1cfb19bdc7d361a89aeb899dcb063877176a8d12
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 peter
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5bfcf5d83a |
refactor(e10): move the platform components into components/ui/ and enforce the boundary
The app HAS a platform layer -- AnchoredPopover (22 importers, with arrows/typeahead/Escape/anchor-flip), QueryState (21), Modal (17), PageShell, DataTable, Tabs, Tooltip and ~26 more -- but it sat flat among ~160 feature components with nothing marking it as one. Several of those files describe themselves as 'the one place' or 'canonical' and were still bypassed by hand-rolled markup, because a layer nobody can see is a layer nobody uses; three separate inventory passes of this codebase misread it the same way. Moves the 33 domain-free modules into components/ui/, rewrites the imports in 89 files, and makes the boundary a lint rule rather than a convention: inside ui/ a one-level-up import (a feature component) and any lib/api slice are errors. The rule was verified to fire on both and to leave generic lib/ helpers alone. README.md states which side of the line a component belongs on and why. No behaviour change: 3x tsc, eslint, knip, prettier and 687 vitest tests all green; no backend file touched. |
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peter
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31fa554b87 |
release: 0.81.0 (improvement/e12-security-ops)
gate / frontend (push) Failing after 1m57s
gate / backend (push) Successful in 3m25s
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peter
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6a0efba477 | chore(release): 0.81.0 — E12 Security & Ops Hardening | ||
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peter
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9f28f46839 |
fix(e12): unbreak the gate, and stop printing a command that can strand the restore
Round five. 47 -> 34 -> 15 -> 7 -> 6 raw findings, and this round's sharpest was the loop's own blind spot: **the branch did not pass the gate.** `prettier --check` is one of its eight lanes and I had been running the other seven, so an unformatted `onError` from round one sat on the branch for four rounds — `siftlode publish` would have refused it, with no --skip flag to get past. **The restart hint could still strand the restored data.** Round four said the scripts no longer print a command they cannot resolve; they did. The COMPOSE_FILE fallback only fires when `docker-compose.yml` is ABSENT, so in a source checkout it never fires and the hint expanded to a bare, pasteable `docker compose up -d` — which reads the other file, whose volumes are `pgdata`/`downloads` rather than `siftlode_pgdata`/`siftlode_downloads`, and recreates the database on an empty one. When the file is unresolved the scripts now print `-f <the compose file you started with>`: not runnable, which is the point. **A comment naming the wrong owner.** `formats.py` still said a zero budget is "a refusal for enqueue to make" — the premise round one disproved, three files away from the two docstrings that now say the opposite. Anyone acting on it would delete the worker's refusal and re-open the original inversion, so it now says where the refusal actually lives. Also: the reset-flag rule was rewritten in three consecutive rounds and pinned by nothing — two tests now cover a fragment losing its token, both by a pasted verify link and by navigating away entirely; `backup.ps1` deletes a partially-copied dump before throwing, the guard round four gave the docs but not the script it mirrors; and one comment that read as if the asset were untouched by a line four below it. Gate green, all eight lanes: ruff, ruff format, 3x tsc, eslint, prettier, knip, vitest 687, pytest 950. |
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peter
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14f1c97c0a |
fix(e12): a bare up -d picks the wrong compose file, and recreates the database
Round four, on round three's diff. 47 -> 34 -> 15 -> 7 raw findings. **The printed restart command could strand the restored data.** Round three replaced `start` with `up -d` because `start` ignores a newly pinned tag — but printed it bare. In the git-clone layout BOTH compose files exist, so the scripts' COMPOSE_FILE fallback never fires and a bare `docker compose up -d` reads `docker-compose.yml`: different volume names, locally built images, no IMAGE_TAG at all. `stop` and `exec` had been fine there (they resolve running containers by project and service), but `up -d` RECREATES — so the operator pastes the hint straight after a successful restore and gets `db` on a new empty volume and a first-run setup wizard, with their data in an orphaned volume. Verified: the two files resolve `siftlode_pgdata` vs `pgdata` and different images. The scripts no longer print a command that recreates from a file they did not resolve. They name the compose file when they resolved one, and otherwise say to start it the way the operator normally does — with the caveats on their own lines rather than in a parenthetical at the end of a very long one. **The reset flag is now decided where the live hash is already parsed.** Round three cleared it in the token effect, which only runs when a NEW verify token arrives — so the back button, or re-pasting an already-consumed verify link, still left the banner promising a recovery whose token was gone. Setting it from the hash on every fragment change is both smaller and closes those. Also: the doc said `start` "still carries the old tag" four lines after "pin the older IMAGE_TAG", where "old" then reads as the tag being rolled back TO — it now reuses the scripts' unambiguous wording; the Windows recipe removes a partially-copied dump before throwing, so a mid-stream `cp` failure cannot leave a truncated file under the final name; and `$WarningPreference` is pinned beside `$ErrorActionPreference` so an inherited SilentlyContinue cannot drop the half-restored warning, with the comment corrected to say what the warning stream actually is. Gate green: vitest 685, pytest 950. |
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peter
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fc56f514b3 |
fix(e12): the restart hint pointed at the one command that undoes a rollback
Round three, on round two's diff. The trend across the loop is 47 -> 34 -> 15 raw findings; the ops half kept producing the sharpest ones because the gate cannot run it. **`docker compose start` ignores a newly pinned IMAGE_TAG.** Round two removed the automatic restart because it re-ran `alembic upgrade head` — and then told the operator to run that exact command by hand, in both scripts and the docs. `start` relaunches the container that already exists, which still carries the tag being rolled back FROM, so pinning 0.79.0 and following the printed instruction brings 0.80.0 back up and re-applies its migrations. Verified against a real daemon: after changing the pinned tag, `start` kept the old image and only `up -d` picked up the new one. Both scripts and the doc now say `up -d`, with the pin-first caveat where the operator reads it. **The reset flag outlived its token.** Reverting round one's "each link clears the other" went one step too far: a `#verify=` link pasted over a standing reset notice replaces the whole fragment, so the reset token is gone — but `resetPending` stayed true, and being checked first it hid the confirmation while promising a recovery that signing out could no longer complete. The flag is now cleared when the fragment it describes is gone, which is narrower than what was reverted and does not blank the signed-out card. **A test that could not fail.** The shared-asset regression test seeded the asset as `pending`, and `_reset_asset_pending` only acts on `downloading` — so the release half was a no-op and deleting it kept the suite green. Seeded as the worker actually leaves it now. Also: the malformed-URL guard answers with urlguard's structured detail rather than a bare English string, so both halves of one typo class get the same localized copy, and the third site in that module handing user input to `urlparse` was swept with it; the asset is released after the job is terminal, not before; the Stats 403 toast gets the wizard handle its own comment claimed it had; the pasted Windows recipe sets `$ErrorActionPreference` inside the block (a scriptblock inherits the caller's, so a `SilentlyContinue` profile swallowed every throw) and cleans up the container-side dump on the failure path too; the restore warning moved to the warning stream so a `> log` redirect cannot file it away; and two comments narrowed to what the code does. Gate green: vitest 685, pytest 950. |
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peter
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358d722ce9 |
fix(e12): close what round one broke, and revert two fixes that overreached
Round two of the review loop, on round one's own diff. Two of its findings were regressions the fixes themselves introduced, which is exactly what the loop is for: **A per-user refusal was writing onto a shared row.** MediaAssets are deduped across users, and the generic failure handler puts the message on the asset — right for an upstream failure, wrong for "your storage is full". Two users queuing the same video share one asset, so the first user hitting their cap failed the second user's job with the first one's private reason, telling someone with an empty library to free up space. The refusal now raises `_OwnerRefused`, caught separately: the job fails, the asset goes back to `pending` for whoever else holds it. Pinned by a test that drives `_download` directly — the refusal happens before extraction, so nothing needs stubbing. **The restore scripts restarted the app, undoing the restore.** `docker compose start` re-runs the container command, and that runs `alembic upgrade head` — so on the rollback path this documents as recommended (restore the dump, THEN pin the older tag) the newer image immediately re-applied the migrations the restore had just undone, and on a FAILED restore it put the app back on a half-restored schema. Both are the opposite of why the stop was added. Nothing is restarted automatically now; the scripts say what to run and when, and the docs' snippets say the same. **Reverted rather than patched:** the OnboardingWizard toast (the wizard already renders that failure inline, next to a Retry button — three recoveries for one failure), and `useVerifyEntry`'s "each new link clears the other". The latter blanked the signed-out card's only banner, where nothing renders the reset flag to replace it. The two states are independent again; what changes is that `dismiss` peels ONE layer, which is what the original finding was actually about. Also: `Stats` uses the YouTube helper rather than the bare one, so the route's English 403 detail no longer beats the translated fallback under a Hungarian UI; `urlparse` guarded alongside `.port` (an unclosed bracket raised just as late), the reason renamed `malformed` since "bad port" misdescribes it; three docstrings narrowed to what the code actually does (the worker's byte check is per-job, not an aggregate ledger, and not on the edit path; the redirect residual leaks a reachability oracle, which the note had denied; the invalidation helper does not cover suspend); the pasted Windows recipe wrapped so `throw` can stop it; the bash one-liner's failure branch no longer exits 0; and the tests that were missing for the round-one fixes — the account panel's error paths, the invalidation set, and the shared-asset case above. Gate green: vitest 685, pytest 950. |
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peter
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fe38dfbcca |
fix(e12): close the eighteen findings the E12 review round left standing
The deep review of the branch raised 47 findings, 18 of which survived adversarial verification. Grouped by what they actually were: **The size ceiling inverted at its boundary.** `remaining_bytes` clamped to 0 for a user already at their storage cap, and `build_ydl_opts` reads 0 as "no limit" — so the one user over quota was the only one downloading with no ceiling at all. `check_enqueue` could not catch it: it ran while the job was queued and the user was still under the cap. The arithmetic moves into `quota.remaining_bytes` (where every other max_bytes decision lives, and where it can be tested), and the worker now fails the job outright rather than proceeding unbounded — as a non-retryable `quota_exceeded`, since retrying cannot help until space is freed. **Silent failures in the new account panel.** All three actions went through `quiet: true` endpoints, which suppress the global error dialog on the promise that the caller reports inline — with no `onError`, that promise was broken and a refusal rendered as nothing. On the broken-SMTP instance this panel exists for, an admin would read silence as "the mail went out". The co-invalidation set and the email-off predicate move to `lib/adminUsers`, shared with the pending-access queue, so the two copies of these mutations cannot drift apart again — which is how half of this was lost in the first place. **A rollback recipe that destroyed data without working.** `alembic downgrade -1` steps back one migration, but a release routinely ships several (0.80.0 shipped four): it drops the newest one's columns and leaves the schema at a revision the older image also cannot resolve, i.e. the crash loop it was meant to escape, minus the data. The dump restore is now the recommended path, and the alembic route asks the target version for its own head revision instead of counting backwards. Also: redirects named in the urlguard docstring beside the DNS-rebinding residual they share a fix with (SEC-17); a malformed port refused as `bad_port` instead of escaping as a 500; the pull cooldown extended to the sibling route spending the same QuotaAction; restore stops the app before dropping its tables; the PowerShell cleanup can no longer decide the script's verdict on 5.1, nor report the wrong exit code; the documented one-liners hardened to match the scripts; the registry's retention window stated where pinning is advertised; the two banners made mutually exclusive so neither can shadow the other; `hover:bg-hover` (a utility this project never generated) replaced by the `selectable` recipe; the clipboard helper reused; and the sync cooldown's copy swept to the two callers that discarded it. Verified: gate green (vitest 678, pytest 949), and the panel, the row hover and the reset banner UAT'd on localdev. |
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peter
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f98b060e2b |
feat(admin): an account panel, and a set-password link that needs no email
Design option C, chosen by the user 2026-09-05. Nothing in the admin UI ever showed an account's GATE STATE: an admin could see a "Pending approval" chip but not whether the address was confirmed, whether SEC-10 had cleared the password, or which Google account was attached — so every support conversation started by guessing. Clicking a row now opens a drawer that says which gate the person is actually stuck behind, with the recovery actions under that readout rather than in the row. The drawer is `Modal placement="drawer"`, not a second dialog: the layer stack, ESC, the focus trap, Back-to-close and the scroll lock are the hard parts, and duplicating them is how two shells drift apart. It slides in, and honours prefers-reduced-motion like the rest. The link itself (SEC-15, SEC-16, and the everyday "no SMTP and someone forgot theirs") reuses the existing token machinery and the SAME `#reset=` entry the mailed link uses, so the signed-out card consumes it with no new flow. It is a distinct token KIND for one reason: a mailed reset arrives in the mailbox, so completing it proves ownership and confirms the address; an admin-issued link proves nothing about the mailbox — the admin hands it over by whatever means they choose — so it must not satisfy the email gate. Claiming otherwise would be the same false attestation SEC-15 is about. Issuing does not revoke the current password: a misclick must not lock anyone out. USING it rewrites the hash and bumps the session epoch, which is what evicts a squatter — SEC-16's actual remedy. Spending either kind burns the siblings of both, so a completed reset cannot leave a live admin link behind. The non-consuming probe learned the new kind too, or every admin link would have opened onto "this link is spent". The audit log records that a link was issued, by whom, for whom — never the link, which is a live credential-setting secret and the last thing that belongs in a long-lived log a human reads. Not gated on account state on purpose: it is useful for a pre-empted address, a revoked password, a Google-only account that wants one, and a plain forgotten password. Narrowing it would only make it refuse exactly when the admin needs it. The shared demo account is the one exception. Verified on localdev, both languages, end to end: issue from the panel -> the signed-in tab shows the honest "reset links open in a signed-out window" banner with the token still in the address bar -> signing out draws the "Set a new password" form, which is only possible because the probe recognises the new kind. Gate: pytest 925 -> 942, vitest 676. |
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peter
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bc9e34d0ae |
fix(auth): close the three leftovers E9.5 logged but kept out of its diff
DX-17, three one-liners the epic's canonical sweep did not reach:
`routes/setup.py::setup_admin` still resolved the wizard's admin by
literal `User.email ==`. The wizard can be re-run, and E9.5's premise is
that two spellings of one Gmail mailbox are one person — so a second run
under the other spelling would have created exactly the duplicate admin
row the epic exists to prevent.
`routes/admin.py::_decide` hand-rolled `db.get` + 404 where the file's
newer endpoints use `get_or_404`. There were TWO such sites, not the one
the review named; both are converted, per the house rule that a
principle gets fixed everywhere in one sweep.
`useVerifyEntry`'s `hashchange` listener recognised `#verify=` but not
`#reset=`, so pasting a reset link into a tab already running the app
was silently ignored — the same silence that made the verify half a bug.
It now notices, and says out loud that reset links need a signed-out
window; the fragment is still deliberately left in the address bar
(review round 4), so signing out from that tab recovers it.
DX-16: `.catch(() => setOutcome("invalid"))` could not tell a spent
token from a 502 mid-deploy or a dropped connection, and by then the
fragment is cleared — so a network blip was reported as "that link is no
longer valid", pushing the user to request a fresh one on the strength
of a false statement. Only a 400 carrying {code:"verify"} is the
server's verdict now; everything else gets its own outcome, with no
resend CTA, because the token is untouched and retrying it works. The
rule was already written one file away for the reset-link probe: "a
network blip must never be cached as 'this link is dead'".
Two existing tests asserted the old conflation by rejecting with a bare
Error("400"); they now reject with the real HttpError. The errors are
built inside the rejection, not hoisted: mountAt calls vi.resetModules(),
so an HttpError imported earlier is a different class identity and
`instanceof` would quietly miss.
Gate: vitest 671 -> 676, pytest 924 -> 925.
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peter
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0cc450d1c9 |
fix(downloads,sync): bound what one user can make the server fetch, download and spend
SEC-12: the download box accepts an arbitrary http(s) URL and yt-dlp fetches it from the WORKER, so any approved user could aim the server at the compose network, the LAN or a cloud metadata endpoint — and read the result off job.error, where "connection refused" vs "HTTP Error 401" vs "timed out" is a port scanner. downloads/urlguard.py refuses a URL whose host resolves to a loopback/private/link-local/reserved address, at enqueue AND again in the worker (DNS can move in between, and the worker is where the socket opens). A network-class failure on a `url` job now reports one fixed sentence instead of the raw transport text; the error CODE is still classified from the original, so the localized explanation is unchanged. DNS rebinding is explicitly NOT closed — that needs the connection gated inside yt-dlp — and the module says so rather than implying more than it does. SEC-13: `noplaylist` only demotes a video-inside-a-playlist URL to that video, so a URL that is purely a playlist or channel still expanded into every entry — one enqueue, unbounded downloads. `playlist_items` pins it to one. Size was unbounded too: `check_enqueue` compares the CURRENT footprint against the cap, and a download's size is unknown until it lands, so one job could overshoot by any amount; the owner's remaining budget is now handed to yt-dlp as `max_filesize`, applied AFTER the adapter merge so no source adapter can raise a limit the quota layer set. A join's cut-list is capped at 100: an accurate join emits two filters per segment into one ffmpeg filter_complex. SEC-14: the YouTube budget is instance-wide, so one user holding down a manual sync spent the day for everyone. Per-user (not per-IP — the cost belongs to the account) 3-per-10-minutes limiters on the two bulk pulls, subscriptions and playlists, with separate budgets so one does not close the other. The review also listed /rss, /backfill and /enrich; E3 deleted them, and search stays unlimited on purpose — it is interactive, not a bulk pull. Gate: pytest 896 -> 924 (none skipped), vitest 671. |
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peter
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688efb9ed6 |
feat(selfhost): license the repo, and make Plex actually usable on the public compose files
DX-10: the repo invited people to clone, build and self-host while carrying no LICENSE at all — which legally means all rights reserved, so none of that was permitted. Adds the verbatim GNU AGPL-3.0 text, the SPDX id in package.json and a README section. AGPL rather than MIT deliberately: this is a server application, so the case worth covering is someone running a modified copy as a network service. DX-12: .env.example documented PLEX_MEDIA_HOST_PATH -> /plex-media and the README advertised the Plex library, but only the localdev and home compose files carried the mount — on both PUBLIC files the module could read Plex's catalogue and then fail to open a single file, because it streams the media itself rather than proxying Plex. Both api and worker now mount it read-only with an empty named volume as the fallback, and self-hosting.md gains the section that explains the server URL/token, the path map and the mount together (it had never mentioned Plex). DX-15: the worker had no init: true on either public file, though localdev and home both carry tini with the reason written out — without PID 1 reaping, a watchdog hard-kill of a download's process group orphans its ffmpeg/yt-dlp grandchildren. Verified: 'compose config' resolves on both files, the Plex mount comes out read_only: true on api and worker, and init lands on worker (not just the bgutil-pot sidecar). Gate green: vitest 671, pytest 896. |
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peter
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ca4e559cc7 |
fix(ops): make backup/restore work, and give upgrades a pin and a rollback
DX-13: both shell scripts ran bare 'docker compose', which has no config
file to find in the layout docs/self-hosting.md tells people to use (only
docker-compose.selfhost.yml is downloaded) — they now fall back to it, while
a source checkout keeps resolving docker-compose.yml as before. The two
PowerShell scripts moved the dump through the PS pipeline, which corrupts
binary on 5.1 and cannot express -Encoding Byte at all on 7 ('Byte' is not a
supported encoding name), so they simply failed there; they now write inside
the container and 'docker compose cp' it across. backup.sh also wrote its
output straight into backups/, leaving a truncated file that looks like a
real backup when pg_dump fails — it writes a .part and promotes on success.
Both restores report a non-zero pg_restore rather than printing 'Restored'
over it. Docs now state that a backup is the dump PLUS .env: without
TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY every encrypted secret in the restored database is
unreadable, which the old one-line 'back up the volume' never said.
DX-14: 'latest' moves with every release and migrations run on every boot,
so self-hosters had no way to choose when they move and no way back. Docs
gain IMAGE_TAG pinning, a rollback recipe (image-only vs schema-bearing) and
the migration-failed-at-boot case; CHANGELOG.md is generated from
releaseNotes.ts so the file cannot drift from what the app shows, and
'siftlode release' refuses on a stale one rather than regenerating it into
the clean tree it just demanded.
Verified: dump + restore round-trip on both platforms against localdev into
a scratch database (8 users, 262822 videos, schema 0082_invite_lang), and
IMAGE_TAG=0.80.0 resolves on both services in 'compose config'.
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peter
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e23128b4a1 |
release: 0.80.0 (improvement/e9.5-onboarding-access)
gate / frontend (push) Failing after 2m26s
gate / backend (push) Successful in 3m42s
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peter
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0d5f8f0708 |
chore(release): 0.80.0 — E9.5 Onboarding & Access flow
Release notes for the epic: bilingual mail, one-mail-one-click approval, order-independent gates with named states, canonical Gmail identity, the admin lifeline for sign-ups stuck outside, and the four-round closing review that converged 12 -> 4 -> 3 -> 2. |
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peter
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a03bf8d371 |
fix(auth): stop erasing a reset link the signed-in tree never reads (E9.5 review round 4)
Round 4 came back converged — nothing above low, and both findings in one family. This is the half worth fixing, because the branch introduced it. Only the signed-out auth card consumes a `#reset=` token, and S2 moved the address-bar cleanup up to a hook App mounts unconditionally. So opening a password-reset link in a browser that already holds a session erased the token from the URL while nothing had read it: the page loads, nothing is said, and clicking the link again does exactly the same, because the token is untouched and the session is still there. That is the dead end this epic exists to remove, and `main` did not have it — the strip used to live inside the card, which a signed-in visitor never renders. An unspent reset fragment now stays, which restores the recovery that shape always had: signing out reloads with the fragment intact and the form is waiting. Once the card has spent the token a later reload meets S4's named dead-link screen, which is true. The affirmative version — a banner telling a signed-in visitor that reset links open in a signed-out window — is logged with DX-15, along with the `hashchange` half that still only recognises `#verify=`. |
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peter
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3dc14402b0 |
test(auth): pin what rounds 1 and 2 left unpinned (E9.5 review round 3)
Three low findings, all in what the review rounds themselves wrote. The comment on `test_approving_an_unverified_account_keeps_its_password` still asserted the argument rounds 1 and 2 refuted — that dropping the approval-time revoke was safe because `password_login` reads `email_verified` first — while the docstrings on the two functions it describes now say the opposite. Two contradictory "why" records for one rule is how the round-1 takeover primitive got reasoned into existence in the first place, so the test comment now carries the corrected account and names SEC-16. `test_a_later_registration_leaves_a_link_already_in_flight_alive` asserted a subset relation that is vacuously true on an empty set, and the guard that made it non-empty had gone out with the revert. It now pins both halves: the old link survives, and exactly one new one appears. Round 2's own fix — activation moved to after a successful send — was unpinned; putting it back above the send left the suite green. The failed-invitation test now also asserts the account was not activated by a request the UI reported as a failure. |
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peter
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540ca244c8 |
revert(auth): the newest registration does not own an unverified account (E9.5 review round 2)
Round 1 fixed the address pre-emption chain by letting a later registration replace the password on an unverified account and delete its outstanding verify tokens. Round 2 read that code and showed it was worse than what it fixed, so it goes back out. It closes nothing. The rule is symmetric and an attacker can simply register last — on a timer, inside the five-per-five-minutes budget — while the owner registers once. What it does add is two primitives an unauthenticated caller did not have: overwrite a real registrant's chosen password, and delete the confirmation link already sitting in their inbox (the approval mail's 7-day token is an ordinary verify token, so the blanket delete took that too). Worst of all it fired on the rows SEC-10 left stripped — password_hash NULL, password_revoked_at set, active — installing an attacker's password where the entire state means "there is none", and clearing the stamp that is the only reason password-reset still accepts them. That is a straight takeover which did not exist before, in the code written to prevent one. The owner's recourse needed no new primitive and already worked: password-reset accepts a pre-empted account, proves the mailbox, rewrites the hash and bumps the session epoch. What remains is the bounded window between a confirmation click and that reset, which is SEC-16 — logged with this attempt written down, so the next person does not reach for it again. Two smaller round-2 findings go with it. `upsert_pending_invite`'s new exact-spelling tie-break ran before any status preference, so it could deterministically pick a DENIED sibling over a pending one and reopen it — the very outcome its comment claimed to prevent; the status preference now comes first. And `send_invitation` activated the account before the send it might have to report as failed, so a request the UI called a failure had quietly let someone in; activation now follows a mail that actually left. The verify token minted to render that mail still commits either way — it is single-use, expires on its own and was mailed nowhere, and the note says so rather than leaving the next reader to wonder whether it was missed. |
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peter
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563fa0513d |
fix(auth): close what the epic's own review found (E9.5 review round 1)
Eleven findings survived adversarial verification; these are the fixes.
**Address pre-emption.** S1 dropped the approval-time password revoke, arguing `password_login`
refuses an unverified account before it reads `is_active`. Two verifiers showed that holds only
while the address stays unverified — and S6's approval mail exists to get the real owner to end that
state, at which point the squatter's password works. While an address is unverified the NEWEST
registration now owns it: the password is replaced and every outstanding verify token deleted, so
the owner takes the row back simply by registering, and a link already in flight cannot confirm it
for anyone else. The residual (an owner who confirms and neither registers nor resets) is logged as
SEC-16 beside SEC-15, where the re-attestation path it needs already lives. The comments that
asserted the old, false invariant now say what actually guards this.
**The entry URL.** S2 moved `clearEntryUrl()` out of the signed-out auth card into a hook App mounts
unconditionally, and it blanket-stripped the whole query string, the fragment and `history.state` on
the FIRST commit. That broke first-run setup outright — the wizard mounts only after its query
resolves and then finds no `?token=` — and silently ate `?link=`/`?oauth=` (no toast, no refetch
after connecting Google), `?v=`/`?chan=` deep links, and scroll restoration. It now clears only the
fragment and the two one-time flags it owns, and preserves `history.state`.
**The env allow-list.** S3 canonicalised the Invite branch of `is_allowed` and left the
ALLOWED_EMAILS/ADMIN_EMAILS fallback matching literally — the 2026-09-03 lockout with a different
source of truth, plus a shadowing trick where an unauthenticated request under a sibling spelling
permanently masked an env grant. Canonical on both sides now, and the same for the delete dialog's
warning and the ADMIN_EMAILS role bootstrap.
**Honest states.** `send_invitation` stamped "I already wrote to them" before a fail-soft background
send; it sends inline and records only what left. The admin-side resend answered `{ok: true}` for a
dropped mail; it now says so. Both also activate/serialize consistently with the other decide paths.
**Correctness sweep.** The 7-day approval link said "expires in 168 hours" — durations render in
days once there is more than one. `_register_account`, `upsert_pending_invite` and `add_invite`
picked among canonical siblings with no ORDER BY and no exact-spelling tie-break, so which account
got the re-send, and whether a denied row was reopened over a pending one, was up to Postgres.
`purge_user` deleted every canonically-equal invite, revoking a surviving sibling account's access.
`ConfirmProvider` wrapped its ReactNode message in a `<p>`. Approving no longer leaves the
stuck-sign-ups list stale. The refusal panels announce and take focus.
**Tests.** Three mailers rewritten this epic never rendered in any test; every `send_*` now renders
in both languages. The orphan-key guard could not fail (it scanned the catalog that defines the
keys) and had no reverse direction. Newly pinned: canonical activation, the surviving sibling's
grant, a failed invitation and resend, an expired reset link, a throttled login's silence, the
per-language admin fan-out, and that the entry URL keeps what it does not own.
|
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peter
|
10c0ca4cf7 |
feat(email): write to people in their own language (E9.5 S7)
Twelve mails carried hardcoded English while the app itself has enforced HU/EN parity since E5.
A mail is the one user-facing surface nobody can re-render by switching the UI language: it arrives
once, in whatever language we picked, and stays that way. That made the epic's own headline mail —
"one mail, one click" — English for a Hungarian reader.
The text moved to a catalog (`mailtext.py`) with a `text(key, lang, **vars)` renderer, and the parity
rule is now a test rather than a habit: every key must carry both languages AND the same
`{placeholders}`. A translation that drops `{link}` sends a mail with no link in it; one that invents
a placeholder raises inside a background task nobody is watching. Both are silent in production.
Every `send_*` takes the language as its second argument, resolved by the REQUEST handler and never
inside the mail — these all run as background tasks, after the request's session is gone, which is
the same reason the approval mail computes its link in the handler.
Where the language comes from, in order: the account's own preference; failing that, the language the
person asked us in; failing that, English. The middle one is new — `invites.lang`, migration `0082` —
because the mails an access request produces go to an address that usually has no account yet, and
the signal does exist: the page their form was submitted from, or the locale Google reported for a
sign-in we refused. Captured rather than derived, for the third time in this epic (`google_email` in
S3, `preferences.language` in S6 taught the same lesson): a signal that exists only in one moment
cannot be backfilled later. So the admin is asked in exactly one place — the invitation to an address
they typed in themselves, where nobody has ever told us anything.
That send is now a dialog rather than a bare click, which is also where the "you already wrote to
them" warning belongs — it used to live only in a tooltip the admin may never hover, guarding the one
action whose failure mode is mailing a real person twice.
S6's registration `lang` field turned out to be dead on arrival: the backend accepted it, the
frontend never sent it, so every account has been storing nothing. The request builders now stamp the
UI language themselves — a signal that has to be passed in by every caller is one every caller can
forget, which is exactly how it shipped unset.
Admins are notified one mail per language group instead of one blast to everyone. They are people
with their own UI language; a single message would have to pick one of them and be wrong for the rest.
Also removes a duplicated `invited_at` column declaration on `Invite` (two identical definitions
landed in S6).
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peter
|
a76bab9b34 |
feat(auth): one mail, one click — the approval mail carries the confirmation link (E9.5 S6)
The funnel's common ordering made a person open TWO messages: one saying their access was approved, another asking them to confirm their address. The approval mail now branches on what they actually still have to do — carry the confirmation link, point at sign-in, or say a confirmation mail follows once they register — so the usual case is one mail and one click. A mail that guesses wrong is worse than a plain one: telling someone to sign in while their address is unconfirmed contradicts the screen that will refuse them. That embedded link lives 7 days rather than the usual 24 hours. Nobody sits waiting for an approval — it can easily be read on Monday after a weekend, and an expired link spends the one-mail promise and puts them back on two. The risk is small: the token only ever confirms an address; it signs nobody in and sets no password. The most likely root cause of the 2026-09-03 report that a confirmation mail "never arrived" is here too, and it was never a delivery failure: re-registering an address that already had an unconfirmed account returned in SILENCE — same cheerful "check your inbox", no mail sent at all. It now re-sends the link. Nothing new leaks: the response and its timing are unchanged, and the public verify/resend already does exactly this for the same input. Whitelisting stays silent, and that is a decision, not an omission. The operator opens a door as a possibility — usually already agreed with the person — and a row can sit approved for weeks with nobody registering; a mail fired automatically there would be nudging someone who never asked. Telling them is its own act on its own button, `invited_at` records it so a second click is a decision rather than an accident, and the button only appears where nobody is behind the address yet: "the door is open, come in" is meaningless to someone already inside. Two things UAT caught that no test would have. Every fresh registration appeared in BOTH admin lists at once, because the stuck-sign-ups filter keyed on "unconfirmed" — the rule is now "the address may sign in, and this account still can't", which leaves an undecided request with the queue that owns it. And the invitation button was offered on every approved row, half of which are existing users. Also: the confirmation mail finally says what its link's rules are (once, 24 hours) — the reset mail always has, while this one left the reader to discover both by meeting a dead link. The card's "didn't get the email?" moves up under the form, and the three waiting messages name the spam folder, which is where a first message to a fresh recipient sometimes lands. Registration now records the language the sign-up page was in. Nothing reads it yet — the bilingual templates are S7 — but it is the only moment that choice exists anywhere the server can see, and a preference nobody recorded cannot be backfilled later. UAT on localdev: re-registering re-sent the link (one token became two, one account); approval issued a 7-day token and moved the account into the stuck list with only a re-send; whitelisting mailed nobody; the invitation recorded itself and the row then warned that sending again would write twice. Test data removed. |
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peter
|
7acdf5d577 |
feat(admin): surface the sign-ups that are stuck outside, and let an admin finish letting them in (E9.5 S5)
Approve an address BEFORE the person registers and their sign-up produces no queue row at all — `_decide` only takes a still-pending invite — so the Access-requests screen sat empty, the tab badge read zero, and the only working move was re-typing the address into the whitelist box. Nobody would guess that, and on 2026-09-03 nobody did. This is roadmap UX-25, where two earlier attempts were reverted after review. Both moved AUTHORITY: auto-activating on registration turns a standing whitelist entry into a bearer grant for whoever registers the address first, and reopening the approved invite to `pending` lets an anonymous sign-up REVOKE a standing approval. What was actually missing was visibility, so this changes nothing about what an unauthenticated caller can cause — the admin could already do exactly this by re-entering the address; they just had no way to know they had to. The section lists every account that cannot sign in yet and says WHICH gate is shut, because the two dead ends look the same from the admin's chair: waiting for activation, or waiting on a confirmation mail. Naming the unconfirmed ones is not decoration — on a no-SMTP instance that is the difference between the owner and whoever registered the address first (SEC-15), and an admin about to let someone in should see it. A person the queue above already covers is deliberately NOT listed here; two buttons for one person is worse than one. Activate is gated on `is_allowed` — the same function the sign-in paths consult, in core, so the button that appears and the badge that counts cannot disagree. Without that gate it would manufacture an inconsistent account: password sign-in only checks `is_active` and would let them in, while their Google sign-in would be turned away and silently reopened as a fresh access request. Letting in someone with no approved invite stays the whitelist box's job, which says so out loud. The badge counts activations SEPARATELY from pending invites rather than widening an existing field's meaning, and only counts what genuinely waits on the admin: an unconfirmed account waits on its owner, so it is listed with a re-send but does not nag. The admin-side resend says plainly what happened, including refusing when the instance has no working SMTP — mail is fail-soft everywhere else, and that silence is exactly what left the 0.78.5 sign-ups with nothing to fall back on. `send_verification_link` is now one function with three callers (registration, the public resend, this one), so the link's shape and TTL cannot drift by who triggered it. UAT on localdev, both languages: the UX-25 shape reproduced end to end (approve the address, then register), the badge counting it, Activate letting them in and dropping the badge, the row losing its Activate but keeping the re-send, a fresh token issued by the re-send, and both actions in the audit log. Test data removed. |
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peter
|
b1086e05dc |
fix(auth): stop drawing a reset form the link can no longer fill (E9.5 S4)
Reported from UAT: delete an account, then open its password-reset link. The card drew the full "set
a new password" form — because a `#reset=` fragment was present, and nothing more — and only after
the user had typed a password did the server answer 400. Measured first: no security hole. A user's
tokens cascade away with the row, so nothing can be set on a deleted or a re-created account. What
was left is a dead end of exactly the kind this epic exists to remove, and it is not rare: a reset
link lives one hour, mail is slow or lands in spam, and whoever got two mails clicks the older one.
password-reset/check answers whether a link is still usable WITHOUT spending it, so asking can never
cost the user their one real attempt — the property the tests pin hardest. It gets its own limiter,
because opening a link must not eat the budget for requesting one, and a throttled caller is told
"ok", never "dead": this check may only ever save someone a wasted form, so when it cannot answer it
degrades to the old behaviour instead of declaring a live link finished. The confirm endpoint stays
the authority, and its failure raises the same named screen, since the token can die between the two
calls or the probe itself may have failed.
A too-short password is deliberately NOT that screen. The length check runs before the token is
spent, so a typo costs the link nothing, and the card tells the two 400s apart by `reason` so only
one of them takes the form down.
Both email-link confirmations (verify, password-reset/confirm) now answer in the {code, reason}
shape S4 introduced. They were the last refusals a user meets by simply clicking an old link while
still being answered in hardcoded English under a bilingual UI. The seven remaining bare strings in
this module (register, request-access, the demo guards, set-password) sit behind client-side
validation the UI does first; they are logged as a follow-up rather than swept in silently here.
One bug found by the UAT itself, in the new code: the check went out FOUR times per opened link —
StrictMode double-invokes effects and the shell remounts the card as the session probe settles.
Harmless per request, but against a per-IP limit it would exhaust the budget in two reloads and then
silently fall back to drawing the form unchecked: nothing errors, the feature just stops working.
Deduped in a module-level map holding the in-flight promise (a ref dies with the remount that causes
it); a failed probe drops itself so a blip is never cached as "dead". The test renders the card
twice, because with one render the guard would rot undetected.
UAT on localdev: the reported scenario end to end (delete the account, open the link) shows the named
screen and no form; a live link still opens the form and completes; the CTA lands on the request-a-
link form; one probe per opened link. Throwaway accounts removed.
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peter
|
ed91c83dd7 |
fix(auth): name the state and the address behind a refused sign-in (E9.5 S4)
"Your account is awaiting admin approval." was true and useless. It never said WHICH mailbox the account was on, and on 2026-09-03 that silence hid a Gmail alias mismatch for a day: a registration as np.temu@gmail.com met a Google claim of nptemu@gmail.com, and every screen in the funnel agreed to say nothing about it. Every refusal password-login can answer with now uses the codebase's structured {code, reason} detail, built in one helper. The three that arrive AFTER the password is proven carry the address on the account plus both gate flags; the two that answer before it (invalid, rate_limited) carry nothing, so a wrong password and an unknown account stay byte-identical. The frontend renders the first three as a named screen in place of the form — there is nothing to retype once the password is correct — with an icon, the two-gate checklist, the address in monospace, and a resend CTA where one helps. Reporting each gate from its own flag is the payoff of S1: approved-but-unverified is a real state now, and a screen that assumed a sequence would send that user off to wait for an admin who has already decided. The Google access-request notice names the address too, and says so when the request was already on file under ANOTHER spelling of the same mailbox — the honest version of "we didn't open a second one", stated only when it applies. It moved from the query string to the fragment: the notice now carries an address, and a query string lands in every reverse-proxy access log. Same reasoning that put the verify/reset tokens there, and the same owner already clears it. urlencode, not an f-string, because URLSearchParams reads a bare + in a fragment as a space and would mangle exactly the +tag addresses this epic exists to protect. upsert_pending_invite returns the row it settled on beside the is-new flag, since the row's stored address is what the notice has to name and what mail will go to. Deviation from the PendingScreen mockup, deliberately: no "Sign out" button and no separate "Not your address?" link. The mockup drew the panel in the app shell; the accepted decision (a) keeps the pending user session-less, so there is no session to end, and the address is named directly above a "Back to sign in" that answers the same question. UAT on localdev, both languages: all three refusals with the typed spelling deliberately differing from the stored one (the panel named the stored one), the resend CTA carrying the typed address into the resend form, and both access-request banners with a +tag address surviving the fragment round trip. Throwaway accounts and the language switch reverted. |
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peter
|
a614ee2435 |
feat(auth): show the Google address beside the one the account registered with (E9.5 S3)
An account can now hold two true addresses: the one its owner typed, which a Google sign-in no longer overwrites, and the one Google answers with. Only the first was stored, so Settings could say 'Connected' without saying connected AS WHOM -- exactly what someone who registered with a +tag needs to know. users.google_email (migration 0080) records Google's answer at sign-in and at an in-app link. /api/me exposes it ONLY when it differs from the account address, so the comparison lives in one place and the majority, whose two addresses are the same string, see no change at all. Rendered in the account menu as a muted third line under the identity, and in the Settings sign-in row under the existing hint. A short 'Google' label rather than a brand glyph: the app draws one icon set (lucide), and a generic mail icon next to an email address says nothing. It also reads to a screen reader, which an unlabelled logo would not. No backfill is possible -- Google's answer is only known at sign-in -- so accounts linked earlier stay NULL until their owner next signs in with Google. |
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peter
|
c74487fbb3 |
fix(auth): keep the address the user registered with, and let it sign them in (E9.5 S3)
Two halves of one rule: the address someone typed is theirs to keep, and it must be the one that gets them back in. A plus-tagged or dotted Gmail is often a deliberate choice -- registering as me+siftlode@gmail.com is how you find out later which site leaked your address. The Google callback overwrote it with the account's primary, which can never contain a '+', so the tag vanished on the first Google sign-in and, because sign-in matched the stored address, took their chosen address with it. The rewrite line is older than this epic, but S3 made it reachable here by matching adoption across spellings. It now runs only when the mailbox GENUINELY changed, and lives in a named helper rather than inline, so the rule has one home. The three lookups that resolve a typed address -- password login, password reset, verify resend -- go through find_user_by_email: exact spelling first, then the unique canonical candidate, and None when several accounts share a mailbox rather than guessing which one a password should open. Reset and resend previously answered a different spelling with silence (they reply uniformly by design), which was a dead end with no way out. Their mail now goes to the address on the account, never the one typed into the form. |
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peter
|
876cece881 |
fix(auth): match identity on a canonical email, so one Gmail mailbox is one account (E9.5 S3)
Gmail delivers x.y@, xy@ and xy+tag@ to one inbox; the invite gate only lowercased. On 2026-09-03 that turned an approved user's Google sign-in into a silent SECOND access request -- OAuth returns the account's stored primary, which need not be the spelling they typed -- and left prod with two user rows for one mailbox (ids 13, 14). The +tag case fails every time: a Google account cannot contain +, so OAuth can only ever answer with the base address. Mail still goes to the address AS TYPED; only identity matching uses the canonical form. utils.canonical_email is the single definition, and a model validator derives users.email_canonical / invites.email_canonical on every write, so no call site can forget it. Scope is narrow on purpose: dots are significant on most providers and the Gmail rule does not hold for Workspace custom domains. Swept every sibling of the same principle, not just the reported one: is_allowed, upsert_pending_invite, the Google-callback adoption, _register_account (so no new duplicate pair can be created), _activate_user_by_email, admin _accounts_for (an invite backing a live user under another spelling used to look deletable) and add_invite, plus purge_user, which now erases every canonically-equal invite instead of leaving one behind that still grants access. Migration 0079 backfills both columns and indexes them NON-uniquely: prod already carries canonical duplicates (approved invite pairs since 2026-06-16), and merging accounts is a judgement call about people's data, not something a migration does on its own. A test pins the backfill SQL against the Python helper. |
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peter
|
e5997ca567 |
fix(auth): consume a verification token that arrives without a page load (E9.5 S2)
Found in UAT. Navigating a tab that already runs the app to a URL differing only in the fragment is a same-document navigation: nothing reloads, so the import-time entry snapshot never sees the token. It sat unconsumed in the address bar and the previous outcome stayed on screen -- the same silence this sprint set out to remove, wearing a different hat. Pasting the emailed link into a running tab does exactly this, and our verification mails were plain text until 0.78.8, which makes pasting the normal way to use one. A hashchange listener now picks up the new token, the guard tracks consumed tokens rather than a single fired flag (still exactly one POST per token), and a fresh link clears the standing outcome instead of leaving the old banner up. |
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peter
|
c134b514c1 |
fix(auth): confirm an emailed verification link wherever it is opened (E9.5 S2)
The token was only ever consumed inside Welcome.tsx, which App renders ONLY when there is no session. Opening the emailed link in a browser that already held a Siftlode session posted nothing, the fragment was then stripped, and the user got no signal at all -- the link simply did nothing. Incognito worked, which is why it survived. Confirmation now happens in App, above that branch: signed out the outcome still drives the auth card's banners, signed in it drives a top-of-app bar. The entry URL is snapshotted once at import time (lib/entryUrl) instead of per component, so no future URL writer can strip a token before whoever needs it has read it -- that ordering race is what broke this in the first place. POST /auth/verify now names the address it confirmed, which matters when the browser holds a session for a different account; the same reasoning as password_reset_required already covers the disclosure. Also here, from the 2026-09-02 review tail: the dead GET /auth/verify goes (both senders emit the fragment form, and the last query-token link expired 24h after the 0.78.7 deploy), a spent #verify=/#reset= fragment is cleared while signed in, and the auth-card banners get role=status. The verifyOkReset copy no longer blames admin approval, which E9.5 S1 made false. |
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peter
|
243869401a |
fix(auth): stop discarding a legitimate password on admin approval (E9.5 S1)
SEC-10 revoked any password set while an account's email was unverified, on both the Google-adoption and the admin-approval path. On the approval path that was redundant: password_login refuses an unverified account before it ever reads is_active, so approval hands a pre-emptor's password nothing it could use. All the revoke achieved there was destroying the password a legitimate registrant had just chosen -- and since the admin normally decides before the user reads their mail, 'your password was cleared for security' was the DEFAULT experience, not an edge case. The guard stays on the Google-adoption path, where the real owner does attest ownership. password_reset_required and the ok_reset banner stay: accounts stripped on prod before this change have no other way back in. Two existing tests pinned the old rule, so they are rewritten rather than deleted, and the SEC-10 recovery pack now builds the revoked state through the surviving producer. |
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peter
|
7339a0b84b |
release: 0.79.0 (improvement/e9-playlist)
gate / frontend (push) Failing after 1m43s
gate / backend (push) Successful in 2m48s
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peter
|
c960c07a6a |
release: 0.79.0 notes + version bump
E9 Playlist module: total playtime in both playlist headers, the header compacted to two rows, and the sticky column header sitting flush. Plus the six defects the epic-end deep review confirmed. |
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peter
|
3cfdb36f06 |
test(format): pin the sub-minute truncation (E9 R2)
Round 2 mutation-checked round 1's own fix and found the one line it left uncovered: every table row was an integer, so `Math.floor(sec)` in the new seconds tier could be deleted or swapped for round/ceil with the suite still green — exactly the "later cleanup removes it as redundant" failure the fix's comment claims to prevent. Two fractional rows kill all three mutants. |
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peter
|
ada95d04a4 |
fix(playlists): one rendering for a playlist total, honest below a minute (E9 R1)
Epic-end deep review, round 1. Six findings survived verification; five of them were one defect wearing different hats. formatRuntime floored 1-59s to "0m". Harmless while it only ever formatted a Plex movie's length, but 12D repurposed it for an aggregate, and a total is the only input that can land under a minute: a playlist of Shorts reported "0m" while the rail beside it read "0:45". Fixed in the function, not behind a `>= 60` guard at each of the seven call sites — the invariant belongs where it cannot be forgotten. Its contract comment claimed "Plex movie/episode lengths" and was two epics stale. The rail rendered the same playlist total as formatDuration (1:23:45) while the new header rendered formatRuntime (1h 23m) — two shapes of one number, side by side on one screen. The rail now uses formatRuntime too; formatTotalHours had already recorded that H:MM:SS is wrong for an aggregate. The rename input kept min-w-0 without flex-1 in the compacted row, so it was the only shrinkable child beside a shrink-0 action cluster. The Plex half of this same epic already had the fix; this restores the symmetry. plex.browse.items had no plural forms, so a one-item Plex playlist read "1 items". Pre-existing, but the new header is the call site where count=1 is ordinary. Both languages get both forms, no key drift. formatRuntime had no unit tests at all across seven call sites. Added a tier table plus a sweep asserting no non-zero second ever renders as "0m". Dropped after 3/3 adversarial refutations: the meta-line segment ordering (the filtered count is labelled, and count-then-runtime is the convention) and the null-duration lower bound (the server's own SUM has skipped NULLs since long before this branch; changing only the client would split them). |
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peter
|
1b004e6ccf |
feat(plex): total playtime in the playlist header (E9 S3)
Parity with the YouTube playlist header (E9 12D): the Plex playlist detail now carries a meta line under the title — "N items · Xh Ym", summed from the items' duration_seconds. No backend change: leaf_card already serializes duration_seconds for both movies and episodes, and no new i18n key either — the count reuses plex.browse.items, the same key the collection header uses. The title/rename input moved into a min-w-0 flex-1 column so the meta line sits under both; the line is hidden on an empty playlist. |
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peter
|
95c33e0b0f |
refactor(playlists): compact the playlist header to two rows (E9 12A)
The header portals into the shell's FIXED toolbar band, so its height is list height the user never gets back — and it was spending four stacked blocks on it: title, meta line, an action row, then a separate view-control row under the cover. Option B collapses that into two tight rows beside a smaller cover: title + rename/YouTube-link on the first, with Play-all, push/revert/delete and the unsynced badge pushed right; the meta line (count · playtime · filtered) and the view controls (group-by, reset view, save order, view status, undo/redo) sharing the second. Every control and its gating is unchanged — the view-control group still appears only for `items.length > 1 || viewActive`, so a one-item playlist shows just the meta line. Measured on a 32-item playlist: the band goes 170px -> 88px at rest (122px while a view is active, where the status sentence wraps), which is ~80px more visible list. |
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peter
|
4e6bcbc078 |
fix(playlists): stop the table header shifting up on first scroll (E9 12B)
The playlist content wrapper carried `pt-3`, so its sticky column header sat 12px below the scroller top at rest and jumped up to `top:0` on the first scroll. Drop the top padding so the header is flush from rest and never shifts — the fixed toolbar band above supplies the breathing room, matching the channel table's already-correct pattern. |
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peter
|
e17fb5bbf5 |
feat(playlists): total playtime in header + sticky-header fade fix (E9 S1)
Surface the playlist's total playtime beside the item count in the detail header (12D) — sums every item's duration (formatRuntime "h m", matching the approved mockup), hidden when nothing sums. Data is already client-side; no backend change. Pass fadeTop:false for the playlists page (12B) so the shell's top edge-fade no longer sits over the already-sticky column header (tableHeader.tsx:257), matching the channels/audit pages. |
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peter
|
a9044ece50 |
release: 0.78.8 (improvement/email-html-alternative)
gate / frontend (push) Failing after 1m40s
gate / backend (push) Successful in 2m40s
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peter
|
473aafd1c8 | release: bump VERSION to 0.78.8 + release notes | ||
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peter
|
7019e3afdf |
fix(email): give every mail an HTML alternative so its link is clickable
The bodies are text/plain only, so whether the URL in a verification or password-reset mail is a link at all was the client's decision. Gmail, Outlook and Apple Mail linkify plain text; lighter web clients render the body verbatim and leave the link as dead text — in a message whose entire purpose is that one link. _send now attaches an HTML part generated from the SAME plain body, rather than per-template HTML that would have to be kept in sync with it: one converter, all eleven templates, and text/plain stays the primary part and the source of truth. Escaping runs before linkification — bodies interpolate untrusted values (a requester's address, the operator contact) — so no caller can inject markup, and a query string's `&` is already `&` when it reaches the href, which is what an HTML attribute wants. Sentence-final punctuation is trimmed out of the href while url-safe token characters (`-`, `_`) are left alone. Inline styles only, no images, no external CSS, no tracking. |
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peter
|
c81b110637 |
release: 0.78.7 (bug/verify-link-and-approval-lockout)
gate / frontend (push) Failing after 1m44s
gate / backend (push) Successful in 2m42s
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peter
|
2ecc70ca6d | release: bump VERSION to 0.78.7 + release notes | ||
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peter
|
f8c63e80c2 |
fix(auth): widen the 0078 backfill so revoke victims who verified are rescued too
Review found the backfill's fourth predicate `AND email_verified = false` strands exactly the subset that needs it most. The revoke does not invalidate the account's outstanding verification token, so clicking the emailed link is the natural next thing such a user does — and it sets email_verified=True while password_hash stays NULL. That row then has no route back at all: reset ineligible, resend refuses an already-verified address, set-password needs a session the account cannot obtain, and nothing re-stamps it because the revoke itself is guarded on being unverified. The remaining three predicates already pin the victim set exactly: registration and the setup wizard always set a hash, every Google row carries a google_sub (adoption assigns it before revoking), and nothing in the codebase ever clears google_sub — so a local, non-demo, passwordless row can only have come from the revoke. Widening is therefore safe, and it is the argument the docstring was already making while the SQL contradicted it. Also corrects that docstring: set-password is unreachable because the account cannot authenticate at all, not because the epoch bump killed a session — an unverified account is refused at login before a session is ever minted, so it never had one. |
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peter
|
3ac3d382e7 |
fix(auth): stop the address-bar mirror eating emailed auth tokens, and unlock revoked accounts
Two independent bugs made an email+password registration unrecoverable in prod. The verification link did nothing. urlWithParams/clearParams rebuilt the URL as pathname+query and dropped the fragment — but the one-time auth tokens ride the fragment (#verify=/#reset=, SB3), and the providers that mirror nav params (useUrlMirror in FeedFilters/Playlists/Plex/Channels) sit ABOVE the lazily-loaded <App> in main.tsx. Their mount effect replaceState'd the token away before the auth card's chunk had loaded, so the card read an empty hash: the link opened a bare sign-in page, no request, no banner. Both helpers now carry the fragment over. The account was then locked out for good. SEC-10 nulls password_hash when an unverified account is attested (here: admin approval landing before the user could verify — which the bug above made impossible). That is indistinguishable from a Google-only account, and reset eligibility keyed off password_hash alone, so no reset link was ever issued: no password to sign in with, and no way to get one. users.password_revoked_at records the revocation, reset eligibility honours it, and setting a password again (reset-confirm or set-password) clears it. An account that never had a password stays ineligible on purpose — its owner adds one from Settings. /auth/verify now also answers password_reset_required so the card can say why the registered password stopped working, instead of leaving the user at the uniform "Invalid email or password". Telling the holder of a valid verify token leaks nothing: they have already proved they own the mailbox. The 0078 migration backfills the stamp for rows carrying the exact lockout signature (local, non-demo, no password, unverified), so existing victims recover unaided. |
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peter
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94c62ca699 |
release: 0.78.6 (feat/admin-invite-delete-email-health)
gate / frontend (push) Failing after 1m43s
gate / backend (push) Successful in 2m53s
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peter
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1fe24d374a |
docs(tests): correct the deny-vs-delete rationale in the invites test file
Round 4's only finding: the file header and one comment still said Deny stops a refused person re-asking. It does not — upsert_pending_invite reopens a denied row as pending — and the delete_invite docstring in the same branch already says so. The real difference is that Deny records an auditable decision and mails the requester; Delete forgets the address. |
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peter
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2cba6b9fca |
docs: round-3 copy corrections, and pin the two behaviours nothing was guarding
Round 3's correctness/security pass came back clean; what was left said more than the code does. - emailOff promised the access-request list is where sign-ups show up. A sign-up on an address that is already approved or already pending adds nothing to it (roadmap UX-25), and "only" was falsified by this release's own inbox notice. - deleteConfirm claimed the admin was dropping "an approval you already gave" — it is the confirmation for pending and denied rows too. - sendFailed blamed the mail server for rejecting a message; the reason covers connect, DNS, TLS and login failures alike, so it now describes the symptom and leaves the diagnosis to the log. - ADMIN_EMAILS re-promotion happens in the Google callback only, not on any sign-in. Tests: the decided-list copy of the delete affordance was never rendered (both new cases fail if that branch is dropped), and the throttle release — a deliberate behaviour the notes advertise — was asserted by nothing; a drop with no admin yet, or with a failing write, must not silence the following hour. |
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peter
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8d7aaad9a8 |
fix: warn before the delete, not after — plus round-2 copy and a11y corrections
Round 2 on the feature diff (15 → 12): - still_allowed_by_env now rides the invite LIST as well as the delete response, so the confirmation warns while the admin can still change their mind. It mattered most for a DENIED row on an env-allow-listed address: deleting it silently converted a refusal into a grant, and the only warning arrived after the irreversible click. - Both inbox bodies claimed to name "the most recent" dropped message. The throttle records the FIRST of each hour and never updates it, so they now say "one of them", and the not-configured body finally names where to fix it. - settings.invites.emailOff told the admin they "get no notice when someone signs up" — rendered directly above the queue that shows exactly that. Only the email is lost, and it now says so. - The disabled delete buttons put their reason out of reach: `disabled` drops a control from the tab order and suppresses its title. Switched to aria-disabled + preventDefault, the pattern Playlists.tsx already established for the same reason. - deleteInvite is quiet, so the 409 the UI handles with a translated toast no longer also raises the server's English detail as a modal. - After a completed password reset, Back landed on the reset form again with a consumed token — the history change made that state reachable. The token is cleared on success so the reset view stops being the card's root. - The hu deleteHasAccount named a tab that renders under a different label. Tests: a dom test for the Access-requests panel covering both has_account variants and all three delete outcomes, /api/me flag cases, an ADMIN_EMAILS case, and the env-allowlist test now patches the raw setting so the parsing stays under test. |
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peter
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85043013f0 |
fix: address the feature review — accurate copy, reachable controls, real coverage
Round 1 on the feature diff found 15; the substantive ones: - The delete control VANISHED on any invite whose address had registered, which is the ordinary sign-up shape (register writes the User and the pending invite together). The guard stays broad — that row is the account's approval gate, and orphaning it strands someone who can then neither sign in nor be approved — but the control is now a disabled button carrying the reason, on both lists, so an admin never sees a row silently missing a button its neighbours have. - Deleting an entry is not always a revoke: is_allowed falls back to the env ALLOWED_EMAILS / ADMIN_EMAILS lists once no row exists, and an ADMIN_EMAILS address is force-promoted on its next Google sign-in. The route now reports still_allowed_by_env and the UI says so instead of claiming access was removed. - "Deny keeps the row so they can't immediately re-ask" was simply false — upsert_pending_invite reopens a denied row. Corrected everywhere it was stated. - The Configuration warning reads me.email_configured, which save() did not invalidate, so it kept warning about fields the admin had just filled in. - The read-only variant was an aria-hidden span explained only by a Tooltip that the hints toggle can switch off; now a disabled button with title + aria-label. - The delete error path threw away the 409's reason (the stale-list case) and left the stale row on screen. - The throttle window was spent even when no notice was written, silencing the next hour on the path whose job is to stop silent drops. - email_enabled() opened a second session and decrypted the SMTP password on every /api/me poll; it now takes the caller's session. - welcomeMode.dom.test.ts never rendered the card, so reverting the history wiring to useState left it green. A render test now drives the real links and fails on that revert (verified). Plus /api/me flag tests, the registration-shaped pending case, the env-allowlist case, and a release note that matches what the code does. |