Round 3 of the review killed the reopen from b5a1002: flipping an approved
invite back to pending let an unauthenticated POST /auth/register REVOKE a
standing approval for any whitelisted-but-unclaimed address, which then fails
is_allowed() and locks the real owner out of Google sign-in — the primary way
people get in here. It also re-armed the pre-emption window it was meant to
close, because with no SMTP email_verified is set True and the SEC-10 guard the
design leaned on never fires.
Two attempts at fixing the stranded-account UX in the same change both came back
worse than the wart. What remains is the narrow, real bug: the account was
silently rolled back and is now committed. An admin still binds the approval to
the account, exactly as before this branch. UX-25 in the roadmap records the
follow-up and both dead ends so they are not retried.
Also from round 3: the upsert docstring no longer claims the admin UI cannot
reach these accounts (re-entering the address in the same panel's whitelist box
does, and a test now pins it), the release notes are scoped to what the diff
actually changes with the operator note moved where the dialog renders it, and
RateLimiter has unit tests so reset() is not production code only a fixture
calls.
Replaces the activation added in ea931dc, which round 2 of the review showed was
a real weakening: on a no-SMTP instance it made a standing whitelist entry a
bearer grant — the first anonymous party to register an approved-but-unclaimed
address got an immediately usable account under that identity, with no
attestation, no admin action and no signal anywhere. The verify-time activation
had the same shape one step removed, and neither site ran the SEC-10 preset-
password guard or left an audit trail.
Keep a human in the loop instead. An approval granted before any account existed
was a decision about the ADDRESS, so registration reopens the invite
(upsert_pending_invite gains revive_approved, used only by the register worker).
The request lands in the Access-requests queue, approving it runs
_activate_user_by_email — and with it revoke_preset_password_if_unverified — and
the account activates. One mechanism, already audited, no new grant path, and
the "awaiting admin approval" copy is honest again.
The explicit commit from the previous commit still matters: with an invite
already pending, upsert returns without committing and _issue_token is gated on
SMTP, so a no-SMTP registration was still being rolled back.
Also from round 2: gate the admin notice on a fresh decision (matching the two
other upsert callers) so a retry no longer re-pings every admin, and reset the
module-level rate limiters between tests — the suite pooled every login into one
300s window and was two logins short of failing an unrelated test with a 429.
Follow-up to the commit fix, from the deep-review. Persisting the account was
only half the story: when the admin had approved the address BEFORE the person
registered, the account landed is_active=False against an invite that is no
longer pending — absent from the Access-requests queue, and approve_invite 409s
on an already-decided invite. The sign-up worked and still could not sign in.
Derive activation from is_allowed() at the moment ownership is attested:
- verify_email_confirm activates a pre-approved account when the emailed link is
confirmed (only the mailbox owner can follow it), so SEC-10 stays intact;
- _register_account activates only when there is no SMTP to verify with, where
the admin whitelist is by design the sole gate — the same one add_invite
already activates on.
Tests: the pre-approved no-SMTP case and the verify-activates case are real
regression tests (both fail without this change); guards cover the unknown-email
and denied->pending branches, verification of an unapproved account, and the
first end-to-end coverage of the /auth/register route and its
allow_registration gate. Release notes rewritten — the previous entry miscounted
its regression tests and advertised an email fix this release has no code for.
_register_account() flushed the new User but relied on someone else to commit:
upsert_pending_invite() commits only when it actually writes an invite row, and
_issue_token() runs only when SMTP is enabled. For an email an admin had ALREADY
approved, on an instance where email is unavailable, neither fired — the session
closed and the account was rolled back. The would-be user got the uniform "ok"
and no account, could not sign in, and re-registering was a silent no-op.
Commit explicitly after the invite upsert (a no-op when upsert already committed
the same transaction). Three DB-lane regression tests cover the pre-approved
no-SMTP path (fails without the fix), the unknown-email path that always worked,
and the pre-approved path with SMTP on.
None are referenced by the SPA or tests; the Scheduler dashboard's "run now"
covers every manual trigger. Removed: POST /api/sync/{rss,backfill,enrich}
(+ the now-dead _user_channels helper and three sync.runner imports),
POST /api/tags/recompute (+ its admin_user / run_autotag_all imports), and
GET /auth/me (a lesser duplicate of the canonical /api/me in routes/me.py).
This also retires a latent bug: POST /api/sync/backfill reset backfill_done /
backfill_cursor on already-fully-backfilled channels (tipping them back to
"needs full history") for up to 25 channels per curl. Full lane 365 pass.
request-access / demo / register / verify / verify-resend / password-login /
password-reset(request|confirm) / set-password each took an untyped `payload:
dict` and hand-picked fields with `.get(...)`. Replace with five small BaseModels
(EmailIn, EmailPasswordIn, TokenIn, TokenPasswordIn, SetPasswordIn) so FastAPI
validates the body shape and publishes the schema. Fields are `str | None` to
preserve exact behaviour — a missing/null field still coerces via the existing
`(... or "")`, no stricter 422s. Green under the auth-session suite (7), ruff clean.
Review round on the whole E1 stack (main..HEAD). 6 findings, all low/medium,
none blocking; fixed for a clean gate-green handoff.
- plex/sync (correctness): the un-enriched cast guard compared the stored cast
against THIS listing's length, so a trimmed Plex cast on a not-yet-enriched
row was never applied. Compare against the listing CAP (_LISTING_CAST_CAP=20)
instead: >cap = enriched (keep, survives a watermark reset), <=cap =
listing-sourced (track edits in both directions). +2 regression tests.
- main (security): add X-Frame-Options: DENY as the legacy-browser fallback for
the CSP frame-ancestors clickjacking guard.
- downloads/service (altitude): finalize_if_running now uses a SQLAlchemy 2.0
update() construct instead of a hand-built text() UPDATE string — same atomic
WHERE status='running', idiomatic, no identifier interpolation, no manual
StrEnum coercion. Drops the now-unused text import.
- auth/admin (reuse): extract the SEC-10 "drop untrusted preset password + bump
epoch" invariant into one helper (revoke_preset_password_if_unverified) so the
Google-callback and admin-activation paths can't drift.
- tests/migrations (robustness): guarantee the shared schema is restored to head
in a finally, so a downgrade/re-upgrade failure can't cascade into later tests.
- worker (simplification): align _finish_from_cache's display_name fill with the
_download path's guard (no behavior change).
Gate green: ruff clean, 334 pytest (0 skip), frontend unchanged.
SEC-10 (account pre-emption / "pre-hijack"): a password set on an account whose
email was never verified is untrusted — whoever registered the address (to
pre-empt the real owner) could have chosen it. Both the Google-adoption callback
and admin activation (_activate_user_by_email) now drop that pre-set password and
bump the session epoch when the account isn't email_verified, so a later Google
login / admin approval can't hand the pre-set password a working login. No-op for
a verified account (the legit no-SMTP flow). +2 tests.
SEC-11 (link/upgrade bound to the session default): the OAuth link/upgrade GETs
resolved to the session DEFAULT account, so a tab acting as a secondary account
would link Google / the YouTube grant to the wrong account. The frontend now
threads the active account through the navigation URL (withActiveAccount ->
?account=<active>), and _complete_link accepts any wallet account, not only the
default, so the identity lands on the account that started the flow.
Cleanup only, no behaviour change (ruff clean + pytest 193):
- keep the whole OAuth scope vocabulary together in app/auth.py: the bundles
(BASE_SCOPES/READ_SCOPES/WRITE_SCOPES/_YOUTUBE_SCOPES) move back next to the
atoms (READ_SCOPE/WRITE_SCOPE) as core; routes/auth.py imports the bundles it
needs instead of rebuilding them from the atoms.
- compact the const groups the split generator spread out (the six rate
limiters, the TTLs, the demo/scope constants) back into blocks.
R12 S2. app/auth.py (1154 lines) mixed the core auth surface with 18 HTTP
endpoints on one /auth router. Split by dependency graph:
- app/auth.py (223 lines) keeps ONLY the core surface other modules import
(current_user, resolved_user_id, admin_user, require_*, has_*_scope,
purge_user, count_admins, get_or_create_demo_user, google_enabled,
is_allowed, operator_contact, optional_current_user) plus everything it
transitively depends on.
- app/routes/auth.py (883 lines, new) gets the router + all 18 endpoints +
their endpoint-only helpers, importing the core surface from app.auth.
- main.py includes auth_routes.router (was app.auth.router).
- test_oauth_redirect imports _oauth_redirect_uri from its new home.
The STAY/MOVE partition is driven by an AST scan of the COMPLETE external
surface (every `from app.auth import` incl. multiline + `from app import
auth; auth.X`), so no still-referenced symbol was moved. Behaviour-equivalent:
every symbol relocated verbatim (get_source_segment equality), route set
proven identical, no undefined names (symtable sweep).
Gate: ruff clean (backend + scripts), pytest 193 passed.
peter