Deep-review round 1 of E22. - A NUL character (`GET /assets/%00` logs the decoded path) made Postgres refuse the row and with it the sink's whole batch, every user's rows included. `to_row` replaces NUL in every text column and in attrs. - An erased account's lines kept arriving after purge_user's DELETE: the erasing request's own access line, a queued row, a background task. `logs.forget_user` runs first; later rows are stored without the account, and the check and the insert share a lock with the erasure. - An admin setting the whole process to TRACE logged every user's query string. The query is now logged only under the user's own Teljes consent, and decoded before redaction, so `%40` no longer hides an address. - The browser log ingest has an hourly storage budget per account (5 MiB, one notice when spent) and reads only a JSON Content-Type, so a same-site text/plain form post cannot write into a user's log. RateLimiter takes a per-attempt cost for the byte budget. - The root level is applied under the elevation lock: two concurrent changes could leave it at the base while an elevation was active. - Tests for the running sink (level gate, drain on stop) and for the admin log level applied at runtime and at boot.
177 lines
7.7 KiB
Python
177 lines
7.7 KiB
Python
"""The browser's log, sent while its user has a raised diagnostics level (E22 S5).
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The client keeps its log in memory (frontend `lib/log.ts`). Only after the user consented to Részletes
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or Teljes in Settings → Diagnosztika does it stream that log here, in batches, and each batch lands in
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`log_events` beside the server's own rows: `source="web"`, the account from the SESSION (never from
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the body), and the request id each event carries, which is what joins a browser line to the server
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line of the same request.
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Nothing from the body is trusted as-is:
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* only a JSON Content-Type is read, and the whole body is capped before it is parsed, and so are
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the number of events and each event's attributes;
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* the pace is capped per account, and so is what an account may store per hour;
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* everything is redacted AGAIN with the server's own rules — the client redacts at capture, but a
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modified client would not;
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* an event below the consented level is dropped (a Részletes consent does not store what only
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Teljes may carry), and so is the whole batch once the level has lapsed;
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* the timestamp is clamped to the consent window, so a row cannot dodge the retention job by
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claiming to come from the future.
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"""
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import json
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from typing import Any, Literal
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request
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from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, ValidationError
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from sqlalchemy import insert
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from app import diagnostics, logs, logsink
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from app.auth import current_user
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from app.db import get_db
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from app.models import LogEvent, User
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from app.ratelimit import RateLimiter
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/diagnostics", tags=["diagnostics"])
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BODY_MAX_BYTES = 512 * 1024
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EVENTS_MAX = 200
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ATTRS_MAX_BYTES = 16 * 1024
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# The client flushes every few seconds and when its buffer fills; this is room for a burst, not a
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# pace anything legitimate keeps up for a minute.
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_batches = RateLimiter(max_events=30, window_seconds=60)
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# What one account may STORE per hour. The pace cap alone still lets a self-consented account write
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# ~15 MiB a minute into the one shared database, kept for the whole retention window; a real session
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# at Teljes stores a few hundred kB an hour. Past the budget a batch is accepted and not stored (a
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# refusal would only make the client resend it), and one notice per hour says so.
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STORED_BYTES_PER_HOUR = 5 * 1024 * 1024
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_stored_bytes = RateLimiter(max_events=STORED_BYTES_PER_HOUR, window_seconds=3600)
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_budget_notices = RateLimiter(max_events=1, window_seconds=3600)
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ClientLevel = Literal["TRACE", "DEBUG", "INFO", "WARNING", "ERROR", "CRITICAL"]
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class ClientEvent(BaseModel):
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ts: datetime
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level: ClientLevel
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event: str = Field(max_length=64, pattern=r"^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*(\.[a-z0-9_]+)*$")
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msg: str = Field(max_length=8_000)
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attrs: dict[str, Any] | None = None
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request_id: str | None = Field(default=None, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,64}$")
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tab_id: str | None = Field(default=None, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,32}$")
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version: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=64)
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class ClientEventsIn(BaseModel):
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events: list[ClientEvent] = Field(max_length=EVENTS_MAX)
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async def _capped_body(request: Request) -> bytes:
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"""The request body, refused the moment it passes BODY_MAX_BYTES while still arriving. Counted,
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not taken from Content-Length: a declared length can be absent (chunked) or wrong, and counting
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stops reading at the same point a declared-length check would have."""
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body = bytearray()
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async for chunk in request.stream():
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body += chunk
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if len(body) > BODY_MAX_BYTES:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail={"code": "too_large"})
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return bytes(body)
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async def _parsed_events(request: Request) -> ClientEventsIn:
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"""The body as the model — parsed only after the size cap, which is why this is a dependency and
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not a plain body parameter (FastAPI reads a declared body in full before anything else runs).
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JSON only, by its Content-Type, as a declared body would be. Parsing any body as JSON would let a
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CORS-simple `text/plain` form post from a same-site page write events into a signed-in user's
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log; the app's own client always sends `application/json`, the unload beacon included."""
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media_type = request.headers.get("content-type", "").split(";")[0].strip().lower()
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if media_type != "application/json" and not media_type.endswith("+json"):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=415, detail={"code": "json_required"})
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raw = await _capped_body(request)
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try:
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return ClientEventsIn.model_validate_json(raw)
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except ValidationError as exc:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail=json.loads(exc.json())) from exc
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def _row(item: ClientEvent, user: User, now: datetime, window_start: datetime) -> dict[str, Any]:
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attrs = logs.redact(item.attrs) if item.attrs else None
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if attrs is not None:
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size = len(json.dumps(attrs, ensure_ascii=False, default=str).encode())
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if size > ATTRS_MAX_BYTES:
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attrs = {"attrs_dropped_bytes": size}
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if item.tab_id:
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attrs = {**(attrs or {}), "tab_id": item.tab_id}
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ts = item.ts if item.ts.tzinfo else item.ts.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
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return logsink.to_row(
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{
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"ts": min(max(ts, window_start), now),
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"level": item.level,
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"sev": logs.SEVERITY[item.level],
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"source": "web",
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"logger": "web",
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"event": item.event,
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"msg": logs.redact_text(item.msg),
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"attrs": attrs,
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"request_id": item.request_id,
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"user_id": user.id,
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"version": item.version,
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}
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)
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@router.post("/events")
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def ingest_events(
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# The account first: dependencies resolve in order, so an anonymous caller is refused before a
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# byte of its body is read.
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user: User = Depends(current_user),
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body: ClientEventsIn = Depends(_parsed_events),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db),
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) -> dict:
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level = diagnostics.effective_level(user)
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if level == diagnostics.BASE:
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# Lapsed or withdrawn: the client stops streaming when it sees this.
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raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail={"code": "diagnostics_off"})
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if not _batches.allow(str(user.id)):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=429, detail={"code": "rate_limited"})
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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window_start = now - timedelta(hours=diagnostics.ELEVATION_HOURS)
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floor = logs.SEVERITY[level]
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rows = [
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_row(item, user, now, window_start)
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for item in body.events
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if logs.SEVERITY[item.level] >= floor
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]
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if not rows:
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return {"ok": True, "stored": 0}
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size = sum(len(json.dumps(row, ensure_ascii=False, default=str).encode()) for row in rows)
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stored = len(rows)
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if not _stored_bytes.allow(str(user.id), size):
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stored = 0
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if not _budget_notices.allow(str(user.id)):
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return {"ok": True, "stored": 0}
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rows = [_budget_notice(user, now)]
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# Under the erasure guard until the commit: an account erased meanwhile gets no rows back.
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with logs.erasure_guard():
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db.execute(insert(LogEvent), logsink.without_erased(rows))
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db.commit()
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return {"ok": True, "stored": stored}
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def _budget_notice(user: User, now: datetime) -> dict[str, Any]:
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return logsink.to_row(
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{
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"ts": now,
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"level": "WARNING",
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"sev": logs.SEVERITY["WARNING"],
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"source": "web",
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"logger": "web",
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"event": "diagnostics.budget_spent",
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"msg": "The browser log passed its hourly storage budget; the rest of the hour is not kept",
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"attrs": {"budget_bytes": STORED_BYTES_PER_HOUR},
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"user_id": user.id,
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}
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)
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