fix: review round 3 — a new tab keeps its account's notices, a revoked tab account lands on the default

Deep-review round 3 over main..improvement/watch-background-audio.

Account boot
- The notification history and settings, and the hints toggle, are read
  when their modules load, which in a new tab (bookmark, typed URL) is
  before BootGate pins the account: they read as nobody's, and the tab's
  first notice replaced the account's stored history (up to 100 entries)
  with a one-item list. They now read again when the tab is pinned
  (onAccountPinned, run by setActiveAccount); a notice raised before the
  pin stays, after the history.
- A tab pinned to an account still in this browser's wallet but whose
  session ended (suspended, deleted, or revoked by "log out everywhere")
  got "signed out" from /api/me while the default account was still
  signed in, and signing in again as anyone else left it there. A refused
  per-tab account now leaves the wallet, and the probe answers as the
  default, so the tab reloads onto it.

Share page (/watch)
- The password unlock is limited per viewer (link + client IP), under a
  per-link ceiling that counts only wrong passwords. Keyed on the link
  alone, ten wrong guesses every five minutes locked out every viewer,
  the ones with the password included. client_ip moves to app.ratelimit
  so the public routes can key on it.
- Its failure messages and the load-failure screen are announced
  (role=alert, the password input described by its error). The sign-in,
  passphrase, password-change and setup form errors get role=alert too.

Comments that still described removed machinery are corrected: App's
collapse flags, SettingsPanel's Save bar, ConfigPanel, authed_format_sig.

Tests: the account's history and hints across the pin; a revoked and a
suspended pinned account; the per-viewer limit and the ceiling; the
limiter's exhausted(); the share page's announced failures; a share
link's feed filters persisted. Each mutation-checked RED for its own
reason.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-15 02:25:00 +02:00
parent f569b19c49
commit e7f38396a2
26 changed files with 366 additions and 93 deletions
+8 -40
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
Split out of app/auth.py (R12 S2); the core auth surface (current_user, scopes, token
helpers) stays in app/auth.py, imported below."""
import ipaddress
import secrets
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from typing import NamedTuple
@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ from app.auth import (
from app.config import settings
from app.db import SessionLocal, get_db
from app.models import AuthToken, DemoWhitelist, Invite, OAuthToken, User
from app.ratelimit import RateLimiter
from app.ratelimit import RateLimiter, client_ip
from app.security import encrypt, hash_password, hash_token, verify_password
from app.utils import canonical_email, valid_email
@@ -172,37 +171,6 @@ def is_demo_allowed(db: Session, email: str) -> bool:
)
def _norm_ip(s: str) -> ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address | None:
"""Parse an IP for comparison, unwrapping IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:10.0.0.1` → `10.0.0.1`) so a
plain-IPv4 allowlist still matches a peer that surfaces in mapped form. None for a non-IP string."""
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(s.strip())
except ValueError:
return None
return ip.ipv4_mapped if getattr(ip, "ipv4_mapped", None) else ip
def _client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
"""Best-effort client IP for rate limiting. X-Forwarded-For is client-controlled, so we trust it
ONLY when the request actually arrived from a configured reverse proxy (settings.trusted_proxy_ips
— the address the proxy connects FROM, e.g. the VPS Caddy's WireGuard peer IP). Our proxy APPENDS
the client it saw to XFF, so the RIGHTMOST entry is the real client and can't be forged by a
client pre-seeding the header. Any other peer (someone hitting the app port directly, bypassing the
proxy) is untrusted — we use its real socket IP, so it can't spoof its rate-limit identity.
SAFETY: this relies on `request.client` being the TRUE socket peer. uvicorn is started WITHOUT
`--proxy-headers` (see entrypoint.sh) precisely so it never rewrites `request.client` from XFF —
do NOT add that flag, or the trust check below would compare against a forgeable value."""
peer = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
trusted = {_norm_ip(p) for p in settings.trusted_proxy_ip_set} - {None}
if _norm_ip(peer) in trusted:
xff = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
parts = [p.strip() for p in (xff or "").split(",") if p.strip()]
if parts:
return parts[-1]
return peer
class InviteRequest(NamedTuple):
"""What an access request settled on.
@@ -674,7 +642,7 @@ async def request_access(
email = (body.email or "").strip().lower()
if not valid_email(email):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Enter a valid email address.")
if not _request_access_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
if not _request_access_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
return {"status": "pending"}
if is_allowed(db, email):
return {"status": "pending"} # already allowed — don't reveal it
@@ -691,7 +659,7 @@ def demo_login(body: EmailIn, request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -
so there is no visible 'demo login' button. Rate-limited per IP; when blocked it answers
exactly like a non-match (authenticated=false) so the field can't be hammered as an
enumeration oracle. On a match it sets the session and the client reloads into the app."""
if not _demo_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
if not _demo_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
return {"authenticated": False}
email = (body.email or "").strip().lower()
if valid_email(email) and is_demo_allowed(db, email):
@@ -837,7 +805,7 @@ def register(
)
if not sysconfig.get_bool(db, "allow_registration"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Registration is currently closed.")
if not _register_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
if not _register_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
return {"status": "ok"} # silently throttle; uniform response
# Do the existence check + account creation OFF the response path (a background task with its own
@@ -1005,7 +973,7 @@ def verify_email_resend(
and re-registering an already-registered email is a silent no-op, so a user who lost the first
mail had no way back. Uniform response + timing regardless of whether the email has a pending
account (the lookup runs off the response path), so it can't probe for registered emails."""
if not _verify_resend_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
if not _verify_resend_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
return {"status": "ok"} # silently throttle; uniform response
email = (body.email or "").strip().lower()
if valid_email(email):
@@ -1064,7 +1032,7 @@ def password_login(
"""Email+password sign-in. Wrong email/password give a single uniform 401 (no enumeration).
Once the password is proven correct, the owner gets a specific reason if their account is
still pending or suspended — that's not an enumeration leak (they already hold the password)."""
if not _login_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
if not _login_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
raise _login_refused(429, "rate_limited")
email = (body.email or "").strip().lower()
password = body.password or ""
@@ -1095,7 +1063,7 @@ def password_reset_request(
) -> dict:
"""Request a password-reset link. Uniform response + timing regardless of whether the email has a
password account (the lookup runs off the response path), so it can't probe for registered emails."""
if not _reset_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
if not _reset_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
return {"status": "ok"}
email = (body.email or "").strip().lower()
# Do the account lookup + token issue + email OFF the response path (a background task with its
@@ -1144,7 +1112,7 @@ def password_reset_check(body: TokenIn, request: Request, db: Session = Depends(
told `true`, never `false`: this check may only ever save a user a wasted form, so when it cannot
answer it must degrade to the old behaviour instead of declaring a live link dead.
"""
if not _reset_check_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
if not _reset_check_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
return {"ok": True}
return {"ok": any(_peek_token(db, body.token, k) is not None for k in _PASSWORD_TOKEN_KINDS)}