The funnel's common ordering made a person open TWO messages: one saying their access was approved,
another asking them to confirm their address. The approval mail now branches on what they actually
still have to do — carry the confirmation link, point at sign-in, or say a confirmation mail follows
once they register — so the usual case is one mail and one click. A mail that guesses wrong is worse
than a plain one: telling someone to sign in while their address is unconfirmed contradicts the
screen that will refuse them.
That embedded link lives 7 days rather than the usual 24 hours. Nobody sits waiting for an approval —
it can easily be read on Monday after a weekend, and an expired link spends the one-mail promise and
puts them back on two. The risk is small: the token only ever confirms an address; it signs nobody in
and sets no password.
The most likely root cause of the 2026-09-03 report that a confirmation mail "never arrived" is here
too, and it was never a delivery failure: re-registering an address that already had an unconfirmed
account returned in SILENCE — same cheerful "check your inbox", no mail sent at all. It now re-sends
the link. Nothing new leaks: the response and its timing are unchanged, and the public verify/resend
already does exactly this for the same input.
Whitelisting stays silent, and that is a decision, not an omission. The operator opens a door as a
possibility — usually already agreed with the person — and a row can sit approved for weeks with
nobody registering; a mail fired automatically there would be nudging someone who never asked.
Telling them is its own act on its own button, `invited_at` records it so a second click is a
decision rather than an accident, and the button only appears where nobody is behind the address yet:
"the door is open, come in" is meaningless to someone already inside.
Two things UAT caught that no test would have. Every fresh registration appeared in BOTH admin lists
at once, because the stuck-sign-ups filter keyed on "unconfirmed" — the rule is now "the address may
sign in, and this account still can't", which leaves an undecided request with the queue that owns
it. And the invitation button was offered on every approved row, half of which are existing users.
Also: the confirmation mail finally says what its link's rules are (once, 24 hours) — the reset mail
always has, while this one left the reader to discover both by meeting a dead link. The card's
"didn't get the email?" moves up under the form, and the three waiting messages name the spam folder,
which is where a first message to a fresh recipient sometimes lands.
Registration now records the language the sign-up page was in. Nothing reads it yet — the bilingual
templates are S7 — but it is the only moment that choice exists anywhere the server can see, and a
preference nobody recorded cannot be backfilled later.
UAT on localdev: re-registering re-sent the link (one token became two, one account); approval issued
a 7-day token and moved the account into the stuck list with only a re-send; whitelisting mailed
nobody; the invitation recorded itself and the row then warned that sending again would write twice.
Test data removed.
Approve an address BEFORE the person registers and their sign-up produces no queue row at all —
`_decide` only takes a still-pending invite — so the Access-requests screen sat empty, the tab badge
read zero, and the only working move was re-typing the address into the whitelist box. Nobody would
guess that, and on 2026-09-03 nobody did.
This is roadmap UX-25, where two earlier attempts were reverted after review. Both moved AUTHORITY:
auto-activating on registration turns a standing whitelist entry into a bearer grant for whoever
registers the address first, and reopening the approved invite to `pending` lets an anonymous sign-up
REVOKE a standing approval. What was actually missing was visibility, so this changes nothing about
what an unauthenticated caller can cause — the admin could already do exactly this by re-entering the
address; they just had no way to know they had to.
The section lists every account that cannot sign in yet and says WHICH gate is shut, because the two
dead ends look the same from the admin's chair: waiting for activation, or waiting on a confirmation
mail. Naming the unconfirmed ones is not decoration — on a no-SMTP instance that is the difference
between the owner and whoever registered the address first (SEC-15), and an admin about to let
someone in should see it. A person the queue above already covers is deliberately NOT listed here;
two buttons for one person is worse than one.
Activate is gated on `is_allowed` — the same function the sign-in paths consult, in core, so the
button that appears and the badge that counts cannot disagree. Without that gate it would
manufacture an inconsistent account: password sign-in only checks `is_active` and would let them in,
while their Google sign-in would be turned away and silently reopened as a fresh access request.
Letting in someone with no approved invite stays the whitelist box's job, which says so out loud.
The badge counts activations SEPARATELY from pending invites rather than widening an existing
field's meaning, and only counts what genuinely waits on the admin: an unconfirmed account waits on
its owner, so it is listed with a re-send but does not nag. The admin-side resend says plainly what
happened, including refusing when the instance has no working SMTP — mail is fail-soft everywhere
else, and that silence is exactly what left the 0.78.5 sign-ups with nothing to fall back on.
`send_verification_link` is now one function with three callers (registration, the public resend,
this one), so the link's shape and TTL cannot drift by who triggered it.
UAT on localdev, both languages: the UX-25 shape reproduced end to end (approve the address, then
register), the badge counting it, Activate letting them in and dropping the badge, the row losing
its Activate but keeping the re-send, a fresh token issued by the re-send, and both actions in the
audit log. Test data removed.
Reported from UAT: delete an account, then open its password-reset link. The card drew the full "set
a new password" form — because a `#reset=` fragment was present, and nothing more — and only after
the user had typed a password did the server answer 400. Measured first: no security hole. A user's
tokens cascade away with the row, so nothing can be set on a deleted or a re-created account. What
was left is a dead end of exactly the kind this epic exists to remove, and it is not rare: a reset
link lives one hour, mail is slow or lands in spam, and whoever got two mails clicks the older one.
password-reset/check answers whether a link is still usable WITHOUT spending it, so asking can never
cost the user their one real attempt — the property the tests pin hardest. It gets its own limiter,
because opening a link must not eat the budget for requesting one, and a throttled caller is told
"ok", never "dead": this check may only ever save someone a wasted form, so when it cannot answer it
degrades to the old behaviour instead of declaring a live link finished. The confirm endpoint stays
the authority, and its failure raises the same named screen, since the token can die between the two
calls or the probe itself may have failed.
A too-short password is deliberately NOT that screen. The length check runs before the token is
spent, so a typo costs the link nothing, and the card tells the two 400s apart by `reason` so only
one of them takes the form down.
Both email-link confirmations (verify, password-reset/confirm) now answer in the {code, reason}
shape S4 introduced. They were the last refusals a user meets by simply clicking an old link while
still being answered in hardcoded English under a bilingual UI. The seven remaining bare strings in
this module (register, request-access, the demo guards, set-password) sit behind client-side
validation the UI does first; they are logged as a follow-up rather than swept in silently here.
One bug found by the UAT itself, in the new code: the check went out FOUR times per opened link —
StrictMode double-invokes effects and the shell remounts the card as the session probe settles.
Harmless per request, but against a per-IP limit it would exhaust the budget in two reloads and then
silently fall back to drawing the form unchecked: nothing errors, the feature just stops working.
Deduped in a module-level map holding the in-flight promise (a ref dies with the remount that causes
it); a failed probe drops itself so a blip is never cached as "dead". The test renders the card
twice, because with one render the guard would rot undetected.
UAT on localdev: the reported scenario end to end (delete the account, open the link) shows the named
screen and no form; a live link still opens the form and completes; the CTA lands on the request-a-
link form; one probe per opened link. Throwaway accounts removed.
"Your account is awaiting admin approval." was true and useless. It never said WHICH mailbox the
account was on, and on 2026-09-03 that silence hid a Gmail alias mismatch for a day: a registration
as np.temu@gmail.com met a Google claim of nptemu@gmail.com, and every screen in the funnel agreed
to say nothing about it.
Every refusal password-login can answer with now uses the codebase's structured {code, reason}
detail, built in one helper. The three that arrive AFTER the password is proven carry the address on
the account plus both gate flags; the two that answer before it (invalid, rate_limited) carry
nothing, so a wrong password and an unknown account stay byte-identical. The frontend renders the
first three as a named screen in place of the form — there is nothing to retype once the password is
correct — with an icon, the two-gate checklist, the address in monospace, and a resend CTA where one
helps. Reporting each gate from its own flag is the payoff of S1: approved-but-unverified is a real
state now, and a screen that assumed a sequence would send that user off to wait for an admin who
has already decided.
The Google access-request notice names the address too, and says so when the request was already on
file under ANOTHER spelling of the same mailbox — the honest version of "we didn't open a second
one", stated only when it applies. It moved from the query string to the fragment: the notice now
carries an address, and a query string lands in every reverse-proxy access log. Same reasoning that
put the verify/reset tokens there, and the same owner already clears it. urlencode, not an f-string,
because URLSearchParams reads a bare + in a fragment as a space and would mangle exactly the
+tag addresses this epic exists to protect.
upsert_pending_invite returns the row it settled on beside the is-new flag, since the row's stored
address is what the notice has to name and what mail will go to.
Deviation from the PendingScreen mockup, deliberately: no "Sign out" button and no separate "Not
your address?" link. The mockup drew the panel in the app shell; the accepted decision (a) keeps the
pending user session-less, so there is no session to end, and the address is named directly above a
"Back to sign in" that answers the same question.
UAT on localdev, both languages: all three refusals with the typed spelling deliberately differing
from the stored one (the panel named the stored one), the resend CTA carrying the typed address into
the resend form, and both access-request banners with a +tag address surviving the fragment round
trip. Throwaway accounts and the language switch reverted.
An account can now hold two true addresses: the one its owner typed, which a Google
sign-in no longer overwrites, and the one Google answers with. Only the first was
stored, so Settings could say 'Connected' without saying connected AS WHOM -- exactly
what someone who registered with a +tag needs to know.
users.google_email (migration 0080) records Google's answer at sign-in and at an
in-app link. /api/me exposes it ONLY when it differs from the account address, so the
comparison lives in one place and the majority, whose two addresses are the same
string, see no change at all. Rendered in the account menu as a muted third line under
the identity, and in the Settings sign-in row under the existing hint.
A short 'Google' label rather than a brand glyph: the app draws one icon set (lucide),
and a generic mail icon next to an email address says nothing. It also reads to a
screen reader, which an unlabelled logo would not.
No backfill is possible -- Google's answer is only known at sign-in -- so accounts
linked earlier stay NULL until their owner next signs in with Google.
Two halves of one rule: the address someone typed is theirs to keep, and it must be
the one that gets them back in.
A plus-tagged or dotted Gmail is often a deliberate choice -- registering as
me+siftlode@gmail.com is how you find out later which site leaked your address. The
Google callback overwrote it with the account's primary, which can never contain a
'+', so the tag vanished on the first Google sign-in and, because sign-in matched the
stored address, took their chosen address with it. The rewrite line is older than
this epic, but S3 made it reachable here by matching adoption across spellings. It
now runs only when the mailbox GENUINELY changed, and lives in a named helper rather
than inline, so the rule has one home.
The three lookups that resolve a typed address -- password login, password reset,
verify resend -- go through find_user_by_email: exact spelling first, then the unique
canonical candidate, and None when several accounts share a mailbox rather than
guessing which one a password should open. Reset and resend previously answered a
different spelling with silence (they reply uniformly by design), which was a dead end
with no way out. Their mail now goes to the address on the account, never the one
typed into the form.
Gmail delivers x.y@, xy@ and xy+tag@ to one inbox; the invite gate only lowercased.
On 2026-09-03 that turned an approved user's Google sign-in into a silent SECOND
access request -- OAuth returns the account's stored primary, which need not be the
spelling they typed -- and left prod with two user rows for one mailbox (ids 13, 14).
The +tag case fails every time: a Google account cannot contain +, so OAuth can only
ever answer with the base address.
Mail still goes to the address AS TYPED; only identity matching uses the canonical
form. utils.canonical_email is the single definition, and a model validator derives
users.email_canonical / invites.email_canonical on every write, so no call site can
forget it. Scope is narrow on purpose: dots are significant on most providers and the
Gmail rule does not hold for Workspace custom domains.
Swept every sibling of the same principle, not just the reported one: is_allowed,
upsert_pending_invite, the Google-callback adoption, _register_account (so no new
duplicate pair can be created), _activate_user_by_email, admin _accounts_for (an
invite backing a live user under another spelling used to look deletable) and
add_invite, plus purge_user, which now erases every canonically-equal invite instead
of leaving one behind that still grants access.
Migration 0079 backfills both columns and indexes them NON-uniquely: prod already
carries canonical duplicates (approved invite pairs since 2026-06-16), and merging
accounts is a judgement call about people's data, not something a migration does on
its own. A test pins the backfill SQL against the Python helper.
The token was only ever consumed inside Welcome.tsx, which App renders ONLY when
there is no session. Opening the emailed link in a browser that already held a
Siftlode session posted nothing, the fragment was then stripped, and the user got
no signal at all -- the link simply did nothing. Incognito worked, which is why it
survived. Confirmation now happens in App, above that branch: signed out the outcome
still drives the auth card's banners, signed in it drives a top-of-app bar.
The entry URL is snapshotted once at import time (lib/entryUrl) instead of per
component, so no future URL writer can strip a token before whoever needs it has
read it -- that ordering race is what broke this in the first place. POST /auth/verify
now names the address it confirmed, which matters when the browser holds a session
for a different account; the same reasoning as password_reset_required already
covers the disclosure.
Also here, from the 2026-09-02 review tail: the dead GET /auth/verify goes (both
senders emit the fragment form, and the last query-token link expired 24h after the
0.78.7 deploy), a spent #verify=/#reset= fragment is cleared while signed in, and
the auth-card banners get role=status. The verifyOkReset copy no longer blames
admin approval, which E9.5 S1 made false.
SEC-10 revoked any password set while an account's email was unverified, on both
the Google-adoption and the admin-approval path. On the approval path that was
redundant: password_login refuses an unverified account before it ever reads
is_active, so approval hands a pre-emptor's password nothing it could use. All the
revoke achieved there was destroying the password a legitimate registrant had just
chosen -- and since the admin normally decides before the user reads their mail,
'your password was cleared for security' was the DEFAULT experience, not an edge
case. The guard stays on the Google-adoption path, where the real owner does attest
ownership.
password_reset_required and the ok_reset banner stay: accounts stripped on prod
before this change have no other way back in.
Two existing tests pinned the old rule, so they are rewritten rather than deleted,
and the SEC-10 recovery pack now builds the revoked state through the surviving
producer.
The bodies are text/plain only, so whether the URL in a verification or
password-reset mail is a link at all was the client's decision. Gmail, Outlook and
Apple Mail linkify plain text; lighter web clients render the body verbatim and leave
the link as dead text — in a message whose entire purpose is that one link.
_send now attaches an HTML part generated from the SAME plain body, rather than
per-template HTML that would have to be kept in sync with it: one converter, all
eleven templates, and text/plain stays the primary part and the source of truth.
Escaping runs before linkification — bodies interpolate untrusted values (a
requester's address, the operator contact) — so no caller can inject markup, and a
query string's `&` is already `&` when it reaches the href, which is what an HTML
attribute wants. Sentence-final punctuation is trimmed out of the href while
url-safe token characters (`-`, `_`) are left alone. Inline styles only, no images,
no external CSS, no tracking.
Review found the backfill's fourth predicate `AND email_verified = false` strands
exactly the subset that needs it most. The revoke does not invalidate the account's
outstanding verification token, so clicking the emailed link is the natural next
thing such a user does — and it sets email_verified=True while password_hash stays
NULL. That row then has no route back at all: reset ineligible, resend refuses an
already-verified address, set-password needs a session the account cannot obtain,
and nothing re-stamps it because the revoke itself is guarded on being unverified.
The remaining three predicates already pin the victim set exactly: registration and
the setup wizard always set a hash, every Google row carries a google_sub (adoption
assigns it before revoking), and nothing in the codebase ever clears google_sub — so
a local, non-demo, passwordless row can only have come from the revoke. Widening is
therefore safe, and it is the argument the docstring was already making while the
SQL contradicted it.
Also corrects that docstring: set-password is unreachable because the account cannot
authenticate at all, not because the epoch bump killed a session — an unverified
account is refused at login before a session is ever minted, so it never had one.
Two independent bugs made an email+password registration unrecoverable in prod.
The verification link did nothing. urlWithParams/clearParams rebuilt the URL as
pathname+query and dropped the fragment — but the one-time auth tokens ride the
fragment (#verify=/#reset=, SB3), and the providers that mirror nav params
(useUrlMirror in FeedFilters/Playlists/Plex/Channels) sit ABOVE the lazily-loaded
<App> in main.tsx. Their mount effect replaceState'd the token away before the auth
card's chunk had loaded, so the card read an empty hash: the link opened a bare
sign-in page, no request, no banner. Both helpers now carry the fragment over.
The account was then locked out for good. SEC-10 nulls password_hash when an
unverified account is attested (here: admin approval landing before the user could
verify — which the bug above made impossible). That is indistinguishable from a
Google-only account, and reset eligibility keyed off password_hash alone, so no
reset link was ever issued: no password to sign in with, and no way to get one.
users.password_revoked_at records the revocation, reset eligibility honours it, and
setting a password again (reset-confirm or set-password) clears it. An account that
never had a password stays ineligible on purpose — its owner adds one from Settings.
/auth/verify now also answers password_reset_required so the card can say why the
registered password stopped working, instead of leaving the user at the uniform
"Invalid email or password". Telling the holder of a valid verify token leaks
nothing: they have already proved they own the mailbox.
The 0078 migration backfills the stamp for rows carrying the exact lockout signature
(local, non-demo, no password, unverified), so existing victims recover unaided.
Round 4's only finding: the file header and one comment still said Deny stops a
refused person re-asking. It does not — upsert_pending_invite reopens a denied
row as pending — and the delete_invite docstring in the same branch already says
so. The real difference is that Deny records an auditable decision and mails the
requester; Delete forgets the address.
Round 3's correctness/security pass came back clean; what was left said more than
the code does.
- emailOff promised the access-request list is where sign-ups show up. A sign-up
on an address that is already approved or already pending adds nothing to it
(roadmap UX-25), and "only" was falsified by this release's own inbox notice.
- deleteConfirm claimed the admin was dropping "an approval you already gave" —
it is the confirmation for pending and denied rows too.
- sendFailed blamed the mail server for rejecting a message; the reason covers
connect, DNS, TLS and login failures alike, so it now describes the symptom and
leaves the diagnosis to the log.
- ADMIN_EMAILS re-promotion happens in the Google callback only, not on any
sign-in.
Tests: the decided-list copy of the delete affordance was never rendered (both
new cases fail if that branch is dropped), and the throttle release — a
deliberate behaviour the notes advertise — was asserted by nothing; a drop with
no admin yet, or with a failing write, must not silence the following hour.
Round 2 on the feature diff (15 → 12):
- still_allowed_by_env now rides the invite LIST as well as the delete response,
so the confirmation warns while the admin can still change their mind. It
mattered most for a DENIED row on an env-allow-listed address: deleting it
silently converted a refusal into a grant, and the only warning arrived after
the irreversible click.
- Both inbox bodies claimed to name "the most recent" dropped message. The
throttle records the FIRST of each hour and never updates it, so they now say
"one of them", and the not-configured body finally names where to fix it.
- settings.invites.emailOff told the admin they "get no notice when someone
signs up" — rendered directly above the queue that shows exactly that. Only
the email is lost, and it now says so.
- The disabled delete buttons put their reason out of reach: `disabled` drops a
control from the tab order and suppresses its title. Switched to
aria-disabled + preventDefault, the pattern Playlists.tsx already established
for the same reason.
- deleteInvite is quiet, so the 409 the UI handles with a translated toast no
longer also raises the server's English detail as a modal.
- After a completed password reset, Back landed on the reset form again with a
consumed token — the history change made that state reachable. The token is
cleared on success so the reset view stops being the card's root.
- The hu deleteHasAccount named a tab that renders under a different label.
Tests: a dom test for the Access-requests panel covering both has_account
variants and all three delete outcomes, /api/me flag cases, an ADMIN_EMAILS
case, and the env-allowlist test now patches the raw setting so the parsing
stays under test.
Round 1 on the feature diff found 15; the substantive ones:
- The delete control VANISHED on any invite whose address had registered, which
is the ordinary sign-up shape (register writes the User and the pending invite
together). The guard stays broad — that row is the account's approval gate, and
orphaning it strands someone who can then neither sign in nor be approved — but
the control is now a disabled button carrying the reason, on both lists, so an
admin never sees a row silently missing a button its neighbours have.
- Deleting an entry is not always a revoke: is_allowed falls back to the env
ALLOWED_EMAILS / ADMIN_EMAILS lists once no row exists, and an ADMIN_EMAILS
address is force-promoted on its next Google sign-in. The route now reports
still_allowed_by_env and the UI says so instead of claiming access was removed.
- "Deny keeps the row so they can't immediately re-ask" was simply false —
upsert_pending_invite reopens a denied row. Corrected everywhere it was stated.
- The Configuration warning reads me.email_configured, which save() did not
invalidate, so it kept warning about fields the admin had just filled in.
- The read-only variant was an aria-hidden span explained only by a Tooltip that
the hints toggle can switch off; now a disabled button with title + aria-label.
- The delete error path threw away the 409's reason (the stale-list case) and
left the stale row on screen.
- The throttle window was spent even when no notice was written, silencing the
next hour on the path whose job is to stop silent drops.
- email_enabled() opened a second session and decrypted the SMTP password on
every /api/me poll; it now takes the caller's session.
- welcomeMode.dom.test.ts never rendered the card, so reverting the history
wiring to useState left it green. A render test now drives the real links and
fails on that revert (verified).
Plus /api/me flag tests, the registration-shaped pending case, the env-allowlist
case, and a release note that matches what the code does.
Three operator gaps, all found the same way — a person could not sign up and the
app showed nobody anything.
- DELETE /api/admin/invites/{id} with a delete control on both the pending
requests and the previously-decided list. Deny keeps the row so the person
cannot immediately re-ask; delete forgets the address. Refused with 409 while
a User row exists for it, because is_allowed reads that row and removing it
would revoke a live user's access with no other sign — the list ships
has_account so the UI withholds the button instead of offering one that fails.
- Email is fail-soft by design, which had come to mean invisible. _send() now
records an email_undelivered notification for every admin when a message is
skipped or rejected, naming the message that was lost, throttled to one an
hour. /api/me carries email_configured, driving a standing warning on
Configuration → Email / SMTP and above the access-request list.
- The sign-in card's Create account / Forgot password / Didn't get the email
views are history entries (useHistorySubview), so Back returns to the previous
view instead of only moving the address bar.
Also: the per-test rate-limiter reset sweeps every loaded app.* module rather
than a hand-kept list of three — this change added a limiter outside it.
Round 6's two remaining nits. The operator note said "Configuration → Email"
but the group renders as "Email / SMTP" in both locales, and
test_an_admin_can_activate_a_pre_approved_registrant requested make_user without
using it — a leftover from the reverted rounds that made the test look like it
seeded an admin when it did not.
Round 5's correctness/security pass came back clean; what was left was text that
said more than the code does.
- The register-path notify comment (and its test) claimed the admin "is still
told". The call fires, but on a no-SMTP instance _send drops it — which is the
open half of the problem, not something this branch fixed. Both now say so.
- The release notes tell admins what to actually do: an account whose address was
whitelisted in advance has no pending request to approve, so the whitelist box
is what activates it. That instruction only existed in the roadmap and in
chores, which the dialog does not render.
- "That one line is the whole production change" now accounts for the test-only
RateLimiter.reset() that also ships.
- The rate-limiter test claimed to pin that blocked attempts are not counted, on
an assertion that held either way. Replaced with one that drives the clock
across the window boundary and fails if hammering extends it.
Round 4 showed the `inv is not None` gate added in b5a1002 removed a signal that
matters: for an address the admin had already approved, that email is their only
notice that someone has now created an account on it — the invite is not pending
so nothing lands in the Access-requests queue either. Suppressing it left the
registrant at "awaiting admin approval" with the admin unaware they existed. The
duplicate it avoided (Request access, then sign up) is mild noise by comparison.
The production change is now one db.commit(), which is all the reported bug ever
needed. Release notes corrected again: a previously-denied address was also
unaffected, the pending-request case never lost its queue entry (only the
account behind it), and the test inventory was missing a guard.
Round 3 of the review killed the reopen from b5a1002: flipping an approved
invite back to pending let an unauthenticated POST /auth/register REVOKE a
standing approval for any whitelisted-but-unclaimed address, which then fails
is_allowed() and locks the real owner out of Google sign-in — the primary way
people get in here. It also re-armed the pre-emption window it was meant to
close, because with no SMTP email_verified is set True and the SEC-10 guard the
design leaned on never fires.
Two attempts at fixing the stranded-account UX in the same change both came back
worse than the wart. What remains is the narrow, real bug: the account was
silently rolled back and is now committed. An admin still binds the approval to
the account, exactly as before this branch. UX-25 in the roadmap records the
follow-up and both dead ends so they are not retried.
Also from round 3: the upsert docstring no longer claims the admin UI cannot
reach these accounts (re-entering the address in the same panel's whitelist box
does, and a test now pins it), the release notes are scoped to what the diff
actually changes with the operator note moved where the dialog renders it, and
RateLimiter has unit tests so reset() is not production code only a fixture
calls.
Replaces the activation added in ea931dc, which round 2 of the review showed was
a real weakening: on a no-SMTP instance it made a standing whitelist entry a
bearer grant — the first anonymous party to register an approved-but-unclaimed
address got an immediately usable account under that identity, with no
attestation, no admin action and no signal anywhere. The verify-time activation
had the same shape one step removed, and neither site ran the SEC-10 preset-
password guard or left an audit trail.
Keep a human in the loop instead. An approval granted before any account existed
was a decision about the ADDRESS, so registration reopens the invite
(upsert_pending_invite gains revive_approved, used only by the register worker).
The request lands in the Access-requests queue, approving it runs
_activate_user_by_email — and with it revoke_preset_password_if_unverified — and
the account activates. One mechanism, already audited, no new grant path, and
the "awaiting admin approval" copy is honest again.
The explicit commit from the previous commit still matters: with an invite
already pending, upsert returns without committing and _issue_token is gated on
SMTP, so a no-SMTP registration was still being rolled back.
Also from round 2: gate the admin notice on a fresh decision (matching the two
other upsert callers) so a retry no longer re-pings every admin, and reset the
module-level rate limiters between tests — the suite pooled every login into one
300s window and was two logins short of failing an unrelated test with a 429.
Follow-up to the commit fix, from the deep-review. Persisting the account was
only half the story: when the admin had approved the address BEFORE the person
registered, the account landed is_active=False against an invite that is no
longer pending — absent from the Access-requests queue, and approve_invite 409s
on an already-decided invite. The sign-up worked and still could not sign in.
Derive activation from is_allowed() at the moment ownership is attested:
- verify_email_confirm activates a pre-approved account when the emailed link is
confirmed (only the mailbox owner can follow it), so SEC-10 stays intact;
- _register_account activates only when there is no SMTP to verify with, where
the admin whitelist is by design the sole gate — the same one add_invite
already activates on.
Tests: the pre-approved no-SMTP case and the verify-activates case are real
regression tests (both fail without this change); guards cover the unknown-email
and denied->pending branches, verification of an unapproved account, and the
first end-to-end coverage of the /auth/register route and its
allow_registration gate. Release notes rewritten — the previous entry miscounted
its regression tests and advertised an email fix this release has no code for.
_register_account() flushed the new User but relied on someone else to commit:
upsert_pending_invite() commits only when it actually writes an invite row, and
_issue_token() runs only when SMTP is enabled. For an email an admin had ALREADY
approved, on an instance where email is unavailable, neither fired — the session
closed and the account was rolled back. The would-be user got the uniform "ok"
and no account, could not sign in, and re-registering was a silent no-op.
Commit explicitly after the invite upsert (a no-op when upsert already committed
the same transaction). Three DB-lane regression tests cover the pre-approved
no-SMTP path (fails without the fix), the unknown-email path that always worked,
and the pre-approved path with SMTP on.
Deep-review round 1 on bug/download-mediakind-probe found a real HIGH the prior
review missed:
- resolve_media_facts used a per-field `probe or info` fallback, so a probe that
RAN and deliberately found no video track (cover-art-only audio: attached_pic
skipped; a still image: format-guarded) had its None video overridden by
yt-dlp's stale vcodec. An audio-mode download from a progressive source (info
carries the source's video codec, embed-thumbnail on) was then classified VIDEO
-> a Play button + a broken in-app <video> with no video track. Only the
download path regressed (upload calls probe_media directly).
Fix: gate precedence on whether ffprobe RAN, not per-field. If the probe read
the file, its codec verdict wins outright (a None means 'no such track'); only a
full ffprobe failure falls back to info. Dimensions still gap-fill from info.
Refactored the parsing into _facts_from_probe so resolve_media_facts can see the
raw probe-ran signal; probe_media keeps its 5-tuple (upload + TestProbeClassifier
unchanged).
- tests: the cover-art-audio and still-image resurrection cases, a differing
populated-info precedence case (the prior-flagged gap), and the ffprobe-failed
info fallback — now stubbing run_ffprobe_json so the real parsing + precedence
run together.
Backend gate green (ruff + full pytest).
Deep-review round 2 on the round-1 fixes (all low):
- part_key churn (state): round 1's part-key reset re-probed EVERY sync for a
multi-version item (an original + a Plex 'Optimized' copy), because
_media_facts reads media[0]/part[0] whose order Plex doesn't guarantee stable,
oscillating transcode_hw between the two versions. Gate the part-key signal on
a single-version item (len(Media)<=1); codec-change reset still applies to all.
A multi-version same-codec re-encode not self-healing is an acceptable rare
edge; a per-sync re-probe loop is not.
- dead i18n key: this diff's playableClass() collapses to transcode_hw/sw, so the
bare plex.playable.transcode key it orphaned is now unused (knip can't see
dynamic keys). Dropped from both locales, parity kept.
- test: cross-facet narrowing by an active playable class (a co-facet's year
range collapses to the selected subset) — the flip side of self-exclusion,
previously unpinned.
The aria-label+title double-announcement on the card dot is a deliberate accepted
trade-off (reliable SR name + mouse tooltip). Backend + FE gates green.
Deep-review round 1 on feature/plex-playback-class-filter:
- Sticky watermark (medium): _apply_item reset the bit-depth probe watermark
only on a codec-string change, so a same-codec re-encode (8-bit->10-bit HEVC)
kept a stale video_bit_depth/transcode_hw forever (the backfill only re-probes
media_probed_at IS NULL rows). Also reset when the Plex Part key changes (the
file was replaced), not just the codec.
- i18n parity (medium): the HU playback-class labels were mixed-language (only
'direct' translated). Translated remux/transcode_hw/transcode_sw and the
tooltips consistently to Hungarian (Kozvetlen streameles / Atkodolas).
- Layering (low): _PLAYBACK_CLASSES was module-private yet imported across into
routes.plex.browse; renamed to public PLAYBACK_CLASSES (it is the shared
source of truth for facet order + zero-fill).
- a11y (low): the browse-card playback-class dot conveyed meaning only via a
mouse-hover title; added role=img + aria-label so SR/touch users get the class.
- tests: the NULL/unprobed transcode_hw -> SW fold (filter + facet), facet
self-exclusion under an active playable filter, the migration codec-set ==
HW_DECODABLE_CODECS drift guard, the probe-batch bound + oldest-first order,
the transient probe-failure retry path, and the same-codec re-encode re-probe.
Backend gate green (ruff + full pytest); FE gate green (tsc/lint/knip/prettier/
vitest). NOTE: the facet-vs-runtime disagreement for 10-bit HEVC (C1) is the
known merge-order constraint — this branch's runtime is codec-only; the facet
becomes truthful once BUG1/tonemap's bit-depth-aware routing lands with it. Left
as a sequencing constraint, not code-changed here.
Deep-review round 3: the only surviving finding — a comment-drift nit. The
fallback's cull-yield comment named the route's 'Not available yet' path, but a
culled-key segment request actually returns 'No active playback session' (the
substantive invariant — never a None that 404s as file-not-found — is unchanged).
Reworded to match the route. Concurrency + correctness came back clean.
Deep-review round 2 on the round-1 fix:
- Race (medium): the round-1 identity guard did the supersede check and the
respawn in TWO separate _lock sections. A newer same-key session installed in
the gap was still torn down by _spawn's unconditional pop+kill (the round-1
comment even had the direction backwards). Fold the check into _spawn via a
new replace_only= param: the identity test and the pop+replace now share ONE
lock, so the respawn is a true no-op when superseded/culled.
- Honest states (low): the superseded branch returned current_session(key),
which is None when the key was cap-culled during our out-of-lock wait; the
route turns None into a dishonest 'Media file not found on disk' 404 for a
file that exists. Yield 'current_session(key) or s' so a culled session
degrades to the route's retryable 'not available yet' path instead.
- Hygiene: _want_hw docstring corrected (it is a test-only shim now; production
decides via _select_encode) and the two stale _want_hw references refreshed
(stream.py header, config.py plex_transcode_hw).
- tests: the cap-cull no-respawn/no-None sub-case; the _opencl_present except
OSError branch (glob raising, not just empty); tightened a tautological -vf
assertion. Backend gate green (ruff + full pytest).
Deep-review round 1 on feature/plex-hdr-hw-tonemap:
- F1 (correctness): _select_encode gated tonemap on bit-depth alone, so a
10-bit *SDR* (bt709) source got the HDR hable tone curve applied, visibly
altering an SDR picture where only a 10->8-bit downconvert was needed. Split
the ffprobe gate into a 3-way classifier (_probe_video_kind: hwsafe / hdr /
sdr10); only true-HDR (PQ/HLG) takes the OpenCL tonemap graph, 10-bit SDR
drops to software libx264 (an exact downconvert). Applies to both auto and on.
- F2 (race): the runtime HW->SW fallback popped+killed _sessions[key] with no
identity check. Because wait_for blocks OUTSIDE _lock, a concurrent same-key
_spawn (rapid seek-restart) or _enforce_cap cull could kill this session; the
fallback then respawned software over the NEWER session and breached the
transcode cap. Guard the respawn: only fall back if _sessions[key] is still
this session, else yield the currently-registered one.
- tests: 3-way classifier (incl. HLG + empty-probe), real _opencl_present glob,
real wait_for proc fast-fail branch, tonemap-variant fallback, the F1
regressions (auto + on), the supersede/no-respawn race, and the on/opencl
matrix cell. Backend gate green (ruff + full pytest).
Upgrade mode-3's 10-bit/HDR branch from "route to software libx264" (BUG 1's
behaviour) to a full-GPU pipeline: VAAPI decode → OpenCL tonemap (hable,
HDR10/HLG → bt709 SDR nv12) → h264_vaapi. Gen 9.5 (UHD 630) can't tonemap in
the VAAPI VPP (tonemap_vaapi fails), so OpenCL is the only HW route — proven on
the prod iGPU at ~4.2x realtime, ~1 CPU core.
- stream.py: `_select_encode` returns (hw, tonemap); a 10-bit/HDR HW-decodable
source picks the tonemap graph when the OpenCL runtime is present, else drops
to software. `_opencl_present` gates on a registered ICD. `_venc_opts` /
`_hwaccel_in_opts` gain the tonemap variant (named vaapi+opencl devices,
`-filter_hw_device ocl`, hwmap→tonemap_opencl→hwmap reverse). `_want_hw` kept
as the hw-half wrapper. The runtime HW→SW fallback still backstops a session
that emits no segment.
- Dockerfile: add the Intel NEO OpenCL runtime (intel-opencl-icd). It was removed
from Debian trixie, so it's pulled from bookworm (22.43 still supports Gen 9.5;
the .deb runs on the trixie base — verified live). Harmless without /dev/dri.
- route + FE: thread `tonemap` through the session response; the stats overlay
mode row reads "transcode · GPU · HDR→SDR" for the tonemap path.
- tests: tonemap command branch, the (hw, tonemap) selection matrix (auto/on ×
8-bit/10-bit × opencl), start_session tonemap wiring, and the fmtMode tag.
Adds a movie-scoped "Playback" filter to the Plex feed so a user can isolate items by how
they play — the groundwork for collecting HW-transcodable (or no-transcode) versions.
Four classes derived from the stored `playable` + a new `transcode_hw` facet:
- Direct Play (direct), Direct Stream (remux)
- Transcode · HW — playable=transcode AND the iGPU can hardware-transcode it
- Transcode · SW — playable=transcode, software libx264 only
The HW/SW split is precise, not codec-only: a 10-bit/HDR HEVC is HW-decodable yet breaks the
VAAPI nv12 pipeline (the same case plex/stream special-cases), so it must count as SW.
Backend:
- New PlexItem columns (migration 0077): transcode_hw, video_bit_depth, media_probed_at.
Migration backfills transcode_hw codec-only so the filter works immediately.
- `plex.sync.transcode_hw_capable` is the single classifier; the HW-decodable codec set moves
to sync as `HW_DECODABLE_CODECS` and plex.stream imports it, so the catalog facet and the
runtime encoder choice can't disagree by codec.
- Bit-depth backfill (`_probe_media_batch`, wired into sync): probes only HW-decodable transcode
items' video Stream for bit-depth + HDR and refines a 10-bit/HDR HEVC to software. Bounded
per run, watermarked by media_probed_at. A codec change resets the watermark (stale probe).
- Filter + self-excluded facet on a shared `playback_class_expr` CASE (movie-leg only — a show
is an aggregate with no single class). transcode_hw threaded onto the feed/detail/card JSON.
Frontend:
- Multi-select "Playback" Combobox in the sidebar (movie scope, facet-empty drop-out), active
chips, 4-way corner-dot badge (green/blue/amber/red) + tooltip, and an info-page playback chip
with a codec · bit-depth subtitle. New `bg-info` (blue) token, i18n HU/EN parity.
- Fix a regression where the card's playback dot lost its hover tooltip: the full-card reveal
overlay swallowed the cursor; the dot now sits above it (z-20).
Gate: backend full lane + frontend typecheck/lint/knip/prettier/vitest all green. Browser-UAT'd
on localdev (filter narrows to the SW set, facet counts, badge colour + tooltip, info chip).
A 10-bit/HDR HEVC source (e.g. an HDR10 x265 file) died at scale_vaapi=format=nv12
on the UHD 630 (Gen 9.5 VPP: "VAProfile not supported"); ffmpeg produced 0 segments
and the item never played, with no fallback — a retry just re-picked the failing HW
path. An 8-bit HEVC and the same file on libx264 both work.
Two defenses:
- `_want_hw` auto mode now also gates on an 8-bit-SDR source via a new
`_probe_video_hwsafe` ffprobe (bit depth from pix_fmt/bits_per_raw_sample, HDR from
color_transfer) — a 10-bit/HDR source takes the software libx264 path, which
downconverts to yuv420p cleanly. The Plex mirror stores no bit-depth signal, so this
is probed at session start. "on" still trusts the admin and skips the gate.
- `start_session` adds a runtime HW→SW fallback: a HW session that emits no first
segment respawns on libx264 and reports hw=False (the route/stats overlay honestly
show CPU). `wait_for` gained an optional `proc` so a dead ffmpeg fails fast instead
of burning the 25s budget before the fallback fires.
Tests: TestProbeVideoHwsafe (parsing + probe-failure-assumes-safe), the 10-bit auto
gate + "on" skip in TestWantHw, and the no-segment HW→SW respawn in
TestTranscodeStartSession. Backend lane green.
A downloaded video was silently demoted to a download-only "file" (no
in-app play/edit) whenever yt-dlp's info dict omitted vcodec/acodec — which
it does for Facebook and other sources. Finalize derived media_kind from
those nulls (`derive(None, None)` -> file), so a genuine H.264/AAC MP4
became non-playable in the library.
Fix: probe the finished file on disk (the ground truth) at finalize and
derive from that, falling back to the info dict only for a field the probe
couldn't read. This is the same ffprobe the upload ingest already used, now
extracted to a shared downloads/probe.py so the download worker and the
upload path share one classifier (and can't drift). Also backfills the
stored vcodec/acodec/width/height from the real file.
Tests: TestResolveMediaFacts pins probe-wins-over-info (incl. the Facebook
no-codec case and yt-dlp's literal "none"); upload's probe tests repoint to
the shared module.
Eight verified findings from the sprint deep-review:
- Transcode cap: _enforce_cap now counts only transcode sessions, so a
live remux (stream-copy) stream can no longer be LRU-evicted mid-play —
matching the config comment + the HU/EN Config hint that promise remux
is uncapped.
- Player Back: the browser/mouse Back interceptor (BackClose) now also
mounts for the stats overlay and up-next card, so Back closes them first
instead of ejecting the whole player (keyboard/Esc already did).
- Honest cold-start: loadSession clears sessionIsTranscode up front, so a
transcode->direct/remux switch no longer flashes a stale "Preparing
stream..." during the session request.
- Stats overlay a11y: the close (X) buttons in the stats, help and info
overlays now read as "Close"/"Bezaras" (new plex.player.close key), not
"Back"; dropped aria-live from the per-second stat grid so a screen
reader is not flooded with telemetry.
Tests: route-level transcode routing (transcode item -> HLS re-encode
session, remux stays copy, direct opens none); start_session threading the
preset/crf/max_height knobs + hw/preexec into the ffmpeg argv; UpNextCard
countdown auto-advance, Play-now, Cancel and the S?-E? heading fallback.
Also brings UpNextCard.tsx / plexStats.ts / plexStats.test.ts to prettier.
The software-fallback re-encode now runs deprioritized and admin-configurable.
The SW transcode ffmpeg child is niced (preexec_fn → os.nice, applied per-child
because the Popen lives in the long-lived API process, which must NOT itself be
niced — unlike the download worker's whole-process _deprioritize) so a CPU-bound
re-encode can't starve request handling or playback; the VAAPI path needs none of
it.
New sysconfig knobs (plex group, rendered on the admin Configuration page, i18n
HU/EN): plex_transcode_hw (auto/on/off, layered onto _want_hw), plex_transcode_
preset, plex_transcode_crf, plex_transcode_max_height (software-only downscale-to
cap; the GPU path encodes at source resolution). plex_max_transcodes stays the
concurrency cap (comment corrected — the fallback is shipped, not "later").
pytest extends the command-builder + _want_hw coverage (preset/crf/max_height
plumbing, the on/off/auto policy). Browser-UAT'd: max_height=240 drops the live
resolution to 330x240; the SW ffmpeg child runs at nice 10 (ppid=api process).
Non-h264 items (playable="transcode": HEVC/VP9/AV1/MPEG-2/XviD…) now play by
re-encoding the video to H.264 inside the existing HLS session, instead of the
old HTTP 501. VAAPI hardware encode (h264_vaapi, full GPU decode→scale→encode
pipeline) where the render node is present and the source is HW-decodable;
libx264 software fallback otherwise (yuv420p 8-bit, -threads reserve-one-core).
The re-encode mints a keyframe at every segment boundary (-force_key_frames) so
the HLS muxer still cuts independent segments and seeking works; everything else
— -copyts, the HLS tail, multi-audio renditions, the AAC audio path — is the
same machinery as remux, so hls.js/subtitles/seeking are unchanged. The session
route returns transcode/hw so the player can surface the active mode.
pytest pins both command branches (software + VAAPI shape) and the HW-selection
gate (render node present AND source HW-decodable). Browser-UAT'd on the XviD
fixture (Winning London): 501→plays, real 528×384 H.264 frames, 0 dropped, seek
lands clean; stats overlay Mode row reads "transcode".
Deep-review remediation for the E7 upload path, all findings adversarially verified:
- Serve every library file with a Content-Type chosen from the ffprobe-verified media_kind
+ a strict container allow-list (storage.served_media_type), never guessed from the
user-controlled file extension. Closes a stored-XSS vector where a media/HTML polyglot
uploaded as "evil.html" was served inline as text/html on the login-free /watch surface.
Applied to both the authenticated /file and the public watch_file endpoints.
- Classify uploaded still images (jpg/png/gif/webp/…) as media_kind='file' so they are
force-downloaded and don't get a broken in-app video player.
- Roll back the on-disk side of an upload when the ingest transaction fails after place_file
(unlink the placed file + its deterministic poster path), so a failed commit can't orphan
bytes in the GC-skipped .uploads tree.
- Floor download_upload_max_bytes at min=1 so a stored 0 can't silently disable the per-file cap.
- Dedupe the ffprobe-JSON invocation into edit.run_ffprobe_json (shared by probe_codecs and
upload._probe) and the upload extension into storage._clean_upload_ext; drop the now-unused
parse_probe_streams.
Tests: public + authenticated force-download and the polyglot-not-served-as-HTML guard, the
real _probe classifier (image/cover-art/dims/duration), the ingest rollback/cleanup path, the
max_jobs branch, the cap-floor invariant, and run_ffprobe_json error handling.
Add the non-yt-dlp ingest path so a user-uploaded file joins the same download
library and inherits its function set. Any file type is accepted: media
(video/audio) gets the full set (metadata, share, play/edit), a generic file
(pdf/zip/docx/…) is download-only.
- MediaAsset.media_kind ("video"|"audio"|"file") — the stored discriminator that
gates library actions. Set at every finalize (download probe, editor carries the
source's kind, upload probe); consolidates the ad-hoc audio-detect that lived only
in links.py into one invariant (downloads.mediakind.derive). Migration 0076 adds
the column + backfills existing rows.
- downloads/upload.py: ingest_upload probes the file (ffprobe → codecs/dims/duration),
places it in a per-user .uploads tree, and creates an already-ready asset + done job
(the same cache-hit shortcut enqueue uses). Uploads never expire (irreplaceable).
- POST /api/downloads/upload: streaming multipart with the per-file cap
(download_upload_max_bytes, default 500 MiB) enforced on actual bytes read; quota
charges the known size up front (quota.check_upload).
- Security: a generic file is always served force-download (attachment +
application/octet-stream) on both the in-app and public endpoints, so uploaded
HTML/SVG can't execute inline. Edit + redownload reject non-media / upload sources.
- python-multipart added (first multipart endpoint in the app).
D2-A: the library row's Share button becomes a single action — quickShareLink()
ensures a public link (minting on demand), copies it to the clipboard, and toasts
with an "Open in new tab" action. A copy failure still toasts (warning) with that
action so the link is never a dead end. Advanced controls (password/expiry/revoke/
user-ACL) stay in the existing ShareDialog, reached via a new "Manage sharing" row
button.
D1 (forward-only): CreateLinkIn.allow_download defaults to true, so a newly minted
link is downloadable by default. The default lives in the API, not a migration —
the download_links column default stays false, so no existing link flips. The
ShareDialog create-default is flipped to match.
Tests: TestCreateLinkDefault (default true; explicit false honored); 4 vitest cases
for quickShareLink (mint-vs-reuse, copy ok/fail, create failure). HU/EN parity.
The Download module's purpose is download -> share -> play in-browser, so the
output must play in EVERY browser (iOS/Safari/WebKit included). The only
universally-safe combo is mp4 + H.264 + AAC/MP3.
- formats.normalize() now CLAMPS every spec to that profile (container->mp4,
vcodec->None, audio_format opus->m4a) at the single point all paths flow
through (picker, stored profile, raw API) — not just by hiding UI options. A
source exposing no H.264 is still caught by the worker's browser-safe
re-encode, so playability is guaranteed end-to-end.
- build_ydl_opts drops the now-unreachable non-compat branches (+ _VCODEC_SORT).
- _SIG_VERSION 3->4 so assets cached under an old non-compat spec — or a stale
non-H.264 mp4 that slipped the v3 net (the HEVC Facebook dls) — re-derive.
- ProfileEditor drops the container/codec pickers and Opus; audio is M4A/MP3.
- i18n: remove the now-unused container/vcodec/any keys (HU+EN parity).
- Button: `loading` always disables (|| not ??) — stops a double-submit
when a call-site passes an explicit boolean `disabled` (VideoEditor).
- playlists: track un-ingestable-but-live YouTube ids in the sync baseline
so a linked playlist containing a private/deleted video converges instead
of re-classifying it as a pending pull forever; re-attempt ingestion each
sync so a restored (private->public) video heals, and prune ids that
leave YouTube.
- SettingsPanel: download-auth section renders an honest error/loading
state (StateMessage + retry) instead of a bare empty section on a failed
credentials fetch; HU+EN loadError string.
- tests: reorder-order, partial-failure baseline hold, un-ingestable
converge/heal/prune, Button loading-disables, download-auth error/retry.
"Sync to YouTube" was a one-directional destructive push (local wins, deletes
from YouTube every item not in the local list), so items added on YouTube were
lost and a dirty pull was skipped entirely. Replace it with a real 3-way merge:
each item is classified against the last-synced baseline as a local-add, a
YouTube-add, or a genuine delete, so an add or delete on either side survives.
- Persist the ordered baseline id set (new playlists.synced_video_ids, migration
0075); the fingerprint hash alone couldn't drive a merge. NULL baseline (fresh
export / pre-S7 link) unions losslessly on the first sync and records one.
- Pure merge_plan(baseline, local, youtube) -> add/remove per side + merged order
(local order, YouTube-only additions appended). merge_playlist applies the
local side directly and the YouTube side through the failure breaker; the
baseline only advances on full success so a partial failure re-converges.
- plan_merge/push-plan now report what each side gains and loses; the confirm
dialog shows the two-way plan before applying (pushPlanMerge, HU+EN).
- Tests: 10 new (pure classification incl. delete-vs-stale-copy; DB apply proving
a YouTube-add and a Siftlode-add both survive on both sides, a genuine delete
propagates without collateral loss, no-baseline never deletes, create path).
Each user stores their own login cookies (Netscape cookies.txt) for an
auth-walled download host (Facebook, Instagram, X, TikTok, Reddit) in
Settings; a download of an auth-walled link on that host is retried with
the acting user's cookie.
Two load-bearing security controls, both in downloads.credentials as the
single source of truth so enqueue and the worker can't drift:
- cache privacy: a cookie-authed download salts its MediaAsset format_sig
with the user id, so the authed asset is private and never cache-served
to another user. The worker attaches a cookie ONLY when the asset it is
downloading into IS that private, salted identity.
- host scope (SEC-12): a cookie is resolved only for a URL whose netloc
the credential owns (netloc-scoped _host_is); a look-alike/unrelated
host gets none.
cookies_enc is Fernet-encrypted at rest, only decrypted in-worker into a
0600 file under staging/.auth/ (survives the retry wipe + _produced_file
scan) and unlinked in finally. The blob is never returned by a route,
logged, audited, or written to a job's error/snapshot. cookiefile is set
after the adapter's extra merge so an adapter can't clobber it. Settings
UI is write-only (host + set/updated only, never echoed). New
download_credentials table + migration 0074; per-user routes; HU+EN i18n.
Tests: host-scope, cache-privacy (no cross-user serve), encrypt-at-rest,
write-only API, worker attach-gate; FE dom test for the write-only field.
The download/edit child (yt-dlp + ffmpeg) shares one LAN box with the API,
Postgres, and Plex playback. A CPU re-encode pegged every core for ~30s and
starved web requests + playback until it finished. Full-scope S4 mitigations:
- Child self-de-prioritizes at startup (inherited by every ffmpeg/yt-dlp
descendant): CPU nice increment + best-effort idle ionice class + an
OMP_NUM_THREADS budget, all config-gated and independently disable-able.
- Cap the browser-safe re-encode's encoder threads (`-threads`) so a transcode
reserves a core for foreground work instead of claiming all of them.
- Throttle the retention GC's whole-tree orphan sweep (yield IO after each
batch of files) so its rglob can't monopolize disk IO in the API process.
- Idle-back-off the Download Center (2s→15s when nothing queued/running) and
UsageBar (2s→15s when running_jobs is 0) polls; both snap back to 2s on the
next fetch after an enqueue (invalidateDownloads refetches immediately).
Tests: encode_thread_cap (pin/reserve-core/edge), -threads flag presence,
_deprioritize (nice/ionice/OMP branches), GC sweep throttle batching.
5a — the public watch page rendered every asset in a <video>, but WebKit (all
iOS browsers) refuses to play an audio-only mp3 in <video>, so shared audio
links were broken on iPad while working on desktop Chromium. public_meta now
flags audio-only assets (codec present, no video stream) and WatchPage renders
a native <audio> in a padded surface card (no artwork exists for these).
5c — a login-walled Facebook post failed as a bare 'unknown', which offered a
misleading Retry. Classify closed-group / cookie-suggestion auth walls as
login_required and genuinely unsupported sites as a new unsupported_host class
(both non-retryable), and drop unknown from the modal's retryable set — an
unclassified failure is most often an unparsed auth wall. The queue row keeps
its own force-retry for real transients.
The incremental watch-sync (run_plex_watch_sync) learned a movie's watched
transition only from the history feed + onDeck. When a movie is finished on
Plex (commonly by scrubbing through the end credits) Plex sets viewCount>0,
clears viewOffset and DROPS it from Continue-Watching, so onDeck no longer
lists it (and onDeck can only ever ADD an in-progress row, never resolve one),
while a scrub-to-end frequently emits no history session row. The stale local
status='new', position>0 row then survived until the DAILY full reconcile —
which is why movies kept showing "in progress".
Add _reconcile_inprogress_movies: for each local in-progress MOVIE that Plex's
onDeck no longer lists, read its current per-account viewCount/viewOffset with
one metadata() call and apply it via the shared _pull_apply, flipping to
watched when Plex says so. Bounded by a probe cap (100), most-recently-touched
first; episodes are left to onDeck/history. No-signal rows are preserved (an
un-watch stays the daily reconcile's job).
Tests: watched-flip, onDeck+episode skip, and no-signal-preserved.
Deep-review of the quickfix batch surfaced two data/preference-loss bugs plus
smaller items; all fixed with tests.
- watch_sync _pull_apply: don't let the Plex-authoritative pull overwrite a DIRTY
local row (a change whose immediate push failed) — that stranded the value
forever since _repush_dirty only retries dirty rows. Leave it dirty for re-push.
- PlexProvider / ChannelsProvider: a partial shared link opened in a fresh tab
persisted mount-time DEFAULTS over the account's stored scope/sort/filters
(base read before the account was pinned). Persist/keep only URL-present dims;
re-hydrate the omitted ones from storage.
- playback resume write-back: guard against out-of-order delivery (a superseded
older push now drops) and evict the throttle map so it can't grow unbounded.
- PlexPlayer: announce mid-playback buffering to assistive tech (role=status +
sr-only label); new plex.player.buffering (HU+EN).
- columnSort: hoist the shared key:dir sort codec used by both URL-state modules.
- Tests: dirty-guard + flag-settle + per-key throttle scoping + superseded-push
(backend); hold-repeat/suppress-click/unmount + partial-link no-clobber +
refetch-doesn't-clobber-undo (frontend). Backend pytest 475, FE vitest 519.
peter