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siftlode/backend/app/sysconfig.py
T
peter efd7b217ca fix(uploads): make both caps answerable, and stop holding a connection
The epic-end deep review found three defects in P1 and four tests that did not
hold what they claimed. They land together because they share the upload route
and its test module; splitting by hunk would have produced commits that do not
individually run green.

* The edge ceiling and the route's own cap are the SAME number at the default
  configuration, so the edge always answers first: a declared Content-Length
  over the cap is refused before a byte is read, and an undeclared body trips
  the middleware on the same chunk the route would have tripped on. The route's
  numbered 422 -- and the drain written for it last week -- are reachable only
  once an admin LOWERS the knob, which is the one shape the browser UAT tested.
  Measured: headroom does not fix this, because the declared-length check fires
  first for any body big enough to matter and the drain pushes the count back
  over the edge for the rest. So the edge's own refusal is made readable
  instead: `errors.tooLarge` localizes `too_large` the way `upload_too_large`
  was already localized, and the dialog refuses an over-cap file BEFORE sending
  it, off the `upload_max_bytes` that GET /api/downloads/usage now reports.
  Measured in Chrome against the API directly: that 413 arrives as `onload`
  with a readable body in 43 ms.

* Reading the body behind the auth dependency put the whole transfer inside the
  request's database session -- the auth SELECT autobegins a transaction, so one
  of the twenty pooled connections sat `idle in transaction`, with nothing to
  time it out, for as long as the client cared to keep sending. That is the
  invariant db.py sizes the pool on and plex/playback.py records an incident
  for. The read transaction now ends before the await. Measured on the dev
  server: an 1818 ms upload shows no idle-in-transaction sample while the bytes
  move, only afterwards, when the handler actually writes.

* The display name moved into a request header, where nothing bounds its length,
  while the column stayed varchar(255) -- so a long enough name was a DataError
  500 after the whole file had already transferred. One `display_text` helper
  now serves all three writers (the metadata PATCH already truncated, the upload
  ingest did not), and the dialog stops at the same number.

* The gate invariant asked `route.dependant.body_params`, which holds only the
  route's OWN callable's parameters: a body declared in a SUB-DEPENDENCY -- the
  upload route's own idiom -- leaves it empty while FastAPI still reads the body
  before auth. It asks `route.body_field` now, which is what FastAPI itself
  consults. The AST registry of body-reading call sites had also never followed
  `capped_stream_to`, so the one route the whole invariant exists for was the
  single site the drift guard could not see.

Four tests that passed over their own mutation are fixed: the cap boundary (a
`>` loosened to `>=` survived the entire suite), the percent-decoding (every
filename the suite sends is ASCII, where quote() is the identity function), the
display-name header (no test at all), and the staging cleanup (deleting the
unlink left the suite green while every refused upload leaked its partial bytes
onto the volume). Every test added or changed here was mutation-checked.
2026-09-22 22:41:22 +02:00

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"""Admin-editable system configuration: a DB-override layer over the env/config defaults.
The registry (SPECS) is the single source of truth for which config keys can be overridden
from the admin Configuration page, plus each key's type, admin-UI group, env/config default,
bounds, and whether it's a secret. The resolver returns the DB override if one is set, else
``settings.<default_attr>`` (same DB-override-or-default pattern as app.state). Secrets are
stored Fernet-encrypted at rest (requires TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY; without it, secrets can't be
stored in the DB and stay env-only).
"""
from dataclasses import dataclass
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app import logs, security
from app.config import Settings, canonical_choice, choices_of, settings
from app.models import SystemConfig
log = logs.get_logger(__name__)
# Config keys whose stored ciphertext failed to decrypt — tracked so the warning is logged once per
# key, not once per request (bounded by the number of secret config keys).
_decrypt_warned: set[str] = set()
# The same for a stored value that no longer coerces (a choice list that shrank in a release): it
# fails on EVERY read of a hot knob until someone saves it again. Keyed with the value, so saving a
# different bad value is reported afresh (bounded by the keys times the values ever saved).
_coerce_warned: set[tuple[str, str]] = set()
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ConfigSpec:
key: str
type: str # "int" | "str" | "bool" | "choice"
group: str # admin-UI grouping (logically related keys stay together)
default_attr: str # attribute on `settings` holding the env/config default
secret: bool = False
min: int | None = None
max: int | None = None
allow_empty: bool = False # str keys: a stored "" is an explicit empty value, not "unset"
@property
def choices(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""A choice key's allowed values, read from its setting's Literal type in config.py — the one
place the list is written. The admin page renders them as a picker."""
return choices_of(Settings.model_fields[self.default_attr].annotation)
# Registry of DB-overridable keys. Add a key here + wire its read through get_*() to move it
# off env into the admin UI; the admin page renders it automatically from this list. The ORDER is the
# admin page's tab order (first appearance of each group), so keep a group's keys together.
SPECS: tuple[ConfigSpec, ...] = (
# --- Access / registration ---
ConfigSpec("allow_registration", "bool", "access", "allow_registration"),
# --- Email / SMTP (one logical group; the password is the only secret) ---
ConfigSpec("smtp_host", "str", "email", "smtp_host"),
ConfigSpec("smtp_port", "int", "email", "smtp_port", min=1, max=65535),
ConfigSpec("smtp_user", "str", "email", "smtp_user", allow_empty=True),
ConfigSpec("smtp_from", "str", "email", "smtp_from"),
ConfigSpec("smtp_password", "str", "email", "smtp_password", secret=True),
# --- YouTube Data API key (secret; optional — public reads prefer it over OAuth) ---
ConfigSpec("youtube_api_key", "str", "youtube", "youtube_api_key", secret=True),
# Optional egress proxy for YouTube API calls (fixed-IP host for an IP-restricted key).
ConfigSpec("youtube_api_proxy", "str", "youtube", "youtube_api_proxy", allow_empty=True),
# --- Google OAuth client (Sign in with Google; both encrypted, env fallback). Set from the
# install wizard / Configuration page so no restart is needed when the creds change. ---
ConfigSpec("google_client_id", "str", "google", "google_client_id", secret=True),
ConfigSpec("google_client_secret", "str", "google", "google_client_secret", secret=True),
# --- Quota (shared YouTube Data API daily budget) ---
ConfigSpec("quota_daily_budget", "int", "quota", "quota_daily_budget", min=1, max=1_000_000),
ConfigSpec(
"backfill_quota_reserve", "int", "quota", "backfill_quota_reserve", min=0, max=1_000_000
),
ConfigSpec(
"search_daily_limit_per_user",
"int",
"quota",
"search_daily_limit_per_user",
min=0,
max=100_000,
),
# Live-search source: "scrape" (InnerTube, zero API quota) or "api" (search.list, 100u/page).
ConfigSpec("search_source", "choice", "quota", "search_source"),
# --- Backfill (recent-first first pass per channel) ---
ConfigSpec(
"backfill_recent_max_videos",
"int",
"backfill",
"backfill_recent_max_videos",
min=1,
max=100_000,
),
ConfigSpec(
"backfill_recent_max_days", "int", "backfill", "backfill_recent_max_days", min=1, max=36_500
),
ConfigSpec("rss_fallback_hours", "int", "backfill", "rss_fallback_hours", min=0, max=168),
# --- Shorts probe ---
ConfigSpec(
"shorts_probe_max_seconds", "int", "shorts", "shorts_probe_max_seconds", min=1, max=3_600
),
ConfigSpec("shorts_probe_batch", "int", "shorts", "shorts_probe_batch", min=1, max=10_000),
# --- Batch sizes ---
ConfigSpec("enrich_batch_size", "int", "batch", "enrich_batch_size", min=1, max=50),
ConfigSpec("autotag_title_sample", "int", "batch", "autotag_title_sample", min=1, max=1_000),
# --- Maintenance (rolling re-validation of already-known videos) ---
# Videos re-checked per maintenance run. Folded here from app_state (B-core-11) so every admin
# knob lives in one store; read by sync/maintenance.py, tuned from the Scheduler dashboard.
ConfigSpec(
"maintenance_revalidate_batch",
"int",
"maintenance",
"maintenance_revalidate_batch",
min=100,
max=100_000,
),
# --- Discovery cleanup (search + explore ephemeral content) ---
# Days an explored-but-unsubscribed channel is kept before the cleanup job purges it.
ConfigSpec("explore_grace_days", "int", "explore", "explore_grace_days", min=0, max=3_650),
# Days an un-kept live-search result video is kept before the cleanup job removes it.
ConfigSpec("search_grace_days", "int", "explore", "search_grace_days", min=0, max=3_650),
# --- Download center (yt-dlp) — per-user defaults + retention/GC + layout ---
ConfigSpec("download_total_max_bytes", "int", "downloads", "download_total_max_bytes", min=0),
ConfigSpec(
"download_default_max_bytes", "int", "downloads", "download_default_max_bytes", min=0
),
ConfigSpec(
"download_default_max_concurrent",
"int",
"downloads",
"download_default_max_concurrent",
min=1,
max=20,
),
ConfigSpec(
"download_default_max_jobs",
"int",
"downloads",
"download_default_max_jobs",
min=1,
max=100_000,
),
# min=1, NOT 0: a stored 0 used to read as "no per-file cap" (the cap was enforced as
# `if cap and size > cap`, so a falsy value disabled it). Since P1 the route passes this number
# straight to `capped_stream_to`, where 0 would refuse every upload instead — the opposite
# failure, and the reason `config.download_upload_max_bytes` carries its own `ge=1`. Either way
# a stored 0 is wrong, so it is floored at 1; the overall footprint is separately bounded by the
# byte quota.
# `max` is not cosmetic: `bodylimit.ROUTE_MAX_BODY_BYTES` refuses an upload body over exactly
# this number at the edge, before the route's own check ever sees it. An admin allowed to raise
# the knob past the edge would get 413s from a layer the admin page never mentions, so the two
# are pinned together here and `tests/test_body_limit.py` holds them that way. Below the edge is
# the useful direction and the one the knob exists for: a lowered knob is what makes the route's
# own 422 — the one carrying this figure — the answer the user gets. `_coerce` also
# REJECTS a stored value outside these bounds on read (falling back to the env default, with a
# warning) — neither bound has always been what it is now, so a legal-when-written override can
# be sitting in the database already.
ConfigSpec(
"download_upload_max_bytes",
"int",
"downloads",
"download_upload_max_bytes",
min=1,
max=settings.download_upload_max_bytes,
),
ConfigSpec(
"download_retention_days", "int", "downloads", "download_retention_days", min=0, max=3_650
),
ConfigSpec(
"download_gc_grace_days", "int", "downloads", "download_gc_grace_days", min=0, max=3_650
),
ConfigSpec("download_layout", "choice", "downloads", "download_layout"),
ConfigSpec(
"download_worker_concurrency",
"int",
"downloads",
"download_worker_concurrency",
min=1,
max=16,
),
ConfigSpec("sponsorblock_default", "bool", "downloads", "sponsorblock_default"),
# --- Audit log ---
# Days to keep admin audit-log rows before the audit_gc job prunes them (0 = keep forever).
ConfigSpec("audit_retention_days", "int", "audit", "audit_retention_days", min=0, max=3650),
# --- Diagnostics (E22) ---
# Runtime log level for the API process. Applied without a restart — see routes/config.py and
# main.py's lifespan.
ConfigSpec("log_level", "choice", "diagnostics", "log_level"),
# Days the log_events table keeps a row (the log_gc job prunes). No "0 = forever": stored logs
# carry account-linked request history, and the privacy policy names a limit.
ConfigSpec("log_retention_days", "int", "diagnostics", "log_retention_days", min=1, max=90),
# --- Plex integration (optional; local-file playback + Plex metadata) ---
ConfigSpec("plex_enabled", "bool", "plex", "plex_enabled"),
ConfigSpec("plex_server_url", "str", "plex", "plex_server_url"),
ConfigSpec("plex_server_token", "str", "plex", "plex_server_token", secret=True),
ConfigSpec("plex_path_map", "str", "plex", "plex_path_map"),
ConfigSpec("plex_libraries", "str", "plex", "plex_libraries"),
ConfigSpec("plex_overlay_map", "str", "plex", "plex_overlay_map"),
# (plex_sync_interval_min is tuned from the Scheduler dashboard, not here — it's a scheduler job.)
ConfigSpec("plex_max_transcodes", "int", "plex", "plex_max_transcodes", min=0, max=16),
ConfigSpec("plex_max_sessions", "int", "plex", "plex_max_sessions", min=1, max=64),
# Transcode re-encode tuning (E6 S1). The libx264 knobs apply only to the software fallback.
# crf 0–51 (x264 range); max_height 0 = source.
ConfigSpec("plex_transcode_hw", "choice", "plex", "plex_transcode_hw"),
ConfigSpec("plex_transcode_preset", "choice", "plex", "plex_transcode_preset"),
ConfigSpec("plex_transcode_crf", "int", "plex", "plex_transcode_crf", min=0, max=51),
ConfigSpec(
"plex_transcode_max_height", "int", "plex", "plex_transcode_max_height", min=0, max=4320
),
# Audio loudness normalisation on the HLS path (remux + transcode alike, not direct play).
ConfigSpec("plex_audio_loudnorm", "bool", "plex", "plex_audio_loudnorm"),
# NOTE: plex_watch_sync_interval_min is a config.py default read by the watch-sync scheduler job
# (scheduler.py); it is intentionally NOT a runtime admin knob, so it stays out of SPECS.
# --- TMDB enrichment (E5 S2; optional) — the API key is the only secret ---
ConfigSpec("tmdb_api_key", "str", "tmdb", "tmdb_api_key", secret=True),
ConfigSpec("tmdb_language", "str", "tmdb", "tmdb_language"),
# --- Bug reports (E16): the Gitea issue tracker a debug session's issue goes to ---
ConfigSpec("issues_gitea_url", "str", "issues", "issues_gitea_url"),
ConfigSpec("issues_gitea_repo", "str", "issues", "issues_gitea_repo"),
ConfigSpec("issues_gitea_token", "str", "issues", "issues_gitea_token", secret=True),
# (tmdb_enrich_interval_min is a scheduler job, tuned from the Scheduler dashboard; tmdb_enrich_batch
# is a config.py default — both stay out of SPECS, like plex_sync_interval_min.)
)
_BY_KEY: dict[str, ConfigSpec] = {s.key: s for s in SPECS}
def spec(key: str) -> ConfigSpec | None:
return _BY_KEY.get(key)
def secrets_manageable() -> bool:
"""Secret values can only be stored when Fernet is configured (TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY)."""
return bool(settings.token_encryption_key)
def _default(s: ConfigSpec):
return getattr(settings, s.default_attr)
class InvalidSetting(ValueError):
"""A value `set_value` refuses, as a reason the UI translates (`errors.refused.setting_<reason>`)
plus what the sentence needs — the English message is for logs only. A ValueError still, so a
caller that only needs "refused or not" keeps working."""
def __init__(self, key: str, reason: str, **params: object):
super().__init__(f"{key}: {reason} {params}")
self.key = key
self.reason = reason
self.params = params
def _choice(s: ConfigSpec, raw: object) -> str:
"""The canonical spelling of `raw` among the key's choices (any letter case), or InvalidSetting."""
option = canonical_choice(s.choices, raw)
if option is None:
raise InvalidSetting(s.key, "not_a_choice", choices=", ".join(s.choices))
return option
class OutOfRange(ValueError):
"""A stored int override that no longer satisfies its spec's bounds."""
def _coerce(s: ConfigSpec, raw: str):
if s.type == "int":
# Bounds are checked on READ, not only in `set_value`. Bounds get ADDED to a spec
# (download_upload_max_bytes gained a `max` when SEC-20 started enforcing the same number at
# the edge; its `min` went 0 → 1 during E7) and env defaults get LOWERED, and either leaves
# a stored value that was legal when it was written. Serving it is how one layer ends up
# acting on a number another layer refuses, with the admin page showing a value outside the
# range it renders.
#
# It raises rather than CLAMPING, and that distinction cost a round: clamping is a silent
# rewrite, and silently rewriting is exactly what this module refuses to do elsewhere. The
# case that settles it is a stored 0 for download_upload_max_bytes — legal when `min` was 0,
# and meaning "no per-file cap" to the route that reads it. Clamped to `min=1` it becomes a
# ONE-BYTE cap and uploads stop working with nothing in the log. Raising drops it into the
# same fallback the uncoercible path uses: the env default, and one warning.
v = int(raw)
if (s.min is not None and v < s.min) or (s.max is not None and v > s.max):
raise OutOfRange(f"{v} is outside [{s.min}, {s.max}]")
return v
if s.type == "bool":
return raw == "true"
if s.type == "choice":
# A stored value that is no longer a choice (the list shrank) reads as the default, like a
# non-numeric int override does — see get().
return _choice(s, raw)
return raw
def _raw_override(db: Session, key: str) -> str | None:
"""Stored (decrypted) override string for `key`, or None if no override is set.
A decrypt failure — a rotated or removed ``TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`` vs the key the value was written
with — must NOT crash the caller. `_raw_override` sits on hot paths (`/api/me` via `google_enabled`,
login, every YouTube scheduler job, account purge), so a raw ``InvalidToken`` here would 500 the
whole app and the SPA wouldn't even boot. Fall back to the env/config default instead, and warn once
per key so the operator gets a real signal without a per-request traceback. Recovery is documented in
docs/self-hosting.md: the key must never change once secrets are stored. (B-core-2)
"""
row = db.get(SystemConfig, key)
if row is None or row.value is None:
return None
if not row.encrypted:
return row.value
try:
return security.decrypt(row.value)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — Fernet InvalidToken / malformed ciphertext (key mismatch)
if key not in _decrypt_warned:
_decrypt_warned.add(key)
log.warning(
"config %r could not be decrypted (TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY changed or missing?) — falling "
"back to the env/config default; the key must not change once secrets are stored",
key,
)
return None
def get(db: Session, key: str):
"""Effective value: the DB override (typed) if set, else the env/config default."""
s = _BY_KEY[key]
raw = _raw_override(db, key)
if raw is None:
return _default(s)
if raw == "" and not s.allow_empty:
# For most keys an empty override means "fall back to the env default". Keys that opt
# into allow_empty (e.g. smtp_user, youtube_api_proxy) treat "" as a real value — so an
# admin can blank one to DISABLE it rather than being stuck with the env default.
return _default(s)
try:
return _coerce(s, raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
# The admin set this in the UI and it is quietly not in force: the app runs on the env
# default while the settings page goes on showing the value that was saved. An OutOfRange is
# the same situation arrived at from the other direction — the value was fine when it was
# written and the spec moved under it — so it gets the same treatment and its own code.
event = (
"sysconfig.override_out_of_range"
if isinstance(exc, OutOfRange)
else "sysconfig.override_uncoercible"
)
if (s.key, raw) not in _coerce_warned:
_coerce_warned.add((s.key, raw))
log.warning(
"a stored setting is not usable; the default is used instead",
extra=logs.event(event, key=s.key, reason=type(exc).__name__),
)
return _default(s)
def get_str(db: Session, key: str) -> str:
v = get(db, key)
return "" if v is None else str(v)
def get_int(db: Session, key: str) -> int:
return int(get(db, key))
def get_bool(db: Session, key: str) -> bool:
return bool(get(db, key))
def set_value(db: Session, key: str, value) -> None:
"""Validate, coerce, and stage a DB override for `key` (secrets are encrypted). Flushes but does
NOT commit — the caller owns the transaction, so the change lands together with its audit row
(B-core-10). The staged value is visible to a same-session `get()` before the commit."""
s = _BY_KEY[key]
if s.type == "int":
try:
v = int(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
raise InvalidSetting(key, "not_a_number") from None
if s.min is not None and v < s.min:
raise InvalidSetting(key, "too_low", min=s.min)
if s.max is not None and v > s.max:
raise InvalidSetting(key, "too_high", max=s.max)
raw = str(v)
elif s.type == "bool":
raw = "true" if value else "false"
elif s.type == "choice":
raw = _choice(s, value)
else:
raw = "" if value is None else str(value)
stored, encrypted = raw, False
if s.secret:
if not secrets_manageable():
raise InvalidSetting(key, "no_encryption_key")
stored, encrypted = security.encrypt(raw) or "", True
row = db.get(SystemConfig, key)
if row is None:
row = SystemConfig(key=key)
db.add(row)
row.value = stored
row.encrypted = encrypted
db.flush()
def reset(db: Session, key: str) -> None:
"""Remove the DB override for `key` (fall back to the env/config default). Flushes but does NOT
commit — the caller owns the transaction (B-core-10)."""
row = db.get(SystemConfig, key)
if row is not None:
db.delete(row)
db.flush()
def describe(db: Session) -> dict:
"""Admin-UI metadata + current values, grouped. Secret values are never echoed —
only whether an override is set and whether an env default exists."""
groups: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
for s in SPECS:
is_set = db.get(SystemConfig, s.key) is not None
item: dict = {
"key": s.key,
"type": s.type,
"group": s.group,
"secret": s.secret,
"min": s.min,
"max": s.max,
"is_set": is_set, # an override row exists
"allow_empty": s.allow_empty, # if true, the UI stores "" rather than deleting the row
"choices": list(s.choices), # the picker's options; [] for any other type
}
if s.secret:
item["default_is_set"] = bool(_default(s))
else:
item["value"] = get(db, s.key)
item["default"] = _default(s)
groups.setdefault(s.group, []).append(item)
return {"groups": groups, "secrets_manageable": secrets_manageable()}