peter
fc56f514b3
Round three, on round two's diff. The trend across the loop is 47 -> 34 -> 15 raw findings; the ops half kept producing the sharpest ones because the gate cannot run it. **`docker compose start` ignores a newly pinned IMAGE_TAG.** Round two removed the automatic restart because it re-ran `alembic upgrade head` — and then told the operator to run that exact command by hand, in both scripts and the docs. `start` relaunches the container that already exists, which still carries the tag being rolled back FROM, so pinning 0.79.0 and following the printed instruction brings 0.80.0 back up and re-applies its migrations. Verified against a real daemon: after changing the pinned tag, `start` kept the old image and only `up -d` picked up the new one. Both scripts and the doc now say `up -d`, with the pin-first caveat where the operator reads it. **The reset flag outlived its token.** Reverting round one's "each link clears the other" went one step too far: a `#verify=` link pasted over a standing reset notice replaces the whole fragment, so the reset token is gone — but `resetPending` stayed true, and being checked first it hid the confirmation while promising a recovery that signing out could no longer complete. The flag is now cleared when the fragment it describes is gone, which is narrower than what was reverted and does not blank the signed-out card. **A test that could not fail.** The shared-asset regression test seeded the asset as `pending`, and `_reset_asset_pending` only acts on `downloading` — so the release half was a no-op and deleting it kept the suite green. Seeded as the worker actually leaves it now. Also: the malformed-URL guard answers with urlguard's structured detail rather than a bare English string, so both halves of one typo class get the same localized copy, and the third site in that module handing user input to `urlparse` was swept with it; the asset is released after the job is terminal, not before; the Stats 403 toast gets the wizard handle its own comment claimed it had; the pasted Windows recipe sets `$ErrorActionPreference` inside the block (a scriptblock inherits the caller's, so a `SilentlyContinue` profile swallowed every throw) and cleans up the container-side dump on the failure path too; the restore warning moved to the warning stream so a `> log` redirect cannot file it away; and two comments narrowed to what the code does. Gate green: vitest 685, pytest 950.
130 lines
7.0 KiB
Python
130 lines
7.0 KiB
Python
"""Classify a raw yt-dlp / ffmpeg failure string into a stable category code.
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The worker stores the raw exception text (truncated) for technical detail, but a raw
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`ERROR: [youtube] <id>: Private video. Sign in…` is noise to a user. `classify()` maps that text
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to one of a small set of category codes; the frontend turns the code into a localized, human
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explanation (and decides whether a retry makes sense). The raw text stays available behind a
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"details" disclosure. This is the same string-matching approach the worker already trusts for
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`_RETRIABLE_MARKERS` — kept here as the single source of truth for "what kind of failure is this".
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"""
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# Two worker-authored strings that this module owns because both are coupled to `_RULES`.
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#
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# QUOTA_FULL_MESSAGE is raised by the worker and must classify back to `quota_exceeded`; its rule
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# below matches a fragment of it, and test_download_errors pins the pair, because a message and its
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# rule drifting apart is exactly how a category silently becomes unreachable.
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#
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# NETWORK_REDACTED_MESSAGE is the opposite direction: it REPLACES a message after classification, so
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# it deliberately has no rule. Nothing re-classifies a stored `job.error` today; if anything ever
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# does, it must carry the original code rather than re-deriving one from this text.
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#
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# Other worker-raised texts are still inline literals at their raise sites. The ffmpeg ones and
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# "produced no output file" have markers here; the urlguard refusal deliberately has none and
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# classifies as `unknown` — it is a refusal, not a diagnosis, and no category would say more.
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QUOTA_FULL_MESSAGE = "Your download storage is full — free up space, then try again."
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NETWORK_REDACTED_MESSAGE = "The server could not reach that address."
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# (marker, category) — first match wins, so order most-specific → most-general. Matching is
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# case-insensitive on a substring, against the raw yt-dlp/ffmpeg message.
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_RULES: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = (
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# Our own refusal: the worker found the user already at their storage cap (SEC-13). Placed
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# first — it is our wording, so it can never be a false match on an upstream message.
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("download storage is full", "quota_exceeded"),
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# Login / age / members / bot-check — the user must be signed in (we deliberately are not).
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("sign in to confirm your age", "login_required"),
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("confirm your age", "login_required"),
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("sign in to confirm you're not a bot", "login_required"),
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("not a bot", "login_required"),
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("sign in to confirm", "login_required"),
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("members-only", "login_required"),
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("available to this channel's members", "login_required"),
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("join this channel", "login_required"),
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("this video is only available to", "login_required"),
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# Some extractors (e.g. Reddit) gate content behind a logged-in account: "Account
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# authentication is required." — an auth wall we deliberately don't cross, not a transient error.
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("authentication is required", "login_required"),
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# Closed-group / private-post auth walls (Facebook groups, Instagram private, …). yt-dlp phrases
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# these many ways; the common thread is "you must be signed in" or its own suggestion to supply
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# cookies. Treating the cookie suggestion as an auth signal is what makes a login-walled link read
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# honestly (and stay non-retryable) when the acting user has no usable cookie for that host.
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("log in to", "login_required"),
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("login required", "login_required"),
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("you must be logged in", "login_required"),
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("only available for registered users", "login_required"),
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("use --cookies", "login_required"),
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("--cookies-from-browser", "login_required"),
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# Geo-restricted.
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("in your country", "geo_blocked"),
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("available in your location", "geo_blocked"),
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("not available from your location", "geo_blocked"),
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("geo restricted", "geo_blocked"),
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# An edit's source download went away — our own wording, and MORE specific than the generic
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# "no longer available" below, so it must be matched first.
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("source download is no longer available", "source_missing"),
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("source file is missing", "source_missing"),
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# Private / deleted / removed / terminated.
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("private video", "unavailable"),
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("video unavailable", "unavailable"),
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("no longer available", "unavailable"),
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("has been removed", "unavailable"),
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("removed by the uploader", "unavailable"),
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("account associated with this video has been terminated", "unavailable"),
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("this video is not available", "unavailable"),
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("this video has been removed", "unavailable"),
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# yt-dlp doesn't support this site at all ("Unsupported URL: …") — distinct from an auth wall on a
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# supported site. Non-retryable: no cookie or retry can make an unsupported host downloadable.
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("unsupported url", "unsupported_host"),
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("no video could be found in this url", "unsupported_host"),
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# DRM.
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("drm protected", "drm"),
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("drm-protected", "drm"),
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# No usable media format.
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("requested format is not available", "format_unavailable"),
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("only images are available", "format_unavailable"),
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("no video formats found", "format_unavailable"),
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("unable to extract", "format_unavailable"),
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# Our own post-processing (ffmpeg) step failed.
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("ffmpeg failed", "postprocess"),
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("ffmpeg stalled", "postprocess"),
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("postprocessing", "postprocess"),
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("produced no output file", "postprocess"),
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("no output file", "postprocess"),
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# Network / transport.
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("unable to download", "network"),
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("http error", "network"),
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("timed out", "network"),
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("read timed out", "network"),
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("temporary failure in name resolution", "network"),
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("connection reset", "network"),
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("connection refused", "network"),
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("failed to resolve", "network"),
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)
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def classify(msg: str | None) -> str:
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"""Return a category code for a raw failure message (``"unknown"`` if nothing matches)."""
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if not msg:
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return "unknown"
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low = msg.lower()
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for marker, category in _RULES:
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if marker in low:
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return category
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return "unknown"
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def user_error_text(source_kind: str, msg: str, code: str) -> str:
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"""The failure text to STORE on the job, given the raw message and its category.
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SEC-12: for a user-supplied URL, a transport-level failure text distinguishes "connection
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refused" from "HTTP Error 401" from "timed out" per host:port — which is a port scanner with
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extra steps, since the raw text is shown to the user behind the details disclosure. `urlguard`
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stops the fetch aiming at our own network; this stops the remaining readout.
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Only the network class, and only for ``url`` jobs: a YouTube job has no user-chosen host, and
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every other class (login_required, geo_blocked, drm, …) is real, useful diagnosis. A separate
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function rather than an inline branch in the worker so it can be pinned by a test — the raw
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text leaking back is a security regression that would otherwise pass a green suite."""
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if source_kind == "url" and code == "network":
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return NETWORK_REDACTED_MESSAGE
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return msg
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