Files
siftlode/backend/app/routes/me.py
T
peter 47d968eeea fix: review round 4 — an account switch unloads as the old account, a share link's lockout costs five networks
Deep-review round 4, targeted at round 3's changes (f569b19c..e7f38396).

Accounts
- Switching, adding or signing out an account moved the tab's pin before
  the page unloaded, so the players' resume beacons fired on the way out
  under the NEW account: one account's playback position saved into the
  other. The pin is now handed to the next page (pinOnNextPage) and taken
  over at import; clearActiveAccount is gone.
- Switching to a suspended account was refused but left it in the
  switcher, refused on every click; a deactivated one was not refused at
  all, and made the default it signed every account in the browser out on
  the next request. Every account _session_user would refuse — gone,
  deactivated, suspended, revoked — is refused and dropped from the list.

Share page (/watch)
- An IPv6 client is limited by its /64 (client_ip becomes client_key, for
  every limiter): keyed on the full address, one subscriber could rotate
  through endless identities. The comments now state what the per-link
  ceiling costs: guessing from five networks can keep a link shut for its
  window, and guesses already running when it fills are still checked.
- The link is looked up before the limiter records the attempt, so made-up
  tokens no longer grow it by an entry each.

Forms
- Failing the same way twice is announced again: the sign-in, passphrase
  and setup errors are keyed on the attempt (a clear and a set in one
  handler left the alert node untouched).
- The install wizard's own validation showed the generic error — it threw
  plain objects its catch did not read. It sets the step's message.

Tests: a re-pin leaving the previous account's notices behind; the pin
hand-over; switching to an ended account; the /64 viewer; made-up tokens;
the repeated alerts. Each mutation-checked RED for its own reason.
2026-09-15 02:53:22 +02:00

204 lines
9.0 KiB
Python

from fastapi import APIRouter, BackgroundTasks, Depends, HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
from sqlalchemy import func, select
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.auth import (
count_admins,
count_pending_activations,
current_user,
drop_from_wallet,
google_enabled,
has_read_scope,
has_write_scope,
is_allowed,
optional_current_user,
purge_user,
)
from app import email as email_mod
from app import sysconfig
from app.db import get_db
from app.models import Invite, User
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/me", tags=["me"])
@router.get("/accounts")
def my_accounts(
request: Request,
user: User = Depends(current_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
) -> list[dict]:
"""The accounts that have authenticated in this browser session (switchable without a
new Google sign-in). The active one is flagged."""
ids = request.session.get("account_ids") or [user.id]
rows = {u.id: u for u in db.query(User).filter(User.id.in_(ids)).all()}
out = []
for uid in ids: # preserve recency order from the session
u = rows.get(uid)
if u is not None:
out.append(
{
"id": u.id,
"email": u.email,
"display_name": u.display_name,
"avatar_url": u.avatar_url,
"active": u.id == user.id,
}
)
return out
class SwitchAccountIn(BaseModel):
user_id: int
@router.post("/switch")
def switch_account(
body: SwitchAccountIn,
request: Request,
user: User = Depends(current_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
) -> dict:
"""Switch the active account to another one already authenticated in this browser. No
Google round-trip — but only accounts present in the session list (proof they signed in
here) are allowed, and access is re-checked in case the invite was revoked since."""
target = body.user_id
if target not in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Not an account you've signed into here.")
# An account `_session_user` would refuse — gone, deactivated, suspended, or its session revoked — is
# refused here too, and dropped from the switch list the way `_session_user` drops it. Made the session
# default instead, the next request's current_user would refuse it as the DEFAULT and clear the whole
# wallet session, logging out every account here. (B-core-9)
u = db.get(User, target)
if u is None:
drop_from_wallet(request.session, target)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="That account no longer exists.")
if not is_allowed(db, u.email):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="That account no longer has access.")
if not u.is_active:
drop_from_wallet(request.session, target)
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="That account no longer has access.")
if u.is_suspended:
drop_from_wallet(request.session, target)
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="That account is suspended.")
# Revoked: a password reset/change or "log out everywhere" bumped the account's epoch.
epochs = request.session.get("epochs") or {}
if int(epochs.get(str(target), 0)) != (u.session_epoch or 0):
drop_from_wallet(request.session, target)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403, detail="That account was signed out elsewhere — sign in again."
)
request.session["user_id"] = target
return {"ok": True, "user_id": target}
@router.get("")
def get_me(
user: User | None = Depends(optional_current_user), db: Session = Depends(get_db)
) -> dict:
# The app's bootstrap probe: return 200 with `authenticated: False` when logged out (rather
# than 401) so the public landing never logs a failed /api/me to the browser console. Other
# protected endpoints still 401, so mid-session expiry is still caught by the global handler.
if user is None:
return {"authenticated": False}
pending_invites = 0
pending_activations = 0
# Admin-only, because it drives an operator warning: email is fail-soft, so a half-filled SMTP
# config costs verification links, password resets and access-request notices with nothing
# visible anywhere. Surfacing it here puts the warning on the screens where onboarding happens.
email_configured = True
if user.role == "admin":
pending_invites = (
db.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(Invite).where(Invite.status == "pending"))
or 0
)
# Counted separately from pending_invites rather than folded into it: the two are different
# facts (a request awaiting a decision vs a decided address whose sign-up never got let in),
# and quietly widening one number would make an existing field mean something new.
pending_activations = count_pending_activations(db)
email_configured = email_mod.email_enabled(db) # this request's session; no second connect
return {
"authenticated": True,
"id": user.id,
"email": user.email,
"display_name": user.display_name,
"avatar_url": user.avatar_url,
"role": user.role,
"is_demo": user.is_demo,
"has_google": user.google_sub is not None,
# The address Google answers with, when it DIFFERS from the account's own. Same string for
# most people, and then this is None so no surface has to decide whether to show it — the
# comparison lives here, once, instead of in every consumer.
"google_email": (
user.google_email if user.google_email and user.google_email != user.email else None
),
"has_password": user.password_hash is not None,
# Instance-wide: whether Google sign-in / YouTube connect is available at all (the UI hides
# YouTube-access affordances and the onboarding nudge when it isn't configured).
"google_enabled": google_enabled(db),
# Whether the optional Plex module is enabled (UI shows the Plex feed source when so).
"plex_enabled": sysconfig.get_bool(db, "plex_enabled"),
"can_read": has_read_scope(user),
"can_write": has_write_scope(user),
"pending_invites": pending_invites,
# Sign-ups an admin still has to let in (roadmap UX-25): approved BEFORE they registered, so
# nothing ever reached the Access-requests queue and the badge used to read zero.
"pending_activations": pending_activations,
"email_configured": email_configured,
"preferences": user.preferences or {},
}
@router.delete("/account")
def delete_my_account(
request: Request,
background: BackgroundTasks,
user: User = Depends(current_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
) -> dict:
"""GDPR self-service erasure: permanently delete the signed-in account and ALL its personal
data — OAuth tokens, subscriptions, tags, watch/save/hide states, playlists, notifications —
which all cascade on the users row. Quota-audit events are kept but anonymised (FK SET NULL).
The shared demo account can't be deleted, and the last remaining admin can't delete itself
(that would lock everyone out of the admin surfaces)."""
# Structured, like the other three demo refusals: `req` leaves 403 to the caller and
# `notifyActionError` discards a plain-string detail in favour of the caller's translated
# fallback, so a hand-written English sentence here reaches a Hungarian UI as a generic
# "couldn't do that" — or, on this affordance, as nothing at all. `reason` distinguishes it
# from the other sites' bare `{code: "demo"}` so the UI can say what specifically is refused.
if user.is_demo:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail={"code": "demo", "reason": "delete_account"})
if user.role == "admin" and count_admins(db) <= 1:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="You're the only admin — promote another admin before deleting your account.",
)
user_id = user.id
# Full erasure (cascades) + access-request cleanup + Google-grant revocation; shared with the
# admin delete path. Capture the id first — `user` is detached once purge_user deletes the row.
purge_user(db, user, background)
# Drop this account from the browser session; switch to another signed-in account if any.
remaining = [a for a in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != user_id]
if remaining:
request.session["account_ids"] = remaining
request.session["user_id"] = remaining[-1]
else:
request.session.clear()
return {"deleted": True}
@router.put("/preferences")
def update_preferences(
preferences: dict,
user: User = Depends(current_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
) -> dict:
# Merge so partial updates don't wipe other keys.
merged = dict(user.preferences or {})
merged.update(preferences)
user.preferences = merged
db.add(user)
db.commit()
return {"preferences": merged}