Commit Graph
7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
peter 90567718b2 feat(files): share-link tokens are kept only hashed and encrypted, and every link change is audited
A /watch link's token is the credential, and it sat in the database as written. Migration 0107
replaces the column with the token's SHA-256 (the lookup) and a Fernet-encrypted copy (so the owner
can copy the same link again); every existing address keeps working, and the downgrade decrypts
them back. Without a copy this key can read, a link still opens but its address cannot be shown:
"Copy link" then takes the newest link that has one or makes a new one, and the Share dialog says
so in that row instead of a broken URL. Making, changing and revoking a link are audited, never
with its token or password.
2026-10-15 01:02:29 +02:00
peter 6b0401b922 fix(logs): rule on every swallowed exception in the backend
114 exception handlers neither logged nor re-raised. The defect was never that
they are silent — plenty of them should be — it is that their silence said
nothing, so nobody could tell a decision from an oversight. Each one has now been
read. 44 got a line; the other 70 carry `# silent-ok: <why>`.

What the silent ones had been hiding, in the cases that got a line:
- A failed ffprobe sent every HDR file down the 8-bit pipeline, so playback
  degraded to a software transcode with nothing saying why; a failed audio probe
  collapsed a multi-audio file to one track and the player showed no language
  picker; a failed first-PTS probe left subtitles seconds out of sync.
- A subtitle sidecar that existed but would not parse made a PARTIAL track read as
  complete, permanently — the viewer loses every cue past the cached window.
- An unreadable crop/trim/cut-list in an edit spec was dropped, so the clip came
  out uncropped, untrimmed, or shorter than the one the user built.
- A dropped `max_height` downloaded at best quality against an explicit cap.
- A failed videos.list enrich made every candidate undroppable-from-judgement and
  therefore dropped: a working search rendered as "no results".
- An unusable password hash answered as "wrong password", locking the owner out
  and telling them they mistyped; a rotated TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY turned every
  stored token into "not connected".
- A stored admin setting that would not coerce fell back to the env default while
  the settings page went on showing the saved value.
- A one-off InnerTube config failure pinned the whole process to the hard-coded
  fallback key, and searches return nothing when that goes stale.
- The HLS sweep reported 0 swept — like a clean run — when it could not list its
  own root, leaving every crashed session's segments on disk forever.

Four of them are counted rather than logged per item (dropped cues, dropped cut
list segments, unreclaimed GC files) and reported once per call, because the
alternative is one line per cue over a whole subtitle track.

ruff gains S110 and BLE001. Every blind `except Exception` that remains carries
`# noqa: BLE001 — <why>`, which is the point: catching everything is sometimes
right, and always worth a sentence. plex/sync.py's three best-effort backfill
catches now keep the traceback — a blind catch over a batch that fetches AND
writes could be Plex, the database or our own bug, and `%s` of the exception told
them apart badly. main.py's boot-time log-level read likewise.

logs.event's `code` is positional-only now: `event("x", code=...)` was a TypeError,
and `code` is exactly the word a caller reaches for when the thing that failed has
one of its own.

tests/test_swallowed_exceptions.py is the wider rule ruff cannot see: a handler
that neither logs nor re-raises must say why. Both cases mutation-checked — a
marker removed and a log line removed each fail it, naming the handler.
2026-09-18 01:20:42 +02:00
peter b1832afd18 style: apply ruff format across backend + scripts (line-length 100)
Mechanical, whole-tree `ruff format` pass — no behaviour change. Recorded in
.git-blame-ignore-revs (next commit) so git blame skips it.
2026-08-23 07:43:06 +02:00
peter a61a281158 fix(auth): security hardening — token encryption, timing, adoption + isolation
From the auth /security-review (contained fixes; architectural SA3 proxy-trust +
SA4 session-revocation deferred to the user):
- SB1: encrypt the OAuth access_token at rest (was plaintext while refresh_token
  was encrypted) — a ~1h Google bearer credential. New security.decrypt_optional()
  falls back to a refresh for legacy plaintext tokens; column is unbounded String.
  E2E-verified: token refreshed → stored as Fernet ciphertext → 319-subscription
  YouTube sync succeeded.
- SA5: password_login is no longer a timing/enumeration oracle — it always runs
  argon2 (against a decoy hash for unknown/passwordless emails), so response time
  can't reveal whether an account exists.
- SB2: Google login only ADOPTS+activates a pre-existing password account when
  Google actually attests email_verified (defense-in-depth against takeover); and
  the email sync won't overwrite with a value another account owns (avoids a 500).
- demo_login clears the wallet first (demo can't switch to / act as a real account
  via the multi-account header); switch_account rejects a suspended target (which
  would otherwise clear the whole session on the next request).

Re-review clean; ruff clean; localdev boots; YouTube auth path E2E-verified.
2026-07-11 21:26:39 +02:00
peter 1758b50062 refactor(auth): centralize token hashing, email validation & admin gating
- app/utils.py: shared valid_email() + now_utc() (one email regex, was duplicated
  in auth.py and admin.py with a looser "@"-in check elsewhere).
- security.hash_token(): one SHA-256 token hasher (was duplicated in auth.py + state.py).
- auth.admin_user dependency + count_admins() helper, replacing the inline role
  checks and the last-admin count query repeated across admin.py/me.py/tags.py.
2026-06-26 03:15:36 +02:00
peter 7efd4f4867 feat(auth): email+password registration with two-gate activation (5a backend)
Add email+password auth alongside Google: argon2id hashing; users gains
password_hash/email_verified/is_active and google_sub becomes nullable (migration
0022); a single-use, hashed auth_tokens table for email verification + password
reset. Registration creates a pending (inactive, unverified) account + an access
request; sign-in needs verified email AND admin approval. Anti-enumeration: uniform
register/login/reset responses (a correct-password owner still gets a specific
pending reason). allow_registration flag (DB-tunable). Admin users-list + role
endpoint (guards: not self, not demo, not the last admin); approving access (or a
manual whitelist add) now activates the matching pending account. current_user
rejects deactivated accounts. Verified end-to-end via curl + DB.
2026-06-19 14:03:11 +02:00
peter 3a5209e96c feat: M1 foundation — compose stack, FastAPI, Google OAuth, encrypted tokens
- docker-compose with Postgres 16 + slim Python API image
- FastAPI app with session middleware, health endpoint, static login page
- Google OAuth (Authlib) with email invite-list whitelist; admin role support
- User + OAuthToken models; refresh tokens encrypted at rest (Fernet)
- Alembic migrations, run automatically on container startup
- Postgres backup/restore scripts for portability between machines
2026-06-11 01:01:37 +02:00