Files
siftlode/backend/app/audit.py
T
peter 6d8b7be6d8 feat!: remove the shared demo account
The demo account — one shared user that whitelisted emails entered from
the login page, reset on a schedule — goes end to end (owner decision,
E34): demo.py and the reset job, users.is_demo and demo_whitelist
(migration 0098 deletes the demo user, its audit rows, the reset job's
override and notices, then drops the column and table; the downgrade
restores the empty schema), the /auth/demo entry, the admin whitelist and
reset, the Demo tab, the banner, the login page's "Try the demo", and
every is_demo branch in routes, userscope, scheduler and the UI.

require_human only ever refused the demo account, so its 87 uses become
current_user (owner-approved); require_write_scope keeps its own check.
The login page's "or" divider now shows only beside the Google button:
without the demo entry under it, an instance without Google would have
said "or" to nothing.

A contract test (removedFeatures) fails on the word anywhere in the
backend, frontend, e2e or scripts — seen red on a planted hit. Size
ceilings tightened for the modules that shrank; admin.py is back under
the limit.
2026-10-05 00:19:38 +02:00

99 lines
4.1 KiB
Python

"""Admin/scheduler audit trail: an append-only record of who changed what and when.
Design (locked): log at ACTION / job-run granularity, NEVER per-row — a scheduler run that
touches thousands of videos is ONE audit row summarising the outcome. Automatic job runs are
only logged when they actually changed something (or errored); all admin actions and all manual
runs are always logged. Secrets are never stored (config changes log the key name only).
`record()` only db.add()s the row — the caller commits it in the SAME transaction as the
mutation it describes, so the trail can't drift from reality (and a rolled-back mutation drops
its audit row too).
"""
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from sqlalchemy import delete
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.models import AuditLog
class AuditAction:
"""Canonical `<entity>_<action>` audit keys — the single source of truth. User-facing labels
are resolved on the client via i18n `auditActions.<key>` (mirrors quota.QuotaAction)."""
# User / roles / access
USER_ROLE_CHANGE = "user_role_change"
USER_SUSPEND = "user_suspend"
USER_UNSUSPEND = "user_unsuspend"
USER_DELETE = "user_delete"
# E9.5 S5: an admin let a stuck registrant in, or re-sent their confirmation link. Both are
# recorded because both are the admin acting ON someone's access, not merely reading a list.
USER_ACTIVATE = "user_activate"
USER_VERIFY_RESEND = "user_verify_resend"
USER_SETPW_LINK = "user_setpw_link"
INVITE_APPROVE = "invite_approve"
INVITE_DENY = "invite_deny"
INVITE_ADD = "invite_add"
INVITE_DELETE = "invite_delete"
# E9.5 S6: the admin chose to tell someone their address is whitelisted. Adding the address is
# silent, so this is the act that actually reaches a person — and the one worth a record.
INVITE_SEND = "invite_send"
DISCOVERY_PURGE = "discovery_purge"
# Config
CONFIG_SET = "config_set"
CONFIG_RESET = "config_reset"
# Scheduler / sync
SCHEDULER_INTERVAL = "scheduler_interval"
MAINTENANCE_TUNE = "maintenance_tune"
SYNC_PAUSE = "sync_pause"
SYNC_RESUME = "sync_resume"
# Scheduler job outcome / run-summary (actor_id set = a manual "run now"; NULL = automatic)
JOB_RUN = "job_run"
# Per-user download cookie/auth credential set or removed (the value is NEVER recorded)
DOWNLOAD_CREDENTIAL_SET = "download_credential_set"
DOWNLOAD_CREDENTIAL_DELETE = "download_credential_delete"
# The log itself was cleared (a single row survives the clear as tamper-evidence)
AUDIT_CLEAR = "audit_clear"
# E16: a user sent a debug session's issue to the tracker — the one act that takes their log
# off this instance, so it is recorded (target = the session, summary = the issue's URL).
ISSUE_CREATE = "issue_create"
def record(
db: Session,
actor_id: int | None,
action: str,
*,
target_type: str | None = None,
target_id: str | int | None = None,
summary: str | None = None,
before: dict | None = None,
after: dict | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Append an audit row (NOT committed — the caller commits it with the mutation)."""
db.add(
AuditLog(
actor_id=actor_id,
action=action,
target_type=target_type,
# Truncate to the column widths so an over-long target/summary can never abort the
# mutation this row is committed alongside (an audit row must not break what it observes).
target_id=None if target_id is None else str(target_id)[:128],
summary=(summary or None) and summary[:255],
before=before,
after=after,
)
)
def gc(db: Session, retention_days: int) -> int:
"""Delete audit rows older than `retention_days`. Returns the number removed. A
retention_days <= 0 disables pruning (keep forever)."""
if retention_days <= 0:
return 0
cutoff = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=retention_days)
result = db.execute(delete(AuditLog).where(AuditLog.created_at < cutoff))
db.commit()
return result.rowcount or 0