fix: review round 3 — a new tab keeps its account's notices, a revoked tab account lands on the default
Deep-review round 3 over main..improvement/watch-background-audio. Account boot - The notification history and settings, and the hints toggle, are read when their modules load, which in a new tab (bookmark, typed URL) is before BootGate pins the account: they read as nobody's, and the tab's first notice replaced the account's stored history (up to 100 entries) with a one-item list. They now read again when the tab is pinned (onAccountPinned, run by setActiveAccount); a notice raised before the pin stays, after the history. - A tab pinned to an account still in this browser's wallet but whose session ended (suspended, deleted, or revoked by "log out everywhere") got "signed out" from /api/me while the default account was still signed in, and signing in again as anyone else left it there. A refused per-tab account now leaves the wallet, and the probe answers as the default, so the tab reloads onto it. Share page (/watch) - The password unlock is limited per viewer (link + client IP), under a per-link ceiling that counts only wrong passwords. Keyed on the link alone, ten wrong guesses every five minutes locked out every viewer, the ones with the password included. client_ip moves to app.ratelimit so the public routes can key on it. - Its failure messages and the load-failure screen are announced (role=alert, the password input described by its error). The sign-in, passphrase, password-change and setup form errors get role=alert too. Comments that still described removed machinery are corrected: App's collapse flags, SettingsPanel's Save bar, ConfigPanel, authed_format_sig. Tests: the account's history and hints across the pin; a revoked and a suspended pinned account; the per-viewer limit and the ceiling; the limiter's exhausted(); the share page's announced failures; a share link's feed filters persisted. Each mutation-checked RED for its own reason.
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@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ in prose):
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is downloading into is that private, salted identity — so a cookie can never poison a shared
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asset (the load-bearing cross-user privacy fix).
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Both go through `cookie_salt` / `authed_format_sig` / `host_key_for_url` here, so they can't drift.
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Both key the private identity on `cookie_salt` / `host_key_for_url` here, so they can't drift.
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Security controls enforced here:
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* **host scope (SEC-12)** — `host_key_for_url` matches the download URL's netloc against a curated
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@@ -101,8 +101,9 @@ def cookie_salt(user_id: int, host_key: str) -> str:
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def authed_format_sig(spec: dict, user_id: int, host_key: str) -> str:
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"""The salted `format_sig` an authed download for (user, host) resolves to — the private asset
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identity. Both enqueue (to create it) and the worker (to recognise it) compute it HERE."""
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"""The salted `format_sig` an authed download for (user, host) resolves to under the current
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signature version — the private asset enqueue creates, and one of the identities `is_authed_asset`
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recognises. Neither calls it; the tests use it to hold the two to each other."""
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return formats.format_sig(spec, salt=cookie_salt(user_id, host_key))
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