fix: stored logs keep bad rows, erased accounts and unconsented queries out

Deep-review round 1 of E22.

- A NUL character (`GET /assets/%00` logs the decoded path) made Postgres
  refuse the row and with it the sink's whole batch, every user's rows
  included. `to_row` replaces NUL in every text column and in attrs.
- An erased account's lines kept arriving after purge_user's DELETE: the
  erasing request's own access line, a queued row, a background task.
  `logs.forget_user` runs first; later rows are stored without the account,
  and the check and the insert share a lock with the erasure.
- An admin setting the whole process to TRACE logged every user's query
  string. The query is now logged only under the user's own Teljes consent,
  and decoded before redaction, so `%40` no longer hides an address.
- The browser log ingest has an hourly storage budget per account (5 MiB,
  one notice when spent) and reads only a JSON Content-Type, so a
  same-site text/plain form post cannot write into a user's log.
  RateLimiter takes a per-attempt cost for the byte budget.
- The root level is applied under the elevation lock: two concurrent
  changes could leave it at the base while an elevation was active.
- Tests for the running sink (level gate, drain on stop) and for the
  admin log level applied at runtime and at boot.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-17 03:53:29 +02:00
parent 9c9b1cf6d5
commit fac5c4465a
9 changed files with 349 additions and 39 deletions
+63 -10
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ import time
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import parse_qsl
from app.config import settings
from app.ratelimit import RateLimiter, client_key
@@ -204,6 +205,14 @@ def redact_text(text: str) -> str:
return _EMAIL_RE.sub(REDACTED_EMAIL, scrubbed)
def redact_query(query: str) -> str:
"""Scrub a raw query string. DECODED first: the text rules match what was typed, and a browser
sends it percent-encoded — `someone%40example.com` is an address `_EMAIL_RE` cannot see. Each
parameter also goes through the key rules, so `?new_password=` goes as `redact` would drop it."""
pairs = parse_qsl(query, keep_blank_values=True)
return "&".join(redact_text(f"{key}={redact(value, key=key)}") for key, value in pairs)
def redact(value: Any, *, key: str = "") -> Any:
"""Recursively scrub a structure destined for the log.
@@ -457,13 +466,57 @@ def _apply_root_level(force: bool = False) -> None:
if _base_level == logging.NOTSET:
return # not configured: the root keeps whatever the process set up
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
# The level is SET under the lock too, not just computed: two threads that each computed a
# different answer would otherwise apply them in either order, and the older one could win —
# the root back at the base while an elevation is still active.
with _elevations_lock:
for user_id in [u for u, (_, until) in _elevations.items() if until <= now]:
del _elevations[user_id]
lowest = min([_base_level, *(lvl for lvl, _ in _elevations.values())])
if force or lowest != _root_applied:
logging.getLogger().setLevel(lowest)
_root_applied = lowest
if force or lowest != _root_applied:
logging.getLogger().setLevel(lowest)
_root_applied = lowest
# --- erased accounts ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# `auth.purge_user` deletes an account's `log_events` rows, but a line about that account can still
# be on its way: the erasing request's own access line is logged AFTER the handler committed, a queued
# row waits for the sink's writer, a background task logs later. Those rows are stored without the
# account (`logsink` asks here). Remembered for an hour in this process — a line later than that has
# no request left to come from, and the retention job is the backstop for any other process.
ERASED_MEMORY_SECONDS = 3600.0
_erased: dict[int, float] = {}
_erased_lock = threading.Lock()
# Held by whoever checks rows against `is_erased` AND writes them (`erasure_guard`). `forget_user`
# takes it too, so an erasure waits for a write that already passed the check to commit — and the
# purge's DELETE, which runs after `forget_user`, then removes those rows as well. Without it a row
# checked a moment before the erasure could be inserted a moment after the DELETE.
_erasure_guard = threading.Lock()
def erasure_guard() -> threading.Lock:
"""Hold this around "drop erased accounts from these rows, insert them, commit"."""
return _erasure_guard
def forget_user(user_id: int) -> None:
"""Mark `user_id` erased: no line logged about it from now on is stored under its id. Call BEFORE
deleting its rows (see `_erasure_guard`)."""
now = time.monotonic()
with _erasure_guard, _erased_lock:
for stale in [u for u, at in _erased.items() if now - at > ERASED_MEMORY_SECONDS]:
del _erased[stale]
_erased[user_id] = now
with _elevations_lock:
_elevations.pop(user_id, None)
def is_erased(user_id: int | None) -> bool:
if user_id is None:
return False
with _erased_lock:
at = _erased.get(user_id)
return at is not None and time.monotonic() - at <= ERASED_MEMORY_SECONDS
def current_source() -> str:
@@ -537,10 +590,10 @@ async def log_requests(request, call_next):
"status": status,
"duration_ms": duration_ms,
}
# Teljes (TRACE, the user's or the whole process's): the query string too — redacted, and in
# attrs only, never in the message.
# Teljes (TRACE) the user consented to: the query string too — redacted, and in attrs only, never
# in the message.
if request.url.query and _traced(scope):
attrs["query"] = redact_text(request.url.query)
attrs["query"] = redact_query(request.url.query)
_request_log.log(
level,
"%s %s %s",
@@ -563,10 +616,10 @@ async def log_requests(request, call_next):
def _traced(scope: _RequestScope) -> bool:
"""Whether this request is logged at TRACE — its user's consent, or the process's base level."""
if scope.level is not None and scope.level <= TRACE:
return True
return _base_level != logging.NOTSET and _base_level <= TRACE
"""Whether this request's query string is logged: only under its OWN user's Teljes consent. An
admin setting the whole process to TRACE gets more detail, not every user's search terms — the
privacy policy promises those are kept only for a user who agreed to it."""
return scope.level is not None and scope.level <= TRACE
# Anonymous request lines kept per client per minute. Signed-in traffic is not capped: it is a known