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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 peter
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4aaaaa7860 |
chore(comments): drop epic, sprint and review-round ids from the code
The code cited its plan instead of saying why: `E28 review J4`, `(R6 S3b)`, `S1 justified…`,
`deep-review round 5`. That plan lives in the private ops repo, so for every reader of this one the
citation was noise, and a sentence whose subject was the plan step ("round 2 showed…") hid its
lesson behind an id. Each one is gone and the "why" kept: a bare citation is deleted, a sentence
carrying a lesson is reworded around it ("a later attempt showed…").
Measured (`scripts/audit_metrics.py`, product code): 652 lines in 270 files carried an epic code by
the definition the next commit holds (507 / 241 by the old, two-digit-only one) -> 0. Across all
code, tests, scripts and configs: ~1100 epic-code lines plus ~320 sprint/round ids.
Behaviour unchanged, checked mechanically: every changed .py file has the same AST once docstrings
are blanked; css/sh/toml/yml/json files are identical once comments are stripped; the only
non-comment changes in TS/JS are test titles, one description string in a contract table, and five
ESLint messages, whose text is all the gates snapshot diff holds. Not touched: Markdown (docs and
the changelog keep their history), Alembic migrations, TV episode notation (`S2 · E5`), DESIGN.md
ids (`C1`, `B4`, `S3h`), tracker ids (`SEC-16`, `DX-17`).
One stale claim fixed on the way: test_hls_reaper's docstring said the player checkpoints "every
10 s whether or not it is playing", which plex/stream.py calls wrong; it now says what the code does.
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peter
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7c0647f87a |
fix(uploads): finish the sweeps round 1 left half-done
Deep-review round 2, on round 1's own fix commit. It found MORE than round 1 did (28 raw, against 13), and most of it was mine -- a new piece of UI attracts findings a backend-only diff never does. The pattern in almost all of them is the same: a principle applied to the site that prompted it and not to its siblings. * `display_text` reached three of the FIVE writers of a user-supplied name. `POST /api/downloads` and `POST /api/downloads/edit` still handed Postgres an unbounded string, so a 300-character name pasted into the Add-download dialog or the editor was a bare 500 (main.py re-raises every DataError but the NUL case). Four of the seven reviewers found it independently. The bound now lives in `models.py`, the three columns are DECLARED with it, and the guard for the next writer is parsed rather than remembered: every `display_name` / `display_uploader` assignment under `app/routes/` must go through the helper. That guard immediately found two more -- the Google sign-in callback writes the profile name into the same 255-wide column -- so it is six, not five. * The connection release reached one of the THREE routes that read their own body. The screenshot route (10 MiB, from a phone) and the client log sink both still held a pooled connection idle-in-transaction for the length of the upload, which is the invariant db.py sizes the pool on. All three now call `db.release_read_connection`, whose precondition -- nothing pending on the shared session -- is CHECKED rather than described, because a whole-session rollback discarding a caller's staged write is a mistake this repo has already made once. `test_body_limit.py` holds the rule for the next such route. * The AST drift registry keyed its sites by (module, limit expression), so a second route copied from the first collapsed onto the same entry and went uncovered -- the exact hole the registry exists to close. Keyed per call site now, and it carries the release requirement too. * The dialog's own refusal was announced once and never again: two over-cap picks leave an identical node with identical text, and an untouched live region says nothing. It is keyed per pick now, the drop zone reads as invalid and points at the sentence, and the reason is reachable from the control rather than only from a one-shot announcement. * Two tests rebuilt the blind spot they were written to remove: the dialog's cap test sat nowhere near the boundary (a `>` loosened to `>=` survived it, which is the mutation round 1 fixed on the server side), and the header-precedence test only covered an exact-case duplicate while a differently-cased one would have been COMBINED onto the wire rather than replaced. Both fixed, and the merge now dedupes case-insensitively because header names are. Also: the upload dialog's unstubbed usage query was firing a real request from jsdom in a neighbouring suite and leaking a delayed "connection lost" toast across test boundaries; `GET /api/downloads/usage` had no test at all though the whole client-side check hangs off it; and the comment claiming the edge 413 is readable now says what was measured -- readable to 200 MiB over loopback, a bare `onerror` through a proxy -- so the pre-send check is named as the mechanism and that branch as the backstop it is. Every test added or changed here was mutation-checked. One mutation SURVIVED and is recorded rather than papered over: the `tooBig` term inside `submit()` cannot be reached, because `ui/Button` swallows the activation itself, so it is marked as belt and braces instead of being described as the guard. |
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peter
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efd7b217ca |
fix(uploads): make both caps answerable, and stop holding a connection
The epic-end deep review found three defects in P1 and four tests that did not hold what they claimed. They land together because they share the upload route and its test module; splitting by hunk would have produced commits that do not individually run green. * The edge ceiling and the route's own cap are the SAME number at the default configuration, so the edge always answers first: a declared Content-Length over the cap is refused before a byte is read, and an undeclared body trips the middleware on the same chunk the route would have tripped on. The route's numbered 422 -- and the drain written for it last week -- are reachable only once an admin LOWERS the knob, which is the one shape the browser UAT tested. Measured: headroom does not fix this, because the declared-length check fires first for any body big enough to matter and the drain pushes the count back over the edge for the rest. So the edge's own refusal is made readable instead: `errors.tooLarge` localizes `too_large` the way `upload_too_large` was already localized, and the dialog refuses an over-cap file BEFORE sending it, off the `upload_max_bytes` that GET /api/downloads/usage now reports. Measured in Chrome against the API directly: that 413 arrives as `onload` with a readable body in 43 ms. * Reading the body behind the auth dependency put the whole transfer inside the request's database session -- the auth SELECT autobegins a transaction, so one of the twenty pooled connections sat `idle in transaction`, with nothing to time it out, for as long as the client cared to keep sending. That is the invariant db.py sizes the pool on and plex/playback.py records an incident for. The read transaction now ends before the await. Measured on the dev server: an 1818 ms upload shows no idle-in-transaction sample while the bytes move, only afterwards, when the handler actually writes. * The display name moved into a request header, where nothing bounds its length, while the column stayed varchar(255) -- so a long enough name was a DataError 500 after the whole file had already transferred. One `display_text` helper now serves all three writers (the metadata PATCH already truncated, the upload ingest did not), and the dialog stops at the same number. * The gate invariant asked `route.dependant.body_params`, which holds only the route's OWN callable's parameters: a body declared in a SUB-DEPENDENCY -- the upload route's own idiom -- leaves it empty while FastAPI still reads the body before auth. It asks `route.body_field` now, which is what FastAPI itself consults. The AST registry of body-reading call sites had also never followed `capped_stream_to`, so the one route the whole invariant exists for was the single site the drift guard could not see. Four tests that passed over their own mutation are fixed: the cap boundary (a `>` loosened to `>=` survived the entire suite), the percent-decoding (every filename the suite sends is ASCII, where quote() is the identity function), the display-name header (no test at all), and the staging cleanup (deleting the unlink left the suite green while every refused upload leaked its partial bytes onto the volume). Every test added or changed here was mutation-checked. |
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peter
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a86131e062 |
fix(downloads): classify media_kind from a file probe, not yt-dlp info
A downloaded video was silently demoted to a download-only "file" (no in-app play/edit) whenever yt-dlp's info dict omitted vcodec/acodec — which it does for Facebook and other sources. Finalize derived media_kind from those nulls (`derive(None, None)` -> file), so a genuine H.264/AAC MP4 became non-playable in the library. Fix: probe the finished file on disk (the ground truth) at finalize and derive from that, falling back to the info dict only for a field the probe couldn't read. This is the same ffprobe the upload ingest already used, now extracted to a shared downloads/probe.py so the download worker and the upload path share one classifier (and can't drift). Also backfills the stored vcodec/acodec/width/height from the real file. Tests: TestResolveMediaFacts pins probe-wins-over-info (incl. the Facebook no-codec case and yt-dlp's literal "none"); upload's probe tests repoint to the shared module. |
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peter
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614c5528ad |
fix(downloads): harden upload serving + ingest against stored-XSS and leaks (E7 review)
Deep-review remediation for the E7 upload path, all findings adversarially verified: - Serve every library file with a Content-Type chosen from the ffprobe-verified media_kind + a strict container allow-list (storage.served_media_type), never guessed from the user-controlled file extension. Closes a stored-XSS vector where a media/HTML polyglot uploaded as "evil.html" was served inline as text/html on the login-free /watch surface. Applied to both the authenticated /file and the public watch_file endpoints. - Classify uploaded still images (jpg/png/gif/webp/…) as media_kind='file' so they are force-downloaded and don't get a broken in-app video player. - Roll back the on-disk side of an upload when the ingest transaction fails after place_file (unlink the placed file + its deterministic poster path), so a failed commit can't orphan bytes in the GC-skipped .uploads tree. - Floor download_upload_max_bytes at min=1 so a stored 0 can't silently disable the per-file cap. - Dedupe the ffprobe-JSON invocation into edit.run_ffprobe_json (shared by probe_codecs and upload._probe) and the upload extension into storage._clean_upload_ext; drop the now-unused parse_probe_streams. Tests: public + authenticated force-download and the polyglot-not-served-as-HTML guard, the real _probe classifier (image/cover-art/dims/duration), the ingest rollback/cleanup path, the max_jobs branch, the cap-floor invariant, and run_ffprobe_json error handling. |
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peter
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fe0b34cd00 |
feat(downloads): local file upload ingest — media library backend (E7 S5a)
Add the non-yt-dlp ingest path so a user-uploaded file joins the same download
library and inherits its function set. Any file type is accepted: media
(video/audio) gets the full set (metadata, share, play/edit), a generic file
(pdf/zip/docx/…) is download-only.
- MediaAsset.media_kind ("video"|"audio"|"file") — the stored discriminator that
gates library actions. Set at every finalize (download probe, editor carries the
source's kind, upload probe); consolidates the ad-hoc audio-detect that lived only
in links.py into one invariant (downloads.mediakind.derive). Migration 0076 adds
the column + backfills existing rows.
- downloads/upload.py: ingest_upload probes the file (ffprobe → codecs/dims/duration),
places it in a per-user .uploads tree, and creates an already-ready asset + done job
(the same cache-hit shortcut enqueue uses). Uploads never expire (irreplaceable).
- POST /api/downloads/upload: streaming multipart with the per-file cap
(download_upload_max_bytes, default 500 MiB) enforced on actual bytes read; quota
charges the known size up front (quota.check_upload).
- Security: a generic file is always served force-download (attachment +
application/octet-stream) on both the in-app and public endpoints, so uploaded
HTML/SVG can't execute inline. Edit + redownload reject non-media / upload sources.
- python-multipart added (first multipart endpoint in the app).
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