Files
siftlode/backend/app/audit.py
T
peter 827df7494c fix(files): ending every session ends every API token, and the share links hold their folder
- A password reset or change, "log out everywhere" and a revoked untrusted password revoke all of the
  account's API tokens too (audited): one minted from a stolen session no longer outlives the answer.
- A bearer token or link grant with a non-ASCII character is refused (401/403), not a 500.
- Making a token's grants or a folder link holds the folder, so a racing delete cannot fail the
  foreign key; a link's view count is one atomic UPDATE.
- A folder link's card counts exactly the files its page lists (one `links.folder_files`).
- A file with no extension is served without a trailing dot.
- 0106's downgrade names a Hub folder so it never collides with one of the user's folders.
- The speed baseline reads share tokens through the app (the database keeps them hashed/encrypted).
- Tests: the token scope on the real session stack, the folder poster, the Hub refused for a link,
  0106's downgrade data step, 0107 without a key; docs/comments follow (three folder kinds, folder
  links, key change, the cleanup job's token warnings).
2026-10-15 04:58:16 +02:00

120 lines
5.1 KiB
Python

"""Admin/scheduler audit trail: an append-only record of who changed what and when.
Design (locked): log at ACTION / job-run granularity, NEVER per-row — a scheduler run that
touches thousands of videos is ONE audit row summarising the outcome. Automatic job runs are
only logged when they actually changed something (or errored); all admin actions and all manual
runs are always logged. Secrets are never stored (config changes log the key name only).
`record()` only db.add()s the row — the caller commits it in the SAME transaction as the
mutation it describes, so the trail can't drift from reality (and a rolled-back mutation drops
its audit row too).
"""
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from sqlalchemy import delete
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.models import AuditLog
class AuditAction:
"""Canonical `<entity>_<action>` audit keys — the single source of truth. User-facing labels
are resolved on the client via i18n `auditActions.<key>` (mirrors quota.QuotaAction)."""
# User / roles / access
USER_ROLE_CHANGE = "user_role_change"
USER_SUSPEND = "user_suspend"
USER_UNSUSPEND = "user_unsuspend"
USER_DELETE = "user_delete"
# An admin let a stuck registrant in, or re-sent their confirmation link. Both are
# recorded because both are the admin acting ON someone's access, not merely reading a list.
USER_ACTIVATE = "user_activate"
USER_VERIFY_RESEND = "user_verify_resend"
USER_SETPW_LINK = "user_setpw_link"
INVITE_APPROVE = "invite_approve"
INVITE_DENY = "invite_deny"
INVITE_ADD = "invite_add"
INVITE_DELETE = "invite_delete"
# The admin chose to tell someone their address is whitelisted. Adding the address is
# silent, so this is the act that actually reaches a person — and the one worth a record.
INVITE_SEND = "invite_send"
DISCOVERY_PURGE = "discovery_purge"
# Config
CONFIG_SET = "config_set"
CONFIG_RESET = "config_reset"
# Scheduler / sync
SCHEDULER_INTERVAL = "scheduler_interval"
MAINTENANCE_TUNE = "maintenance_tune"
SYNC_PAUSE = "sync_pause"
SYNC_RESUME = "sync_resume"
# Scheduler job outcome / run-summary (actor_id set = a manual "run now"; NULL = automatic)
JOB_RUN = "job_run"
# Per-user download cookie/auth credential set or removed (the value is NEVER recorded)
DOWNLOAD_CREDENTIAL_SET = "download_credential_set"
DOWNLOAD_CREDENTIAL_DELETE = "download_credential_delete"
# The log itself was cleared (a single row survives the clear as tamper-evidence)
AUDIT_CLEAR = "audit_clear"
# A user sent a debug session's issue to the tracker — the one act that takes their log
# off this instance, so it is recorded (target = the session, summary = the issue's URL).
ISSUE_CREATE = "issue_create"
# The Files library (`routes.files`): what a user put in, took out, kept or reorganised. Ids
# only — a file's or folder's name is the user's own text, not the admin's to read here.
FILE_UPLOAD = "file_upload"
FILE_DELETE = "file_delete"
FILE_KEEP = "file_keep"
FILE_UNKEEP = "file_unkeep"
FILE_MOVE = "file_move"
FILE_FOLDER_CREATE = "file_folder_create"
FILE_FOLDER_RENAME = "file_folder_rename"
FILE_FOLDER_RETENTION = "file_folder_retention"
FILE_FOLDER_DELETE = "file_folder_delete"
# A machine's token to the library (`routes.tokens`): made (its folders and rights) or revoked.
# What a token then did is the file rows above, their summary naming it.
API_TOKEN_CREATE = "api_token_create"
API_TOKEN_REVOKE = "api_token_revoke"
# A public `/watch` link to a file or a folder (`routes.downloads`): made, its settings changed,
# revoked.
# Never its token or password — only whether it has one.
DOWNLOAD_LINK_CREATE = "download_link_create"
DOWNLOAD_LINK_UPDATE = "download_link_update"
DOWNLOAD_LINK_REVOKE = "download_link_revoke"
def record(
db: Session,
actor_id: int | None,
action: str,
*,
target_type: str | None = None,
target_id: str | int | None = None,
summary: str | None = None,
before: dict | None = None,
after: dict | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Append an audit row (NOT committed — the caller commits it with the mutation)."""
db.add(
AuditLog(
actor_id=actor_id,
action=action,
target_type=target_type,
# Truncate to the column widths so an over-long target/summary can never abort the
# mutation this row is committed alongside (an audit row must not break what it observes).
target_id=None if target_id is None else str(target_id)[:128],
summary=(summary or None) and summary[:255],
before=before,
after=after,
)
)
def gc(db: Session, retention_days: int) -> int:
"""Delete audit rows older than `retention_days`. Returns the number removed. A
retention_days <= 0 disables pruning (keep forever)."""
if retention_days <= 0:
return 0
cutoff = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=retention_days)
result = db.execute(delete(AuditLog).where(AuditLog.created_at < cutoff))
db.commit()
return result.rowcount or 0