Two rows of the canonical-patterns table had drifted, found while closing the roadmap audit:
- 63 mutation responses carried no `ok` — `{"unsubscribed": true}`, `{"status": "ok"}`,
`{"added": 3, …}` and so on. Each now leads with `"ok": true` (additive: every field a client
reads is still there).
- Twelve route helpers committed on their own. Six were just the end of their handler's work and now
flush: the playlist item add/remove and Watch later get-or-create, the Plex series/season bulk
mark, and the invite decision + account activation — which an approval used to land in separate
transactions. The other six commit on purpose (a token durable before its link is mailed, a
single-use token burned as its own unit, the Google callback's tail, a background registration
with its own session, the staged search ingest around YouTube calls), each listed with its reason.
`tests/test_route_conventions.py` holds both rules in code; CLAUDE.md's two rows point at it.
134 lines
4.7 KiB
Python
134 lines
4.7 KiB
Python
"""Admin Configuration page API: read/edit the DB-overridable operational settings defined in
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app.sysconfig. Secret values (e.g. SMTP password) are write-only — never returned."""
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import re
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from typing import Any
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from app import audit
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from app import email as email_mod
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from app import logs
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from app import mailtext
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from app import sysconfig
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from app.audit import AuditAction
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from app.auth import admin_user
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from app.db import get_db
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from app.models import User
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from app.refusal import refused
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from app.routes._common import not_found
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from app.refusal import setting_refused
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/admin/config", tags=["admin"])
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# Strip URL userinfo (user:pass@) so a non-secret setting that happens to embed credentials —
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# e.g. an authenticated egress proxy http://user:pass@host:port — never lands plaintext in the
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# audit trail. Non-secret values are shown live in the UI, but the log shouldn't retain creds.
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_URL_USERINFO = re.compile(r"(://)[^/@\s]+@")
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def _redact(v):
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return _URL_USERINFO.sub(r"\1***@", v) if isinstance(v, str) else v
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def _apply_runtime(db: Session, key: str) -> None:
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"""Some knobs change how THIS process behaves, not just what a later read returns — they have to
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take effect now, without a restart. One dispatch for both call sites (set and reset), so the next
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such key can't be wired into one of them and forgotten in the other."""
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if key == "log_level":
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logs.set_level(sysconfig.get_str(db, "log_level"))
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@router.get("")
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def get_config(_: User = Depends(admin_user), db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -> dict:
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return sysconfig.describe(db)
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class ConfigSetIn(BaseModel):
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# A config value is arbitrarily typed (str/int/bool/…), validated downstream by
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# sysconfig.set_value. `value` defaults to a sentinel so a MISSING value stays a 400
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# ("Missing 'value'") while an explicit `null` is a real, settable value.
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value: Any = None
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@router.patch("/{key}")
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def set_config(
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key: str,
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body: ConfigSetIn,
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admin: User = Depends(admin_user),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db),
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) -> dict:
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s = sysconfig.spec(key)
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if s is None:
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raise not_found("config_key")
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if "value" not in body.model_fields_set:
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raise refused(400, "value_missing")
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if s.secret and not sysconfig.secrets_manageable():
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raise refused(400, "no_encryption_key")
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old = None if s.secret else sysconfig.get(db, key)
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try:
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sysconfig.set_value(db, key, body.value)
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except sysconfig.InvalidSetting as exc:
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raise setting_refused(exc) from None
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# Never log a secret's value — only that it was changed, by whom. Non-secret values are logged
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# but with URL credentials redacted (a proxy/URL setting can embed user:pass). Skip the row when
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# a non-secret value didn't actually change (a no-op re-save shouldn't add trail noise); secrets
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# are write-only so we can't compare — always log.
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new = None if s.secret else sysconfig.get(db, key)
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if s.secret or new != old:
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audit.record(
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db,
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admin.id,
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AuditAction.CONFIG_SET,
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target_type="config",
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target_id=key,
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summary=f"{key} = (secret updated)" if s.secret else f"{key} = {_redact(new)}",
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before=None if s.secret else {"value": _redact(old)},
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after=None if s.secret else {"value": _redact(new)},
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)
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db.commit()
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_apply_runtime(db, key)
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return sysconfig.describe(db)
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@router.delete("/{key}")
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def reset_config(
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key: str,
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admin: User = Depends(admin_user),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db),
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) -> dict:
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s = sysconfig.spec(key)
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if s is None:
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raise not_found("config_key")
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old = None if s.secret else sysconfig.get(db, key)
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sysconfig.reset(db, key)
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audit.record(
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db,
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admin.id,
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AuditAction.CONFIG_RESET,
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target_type="config",
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target_id=key,
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summary=f"{key} → default",
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before=None if s.secret else {"value": _redact(old)},
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)
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db.commit()
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_apply_runtime(db, key)
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return sysconfig.describe(db)
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@router.post("/test-email")
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def send_test_email(
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user: User = Depends(admin_user),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db),
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) -> dict:
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"""Send a test email to the requesting admin using the current (DB or env) SMTP config —
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lets the admin verify the settings actually work."""
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if not email_mod.email_enabled():
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raise refused(400, "smtp_off")
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sent = email_mod.send_test(user.email, mailtext.lang_for_user(user))
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if not sent:
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raise refused(422, "smtp_failed")
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return {"ok": True, "sent": True, "to": user.email}
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