refactor(reader): the HTTP layer reads through queries and writes through the service

Feed, playlists, saved views, tags and the Home pins do no database work in their routes any more:
reads go through reader/queries (and feedquery for a feed page, its counts and facets), writes
through reader/service and discover/pins, which flush; the handlers commit. Reader is fenced below
its HTTP layer too: its owner filters go through userscope, and the catalog's jobs ask Reader
instead of joining its tables (the auto-tagger's system tags, the cleanup jobs' keep rule, the
maintenance notice). A playlist sync's catalog ingest moves to sync/videos.
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-19 01:20:14 +02:00
parent e82f87acb0
commit dbb4065e7b
24 changed files with 1489 additions and 915 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ project checks needs a row.
| CVE gate | HIGH/CRITICAL with a fix available only | `--ignore-unfixed` + `--severity HIGH,CRITICAL`: a finding with no fix cannot be acted on by an upgrade; it shows in the scan output. A fixable one fails the publish, and the only way past it is `.trivyignore.yaml`. | 0 open (E32 S1) |
| npm audit | `--omit=dev --audit-level=high` | What ships to the browser, at high or above. The dev toolchain's advisories were burned down by hand in E32 S1 (18 → 0). | 0 |
| knip | `entry` — one file added | Not a narrowing: knip's Vite plugin reads entries from index.html only, so the shared link's page (`watch.html` → `src/watchMain.tsx`) is named here, or the lane reports that whole entry unused. It adds files to the lane, never takes any out. | 1 entry |
| unit fence | the database work the HTTP layer still does, pinned | `backend/tests/test_unit_fences.py`: a unit's route file may not build SQL, call the session's data methods, set a model's attributes or import a unit's tables; a core route may not import a unit's tables. Switched on unit by unit: `ALLOWED` pins each file's count exactly, so a rise fails and a fall fails until the pin is lowered — the list may only shrink. End state: empty, and the pin mechanism goes. A unit in `FENCED` is held below its HTTP layer too: its code reads another unit's tables only along `READS`, writes them never, filters owners through `userscope`, and commits only where `UNIT_COMMITS` names a job's own session. | 826 in 23 files (E42 S0) → 667 in 19 (S1: Capture 0, fenced) |
| unit fence | the database work the HTTP layer still does, pinned | `backend/tests/test_unit_fences.py`: a unit's route file may not build SQL, call the session's data methods, set a model's attributes or import a unit's tables; a core route may not import a unit's tables. Switched on unit by unit: `ALLOWED` pins each file's count exactly, so a rise fails and a fall fails until the pin is lowered — the list may only shrink. End state: empty, and the pin mechanism goes. A unit in `FENCED` is held below its HTTP layer too: its code reads another unit's tables only along `READS`, writes them never, filters owners through `userscope`, and commits only where `UNIT_COMMITS` names a job's own session. | 826 in 23 files (E42 S0) → 667 in 19 (S1: Capture 0, fenced) → 525 in 14 (S2: Reader 0, fenced) |
| React Compiler | the functions it skips, pinned | `components/compilerCoverage.contract.test.ts` — the list may only shrink. End state: only VirtualGrid (TanStack Virtual, an IncompatibleLibrary) remains. | 93 (E32 S1) → 29 (E32 S3) → 1, VirtualGrid (E32 S4) |
## Accepted findings