114 exception handlers neither logged nor re-raised. The defect was never that
they are silent — plenty of them should be — it is that their silence said
nothing, so nobody could tell a decision from an oversight. Each one has now been
read. 44 got a line; the other 70 carry `# silent-ok: <why>`.
What the silent ones had been hiding, in the cases that got a line:
- A failed ffprobe sent every HDR file down the 8-bit pipeline, so playback
degraded to a software transcode with nothing saying why; a failed audio probe
collapsed a multi-audio file to one track and the player showed no language
picker; a failed first-PTS probe left subtitles seconds out of sync.
- A subtitle sidecar that existed but would not parse made a PARTIAL track read as
complete, permanently — the viewer loses every cue past the cached window.
- An unreadable crop/trim/cut-list in an edit spec was dropped, so the clip came
out uncropped, untrimmed, or shorter than the one the user built.
- A dropped `max_height` downloaded at best quality against an explicit cap.
- A failed videos.list enrich made every candidate undroppable-from-judgement and
therefore dropped: a working search rendered as "no results".
- An unusable password hash answered as "wrong password", locking the owner out
and telling them they mistyped; a rotated TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY turned every
stored token into "not connected".
- A stored admin setting that would not coerce fell back to the env default while
the settings page went on showing the saved value.
- A one-off InnerTube config failure pinned the whole process to the hard-coded
fallback key, and searches return nothing when that goes stale.
- The HLS sweep reported 0 swept — like a clean run — when it could not list its
own root, leaving every crashed session's segments on disk forever.
Four of them are counted rather than logged per item (dropped cues, dropped cut
list segments, unreclaimed GC files) and reported once per call, because the
alternative is one line per cue over a whole subtitle track.
ruff gains S110 and BLE001. Every blind `except Exception` that remains carries
`# noqa: BLE001 — <why>`, which is the point: catching everything is sometimes
right, and always worth a sentence. plex/sync.py's three best-effort backfill
catches now keep the traceback — a blind catch over a batch that fetches AND
writes could be Plex, the database or our own bug, and `%s` of the exception told
them apart badly. main.py's boot-time log-level read likewise.
logs.event's `code` is positional-only now: `event("x", code=...)` was a TypeError,
and `code` is exactly the word a caller reaches for when the thing that failed has
one of its own.
tests/test_swallowed_exceptions.py is the wider rule ruff cannot see: a handler
that neither logs nor re-raises must say why. Both cases mutation-checked — a
marker removed and a log line removed each fail it, naming the handler.
From the auth /security-review (contained fixes; architectural SA3 proxy-trust +
SA4 session-revocation deferred to the user):
- SB1: encrypt the OAuth access_token at rest (was plaintext while refresh_token
was encrypted) — a ~1h Google bearer credential. New security.decrypt_optional()
falls back to a refresh for legacy plaintext tokens; column is unbounded String.
E2E-verified: token refreshed → stored as Fernet ciphertext → 319-subscription
YouTube sync succeeded.
- SA5: password_login is no longer a timing/enumeration oracle — it always runs
argon2 (against a decoy hash for unknown/passwordless emails), so response time
can't reveal whether an account exists.
- SB2: Google login only ADOPTS+activates a pre-existing password account when
Google actually attests email_verified (defense-in-depth against takeover); and
the email sync won't overwrite with a value another account owns (avoids a 500).
- demo_login clears the wallet first (demo can't switch to / act as a real account
via the multi-account header); switch_account rejects a suspended target (which
would otherwise clear the whole session on the next request).
Re-review clean; ruff clean; localdev boots; YouTube auth path E2E-verified.
- app/utils.py: shared valid_email() + now_utc() (one email regex, was duplicated
in auth.py and admin.py with a looser "@"-in check elsewhere).
- security.hash_token(): one SHA-256 token hasher (was duplicated in auth.py + state.py).
- auth.admin_user dependency + count_admins() helper, replacing the inline role
checks and the last-admin count query repeated across admin.py/me.py/tags.py.
Add email+password auth alongside Google: argon2id hashing; users gains
password_hash/email_verified/is_active and google_sub becomes nullable (migration
0022); a single-use, hashed auth_tokens table for email verification + password
reset. Registration creates a pending (inactive, unverified) account + an access
request; sign-in needs verified email AND admin approval. Anti-enumeration: uniform
register/login/reset responses (a correct-password owner still gets a specific
pending reason). allow_registration flag (DB-tunable). Admin users-list + role
endpoint (guards: not self, not demo, not the last admin); approving access (or a
manual whitelist add) now activates the matching pending account. current_user
rejects deactivated accounts. Verified end-to-end via curl + DB.
- docker-compose with Postgres 16 + slim Python API image
- FastAPI app with session middleware, health endpoint, static login page
- Google OAuth (Authlib) with email invite-list whitelist; admin role support
- User + OAuthToken models; refresh tokens encrypted at rest (Fernet)
- Alembic migrations, run automatically on container startup
- Postgres backup/restore scripts for portability between machines
peter