- The queue keeps a done job by when it became done (ready_at), not by its last write: renaming,
keeping or moving an old file, or the GC's expiry warning, no longer brings it back as just finished.
- GC expiry and eviction re-read each file under the asset→job locks the user routes take, and commit
one file at a time: a delete, a re-download or a keep made while the GC runs is honoured, never a
second release that frees a file another user still holds.
- A file records the origin it was placed under (download_jobs.source_key, migration 0105): an edit
whose parent expired still goes back to its folder, not to Uploads.
- A folder a file is being put in is held (FOR SHARE) until it lands; a delete of it waits and takes
that file home too, instead of failing on the foreign key.
- The hash route reads at most two files at once (429 past that) and holds no connection meanwhile.
- 0104's backfill dates old files by their request date only: no notice prod wrote names its job.
- The old DOWNLOAD_ROOT still finds the files; a files root that is not a mounted volume stops the
worker and is logged by the API; the volume-copy recipe looks the project-prefixed names up.
- Stale comments about the /downloads mount and the Downloads page.
The Files library starts here. A user's every download, clip and upload now
lands in a source folder made per origin (YouTube, Plex clips, uploads, one per
other site), decided once in downloads/folders.py at every place a job is made.
How long a file stays moves from the shared asset to the user's job: stamped
from its folder when it is done, never for a file the user keeps. The GC warns
each user once, then takes the expired file out of their library; the cache cap
never evicts a kept file, and an evicted one leaves every holder's library.
The media mount is /files now (FILES_ROOT, FILES_HOST_PATH, volume
siftlode_files); docs/self-hosting.md says how to carry an old volume over.
Migration 0102 places every existing job and carries each done file's expiry
over from its asset.
safe_abs_path takes a missing path and answers None, which drops one baselined
type error.
The code cited its plan instead of saying why: `E28 review J4`, `(R6 S3b)`, `S1 justified…`,
`deep-review round 5`. That plan lives in the private ops repo, so for every reader of this one the
citation was noise, and a sentence whose subject was the plan step ("round 2 showed…") hid its
lesson behind an id. Each one is gone and the "why" kept: a bare citation is deleted, a sentence
carrying a lesson is reworded around it ("a later attempt showed…").
Measured (`scripts/audit_metrics.py`, product code): 652 lines in 270 files carried an epic code by
the definition the next commit holds (507 / 241 by the old, two-digit-only one) -> 0. Across all
code, tests, scripts and configs: ~1100 epic-code lines plus ~320 sprint/round ids.
Behaviour unchanged, checked mechanically: every changed .py file has the same AST once docstrings
are blanked; css/sh/toml/yml/json files are identical once comments are stripped; the only
non-comment changes in TS/JS are test titles, one description string in a contract table, and five
ESLint messages, whose text is all the gates snapshot diff holds. Not touched: Markdown (docs and
the changelog keep their history), Alembic migrations, TV episode notation (`S2 · E5`), DESIGN.md
ids (`C1`, `B4`, `S3h`), tracker ids (`SEC-16`, `DX-17`).
One stale claim fixed on the way: test_hls_reaper's docstring said the player checkpoints "every
10 s whether or not it is playing", which plex/stream.py calls wrong; it now says what the code does.
log_level, search_source, download_layout and the transcode hw/preset
were typed by hand, and every consumer carried its own guess at what a
typo meant. The value set is now a Literal in config.py: pydantic
rejects a bad env value at boot (any letter case accepted), sysconfig
refuses a bad override and derives the admin picker's options from the
same Literal, and the consumers read the value as-is.
The Configuration page renders a choice key as a segmented bar, or a
dropdown past six options, with translated option names. Its tabs now
follow the registry's order instead of a hand-kept copy that had
already dropped the explore group.
A single-choice FilterSelect now opens on the option in use: in the
browser it could land on the first row instead.
A deployment printed four different log formats and none of them could be
joined up: uvicorn's log_config.json for the API, a hand-rolled StreamHandler in
main.py for anything not started by uvicorn, logging.basicConfig() in the worker
and in the download child (no timestamp at all), and alembic's fileConfig.
app/logs.py replaces all four with one JSON line per event (OpenTelemetry's log
data model, no SDK): ts, level, severity, source, logger, event code, message,
attributes, plus the correlation the context carries — request id, account,
download job.
Redaction is applied at the HANDLER, not at the call sites: every message, every
attribute and every traceback is scrubbed on the way out, so a secret cannot
leak by being forgotten at one of ~125 call sites. Passwords, tokens, cookies,
secret config values and email addresses never reach a line.
The access log is ours now (`http.request`): the route template instead of the
concrete path, the status, the duration and the account — and never the query
string, which uvicorn's access log printed on every single request (`?account=`,
`?source=`, the `?token=` of a share link). A well-formed client request id is
accepted and echoed in X-Request-Id, so a browser line and a server line join up.
The account comes from `request.state`, filled by the auth dependency: the
middleware is the outermost one, so it runs outside SessionMiddleware and in a
different task context.
`log_level` becomes an admin knob (sysconfig), applied without a restart and
re-applied at startup — best-effort on purpose, since a logging knob must never
be what stops the app from booting. Every compose service gets bounded json-file
logs (3×50 MB): Docker keeps every line forever by default, and the API now
writes one line per request.
Verified on the localdev stack: JSON everywhere including alembic and the
worker, the query strings gone, a supplied X-Request-Id echoed and logged, and
three /healthz hits of which only the one made while the level was DEBUG
produced a line.
_client_ip trusted the first X-Forwarded-For hop unconditionally, so anyone able to
reach the app port could forge XFF and dodge the login/register/reset/demo rate limits.
Now trust XFF ONLY when the request's socket peer is a configured reverse proxy
(settings.trusted_proxy_ips, e.g. the VPS Caddy's WireGuard peer IP), and take the
RIGHTMOST entry — the client our proxy actually saw and appended, immune to a client
pre-seeding a fake XFF. A request from any other peer (hitting the port directly) is
keyed on its real socket IP, so XFF can't be forged to bypass the limits.
New TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS env (empty default = no proxy, use the direct peer). Documented in
.env.example, docs/self-hosting.md, README. Unit-verified against spoof-through-proxy and
direct-bypass cases.
The real docker-compose.home.yml + CLAUDE.md lived only in the working tree via a
fragile .git/info/exclude hack (leak-prone). They now live in a separate PRIVATE
devops repo (siftlode-ops). This repo keeps only a generic, placeholder-templated
docker-compose.home.yml.example plus the existing .env.example (extended with the
optional Plex keys), so nothing environment-specific can leak here. Exclude emptied.
Prep the Download Center epic (Phase 1 + editor + share) for prod/self-host:
- Dockerfile: create /downloads owned by appuser so a named-volume mount is writable (prod Linux).
- docker-compose.{home,selfhost,yml}: add the 'worker' (yt-dlp/ffmpeg job loop) + 'bgutil-pot'
(PO-token) services + a downloads mount (DOWNLOAD_ROOT, WORKER_ENABLED). Media defaults to a
named volume; DOWNLOAD_HOST_PATH points it at a host dir (e.g. a Plex-readable folder).
- README / docs/self-hosting.md / .env.example / install.{sh,ps1}: document the Download Center,
the two extra containers, and DOWNLOAD_HOST_PATH.
- VERSION 0.22.0 + releaseNotes entry.
- Remove owner-specific / legacy deploy files (home/prod/server compose, deploy/).
The home compose stays as a local untracked file for the maintainer's own deploy.
- Genericise infra-specific code comments (egress-proxy examples) to neutral wording.
- Replace the hardcoded contact email on the legal pages with the instance operator's
configured admin email, served via the public /auth/config and shown with a neutral
fallback — so each self-hosted instance shows its own contact.
- Rewrite README for the current app + a copy-paste self-hosting quick start (prebuilt
image + first-run wizard) with a build-from-source alternative; tidy .env.example.
Replace the leftover 'subfeed' name across logger names + log_config,
frontend localStorage keys, Postgres user/db/volume defaults in the
compose files, .env.example, config.py, backup/restore scripts and the
README. Pure rename; no behavioural change. localStorage keys move from
subfeed.* to siftlode.* (one-time UI-state reset is acceptable).
Base login now requests only openid/email/profile (non-sensitive), so a new user
gets a clean Google consent with no "unverified app" warning and no 7-day refresh
token expiry. YouTube read (youtube.readonly) and write (youtube) are granted later
by the onboarding wizard via a parameterized /auth/upgrade?access=read|write.
Security fixes folded in from the baseline audit:
- config: refuse to boot in production (https OAUTH_REDIRECT_URL) with the
placeholder/short SECRET_KEY or a missing TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY, closing a
session-forgery / admin-impersonation hole.
- main: mark the session cookie Secure when served over HTTPS.
- me: expose can_read; sync/subscriptions returns a friendly 403 (not a 500)
until YouTube read access is granted.
Move the access whitelist from the ALLOWED_EMAILS env var into a DB Invite table
(env kept as bootstrap fallback), and add a self-service request + admin approval
flow with fail-soft email.
- models: Invite(email, status pending|approved|denied, requested_at, decided_*)
- migration 0008: invites table; seed env ALLOWED_EMAILS u ADMIN_EMAILS as approved
- auth: is_allowed() (DB-first, env fallback); a denied Google login records a pending
request and bounces to /?access=requested instead of a raw 403; public POST
/auth/request-access; upsert is idempotent so repeats don't re-spam admins
- routes/admin.py (admin-only): list/approve/deny invites + manual add
- email.py: smtplib + Gmail App Password, fail-soft (skips if SMTP unset)
- /api/me exposes pending_invites; config + .env.example gain SMTP_*
- UI: Login 'Request access' form + access=requested/denied handling; Settings ->
Access requests (approve/deny + add); admin nudge toast on pending requests
Verified locally: request-access creates a pending invite and emails the admin;
seed approved npeter83; guinea-pig yt.trash2023 denied until approved.
Add a server compose (full stack, Postgres on the LAN, scheduler on, host-visible
pgdata bind mount) and a localdev compose (webapp only, no DB, scheduler off) that
points at the shared database. Document the shared-database topology, the
exactly-one-scheduler rule, and YOUTUBE_API_KEY for unattended backfill that does
not depend on a 7-day OAuth refresh token.
- docker-compose with Postgres 16 + slim Python API image
- FastAPI app with session middleware, health endpoint, static login page
- Google OAuth (Authlib) with email invite-list whitelist; admin role support
- User + OAuthToken models; refresh tokens encrypted at rest (Fernet)
- Alembic migrations, run automatically on container startup
- Postgres backup/restore scripts for portability between machines
peter