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Commits
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4aaaaa7860 |
chore(comments): drop epic, sprint and review-round ids from the code
The code cited its plan instead of saying why: `E28 review J4`, `(R6 S3b)`, `S1 justified…`,
`deep-review round 5`. That plan lives in the private ops repo, so for every reader of this one the
citation was noise, and a sentence whose subject was the plan step ("round 2 showed…") hid its
lesson behind an id. Each one is gone and the "why" kept: a bare citation is deleted, a sentence
carrying a lesson is reworded around it ("a later attempt showed…").
Measured (`scripts/audit_metrics.py`, product code): 652 lines in 270 files carried an epic code by
the definition the next commit holds (507 / 241 by the old, two-digit-only one) -> 0. Across all
code, tests, scripts and configs: ~1100 epic-code lines plus ~320 sprint/round ids.
Behaviour unchanged, checked mechanically: every changed .py file has the same AST once docstrings
are blanked; css/sh/toml/yml/json files are identical once comments are stripped; the only
non-comment changes in TS/JS are test titles, one description string in a contract table, and five
ESLint messages, whose text is all the gates snapshot diff holds. Not touched: Markdown (docs and
the changelog keep their history), Alembic migrations, TV episode notation (`S2 · E5`), DESIGN.md
ids (`C1`, `B4`, `S3h`), tracker ids (`SEC-16`, `DX-17`).
One stale claim fixed on the way: test_hls_reaper's docstring said the player checkpoints "every
10 s whether or not it is playing", which plex/stream.py calls wrong; it now says what the code does.
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7c0647f87a |
fix(uploads): finish the sweeps round 1 left half-done
Deep-review round 2, on round 1's own fix commit. It found MORE than round 1 did (28 raw, against 13), and most of it was mine -- a new piece of UI attracts findings a backend-only diff never does. The pattern in almost all of them is the same: a principle applied to the site that prompted it and not to its siblings. * `display_text` reached three of the FIVE writers of a user-supplied name. `POST /api/downloads` and `POST /api/downloads/edit` still handed Postgres an unbounded string, so a 300-character name pasted into the Add-download dialog or the editor was a bare 500 (main.py re-raises every DataError but the NUL case). Four of the seven reviewers found it independently. The bound now lives in `models.py`, the three columns are DECLARED with it, and the guard for the next writer is parsed rather than remembered: every `display_name` / `display_uploader` assignment under `app/routes/` must go through the helper. That guard immediately found two more -- the Google sign-in callback writes the profile name into the same 255-wide column -- so it is six, not five. * The connection release reached one of the THREE routes that read their own body. The screenshot route (10 MiB, from a phone) and the client log sink both still held a pooled connection idle-in-transaction for the length of the upload, which is the invariant db.py sizes the pool on. All three now call `db.release_read_connection`, whose precondition -- nothing pending on the shared session -- is CHECKED rather than described, because a whole-session rollback discarding a caller's staged write is a mistake this repo has already made once. `test_body_limit.py` holds the rule for the next such route. * The AST drift registry keyed its sites by (module, limit expression), so a second route copied from the first collapsed onto the same entry and went uncovered -- the exact hole the registry exists to close. Keyed per call site now, and it carries the release requirement too. * The dialog's own refusal was announced once and never again: two over-cap picks leave an identical node with identical text, and an untouched live region says nothing. It is keyed per pick now, the drop zone reads as invalid and points at the sentence, and the reason is reachable from the control rather than only from a one-shot announcement. * Two tests rebuilt the blind spot they were written to remove: the dialog's cap test sat nowhere near the boundary (a `>` loosened to `>=` survived it, which is the mutation round 1 fixed on the server side), and the header-precedence test only covered an exact-case duplicate while a differently-cased one would have been COMBINED onto the wire rather than replaced. Both fixed, and the merge now dedupes case-insensitively because header names are. Also: the upload dialog's unstubbed usage query was firing a real request from jsdom in a neighbouring suite and leaking a delayed "connection lost" toast across test boundaries; `GET /api/downloads/usage` had no test at all though the whole client-side check hangs off it; and the comment claiming the edge 413 is readable now says what was measured -- readable to 200 MiB over loopback, a bare `onerror` through a proxy -- so the pre-send check is named as the mechanism and that branch as the backstop it is. Every test added or changed here was mutation-checked. One mutation SURVIVED and is recorded rather than papered over: the `tooBig` term inside `submit()` cannot be reached, because `ui/Button` swallows the activation itself, so it is marked as belt and braces instead of being described as the guard. |
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a7d7456279 |
feat(diagnostics): debug sessions — start, stop, the tag on every line, screenshots (E16 S1)
A session is one recording, capped at 60 minutes by the server. While it is open, a request naming the caller's own session in X-Debug-Session is logged at the session's level with every line tagged; a header naming anything else is ignored. The browser's batches count a session as consent to its level and keep the tag only on its own events. Screenshots are judged by their bytes, capped in size and count, and served back to their owner only. - debug_sessions / debug_screenshots tables, one open session per user (partial unique index), log_events.debug_session_id indexed - /api/debug-sessions: start (joins a running one), stop, list, get, events, screenshots; /api/me reports the live session - the hourly log job closes expired sessions and drops them with the logs - logsink.serialize and routes._common.capped_body shared by their readers |
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b2eaa9e00b |
fix: a credential, an erased account and a stale level stay out of the log
Round 2 of the E22 review, on what round 1 changed. `redact_query` decodes a parameter before the text rules see it, which is what lets `%40` be recognised as an address — but `_SECRET_PARAM_RE` was written for the raw, encoded form, where a value holds no space, `&` or quote. On decoded text its value class stops at the first one, so `?state=a%20b` kept its tail and `?code=%20abc` was not matched at all. The parameter-NAME rule now decides, on the key, before any text rule runs. `forget_user` dropped the account's level elevation without recomputing the root level, so a process whose only elevated account had just deleted itself kept building TRACE records to throw away, until some later request happened to recompute it. Every other path that drops an elevation recomputes. The sink's writer took the erasure lock and THEN waited for a pooled connection, while every request path already holds a connection when it reaches that lock — so under pool pressure the writer held a process-global lock against the very requests that could hand a connection back. Same order on both sides now; the lock still spans the check, the insert and the commit. The storage-budget notice said the rest of the hour was not kept, and then smaller batches kept landing underneath it: the window slides and a refused batch is not charged to it. Says what it does. Tests: the route's half of the erasure rule had no test — only the sink's did — and a source-level contract test now covers the third insert nobody has written yet. `logs._erased` is process-global with an hour's memory while the DB fixture hands serial ids back out from 1, so it is swept before each test like the rate limiters are. |
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fac5c4465a |
fix: stored logs keep bad rows, erased accounts and unconsented queries out
Deep-review round 1 of E22. - A NUL character (`GET /assets/%00` logs the decoded path) made Postgres refuse the row and with it the sink's whole batch, every user's rows included. `to_row` replaces NUL in every text column and in attrs. - An erased account's lines kept arriving after purge_user's DELETE: the erasing request's own access line, a queued row, a background task. `logs.forget_user` runs first; later rows are stored without the account, and the check and the insert share a lock with the erasure. - An admin setting the whole process to TRACE logged every user's query string. The query is now logged only under the user's own Teljes consent, and decoded before redaction, so `%40` no longer hides an address. - The browser log ingest has an hourly storage budget per account (5 MiB, one notice when spent) and reads only a JSON Content-Type, so a same-site text/plain form post cannot write into a user's log. RateLimiter takes a per-attempt cost for the byte budget. - The root level is applied under the elevation lock: two concurrent changes could leave it at the base while an elevation was active. - Tests for the running sink (level gate, drain on stop) and for the admin log level applied at runtime and at boot. |
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5883ea509d |
feat: Settings → Diagnostics, a consented log level and the tab's own log
A user can raise their diagnostics level to Részletes (DEBUG) or Teljes (TRACE) for 24 hours from a new Settings tab, after a consent box that says what is recorded, that the server keeps it and for how long (the instance's own retention), and that it lapses. Alap is the base and needs no consent. - users.diagnostics_level/_until (migration 0087), written only by PUT /api/me/diagnostics, which computes the expiry itself; the demo account cannot raise it. /api/me reports the level in force. - The server logs an elevated user's requests at that level and stores every line of them (logs.LevelGate on the stdout handler and the sink; the root is lowered only while an elevation is active). Teljes adds the redacted query string to the request line. - POST /api/diagnostics/events stores the browser's log as source=web rows: account from the session, body capped while streaming, events/attrs capped, re-redacted, events under the consented level dropped, timestamps clamped, 30 batches a minute, 409 once the level lapsed. - lib/diagnostics.ts applies the level to the tab and streams only what happens after consent, in batches, never its own request lines, with a keepalive flush on pagehide; stops on lapse (its own timer), on withdrawal and on 409. - Detail hooks at DEBUG: which control was clicked (test id, icon, app copy in English — never user text, input values or a link's query), visibility/bfcache/resize, filter changes (lib/filterLog.ts; typed search only at TRACE), player events (lib/mediaLog.ts; media errors are warnings at every level). Offline/online at the base level. - "Saját napló" viewer: live, newest first, level groups with counts, search, row details, copy the filtered events as JSON lines, clear. - Privacy policy and Terms exist in Hungarian and English (a contract test holds both languages to the same sections); the policy now describes the server logs and diagnostic logging, self-service deletion and password sign-in. Fixed on the way: - A sync auth dependency ran logs.set_user on a copied context, so the account never reached a handler's own log lines (measured); a per-request mutable scope carries it now. - The Settings tab rail left a phone no room (clipped labels, buttons over text): below `sm` it is a scrolling row above the content. - PUT /api/me/preferences took a bare dict body; it is a Pydantic model now. |