peter
e764ca4568
Address the /code-review findings on the S2 test-net: - as_user no longer sets a global `lambda: user` override that two users in one test would collide on; the shared current_user override now resolves the caller from an x-test-user header, and each returned client tags its own requests, so as_user(a)/as_user(b) are independent (#1). - override_dep records the prior value per dependency key and restores it on teardown instead of a blanket dependency_overrides.clear(), so fixtures compose without clobbering each other (#5). - a _configured fixture bakes the post-setup state into client/as_user, and the per-test inline monkeypatch / autouse duplicates are removed (#4). - the feed keyset walk asserts all seeded rows surfaced before comparing, so a seeding regression can't make the sorts pass vacuously (#3).
93 lines
4.7 KiB
Python
93 lines
4.7 KiB
Python
"""Auth / session security core (TEST-1), DB-lane.
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The wallet impersonation gate, epoch-based session revocation, single-use tokens and the
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enumeration-safe uniform 401 are the security mag, and had zero tests (only `_oauth_redirect_uri` was
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covered). Starlette's SessionMiddleware round-trips the signed cookie under TestClient, so the whole
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browser-less flow is exercisable. Uses the real auth stack via the `client` fixture (NO current_user
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override) so login, the wallet gate and epoch revoke are the code under test.
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Note: `/api/me` is the bootstrap probe — it returns 200 `{authenticated: False}` when logged out, not a
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401. A revoked session is therefore checked on a PROTECTED endpoint (`/api/feed`), which does 401.
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"""
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from datetime import timedelta
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from app.auth import ACTIVE_ACCOUNT_HEADER
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from app.main import app
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_PW = "correct horse battery"
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# The `client`/`as_user` fixtures bake in the post-setup `_configured` state, so no per-test patch here.
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def _login(client, email, password):
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return client.post("/auth/password-login", json={"email": email, "password": password})
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def test_password_login_then_me_is_authenticated(client, make_user):
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make_user(email="alice@example.com", password=_PW)
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assert _login(client, "alice@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
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me = client.get("/api/me")
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assert me.status_code == 200
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assert me.json()["authenticated"] is True
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assert me.json()["email"] == "alice@example.com"
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def test_wrong_password_and_unknown_email_give_a_byte_identical_401(client, make_user):
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make_user(email="bob@example.com", password=_PW)
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wrong_pw = _login(client, "bob@example.com", "not the password")
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unknown = _login(client, "nobody@example.com", _PW)
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assert wrong_pw.status_code == 401 and unknown.status_code == 401
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# Identical body: a wrong password and a non-existent account must be indistinguishable (no
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# account-enumeration oracle).
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assert wrong_pw.json() == unknown.json()
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def test_a_non_wallet_account_header_falls_back_to_the_default(client, make_user):
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# The X-Siftlode-Account header may only re-target an account already signed into THIS browser
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# (in the session wallet). A header naming someone else must be ignored, not honored — otherwise
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# it's an impersonation gate hole.
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make_user(email="alice2@example.com", password=_PW)
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mallory = make_user(email="mallory@example.com", password=_PW)
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assert _login(client, "alice2@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
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me = client.get("/api/me", headers={ACTIVE_ACCOUNT_HEADER: str(mallory.id)})
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assert me.status_code == 200
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assert me.json()["email"] == "alice2@example.com" # still Alice, not Mallory
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def test_logout_others_revokes_the_other_session_but_keeps_the_caller(client, make_user):
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# Two independent cookie jars (browsers) signed into the same account. `logout-others` from one
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# bumps the account epoch so the OTHER's cookie is rejected on its next request, while the caller
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# is re-stamped and stays in. Checked on /api/feed (a protected endpoint that 401s on revocation).
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make_user(email="carol@example.com", password=_PW)
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# A second, independent cookie jar; the `client` fixture already routed get_db to the test DB on
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# the shared app, so this instance uses it too — it just has its own session cookie.
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other = TestClient(app)
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assert _login(client, "carol@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
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assert _login(other, "carol@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
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assert other.get("/api/feed").status_code == 200 # both valid to start
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assert client.post("/auth/logout-others").status_code == 200
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assert other.get("/api/feed").status_code == 401 # its epoch is now stale
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assert client.get("/api/feed").status_code == 200 # the caller stays signed in
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def test_reset_confirm_is_single_use_and_kills_existing_sessions(client, make_user, db):
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from app.routes.auth import _issue_token
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user = make_user(email="dave@example.com", password=_PW)
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assert _login(client, "dave@example.com", _PW).status_code == 200
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assert client.get("/api/feed").status_code == 200 # session valid at the pre-reset epoch
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raw = _issue_token(db, user, "reset", timedelta(hours=1))
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db.commit()
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ok = client.post("/auth/password-reset/confirm", json={"token": raw, "password": "brand new pw!"})
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assert ok.status_code == 200
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# A reset bumps the epoch (compromise response) -> the pre-reset cookie is now rejected.
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assert client.get("/api/feed").status_code == 401
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# The token is single-use: a replay is a clean 400, not a second reset.
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replay = client.post("/auth/password-reset/confirm", json={"token": raw, "password": "another pw!!"})
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assert replay.status_code == 400
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