Two halves of one rule: the address someone typed is theirs to keep, and it must be
the one that gets them back in.
A plus-tagged or dotted Gmail is often a deliberate choice -- registering as
me+siftlode@gmail.com is how you find out later which site leaked your address. The
Google callback overwrote it with the account's primary, which can never contain a
'+', so the tag vanished on the first Google sign-in and, because sign-in matched the
stored address, took their chosen address with it. The rewrite line is older than
this epic, but S3 made it reachable here by matching adoption across spellings. It
now runs only when the mailbox GENUINELY changed, and lives in a named helper rather
than inline, so the rule has one home.
The three lookups that resolve a typed address -- password login, password reset,
verify resend -- go through find_user_by_email: exact spelling first, then the unique
canonical candidate, and None when several accounts share a mailbox rather than
guessing which one a password should open. Reset and resend previously answered a
different spelling with silence (they reply uniformly by design), which was a dead end
with no way out. Their mail now goes to the address on the account, never the one
typed into the form.
Gmail delivers x.y@, xy@ and xy+tag@ to one inbox; the invite gate only lowercased.
On 2026-09-03 that turned an approved user's Google sign-in into a silent SECOND
access request -- OAuth returns the account's stored primary, which need not be the
spelling they typed -- and left prod with two user rows for one mailbox (ids 13, 14).
The +tag case fails every time: a Google account cannot contain +, so OAuth can only
ever answer with the base address.
Mail still goes to the address AS TYPED; only identity matching uses the canonical
form. utils.canonical_email is the single definition, and a model validator derives
users.email_canonical / invites.email_canonical on every write, so no call site can
forget it. Scope is narrow on purpose: dots are significant on most providers and the
Gmail rule does not hold for Workspace custom domains.
Swept every sibling of the same principle, not just the reported one: is_allowed,
upsert_pending_invite, the Google-callback adoption, _register_account (so no new
duplicate pair can be created), _activate_user_by_email, admin _accounts_for (an
invite backing a live user under another spelling used to look deletable) and
add_invite, plus purge_user, which now erases every canonically-equal invite instead
of leaving one behind that still grants access.
Migration 0079 backfills both columns and indexes them NON-uniquely: prod already
carries canonical duplicates (approved invite pairs since 2026-06-16), and merging
accounts is a judgement call about people's data, not something a migration does on
its own. A test pins the backfill SQL against the Python helper.
A rotated or missing TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY makes every stored secret undecryptable.
sysconfig._raw_override called security.decrypt() with no guard, and it sits on
hot paths (/api/me via google_enabled, login, every YouTube scheduler job,
account purge) — so a key mismatch raised InvalidToken and 500'd the whole app,
the SPA wouldn't even boot, with no documented recovery.
Catch the decrypt failure in _raw_override -> warn once per key and fall back to
the env/config default. The YouTube client's refresh-token decrypt now raises a
clear YouTubeError ("reconnect") that every caller already handles, and
purge_user uses decrypt_optional so a best-effort revoke can't 500 the delete.
Document that the key must never change once secrets are stored (recovery: clear
the affected system_config rows and re-enter).
Cleanup only, no behaviour change (ruff clean + pytest 193):
- keep the whole OAuth scope vocabulary together in app/auth.py: the bundles
(BASE_SCOPES/READ_SCOPES/WRITE_SCOPES/_YOUTUBE_SCOPES) move back next to the
atoms (READ_SCOPE/WRITE_SCOPE) as core; routes/auth.py imports the bundles it
needs instead of rebuilding them from the atoms.
- compact the const groups the split generator spread out (the six rate
limiters, the TTLs, the demo/scope constants) back into blocks.
R12 S2. app/auth.py (1154 lines) mixed the core auth surface with 18 HTTP
endpoints on one /auth router. Split by dependency graph:
- app/auth.py (223 lines) keeps ONLY the core surface other modules import
(current_user, resolved_user_id, admin_user, require_*, has_*_scope,
purge_user, count_admins, get_or_create_demo_user, google_enabled,
is_allowed, operator_contact, optional_current_user) plus everything it
transitively depends on.
- app/routes/auth.py (883 lines, new) gets the router + all 18 endpoints +
their endpoint-only helpers, importing the core surface from app.auth.
- main.py includes auth_routes.router (was app.auth.router).
- test_oauth_redirect imports _oauth_redirect_uri from its new home.
The STAY/MOVE partition is driven by an AST scan of the COMPLETE external
surface (every `from app.auth import` incl. multiline + `from app import
auth; auth.X`), so no still-referenced symbol was moved. Behaviour-equivalent:
every symbol relocated verbatim (get_source_segment equality), route set
proven identical, no undefined names (symtable sweep).
Gate: ruff clean (backend + scripts), pytest 193 passed.
Establish the R6 API-contract infra before the S1b payload:dict migration:
- iso(dt) in utils.py replaces the ~16 hand-rolled `x.isoformat() if x else None`
serializer idioms across the routes.
- get_or_404 / owned_or_404 in routes/_common.py — one 404 + existence-leak policy;
plex's _own_playlist_or_404 and saved_views' _own_view now delegate to it.
- require_write_scope dependency in auth.py collapses the inline has_write_scope→403
checks (channels subscribe/unsubscribe, playlists push/push-plan) that had drifted
into three different messages into one; the conditional delete_playlist guard stays
inline (its message was already canonical).
No response-shape change (iso == isoformat for a present value). Gate: ruff clean,
pytest 163 green (+ test_utils for iso).
- C-3.7: fold a per-link password_version into the signed watch grant (migration
0059 adds the column) and bump it on every password change, so rotating a share
link's password invalidates outstanding grants at once instead of letting them
live out the 6h TTL. make_grant/check_grant take the version; update_link bumps.
- C-3.8: the share recipient picker and share-by-email now reuse the messageable
filter (not-demo AND active AND not-suspended) instead of only excluding demo,
so suspended/deactivated addresses aren't leaked or reachable as targets.
- C-3.9: GET /keys/{user_id} adopts get_thread's MB2 guard — a non-messageable
target with no shared history returns the same "User not found" as a missing id,
so it can't be probed to enumerate users or fetch suspended users' keys.
- C-3.12: _register_account catches IntegrityError on the insert (the select-then-
insert TOCTOU) and treats it as the already-registered no-op.
- C-3.13: trigger_job claims the running flag atomically under _activity_lock
(compare-and-set) instead of a bare check, closing the double-start window.
- Move _messageable/is_messageable_user into a shared app/userscope.py so downloads
doesn't import the messages route module.
Re-add the 127.0.0.1 callbacks to the dev host allowlist (now registered in the
Google console alongside the localhost ones). Deriving the redirect_uri from the
request host keeps the whole round-trip — login, Google callback, and the
session/state cookie — on one origin; a cross-host fallback (127.0.0.1 → the
fixed localhost callback) would silently lose the OAuth state, since a session
cookie set on 127.0.0.1 is never sent to localhost. Clarify that in the comment
and cover all four hosts in the unit test.
- OAuth-cancel feedback now keys on the live session, not link_uid: ANY
signed-in cancel (add-another-account via /auth/login, link, or upgrade)
redirects to /?oauth=cancelled and gets a neutral "Google sign-in was
cancelled" toast — the add-account path set no marker and was silent, and
the shared ?link= message wrongly called an upgrade "account linking"
- drop 127.0.0.1 from the dev OAuth host allowlist: only the localhost
callbacks are registered in the Google console, so a 127.0.0.1 origin now
falls back to the fixed callback instead of a redirect_uri_mismatch
- Welcome: extract the shared goResend handler (banner CTA + sign-in link) and
merge the two adjacent signin-only blocks
- link/upgrade OAuth cancel now redirects to /?link=cancelled (a channel App.tsx
surfaces as a toast) instead of the pre-auth /?login=oauth_cancelled banner a
signed-in user never sees; a plain sign-in cancel is unchanged
- the login banner (suspended / oauth_cancelled) is now state, cleared on the
first deliberate action like the verify banner — no more stale lingering
- add a "Didn't get the verification email?" resend entry on the sign-in screen
so a never-arrived verification mail isn't a dead end (was only reachable from
the expired-link banner)
- unit-test _oauth_redirect_uri (dev-host derive, unknown-host fallback, prod
ignores the Host header — the injection guard)
- collapse the 5-deep title/button ternaries into Record<Mode,string> maps
A Google login started on the Vite dev server (:5173) always came back to the
fixed :8080 callback, because login/link/upgrade passed the static
settings.oauth_redirect_url. Derive the redirect_uri from the request origin
instead, but only in local dev and only for a known dev-host allowlist —
production still uses the fixed configured URL and never trusts the Host header
(host-injection guard). Set the Vite proxy to changeOrigin:false so it forwards
the real Host:localhost:5173 (it was rewriting it to the 127.0.0.1:8080 target).
Both callbacks must be registered in the Google console.
- password reset also sets email_verified (the mail proves the mailbox),
rescuing an account that never clicked the verify link; is_active (admin
approval) is deliberately left untouched
- add POST /auth/verify/resend (rate-limited, off-response-path, anti-enum)
+ a "resend" mode/CTA on the verifyInvalid banner, so an expired/lost
verification link is no longer a dead end (re-register was a silent no-op)
- OAuth cancel/deny now redirects to /?login=oauth_cancelled with a friendly
banner instead of a raw 400 JSON page; pop the oauth_link markers BEFORE the
token exchange so an aborted link flow can't poison the next clean sign-in
C-3.5: /auth/request-access had no rate limiter (unlike register/login/reset/demo)
and answered "approved" for an allow-listed email — a public enumeration oracle for
the allow-list, and an unthrottled invite/admin-mail firehose. It now rate-limits per
client IP and returns a uniform "pending" for every outcome (allowed, pending, new,
throttled); an already-allowed user can still just sign in with Google.
C-3.11: _consume_token was a read-check-write, so two concurrent requests could both
consume the same verify/reset token. It's now a single conditional UPDATE
(...WHERE used_at IS NULL AND expires_at >= now RETURNING user_id) — only the request
that flips used_at gets a user back.
Only English and Hungarian remain. Drops the de locale files, the LANGUAGES
entry, the Google-locale mapping in auth, and the German welcome-message
template. A legacy "de" preference falls back to English gracefully. Content-
language detection and subtitle languages are untouched (media, not UI).
purge_user's revoke used `decrypt(refresh) or tok.access_token`, but access_token is
stored ENCRYPTED — so a token row without a refresh token would send ciphertext to
Google's revoke endpoint and silently fail. Decrypt it. (Pre-existing; surfaced by the
review of the OAuth-scope fix.)
Correcting the earlier scope-union-only fix. The real damage from a logout→login isn't
just the stored `scope` field — verified via a live token refresh that the stored refresh
token itself had been REPLACED with a base-only one: a plain sign-in requests only
BASE_SCOPES and Google handed back a fresh base-only access+refresh token, which
_store_token adopted verbatim, destroying the read/write grant (the old refresh token
stays valid on Google's side, so overwriting it is what loses access).
_store_token now detects when an exchange would NARROW our YouTube scopes and, in that
case, keeps the WHOLE existing grant (refresh token, access token, scopes) untouched.
Broader-or-equal exchanges (first grant, read→write upgrade) adopt + union as before.
Unit-verified across base-relogin / upgrade / new-user / base-user cases.
Two user-reported signin bugs:
1) A plain re-login (or logout→login) wiped the user's YouTube grant: login requests
only BASE_SCOPES and Google's returned `scope` can list just those, but _store_token
wrote it verbatim — dropping a previously-granted youtube.readonly/youtube scope, so
can_read flipped to false and the feed demanded a reconnect. The underlying grant
(refresh token) survives such a login, so UNION the scopes instead of narrowing; they
only shrink on full disconnect (purge deletes the token row).
2) Admin 'new access request' email: (a) it named the wrong menu ('Settings → Account'
instead of Users → Access requests); (b) the requester address was invisible so the
'reply reaches them' note looked wrong (Reply-To is in fact set to the requester) —
now spelled out + a deep-link straight to the approve view (?admin=access-requests,
handled in App); (c) it emailed only the static env ADMIN_EMAILS — now notifies the
ACTUAL admins (active role=admin users) unioned with env, so a UI-promoted admin (who
CAN approve — the approve UI is role-gated) is notified too.
Loose ends to finish the auth security round:
- register + password-reset-request had an enumeration TIMING oracle: an already-
registered email skipped the create path (hash + row writes + email scheduling) and
responded measurably faster than a new one. Move the whole lookup+create (register)
and lookup+token+email (reset) into a background task with its own DB session, so the
endpoint returns in the same time for any valid email regardless of whether it exists.
Verified: existing vs new now ~equal (was 34ms vs 82ms on register); accounts/tokens
still created off-path.
- messages_ws re-implemented resolved_user_id's per-tab wallet-gated account resolution.
Generalize resolved_user_id to take any HTTPConnection (Request OR WebSocket) and call
it from the WS — one shared, wallet-gated resolution. Behavior-identical (unit-checked).
Post-review hardening (both fail-safe, not bugs):
- _client_ip normalizes IPs via ipaddress and unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6, so a plain
TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS=10.10.0.1 also matches a peer surfaced as ::ffff:10.10.0.1 (a
Docker/IPv6 self-host footgun that would otherwise silently collapse everyone into
one rate-limit bucket).
- entrypoint.sh + _client_ip docstring: explicit warning never to add uvicorn
--proxy-headers, which would rewrite request.client from the forgeable XFF and defeat
the trust check.
_client_ip trusted the first X-Forwarded-For hop unconditionally, so anyone able to
reach the app port could forge XFF and dodge the login/register/reset/demo rate limits.
Now trust XFF ONLY when the request's socket peer is a configured reverse proxy
(settings.trusted_proxy_ips, e.g. the VPS Caddy's WireGuard peer IP), and take the
RIGHTMOST entry — the client our proxy actually saw and appended, immune to a client
pre-seeding a fake XFF. A request from any other peer (hitting the port directly) is
keyed on its real socket IP, so XFF can't be forged to bypass the limits.
New TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS env (empty default = no proxy, use the direct peer). Documented in
.env.example, docs/self-hosting.md, README. Unit-verified against spoof-through-proxy and
direct-bypass cases.
Adversarial re-review of the session-epoch work surfaced:
- WS auth (messages_ws) skipped the epoch check, so a revoked-but-unexpired cookie
could still open the live push channel after a reset/logout-others. Now mirrors
current_user: loads the user once, rejects a stale-epoch cookie before connecting.
- set_password + logout_others re-stamped the cookie BEFORE db.commit(); a failed
commit would strand the current session at a newer epoch than the DB and wrongly
401 it. Commit first, then re-stamp.
- Welcome verify effect could double-POST the single-use token (StrictMode/remount)
and flip the banner to a false 'invalid'. Fire-once useRef guard.
Left as-is (low value, documented): the Plex image proxy authenticates without a DB
load / epoch check (poster/art fetches only); adding one would cost a DB hit per image.
Signed client-side session cookies had no server-side kill switch: logout + password
reset couldn't evict a stolen/copied cookie (valid until expiry). Add User.session_epoch
(migration 0053), record it in the cookie at every login, and reject in current_user any
cookie whose recorded epoch is behind the account's current one.
- Bump the epoch on: password reset (kills ALL sessions — a reset is a compromise response),
password change + a new 'Log out other sessions' action (both re-stamp the CURRENT cookie
so the caller stays signed in, evicting only the others).
- Per-account epoch map in the session so one account's revocation doesn't evict the other
signed-in accounts in the same browser wallet.
- Missing epoch (pre-SA4 cookie) is treated as 0, so the first bump revokes grandfathered
sessions too.
- New POST /auth/logout-others + a Settings → Account 'Active sessions' button (trilingual).
Secret email tokens now ride the URL fragment (#reset=/#verify=), never the query
(?reset=/?token=): a fragment isn't sent to the server, so the token can't leak into
proxy/access logs or a Referer header.
- Reset: link → /#reset=; the SPA reads the token from location.hash and POSTs it
(unchanged /password-reset/confirm).
- Verify: link → /#verify=; new POST /auth/verify (token in body). The legacy GET
/auth/verify?token= is kept so pre-deploy emails in flight still work until they
expire. The SPA reads the fragment token, POSTs it, shows ok/invalid.
- Welcome: read secret tokens from the fragment, status flags from the query; strip
both after capture so nothing lingers in history.
From the auth /security-review (contained fixes; architectural SA3 proxy-trust +
SA4 session-revocation deferred to the user):
- SB1: encrypt the OAuth access_token at rest (was plaintext while refresh_token
was encrypted) — a ~1h Google bearer credential. New security.decrypt_optional()
falls back to a refresh for legacy plaintext tokens; column is unbounded String.
E2E-verified: token refreshed → stored as Fernet ciphertext → 319-subscription
YouTube sync succeeded.
- SA5: password_login is no longer a timing/enumeration oracle — it always runs
argon2 (against a decoy hash for unknown/passwordless emails), so response time
can't reveal whether an account exists.
- SB2: Google login only ADOPTS+activates a pre-existing password account when
Google actually attests email_verified (defense-in-depth against takeover); and
the email sync won't overwrite with a value another account owns (avoids a 500).
- demo_login clears the wallet first (demo can't switch to / act as a real account
via the multi-account header); switch_account rejects a suspended target (which
would otherwise clear the whole session on the next request).
Re-review clean; ruff clean; localdev boots; YouTube auth path E2E-verified.
The logged-out landing probed /api/me, which 401'd, and the browser logs every
non-2xx fetch as a console error regardless of how the app handles it. The
bootstrap probe now returns 200 with {authenticated:false} via a new
optional_current_user dependency; api.me() maps that to null. The render gate
treats no-data as 'signed out' -> the landing, and a thrown error as a real
network/5xx failure. Other protected endpoints still 401, so mid-session expiry
is still caught by the global handler. Lighthouse (dev): Best Practices 96->100.
A plain <a> file download can't send the X-Siftlode-Account header, so current_user resolved
it to the session-default account — 404 'Unknown download' when the tab acts as a non-default
wallet account that owns the file. resolved_user_id now also honours a ?account= query param
(the same wallet-gated selection the WebSocket already uses), and downloadFileUrl appends the
active account id. Verified: default account -> 404, ?account=<owner> -> 206 with the right
Content-Disposition.
Two tabs in one browser can now run two different signed-in accounts at once.
- The signed session cookie stays the browser's account WALLET (account_ids). Which account a
given tab acts as is a per-tab choice held in sessionStorage and sent per-request via the
X-Siftlode-Account header; current_user honours it only for an account already in the wallet,
without mutating the cookie's default account. Switching accounts sets the header + reloads
THIS tab only, instead of the old cookie-wide switch that changed every tab.
- WebSocket can't send headers, so the per-tab account rides in the ?account= query param
(validated against the wallet).
- Logout is per-tab aware: it signs the requesting tab's active account out of the wallet
(promoting a new default only if the removed one was the default), and the tab drops its
override. A stale per-tab header account 401s just that tab instead of clearing the session.
- Serve index.html with Cache-Control: no-cache so a deploy's new hashed bundle is picked up
immediately instead of the browser running a heuristically-cached stale index.html.
- Remove owner-specific / legacy deploy files (home/prod/server compose, deploy/).
The home compose stays as a local untracked file for the maintainer's own deploy.
- Genericise infra-specific code comments (egress-proxy examples) to neutral wording.
- Replace the hardcoded contact email on the legal pages with the instance operator's
configured admin email, served via the public /auth/config and shown with a neutral
fallback — so each self-hosted instance shows its own contact.
- Rewrite README for the current app + a copy-paste self-hosting quick start (prebuilt
image + first-run wizard) with a build-from-source alternative; tidy .env.example.
- app/utils.py: shared valid_email() + now_utc() (one email regex, was duplicated
in auth.py and admin.py with a looser "@"-in check elsewhere).
- security.hash_token(): one SHA-256 token hasher (was duplicated in auth.py + state.py).
- auth.admin_user dependency + count_admins() helper, replacing the inline role
checks and the last-admin count query repeated across admin.py/me.py/tags.py.
Replace the leftover 'subfeed' name across logger names + log_config,
frontend localStorage keys, Postgres user/db/volume defaults in the
compose files, .env.example, config.py, backup/restore scripts and the
README. Pure rename; no behavioural change. localStorage keys move from
subfeed.* to siftlode.* (one-time UI-state reset is acceptable).
- Build the Google OAuth client lazily from sysconfig (DB override, env fallback) and re-register
when the credentials change, so the install wizard / admin can set them without a restart.
- New 'google' config group (google_client_id/secret, encrypted) on the Configuration page; the
token-refresh reads the creds the same way.
- Public GET /auth/config exposes google_enabled; the login page hides 'Continue with Google'
when Google OAuth isn't configured (email+password still works).
- Link a Google account to a password account, and adopt the Google identity onto a matching
email account instead of 500ing on a duplicate; set or change a password from Settings.
- Expose has_google/has_password on /api/me for the Sign-in methods UI.
- Mark Google logins email-verified (backfill existing rows, migration 0024); stop a routine
login from clobbering an admin-assigned role (env ADMIN_EMAILS stays the bootstrap admin).
- Suspension login-gates (password + Google callback + current_user) with a rate-limited
'suspended' notice; shared purge_user (cascade delete + access-request cleanup + Google-grant
revoke) behind self- and admin-deletion; single app_base source for user-facing email links.
Add email+password auth alongside Google: argon2id hashing; users gains
password_hash/email_verified/is_active and google_sub becomes nullable (migration
0022); a single-use, hashed auth_tokens table for email verification + password
reset. Registration creates a pending (inactive, unverified) account + an access
request; sign-in needs verified email AND admin approval. Anti-enumeration: uniform
register/login/reset responses (a correct-password owner still gets a specific
pending reason). allow_registration flag (DB-tunable). Admin users-list + role
endpoint (guards: not self, not demo, not the last admin); approving access (or a
manual whitelist add) now activates the matching pending account. current_user
rejects deactivated accounts. Verified end-to-end via curl + DB.
The shared demo account no longer hits YouTube affordances: the onboarding
wizard never opens (or renders) for it, the empty-feed prompt nudges into
the shared library instead of the connect wizard, and the browser-facing
/auth/upgrade redirects the demo home instead of returning a raw 403 JSON.
Whitelisted emails enter the shared demo user via /auth/demo (lazily
created, no OAuth token/scope), rate-limited per IP and answering
uniformly so it can't be hammered as an enumeration oracle. Add a
require_human dependency that blocks the demo account from quota-spending
sync endpoints and the OAuth upgrade flow, and surface is_demo on /api/me.
Sessions created before multi-session existed had no account_ids, so adding a second
account left the first one (e.g. the long-lived session) absent from the switcher.
current_user now ensures the active user_id is always present in account_ids, so the
switch list is never missing the account you're using.
Track every account that completes OAuth in a browser session (session 'account_ids',
~14-day cookie), so the user can switch between them without another Google round-trip.
New GET /api/me/accounts (switchable accounts, active flagged) and POST /api/me/switch
(guarded: target must be in the session list — proof it signed in here — and re-checked
against is_allowed in case the invite was revoked). Logout now signs out the active
account and falls back to the most recent remaining one, else clears the session. UI: the
account popover lists the other signed-in accounts (click to switch, reloads) plus an
'Add another account' action (-> /auth/login, which uses prompt=select_account).
Trilingual. Third step of Epic N.
Set up react-i18next with locale files auto-loaded per area (Vite glob), a compact
LanguageSwitcher, and language as a server-persisted preference (preferences.language)
mirrored to localStorage. On first login the default UI language is guessed from the
Google-reported locale (hu/en/de, else English). vite-env.d.ts types the build-time env.
- requirements: cryptography >=46.0.7 (was pinned <46, which excluded the fix for
the CVEs pip-audit flagged in our Fernet/crypto library). pip-audit now clean.
- Dockerfile: upgrade pip before installing deps (patches installer-level CVEs).
- auth: /auth/upgrade now defaults to the least-privileged read scope; only an
explicit access=write requests the write scope.
Base login now requests only openid/email/profile (non-sensitive), so a new user
gets a clean Google consent with no "unverified app" warning and no 7-day refresh
token expiry. YouTube read (youtube.readonly) and write (youtube) are granted later
by the onboarding wizard via a parameterized /auth/upgrade?access=read|write.
Security fixes folded in from the baseline audit:
- config: refuse to boot in production (https OAUTH_REDIRECT_URL) with the
placeholder/short SECRET_KEY or a missing TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY, closing a
session-forgery / admin-impersonation hole.
- main: mark the session cookie Secure when served over HTTPS.
- me: expose can_read; sync/subscriptions returns a friendly 403 (not a 500)
until YouTube read access is granted.
Move the access whitelist from the ALLOWED_EMAILS env var into a DB Invite table
(env kept as bootstrap fallback), and add a self-service request + admin approval
flow with fail-soft email.
- models: Invite(email, status pending|approved|denied, requested_at, decided_*)
- migration 0008: invites table; seed env ALLOWED_EMAILS u ADMIN_EMAILS as approved
- auth: is_allowed() (DB-first, env fallback); a denied Google login records a pending
request and bounces to /?access=requested instead of a raw 403; public POST
/auth/request-access; upsert is idempotent so repeats don't re-spam admins
- routes/admin.py (admin-only): list/approve/deny invites + manual add
- email.py: smtplib + Gmail App Password, fail-soft (skips if SMTP unset)
- /api/me exposes pending_invites; config + .env.example gain SMTP_*
- UI: Login 'Request access' form + access=requested/denied handling; Settings ->
Access requests (approve/deny + add); admin nudge toast on pending requests
Verified locally: request-access creates a pending invite and emails the admin;
seed approved npeter83; guinea-pig yt.trash2023 denied until approved.
- uvicorn --log-config (log_config.json): timestamped formatters for uvicorn
access/error and the app's own "subfeed" loggers (ms precision)
- Log key activity: startup/shutdown, login/denied, token refresh, YouTube API
errors, subscription imports, sync pause/resume
- Background sync jobs no longer swallow errors silently — failures in RSS poll,
backfill, enrichment, autotag and resync are logged with tracebacks
- Shorts: confirm via youtube.com/shorts/<id> probe (SOCS cookie bypasses the
consent redirect) instead of a 60s heuristic; concurrent probing, shorts_probed
flag, scheduled refinement (migration 0005)
- Search: match title + channel name only (descriptions caused noisy results)
- Faceted tag filtering: AND across categories (language AND topic narrows),
OR within a category; any/all toggle applies to topics
- Language detection: majority vote over individual titles (fixes misdetections
like multipoleguy -> English; drops bogus Polish/Romanian)
- Login: drop forced consent so returning sign-in is quick (select_account)
- Feed cards: clickable channel name (opens channel), persistent saved badge,
undo toast on hide, Hidden view to restore; tag chips show counts in tooltip
- docker-compose with Postgres 16 + slim Python API image
- FastAPI app with session middleware, health endpoint, static login page
- Google OAuth (Authlib) with email invite-list whitelist; admin role support
- User + OAuthToken models; refresh tokens encrypted at rest (Fernet)
- Alembic migrations, run automatically on container startup
- Postgres backup/restore scripts for portability between machines
peter