Two independent bugs made an email+password registration unrecoverable in prod.
The verification link did nothing. urlWithParams/clearParams rebuilt the URL as
pathname+query and dropped the fragment — but the one-time auth tokens ride the
fragment (#verify=/#reset=, SB3), and the providers that mirror nav params
(useUrlMirror in FeedFilters/Playlists/Plex/Channels) sit ABOVE the lazily-loaded
<App> in main.tsx. Their mount effect replaceState'd the token away before the auth
card's chunk had loaded, so the card read an empty hash: the link opened a bare
sign-in page, no request, no banner. Both helpers now carry the fragment over.
The account was then locked out for good. SEC-10 nulls password_hash when an
unverified account is attested (here: admin approval landing before the user could
verify — which the bug above made impossible). That is indistinguishable from a
Google-only account, and reset eligibility keyed off password_hash alone, so no
reset link was ever issued: no password to sign in with, and no way to get one.
users.password_revoked_at records the revocation, reset eligibility honours it, and
setting a password again (reset-confirm or set-password) clears it. An account that
never had a password stays ineligible on purpose — its owner adds one from Settings.
/auth/verify now also answers password_reset_required so the card can say why the
registered password stopped working, instead of leaving the user at the uniform
"Invalid email or password". Telling the holder of a valid verify token leaks
nothing: they have already proved they own the mailbox.
The 0078 migration backfills the stamp for rows carrying the exact lockout signature
(local, non-demo, no password, unverified), so existing victims recover unaided.
peter
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