Approve an address BEFORE the person registers and their sign-up produces no queue row at all — `_decide` only takes a still-pending invite — so the Access-requests screen sat empty, the tab badge read zero, and the only working move was re-typing the address into the whitelist box. Nobody would guess that, and on 2026-09-03 nobody did. This is roadmap UX-25, where two earlier attempts were reverted after review. Both moved AUTHORITY: auto-activating on registration turns a standing whitelist entry into a bearer grant for whoever registers the address first, and reopening the approved invite to `pending` lets an anonymous sign-up REVOKE a standing approval. What was actually missing was visibility, so this changes nothing about what an unauthenticated caller can cause — the admin could already do exactly this by re-entering the address; they just had no way to know they had to. The section lists every account that cannot sign in yet and says WHICH gate is shut, because the two dead ends look the same from the admin's chair: waiting for activation, or waiting on a confirmation mail. Naming the unconfirmed ones is not decoration — on a no-SMTP instance that is the difference between the owner and whoever registered the address first (SEC-15), and an admin about to let someone in should see it. A person the queue above already covers is deliberately NOT listed here; two buttons for one person is worse than one. Activate is gated on `is_allowed` — the same function the sign-in paths consult, in core, so the button that appears and the badge that counts cannot disagree. Without that gate it would manufacture an inconsistent account: password sign-in only checks `is_active` and would let them in, while their Google sign-in would be turned away and silently reopened as a fresh access request. Letting in someone with no approved invite stays the whitelist box's job, which says so out loud. The badge counts activations SEPARATELY from pending invites rather than widening an existing field's meaning, and only counts what genuinely waits on the admin: an unconfirmed account waits on its owner, so it is listed with a re-send but does not nag. The admin-side resend says plainly what happened, including refusing when the instance has no working SMTP — mail is fail-soft everywhere else, and that silence is exactly what left the 0.78.5 sign-ups with nothing to fall back on. `send_verification_link` is now one function with three callers (registration, the public resend, this one), so the link's shape and TTL cannot drift by who triggered it. UAT on localdev, both languages: the UX-25 shape reproduced end to end (approve the address, then register), the badge counting it, Activate letting them in and dropping the badge, the row losing its Activate but keeping the re-send, a fresh token issued by the re-send, and both actions in the audit log. Test data removed.
196 lines
8.4 KiB
Python
196 lines
8.4 KiB
Python
from fastapi import APIRouter, BackgroundTasks, Depends, HTTPException, Request
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from sqlalchemy import func, select
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from app.auth import (
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count_admins,
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count_pending_activations,
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current_user,
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google_enabled,
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has_read_scope,
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has_write_scope,
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is_allowed,
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optional_current_user,
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purge_user,
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)
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from app import email as email_mod
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from app import sysconfig
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from app.db import get_db
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from app.models import Invite, User
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/me", tags=["me"])
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@router.get("/accounts")
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def my_accounts(
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request: Request,
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user: User = Depends(current_user),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db),
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) -> list[dict]:
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"""The accounts that have authenticated in this browser session (switchable without a
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new Google sign-in). The active one is flagged."""
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ids = request.session.get("account_ids") or [user.id]
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rows = {u.id: u for u in db.query(User).filter(User.id.in_(ids)).all()}
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out = []
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for uid in ids: # preserve recency order from the session
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u = rows.get(uid)
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if u is not None:
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out.append(
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{
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"id": u.id,
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"email": u.email,
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"display_name": u.display_name,
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"avatar_url": u.avatar_url,
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"active": u.id == user.id,
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}
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)
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return out
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class SwitchAccountIn(BaseModel):
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user_id: int
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@router.post("/switch")
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def switch_account(
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body: SwitchAccountIn,
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request: Request,
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user: User = Depends(current_user),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db),
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) -> dict:
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"""Switch the active account to another one already authenticated in this browser. No
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Google round-trip — but only accounts present in the session list (proof they signed in
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here) are allowed, and access is re-checked in case the invite was revoked since."""
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target = body.user_id
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if target not in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Not an account you've signed into here.")
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u = db.get(User, target)
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if u is None:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="That account no longer exists.")
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if not is_allowed(db, u.email):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="That account no longer has access.")
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if u.is_suspended:
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# Don't make a suspended account the active one — the next request's current_user would
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# see the suspension and clear the WHOLE wallet session, logging out every account here.
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="That account is suspended.")
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# Same reasoning for a REVOKED session (a password reset/change or "log out everywhere" bumped the
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# account's epoch): making it the session default would trip current_user's epoch check on the next
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# request and clear the whole wallet. Mirror the suspend guard — drop the stale account from the
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# switch list and refuse, rather than logging everyone out. (B-core-9)
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epochs = request.session.get("epochs") or {}
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if int(epochs.get(str(target), 0)) != (u.session_epoch or 0):
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request.session["account_ids"] = [
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a for a in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != target
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]
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=403, detail="That account was signed out elsewhere — sign in again."
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)
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request.session["user_id"] = target
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return {"ok": True, "user_id": target}
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@router.get("")
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def get_me(
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user: User | None = Depends(optional_current_user), db: Session = Depends(get_db)
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) -> dict:
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# The app's bootstrap probe: return 200 with `authenticated: False` when logged out (rather
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# than 401) so the public landing never logs a failed /api/me to the browser console. Other
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# protected endpoints still 401, so mid-session expiry is still caught by the global handler.
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if user is None:
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return {"authenticated": False}
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pending_invites = 0
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pending_activations = 0
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# Admin-only, because it drives an operator warning: email is fail-soft, so a half-filled SMTP
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# config costs verification links, password resets and access-request notices with nothing
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# visible anywhere. Surfacing it here puts the warning on the screens where onboarding happens.
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email_configured = True
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if user.role == "admin":
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pending_invites = (
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db.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(Invite).where(Invite.status == "pending"))
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or 0
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)
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# Counted separately from pending_invites rather than folded into it: the two are different
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# facts (a request awaiting a decision vs a decided address whose sign-up never got let in),
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# and quietly widening one number would make an existing field mean something new.
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pending_activations = count_pending_activations(db)
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email_configured = email_mod.email_enabled(db) # this request's session; no second connect
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return {
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"authenticated": True,
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"id": user.id,
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"email": user.email,
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"display_name": user.display_name,
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"avatar_url": user.avatar_url,
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"role": user.role,
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"is_demo": user.is_demo,
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"has_google": user.google_sub is not None,
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# The address Google answers with, when it DIFFERS from the account's own. Same string for
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# most people, and then this is None so no surface has to decide whether to show it — the
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# comparison lives here, once, instead of in every consumer.
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"google_email": (
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user.google_email if user.google_email and user.google_email != user.email else None
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),
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"has_password": user.password_hash is not None,
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# Instance-wide: whether Google sign-in / YouTube connect is available at all (the UI hides
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# YouTube-access affordances and the onboarding nudge when it isn't configured).
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"google_enabled": google_enabled(db),
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# Whether the optional Plex module is enabled (UI shows the Plex feed source when so).
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"plex_enabled": sysconfig.get_bool(db, "plex_enabled"),
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"can_read": has_read_scope(user),
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"can_write": has_write_scope(user),
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"pending_invites": pending_invites,
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# Sign-ups an admin still has to let in (roadmap UX-25): approved BEFORE they registered, so
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# nothing ever reached the Access-requests queue and the badge used to read zero.
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"pending_activations": pending_activations,
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"email_configured": email_configured,
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"preferences": user.preferences or {},
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}
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@router.delete("/account")
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def delete_my_account(
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request: Request,
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background: BackgroundTasks,
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user: User = Depends(current_user),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db),
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) -> dict:
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"""GDPR self-service erasure: permanently delete the signed-in account and ALL its personal
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data — OAuth tokens, subscriptions, tags, watch/save/hide states, playlists, notifications —
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which all cascade on the users row. Quota-audit events are kept but anonymised (FK SET NULL).
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The shared demo account can't be deleted, and the last remaining admin can't delete itself
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(that would lock everyone out of the admin surfaces)."""
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if user.is_demo:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="The shared demo account can't be deleted.")
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if user.role == "admin" and count_admins(db) <= 1:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=400,
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detail="You're the only admin — promote another admin before deleting your account.",
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)
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user_id = user.id
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# Full erasure (cascades) + access-request cleanup + Google-grant revocation; shared with the
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# admin delete path. Capture the id first — `user` is detached once purge_user deletes the row.
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purge_user(db, user, background)
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# Drop this account from the browser session; switch to another signed-in account if any.
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remaining = [a for a in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != user_id]
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if remaining:
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request.session["account_ids"] = remaining
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request.session["user_id"] = remaining[-1]
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else:
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request.session.clear()
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return {"deleted": True}
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@router.put("/preferences")
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def update_preferences(
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preferences: dict,
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user: User = Depends(current_user),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db),
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) -> dict:
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# Merge so partial updates don't wipe other keys.
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merged = dict(user.preferences or {})
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merged.update(preferences)
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user.preferences = merged
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db.add(user)
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db.commit()
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return {"preferences": merged}
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