fix: review round 3 — a new tab keeps its account's notices, a revoked tab account lands on the default
Deep-review round 3 over main..improvement/watch-background-audio. Account boot - The notification history and settings, and the hints toggle, are read when their modules load, which in a new tab (bookmark, typed URL) is before BootGate pins the account: they read as nobody's, and the tab's first notice replaced the account's stored history (up to 100 entries) with a one-item list. They now read again when the tab is pinned (onAccountPinned, run by setActiveAccount); a notice raised before the pin stays, after the history. - A tab pinned to an account still in this browser's wallet but whose session ended (suspended, deleted, or revoked by "log out everywhere") got "signed out" from /api/me while the default account was still signed in, and signing in again as anyone else left it there. A refused per-tab account now leaves the wallet, and the probe answers as the default, so the tab reloads onto it. Share page (/watch) - The password unlock is limited per viewer (link + client IP), under a per-link ceiling that counts only wrong passwords. Keyed on the link alone, ten wrong guesses every five minutes locked out every viewer, the ones with the password included. client_ip moves to app.ratelimit so the public routes can key on it. - Its failure messages and the load-failure screen are announced (role=alert, the password input described by its error). The sign-in, passphrase, password-change and setup form errors get role=alert too. Comments that still described removed machinery are corrected: App's collapse flags, SettingsPanel's Save bar, ConfigPanel, authed_format_sig. Tests: the account's history and hints across the pin; a revoked and a suspended pinned account; the per-viewer limit and the ceiling; the limiter's exhausted(); the share page's announced failures; a share link's feed filters persisted. Each mutation-checked RED for its own reason.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
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Split out of app/auth.py (R12 S2); the core auth surface (current_user, scopes, token
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helpers) stays in app/auth.py, imported below."""
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import ipaddress
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import secrets
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from typing import NamedTuple
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@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ from app.auth import (
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from app.config import settings
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from app.db import SessionLocal, get_db
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from app.models import AuthToken, DemoWhitelist, Invite, OAuthToken, User
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from app.ratelimit import RateLimiter
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from app.ratelimit import RateLimiter, client_ip
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from app.security import encrypt, hash_password, hash_token, verify_password
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from app.utils import canonical_email, valid_email
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@@ -172,37 +171,6 @@ def is_demo_allowed(db: Session, email: str) -> bool:
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)
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def _norm_ip(s: str) -> ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address | None:
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"""Parse an IP for comparison, unwrapping IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:10.0.0.1` → `10.0.0.1`) so a
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plain-IPv4 allowlist still matches a peer that surfaces in mapped form. None for a non-IP string."""
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try:
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ip = ipaddress.ip_address(s.strip())
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except ValueError:
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return None
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return ip.ipv4_mapped if getattr(ip, "ipv4_mapped", None) else ip
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def _client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Best-effort client IP for rate limiting. X-Forwarded-For is client-controlled, so we trust it
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ONLY when the request actually arrived from a configured reverse proxy (settings.trusted_proxy_ips
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— the address the proxy connects FROM, e.g. the VPS Caddy's WireGuard peer IP). Our proxy APPENDS
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the client it saw to XFF, so the RIGHTMOST entry is the real client and can't be forged by a
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client pre-seeding the header. Any other peer (someone hitting the app port directly, bypassing the
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proxy) is untrusted — we use its real socket IP, so it can't spoof its rate-limit identity.
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SAFETY: this relies on `request.client` being the TRUE socket peer. uvicorn is started WITHOUT
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`--proxy-headers` (see entrypoint.sh) precisely so it never rewrites `request.client` from XFF —
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do NOT add that flag, or the trust check below would compare against a forgeable value."""
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peer = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
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trusted = {_norm_ip(p) for p in settings.trusted_proxy_ip_set} - {None}
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if _norm_ip(peer) in trusted:
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xff = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
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parts = [p.strip() for p in (xff or "").split(",") if p.strip()]
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if parts:
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return parts[-1]
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return peer
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class InviteRequest(NamedTuple):
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"""What an access request settled on.
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@@ -674,7 +642,7 @@ async def request_access(
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email = (body.email or "").strip().lower()
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if not valid_email(email):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Enter a valid email address.")
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if not _request_access_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
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if not _request_access_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
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return {"status": "pending"}
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if is_allowed(db, email):
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return {"status": "pending"} # already allowed — don't reveal it
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@@ -691,7 +659,7 @@ def demo_login(body: EmailIn, request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -
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so there is no visible 'demo login' button. Rate-limited per IP; when blocked it answers
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exactly like a non-match (authenticated=false) so the field can't be hammered as an
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enumeration oracle. On a match it sets the session and the client reloads into the app."""
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if not _demo_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
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if not _demo_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
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return {"authenticated": False}
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email = (body.email or "").strip().lower()
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if valid_email(email) and is_demo_allowed(db, email):
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@@ -837,7 +805,7 @@ def register(
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)
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if not sysconfig.get_bool(db, "allow_registration"):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Registration is currently closed.")
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if not _register_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
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if not _register_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
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return {"status": "ok"} # silently throttle; uniform response
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# Do the existence check + account creation OFF the response path (a background task with its own
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@@ -1005,7 +973,7 @@ def verify_email_resend(
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and re-registering an already-registered email is a silent no-op, so a user who lost the first
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mail had no way back. Uniform response + timing regardless of whether the email has a pending
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account (the lookup runs off the response path), so it can't probe for registered emails."""
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if not _verify_resend_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
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if not _verify_resend_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
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return {"status": "ok"} # silently throttle; uniform response
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email = (body.email or "").strip().lower()
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if valid_email(email):
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@@ -1064,7 +1032,7 @@ def password_login(
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"""Email+password sign-in. Wrong email/password give a single uniform 401 (no enumeration).
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Once the password is proven correct, the owner gets a specific reason if their account is
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still pending or suspended — that's not an enumeration leak (they already hold the password)."""
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if not _login_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
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if not _login_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
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raise _login_refused(429, "rate_limited")
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email = (body.email or "").strip().lower()
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password = body.password or ""
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@@ -1095,7 +1063,7 @@ def password_reset_request(
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) -> dict:
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"""Request a password-reset link. Uniform response + timing regardless of whether the email has a
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password account (the lookup runs off the response path), so it can't probe for registered emails."""
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if not _reset_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
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if not _reset_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
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return {"status": "ok"}
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email = (body.email or "").strip().lower()
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# Do the account lookup + token issue + email OFF the response path (a background task with its
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@@ -1144,7 +1112,7 @@ def password_reset_check(body: TokenIn, request: Request, db: Session = Depends(
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told `true`, never `false`: this check may only ever save a user a wasted form, so when it cannot
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answer it must degrade to the old behaviour instead of declaring a live link dead.
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"""
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if not _reset_check_limiter.allow(_client_ip(request)):
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if not _reset_check_limiter.allow(client_ip(request)):
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return {"ok": True}
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return {"ok": any(_peek_token(db, body.token, k) is not None for k in _PASSWORD_TOKEN_KINDS)}
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ from app.auth import (
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count_admins,
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count_pending_activations,
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current_user,
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drop_from_wallet,
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google_enabled,
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has_read_scope,
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has_write_scope,
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@@ -80,9 +81,7 @@ def switch_account(
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# switch list and refuse, rather than logging everyone out. (B-core-9)
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epochs = request.session.get("epochs") or {}
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if int(epochs.get(str(target), 0)) != (u.session_epoch or 0):
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request.session["account_ids"] = [
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a for a in (request.session.get("account_ids") or []) if a != target
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]
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drop_from_wallet(request.session, target)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=403, detail="That account was signed out elsewhere — sign in again."
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)
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ the app or any account data. Password-protected links exchange the password once
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a short-lived signed grant that the media URL carries (a `<video src>` can't send a header).
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"""
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request
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from fastapi.responses import FileResponse
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from sqlalchemy import select
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@@ -17,13 +17,18 @@ from app.db import get_db
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from app.downloads import links as linksmod
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from app.downloads import storage
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from app.models import DownloadJob, DownloadLink, MediaAsset
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from app.ratelimit import RateLimiter
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from app.ratelimit import RateLimiter, client_ip
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from app.security import verify_password
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/public", tags=["public"])
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# Slow password guessing per link (the token itself is 192-bit, so it needs no throttle).
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# Slow password guessing on a link (the token itself is 192-bit, so it needs no throttle). Counted per
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# viewer — the link AND the client — so someone who has the link but not its password can't lock out the
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# viewers who do, and a busy link's own unlocks don't count against its next viewer.
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_unlock_limit = RateLimiter(max_events=10, window_seconds=300)
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# ...under a ceiling on WRONG passwords for the link from every client together, so guessing spread over
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# many addresses stays slow too. Viewers who have the password never add to it.
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_unlock_failures = RateLimiter(max_events=50, window_seconds=300)
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def _link_or_404(db: Session, token: str) -> DownloadLink:
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@@ -83,9 +88,12 @@ class WatchUnlockIn(BaseModel):
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@router.post("/watch/{token}/unlock")
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def watch_unlock(token: str, body: WatchUnlockIn, db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -> dict:
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def watch_unlock(
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token: str, body: WatchUnlockIn, request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)
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) -> dict:
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"""Exchange the link password for a signed grant carried by the media URL."""
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if not _unlock_limit.allow(token):
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viewer = f"{token}|{client_ip(request)}"
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if _unlock_failures.exhausted(token) or not _unlock_limit.allow(viewer):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=429, detail="Too many attempts. Try again later.")
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link = _link_or_404(db, token)
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if not link.password_hash:
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@@ -96,6 +104,7 @@ def watch_unlock(token: str, body: WatchUnlockIn, db: Session = Depends(get_db))
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**linksmod.public_meta(link, job, asset, _file_url(token), _poster_url(token, asset)),
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}
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if not verify_password(body.password, link.password_hash):
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_unlock_failures.allow(token)
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Wrong password.")
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job, asset = _ready_target(db, link)
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link.view_count += 1
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