Files
siftlode/backend/app/routes/me.py
T
peter e7f38396a2 fix: review round 3 — a new tab keeps its account's notices, a revoked tab account lands on the default
Deep-review round 3 over main..improvement/watch-background-audio.

Account boot
- The notification history and settings, and the hints toggle, are read
  when their modules load, which in a new tab (bookmark, typed URL) is
  before BootGate pins the account: they read as nobody's, and the tab's
  first notice replaced the account's stored history (up to 100 entries)
  with a one-item list. They now read again when the tab is pinned
  (onAccountPinned, run by setActiveAccount); a notice raised before the
  pin stays, after the history.
- A tab pinned to an account still in this browser's wallet but whose
  session ended (suspended, deleted, or revoked by "log out everywhere")
  got "signed out" from /api/me while the default account was still
  signed in, and signing in again as anyone else left it there. A refused
  per-tab account now leaves the wallet, and the probe answers as the
  default, so the tab reloads onto it.

Share page (/watch)
- The password unlock is limited per viewer (link + client IP), under a
  per-link ceiling that counts only wrong passwords. Keyed on the link
  alone, ten wrong guesses every five minutes locked out every viewer,
  the ones with the password included. client_ip moves to app.ratelimit
  so the public routes can key on it.
- Its failure messages and the load-failure screen are announced
  (role=alert, the password input described by its error). The sign-in,
  passphrase, password-change and setup form errors get role=alert too.

Comments that still described removed machinery are corrected: App's
collapse flags, SettingsPanel's Save bar, ConfigPanel, authed_format_sig.

Tests: the account's history and hints across the pin; a revoked and a
suspended pinned account; the per-viewer limit and the ceiling; the
limiter's exhausted(); the share page's announced failures; a share
link's feed filters persisted. Each mutation-checked RED for its own
reason.
2026-09-15 02:25:00 +02:00

200 lines
8.8 KiB
Python

from fastapi import APIRouter, BackgroundTasks, Depends, HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
from sqlalchemy import func, select
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.auth import (
count_admins,
count_pending_activations,
current_user,
drop_from_wallet,
google_enabled,
has_read_scope,
has_write_scope,
is_allowed,
optional_current_user,
purge_user,
)
from app import email as email_mod
from app import sysconfig
from app.db import get_db
from app.models import Invite, User
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/me", tags=["me"])
@router.get("/accounts")
def my_accounts(
request: Request,
user: User = Depends(current_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
) -> list[dict]:
"""The accounts that have authenticated in this browser session (switchable without a
new Google sign-in). The active one is flagged."""
ids = request.session.get("account_ids") or [user.id]
rows = {u.id: u for u in db.query(User).filter(User.id.in_(ids)).all()}
out = []
for uid in ids: # preserve recency order from the session
u = rows.get(uid)
if u is not None:
out.append(
{
"id": u.id,
"email": u.email,
"display_name": u.display_name,
"avatar_url": u.avatar_url,
"active": u.id == user.id,
}
)
return out
class SwitchAccountIn(BaseModel):
user_id: int
@router.post("/switch")
def switch_account(
body: SwitchAccountIn,
request: Request,
user: User = Depends(current_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
) -> dict:
"""Switch the active account to another one already authenticated in this browser. No
Google round-trip — but only accounts present in the session list (proof they signed in
here) are allowed, and access is re-checked in case the invite was revoked since."""
target = body.user_id
if target not in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Not an account you've signed into here.")
u = db.get(User, target)
if u is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="That account no longer exists.")
if not is_allowed(db, u.email):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="That account no longer has access.")
if u.is_suspended:
# Don't make a suspended account the active one — the next request's current_user would
# see the suspension and clear the WHOLE wallet session, logging out every account here.
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="That account is suspended.")
# Same reasoning for a REVOKED session (a password reset/change or "log out everywhere" bumped the
# account's epoch): making it the session default would trip current_user's epoch check on the next
# request and clear the whole wallet. Mirror the suspend guard — drop the stale account from the
# switch list and refuse, rather than logging everyone out. (B-core-9)
epochs = request.session.get("epochs") or {}
if int(epochs.get(str(target), 0)) != (u.session_epoch or 0):
drop_from_wallet(request.session, target)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403, detail="That account was signed out elsewhere — sign in again."
)
request.session["user_id"] = target
return {"ok": True, "user_id": target}
@router.get("")
def get_me(
user: User | None = Depends(optional_current_user), db: Session = Depends(get_db)
) -> dict:
# The app's bootstrap probe: return 200 with `authenticated: False` when logged out (rather
# than 401) so the public landing never logs a failed /api/me to the browser console. Other
# protected endpoints still 401, so mid-session expiry is still caught by the global handler.
if user is None:
return {"authenticated": False}
pending_invites = 0
pending_activations = 0
# Admin-only, because it drives an operator warning: email is fail-soft, so a half-filled SMTP
# config costs verification links, password resets and access-request notices with nothing
# visible anywhere. Surfacing it here puts the warning on the screens where onboarding happens.
email_configured = True
if user.role == "admin":
pending_invites = (
db.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(Invite).where(Invite.status == "pending"))
or 0
)
# Counted separately from pending_invites rather than folded into it: the two are different
# facts (a request awaiting a decision vs a decided address whose sign-up never got let in),
# and quietly widening one number would make an existing field mean something new.
pending_activations = count_pending_activations(db)
email_configured = email_mod.email_enabled(db) # this request's session; no second connect
return {
"authenticated": True,
"id": user.id,
"email": user.email,
"display_name": user.display_name,
"avatar_url": user.avatar_url,
"role": user.role,
"is_demo": user.is_demo,
"has_google": user.google_sub is not None,
# The address Google answers with, when it DIFFERS from the account's own. Same string for
# most people, and then this is None so no surface has to decide whether to show it — the
# comparison lives here, once, instead of in every consumer.
"google_email": (
user.google_email if user.google_email and user.google_email != user.email else None
),
"has_password": user.password_hash is not None,
# Instance-wide: whether Google sign-in / YouTube connect is available at all (the UI hides
# YouTube-access affordances and the onboarding nudge when it isn't configured).
"google_enabled": google_enabled(db),
# Whether the optional Plex module is enabled (UI shows the Plex feed source when so).
"plex_enabled": sysconfig.get_bool(db, "plex_enabled"),
"can_read": has_read_scope(user),
"can_write": has_write_scope(user),
"pending_invites": pending_invites,
# Sign-ups an admin still has to let in (roadmap UX-25): approved BEFORE they registered, so
# nothing ever reached the Access-requests queue and the badge used to read zero.
"pending_activations": pending_activations,
"email_configured": email_configured,
"preferences": user.preferences or {},
}
@router.delete("/account")
def delete_my_account(
request: Request,
background: BackgroundTasks,
user: User = Depends(current_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
) -> dict:
"""GDPR self-service erasure: permanently delete the signed-in account and ALL its personal
data — OAuth tokens, subscriptions, tags, watch/save/hide states, playlists, notifications —
which all cascade on the users row. Quota-audit events are kept but anonymised (FK SET NULL).
The shared demo account can't be deleted, and the last remaining admin can't delete itself
(that would lock everyone out of the admin surfaces)."""
# Structured, like the other three demo refusals: `req` leaves 403 to the caller and
# `notifyActionError` discards a plain-string detail in favour of the caller's translated
# fallback, so a hand-written English sentence here reaches a Hungarian UI as a generic
# "couldn't do that" — or, on this affordance, as nothing at all. `reason` distinguishes it
# from the other sites' bare `{code: "demo"}` so the UI can say what specifically is refused.
if user.is_demo:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail={"code": "demo", "reason": "delete_account"})
if user.role == "admin" and count_admins(db) <= 1:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="You're the only admin — promote another admin before deleting your account.",
)
user_id = user.id
# Full erasure (cascades) + access-request cleanup + Google-grant revocation; shared with the
# admin delete path. Capture the id first — `user` is detached once purge_user deletes the row.
purge_user(db, user, background)
# Drop this account from the browser session; switch to another signed-in account if any.
remaining = [a for a in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != user_id]
if remaining:
request.session["account_ids"] = remaining
request.session["user_id"] = remaining[-1]
else:
request.session.clear()
return {"deleted": True}
@router.put("/preferences")
def update_preferences(
preferences: dict,
user: User = Depends(current_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
) -> dict:
# Merge so partial updates don't wipe other keys.
merged = dict(user.preferences or {})
merged.update(preferences)
user.preferences = merged
db.add(user)
db.commit()
return {"preferences": merged}