// The admin surface: discovery purge, system configuration, users & roles, the audit log, the
// diagnostics console's server log, the scheduler + maintenance controls, and access invites. Only touches core's req. (Grouped by sub-area below; kept in one
// module as the cohesive "admin" domain.)
import type { Level } from "../log";
import { req } from "./core";

export interface Invite {
  id: number;
  email: string;
  status: "pending" | "approved" | "denied";
  note: string | null;
  requested_at: string | null;
  decided_at: string | null;
  decided_by: string | null;
  /** An account already exists for this address, so the entry can't be deleted from here — deleting
   *  it would revoke that user's access (is_allowed reads this row). Delete the user instead. */
  has_account: boolean;
  /** The address stays allow-listed by the server's env ALLOWED_EMAILS / ADMIN_EMAILS, so removing
   *  this row would NOT take access away. The delete confirmation says so. */
  still_allowed_by_env: boolean;
  /** When the admin last invited this person, or null if never. Adding an address to the whitelist
   *  is deliberately silent — it opens a door rather than knocking — so telling them is a separate
   *  act, and this is how the admin sees they have already done it. */
  invited_at: string | null;
  /** The language this person asked us in, or null when nobody ever told us — a row the admin
   *  whitelisted by hand. The invitation dialog preselects it and falls back to the admin's own UI
   *  language, so the guess is visible and correctable before anything is sent. */
  lang: string | null;
}

/** A sign-up that is still outside, as the admin screen shows it. Same shape as a user row plus the
 *  one thing the client cannot work out for itself. */
export interface PendingAccessRow extends AdminUserRow {
  /** The address is already allowed and the account is merely inactive, so Activate finishes a
   *  decision the admin has already made. False when there is no approved invite behind it —
   *  activating then would make an account that signs in with a password but is turned away by
   *  Google, so the whitelist box is the honest move instead. */
  can_activate: boolean;
}

// Admin Configuration page: one DB-overridable setting (registry entry on the backend).
export interface ConfigItem {
  key: string;
  type: "int" | "str" | "bool" | "choice";
  group: string;
  secret: boolean;
  min: number | null;
  max: number | null;
  is_set: boolean; // a DB override row exists (else using the env/config default)
  allow_empty?: boolean; // if true, a blank field stores "" (explicit empty) rather than resetting
  choices: string[]; // a "choice" key's options (the backend Literal); [] for any other type
  value?: string | number | boolean; // non-secret: effective value
  default?: string | number | boolean; // non-secret: env/config default
  default_is_set?: boolean; // secret: whether an env default exists
}
export interface SystemConfigData {
  groups: Record<string, ConfigItem[]>;
  /** The page's headings, in order, each with its groups in order; every group is in one. */
  sections: { id: string; groups: string[] }[];
  secrets_manageable: boolean;
}

// Admin Users & roles page.
export interface AdminUserRow {
  id: number;
  email: string;
  display_name: string | null;
  role: string; // "user" | "admin"
  is_active: boolean;
  is_suspended: boolean;
  email_verified: boolean;
  has_password: boolean;
  /** When SEC-10 cleared this account's password, or null. Separates "never had one" (a Google-only
   *  account) from "we took it away" — different problems needing different help. */
  password_revoked_at: string | null;
  has_google: boolean;
  /** The Google account's address, ONLY when it differs from the account address. */
  google_email: string | null;
  created_at: string | null;
  /** Last sign-in (Google or password). Null = not since 0.88 (no backfill). */
  last_login_at: string | null;
}

/** The account panel's view of why someone can or cannot get in. */
export interface AdminUserAccess extends AdminUserRow {
  /** The address passes the invite gate — so Google sign-in will be let through, not filed as a
   *  fresh access request. */
  is_allowed: boolean;
  can_activate: boolean;
  /** Whether this instance has working mail at all. Decides whether the two mail-shaped recovery
   *  actions are offered or shown as unavailable — rather than failing after the click. */
  email_configured: boolean;
}

export interface AuditRow {
  id: number;
  created_at: string | null;
  actor: string | null; // email of the acting admin; null = System (scheduler/background)
  action: string; // canonical key, localized on the client via auditActions.<action>
  target_type: string | null;
  target_id: string | null;
  summary: string | null;
  before: Record<string, unknown> | null;
  after: Record<string, unknown> | null;
}
export interface AuditListResult {
  items: AuditRow[];
  total: number; // total rows in the log (may exceed `items` if capped)
  returned: number;
}

/** One stored log line (`log_events`), as the diagnostics console reads it. Values the server's
 *  redactor took out arrive as `[redacted]` / `[email]`. */
export interface ServerLogRow {
  id: number;
  ts: string;
  level: Level;
  source: string;
  logger: string;
  event: string | null;
  msg: string;
  attrs: Record<string, unknown> | null;
  exc: string | null;
  request_id: string | null;
  user_id: number | null;
  job_id: number | null;
  debug_session_id: string | null;
  version: string | null;
}

/** The console's filters, as the API takes them. `none` picks the rows without an account / code. */
export interface LogQuery {
  levels?: readonly Level[];
  sources?: readonly string[];
  user?: string;
  event?: string;
  request_id?: string;
  job_id?: number;
  q?: string;
  since?: string;
}

export interface LogPage {
  items: ServerLogRow[];
  /** The accounts this page names, by id; an erased one is absent. */
  accounts: Record<string, string>;
  next_cursor: string | null;
}

export interface LogFacet {
  value: string;
  count: number;
}

/** Each facet is counted under every filter but its own; `total` is the all-levels count. */
export interface LogFacets {
  levels: LogFacet[];
  sources: LogFacet[];
  events: LogFacet[];
  users: LogFacet[];
  accounts: Record<string, string>;
  total: number;
}

function logParams(query: LogQuery, extra: Record<string, string | number | null> = {}): string {
  const p = new URLSearchParams();
  for (const level of query.levels ?? []) p.append("levels", level);
  for (const source of query.sources ?? []) p.append("sources", source);
  const single: Record<string, string | number | null | undefined> = {
    user: query.user,
    event: query.event,
    request_id: query.request_id,
    job_id: query.job_id,
    q: query.q,
    since: query.since,
    ...extra,
  };
  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(single)) {
    if (value !== undefined && value !== null && value !== "") p.set(key, String(value));
  }
  const s = p.toString();
  return s ? `?${s}` : "";
}

export type JobResult = { [key: string]: number | string | JobResult };

export interface SchedulerJob {
  id: string;
  interval_minutes: number;
  next_run: string | null;
  running: boolean;
  status: "ok" | "error" | "skipped" | null;
  last_started: string | null;
  last_finished: string | null;
  last_result: string | null; // the English one-liner — the fallback for a job with no `result`
  // The last result as data: counts, a `skipped` / `reason` word, a nested dict per phase —
  // named in the reader's language by lib/jobResult.
  result: JobResult | null;
  last_error: string | null;
  // Live progress while running (null when idle or for jobs that don't report it).
  // total is null for indeterminate progress (e.g. enrichment drains an unknown queue).
  progress: { current: number; total: number | null; phase: string | null } | null;
}

export interface SchedulerStatus {
  running_here: boolean;
  enabled: boolean;
  paused: boolean;
  jobs: SchedulerJob[];
  queue: {
    channels_recent_pending: number;
    channels_deep_pending: number;
    deep_eta_seconds: number;
    videos_pending_enrich: number;
    videos_pending_shorts: number;
    videos_live_refresh: number;
  };
  quota: {
    used_today: number;
    remaining_today: number;
    daily_budget: number;
    backfill_reserve: number;
  };
  maintenance: {
    revalidate_batch: number;
    revalidate_batch_default: number;
    min: number;
    max: number;
  };
}

export const adminApi = {
  // --- discovery / system configuration ---
  // Admin: reclaim all un-kept discovery content (search results + explored channels) now.
  purgeDiscovery: (): Promise<Record<string, number>> =>
    req("/api/admin/purge-discovery", { method: "POST" }),
  adminConfig: (): Promise<SystemConfigData> => req("/api/admin/config"),
  setConfig: (key: string, value: string | number | boolean): Promise<SystemConfigData> =>
    req(`/api/admin/config/${key}`, { method: "PATCH", body: JSON.stringify({ value }) }),
  resetConfig: (key: string): Promise<SystemConfigData> =>
    req(`/api/admin/config/${key}`, { method: "DELETE" }),
  testEmail: (): Promise<{ sent: boolean; to: string }> =>
    req("/api/admin/config/test-email", { method: "POST" }),
  /** The bug-report tracker: answers, takes issues, and is private. */
  testIssues: (): Promise<{ ok: true; repo: string; url: string | null }> =>
    req("/api/admin/config/test-issues", { method: "POST" }),
  // --- users & roles ---
  adminAudit: (limit = 500): Promise<AuditListResult> => req(`/api/admin/audit?limit=${limit}`),
  clearAudit: (): Promise<{ cleared: number }> => req("/api/admin/audit", { method: "DELETE" }),
  // --- diagnostics console ---
  adminLogs: (query: LogQuery, before: string | null): Promise<LogPage> =>
    req(`/api/admin/logs${logParams(query, { before })}`),
  adminLogFacets: (query: LogQuery): Promise<LogFacets> =>
    req(`/api/admin/logs/facets${logParams(query)}`),
  adminUsers: (): Promise<AdminUserRow[]> => req("/api/admin/users"),
  setUserRole: (id: number, role: "user" | "admin"): Promise<AdminUserRow> =>
    req(`/api/admin/users/${id}/role`, { method: "PATCH", body: JSON.stringify({ role }) }),
  setUserSuspended: (id: number, suspended: boolean): Promise<AdminUserRow> =>
    req(`/api/admin/users/${id}/suspend`, { method: "PATCH", body: JSON.stringify({ suspended }) }),
  adminDeleteUser: (id: number): Promise<{ deleted: number }> =>
    req(`/api/admin/users/${id}`, { method: "DELETE" }),
  // --- scheduler + maintenance ---
  schedulerStatus: (): Promise<SchedulerStatus> => req("/api/admin/scheduler"),
  updateSchedulerJob: (
    jobId: string,
    intervalMinutes: number,
  ): Promise<{ id: string; interval_minutes: number }> =>
    req(`/api/admin/scheduler/jobs/${jobId}`, {
      method: "PATCH",
      body: JSON.stringify({ interval_minutes: intervalMinutes }),
    }),
  runSchedulerJob: (jobId: string): Promise<{ id: string; started: boolean }> =>
    req(`/api/admin/scheduler/jobs/${jobId}/run`, { method: "POST" }),
  runAllSchedulerJobs: (): Promise<{ started: string[] }> =>
    req("/api/admin/scheduler/run-all", { method: "POST" }),
  updateMaintenanceBatch: (revalidateBatch: number): Promise<{ revalidate_batch: number }> =>
    req("/api/admin/scheduler/maintenance", {
      method: "PATCH",
      body: JSON.stringify({ revalidate_batch: revalidateBatch }),
    }),
  // --- access invites ---
  // Sign-ups that registered but still cannot get in — the admin lifeline for roadmap UX-25.
  adminPendingAccess: (): Promise<PendingAccessRow[]> => req("/api/admin/pending-access"),
  // Let one in. Admin-only and explicit: it changes discoverability, not authority — the same thing
  // was always possible by re-entering the address in the whitelist box.
  activateUser: (id: number): Promise<AdminUserRow> =>
    req(`/api/admin/users/${id}/activate`, { method: "POST" }, { quiet: true }),
  // Re-send someone's confirmation link. Unlike the public resend this one says what happened,
  // because the caller is already an authenticated admin.
  resendUserVerification: (id: number): Promise<{ ok: boolean; email: string }> =>
    req(`/api/admin/users/${id}/resend-verification`, { method: "POST" }, { quiet: true }),
  // What the account panel shows: the two computed gate answers, resolved for one user on open.
  adminUserAccess: (id: number): Promise<AdminUserAccess> => req(`/api/admin/users/${id}/access`),
  // Mint a one-time, no-email link that lets this account set a password (SEC-15 / SEC-16, and the
  // everyday "no SMTP and someone forgot theirs"). Issuing does not revoke the current password.
  createSetPasswordLink: (
    id: number,
  ): Promise<{ ok: boolean; url: string; expires_at: string | null; email: string }> =>
    req(`/api/admin/users/${id}/set-password-link`, { method: "POST" }, { quiet: true }),
  adminInvites: (status?: string): Promise<Invite[]> =>
    req(`/api/admin/invites${status ? `?status=${status}` : ""}`),
  approveInvite: (id: number) => req(`/api/admin/invites/${id}/approve`, { method: "POST" }),
  denyInvite: (id: number) => req(`/api/admin/invites/${id}/deny`, { method: "POST" }),
  // Tell someone their address is whitelisted. Never automatic: adding the address stays silent, so
  // this is the deliberate act that actually reaches a person.
  sendInvitation: (id: number, lang: string): Promise<Invite> =>
    req(
      `/api/admin/invites/${id}/invite`,
      { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify({ lang }) },
      { quiet: true },
    ),
  addInvite: (email: string) =>
    req("/api/admin/invites", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify({ email }) }),
  /** `still_allowed_by_env` is true when the address stays allow-listed by the server's env
   *  ALLOWED_EMAILS / ADMIN_EMAILS, i.e. removing the row did not actually revoke access. */
  // quiet: a 409 here ("that address has an account") is a case the UI handles with a translated
  // toast; without this the shared handler ALSO raises the server's English detail as a modal.
  deleteInvite: (id: number): Promise<{ deleted: number; still_allowed_by_env: boolean }> =>
    req(`/api/admin/invites/${id}`, { method: "DELETE" }, { quiet: true }),
};