Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
peter e9c60f72cd refactor(capture): the HTTP layer reads through queries and writes through the service
Capture's routes (downloads, files, public watch links) and the token list no longer build SQL, call
the session or set a model's fields: reads are downloads/queries, writes the unit's service (service,
folders, links, quota), and each write flushes for the handler to commit. Whose a row is goes
through userscope (owned_by, owned_row), which owned_or_404 now uses too.

The fence holds Capture below its routes as well: it reads only Catalog's and Plex's tables, writes
no other unit's, filters owners through userscope and commits only in its jobs and the upload
ingest. A test per service use case, among them that the tray lists only the caller's files.
2026-10-19 00:19:03 +02:00
peter 6d8b7be6d8 feat!: remove the shared demo account
The demo account — one shared user that whitelisted emails entered from
the login page, reset on a schedule — goes end to end (owner decision,
E34): demo.py and the reset job, users.is_demo and demo_whitelist
(migration 0098 deletes the demo user, its audit rows, the reset job's
override and notices, then drops the column and table; the downgrade
restores the empty schema), the /auth/demo entry, the admin whitelist and
reset, the Demo tab, the banner, the login page's "Try the demo", and
every is_demo branch in routes, userscope, scheduler and the UI.

require_human only ever refused the demo account, so its 87 uses become
current_user (owner-approved); require_write_scope keeps its own check.
The login page's "or" divider now shows only beside the Google button:
without the demo entry under it, an instance without Google would have
said "or" to nothing.

A contract test (removedFeatures) fails on the word anywhere in the
backend, frontend, e2e or scripts — seen red on a planted hit. Size
ceilings tightened for the modules that shrank; admin.py is back under
the limit.
2026-10-05 00:19:38 +02:00
peter b1832afd18 style: apply ruff format across backend + scripts (line-length 100)
Mechanical, whole-tree `ruff format` pass — no behaviour change. Recorded in
.git-blame-ignore-revs (next commit) so git blame skips it.
2026-08-23 07:43:06 +02:00
peter 733b41fd86 feat(security): R4 S3 — abuse & leak hardening
- C-3.7: fold a per-link password_version into the signed watch grant (migration
  0059 adds the column) and bump it on every password change, so rotating a share
  link's password invalidates outstanding grants at once instead of letting them
  live out the 6h TTL. make_grant/check_grant take the version; update_link bumps.
- C-3.8: the share recipient picker and share-by-email now reuse the messageable
  filter (not-demo AND active AND not-suspended) instead of only excluding demo,
  so suspended/deactivated addresses aren't leaked or reachable as targets.
- C-3.9: GET /keys/{user_id} adopts get_thread's MB2 guard — a non-messageable
  target with no shared history returns the same "User not found" as a missing id,
  so it can't be probed to enumerate users or fetch suspended users' keys.
- C-3.12: _register_account catches IntegrityError on the insert (the select-then-
  insert TOCTOU) and treats it as the already-registered no-op.
- C-3.13: trigger_job claims the running flag atomically under _activity_lock
  (compare-and-set) instead of a bare check, closing the double-start window.
- Move _messageable/is_messageable_user into a shared app/userscope.py so downloads
  doesn't import the messages route module.
2026-07-23 03:38:57 +02:00