diff --git a/.trivyignore.yaml b/.trivyignore.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..79dbc1c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.trivyignore.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# The CVE gate's allowlist (E32). The publish gate scans the built image and the committed tree with
+# Trivy and fails on any HIGH or CRITICAL finding that has a fix available. A finding that cannot be
+# fixed yet is let through ONLY by an entry here, and every entry carries both:
+#   statement   — why it is acceptable for now (what is exposed, what is not)
+#   expired_at  — the date it stops being accepted; after it, the gate fails again on its own
+# A contract test (frontend/src/lib/gates.contract.test.ts) refuses an entry without either, and
+# docs/gates.md lists them.
+#
+# Example:
+#   vulnerabilities:
+#     - id: CVE-2026-00000
+#       statement: in libfoo's XML path, which nothing in the image calls; no fixed Debian build yet
+#       expired_at: 2026-12-31
+vulnerabilities: []
+secrets: []
diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile
index d6b362c5..c1c69b2a 100644
--- a/Dockerfile
+++ b/Dockerfile
@@ -53,8 +53,11 @@ RUN adduser --disabled-password --gecos "" appuser \
 # Harmless on hosts with no /dev/dri (the driver just goes unused). Deno: the JavaScript runtime yt-dlp
 # uses to solve YouTube's "n" signature challenge for the web player clients (required alongside the PO
 # token, else only storyboards are offered). yt-dlp auto-detects deno on PATH.
+# `apt-get upgrade` (E32): the base image is a snapshot, and the Debian security fixes released since it
+# was cut are only in the archive — the first Trivy scan found one (pcre2) fixed upstream but not in it.
 ARG DENO_VERSION=v2.9.1
 RUN apt-get update \
+    && apt-get upgrade -y --no-install-recommends \
     && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ffmpeg intel-media-va-driver unzip curl ca-certificates \
     && curl -fsSL "https://github.com/denoland/deno/releases/download/${DENO_VERSION}/deno-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.zip" -o /tmp/deno.zip \
     && unzip -o /tmp/deno.zip -d /usr/local/bin \
@@ -78,9 +81,12 @@ RUN printf 'Types: deb\nURIs: http://deb.debian.org/debian\nSuites: bookworm\nCo
 # Install from the PINNED lock (requirements.lock, generated from requirements.txt) so the image is
 # byte-reproducible and the exact versions are the ones pip-audit scanned in CI — not whatever floats
 # up from the floor ranges on build day. Regenerate the lock when requirements.txt changes (see its header).
+# pip itself is removed once it has installed the lock (E32): nothing runs it at runtime, and it carries
+# its own VENDORED copies of urllib3, msgpack and setuptools, which Trivy reports as the image's own —
+# an attack surface and a CVE stream for a tool the running app never calls.
 COPY backend/requirements.lock .
 RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/pip \
-    pip install --upgrade pip && pip install -r requirements.lock
+    pip install --upgrade pip && pip install -r requirements.lock && pip uninstall -y pip
 
 COPY --chown=appuser backend/ .
 # Read at runtime by config.py as the app_version (a committed single source of truth).