local dev it honors a small allowlist of dev origins so a login started on the
+Vite server (:5173) returns to :5173."""
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+from app import auth
+
+
+def _req(host):
+    """Minimal stand-in for a Starlette Request: only .headers.get('host') is read."""
+    return SimpleNamespace(headers={"host": host} if host is not None else {})
+
+
+def _dev_settings():
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        session_https_only=False,
+        oauth_redirect_url="http://localhost:8080/auth/callback",
+    )
+
+
+def _prod_settings():
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        session_https_only=True,
+        oauth_redirect_url="https://siftlode.example.eu/auth/callback",
+    )
+
+
+def test_dev_known_host_returns_to_that_origin(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "settings", _dev_settings())
+    assert auth._oauth_redirect_uri(_req("localhost:5173")) == "http://localhost:5173/auth/callback"
+    assert auth._oauth_redirect_uri(_req("localhost:8080")) == "http://localhost:8080/auth/callback"
+    assert auth._oauth_redirect_uri(_req("127.0.0.1:5173")) == "http://127.0.0.1:5173/auth/callback"
+
+
+def test_dev_host_is_case_insensitive(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "settings", _dev_settings())
+    assert auth._oauth_redirect_uri(_req("LOCALHOST:5173")) == "http://localhost:5173/auth/callback"
+
+
+def test_dev_unknown_or_missing_host_falls_back_to_configured(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "settings", _dev_settings())
+    # An origin not on the allowlist (or a request with no Host) must not drive the redirect.
+    assert auth._oauth_redirect_uri(_req("evil.example.com")) == "http://localhost:8080/auth/callback"
+    assert auth._oauth_redirect_uri(_req(None)) == "http://localhost:8080/auth/callback"
+
+
+def test_prod_ignores_host_even_when_it_matches_a_dev_origin(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "settings", _prod_settings())
+    # The host-injection guard: in production the fixed URL wins regardless of the Host header.
+    assert (
+        auth._oauth_redirect_uri(_req("localhost:5173"))
+        == "https://siftlode.example.eu/auth/callback"
+    )
+    assert (
+        auth._oauth_redirect_uri(_req("attacker.test"))
+        == "https://siftlode.example.eu/auth/callback"
+    )