SEC-10 (account pre-emption / "pre-hijack"): a password set on an account whose
email was never verified is untrusted — whoever registered the address (to
pre-empt the real owner) could have chosen it. Both the Google-adoption callback
and admin activation (_activate_user_by_email) now drop that pre-set password and
bump the session epoch when the account isn't email_verified, so a later Google
login / admin approval can't hand the pre-set password a working login. No-op for
a verified account (the legit no-SMTP flow). +2 tests.
SEC-11 (link/upgrade bound to the session default): the OAuth link/upgrade GETs
resolved to the session DEFAULT account, so a tab acting as a secondary account
would link Google / the YouTube grant to the wrong account. The frontend now
threads the active account through the navigation URL (withActiveAccount ->
?account=<active>), and _complete_link accepts any wallet account, not only the
default, so the identity lands on the account that started the flow.
Address the /code-review findings on the S2 test-net:
- as_user no longer sets a global `lambda: user` override that two users in one
test would collide on; the shared current_user override now resolves the caller
from an x-test-user header, and each returned client tags its own requests, so
as_user(a)/as_user(b) are independent (#1).
- override_dep records the prior value per dependency key and restores it on
teardown instead of a blanket dependency_overrides.clear(), so fixtures compose
without clobbering each other (#5).
- a _configured fixture bakes the post-setup state into client/as_user, and the
per-test inline monkeypatch / autouse duplicates are removed (#4).
- the feed keyset walk asserts all seeded rows surfaced before comparing, so a
seeding regression can't make the sorts pass vacuously (#3).
The auth security mag had zero tests. Add a DB-lane suite over the real
auth/session stack (TestClient carries the signed cookie): password login ->
/api/me authenticated; a wrong password and an unknown email return a
byte-identical 401 (no enumeration oracle); an X-Siftlode-Account header naming
a non-wallet account falls back to the default (impersonation gate); logout-others
bumps the epoch so a second session is rejected (401 on a protected endpoint)
while the caller stays in; and password-reset/confirm is single-use (replay ->
400) and bumps the epoch so pre-reset sessions die.
peter