The epic-end deep review found three defects in P1 and four tests that did not
hold what they claimed. They land together because they share the upload route
and its test module; splitting by hunk would have produced commits that do not
individually run green.
* The edge ceiling and the route's own cap are the SAME number at the default
configuration, so the edge always answers first: a declared Content-Length
over the cap is refused before a byte is read, and an undeclared body trips
the middleware on the same chunk the route would have tripped on. The route's
numbered 422 -- and the drain written for it last week -- are reachable only
once an admin LOWERS the knob, which is the one shape the browser UAT tested.
Measured: headroom does not fix this, because the declared-length check fires
first for any body big enough to matter and the drain pushes the count back
over the edge for the rest. So the edge's own refusal is made readable
instead: `errors.tooLarge` localizes `too_large` the way `upload_too_large`
was already localized, and the dialog refuses an over-cap file BEFORE sending
it, off the `upload_max_bytes` that GET /api/downloads/usage now reports.
Measured in Chrome against the API directly: that 413 arrives as `onload`
with a readable body in 43 ms.
* Reading the body behind the auth dependency put the whole transfer inside the
request's database session -- the auth SELECT autobegins a transaction, so one
of the twenty pooled connections sat `idle in transaction`, with nothing to
time it out, for as long as the client cared to keep sending. That is the
invariant db.py sizes the pool on and plex/playback.py records an incident
for. The read transaction now ends before the await. Measured on the dev
server: an 1818 ms upload shows no idle-in-transaction sample while the bytes
move, only afterwards, when the handler actually writes.
* The display name moved into a request header, where nothing bounds its length,
while the column stayed varchar(255) -- so a long enough name was a DataError
500 after the whole file had already transferred. One `display_text` helper
now serves all three writers (the metadata PATCH already truncated, the upload
ingest did not), and the dialog stops at the same number.
* The gate invariant asked `route.dependant.body_params`, which holds only the
route's OWN callable's parameters: a body declared in a SUB-DEPENDENCY -- the
upload route's own idiom -- leaves it empty while FastAPI still reads the body
before auth. It asks `route.body_field` now, which is what FastAPI itself
consults. The AST registry of body-reading call sites had also never followed
`capped_stream_to`, so the one route the whole invariant exists for was the
single site the drift guard could not see.
Four tests that passed over their own mutation are fixed: the cap boundary (a
`>` loosened to `>=` survived the entire suite), the percent-decoding (every
filename the suite sends is ASCII, where quote() is the identity function), the
display-name header (no test at all), and the staging cleanup (deleting the
unlink left the suite green while every refused upload leaked its partial bytes
onto the volume). Every test added or changed here was mutation-checked.
A downloaded video was silently demoted to a download-only "file" (no
in-app play/edit) whenever yt-dlp's info dict omitted vcodec/acodec — which
it does for Facebook and other sources. Finalize derived media_kind from
those nulls (`derive(None, None)` -> file), so a genuine H.264/AAC MP4
became non-playable in the library.
Fix: probe the finished file on disk (the ground truth) at finalize and
derive from that, falling back to the info dict only for a field the probe
couldn't read. This is the same ffprobe the upload ingest already used, now
extracted to a shared downloads/probe.py so the download worker and the
upload path share one classifier (and can't drift). Also backfills the
stored vcodec/acodec/width/height from the real file.
Tests: TestResolveMediaFacts pins probe-wins-over-info (incl. the Facebook
no-codec case and yt-dlp's literal "none"); upload's probe tests repoint to
the shared module.
Deep-review remediation for the E7 upload path, all findings adversarially verified:
- Serve every library file with a Content-Type chosen from the ffprobe-verified media_kind
+ a strict container allow-list (storage.served_media_type), never guessed from the
user-controlled file extension. Closes a stored-XSS vector where a media/HTML polyglot
uploaded as "evil.html" was served inline as text/html on the login-free /watch surface.
Applied to both the authenticated /file and the public watch_file endpoints.
- Classify uploaded still images (jpg/png/gif/webp/…) as media_kind='file' so they are
force-downloaded and don't get a broken in-app video player.
- Roll back the on-disk side of an upload when the ingest transaction fails after place_file
(unlink the placed file + its deterministic poster path), so a failed commit can't orphan
bytes in the GC-skipped .uploads tree.
- Floor download_upload_max_bytes at min=1 so a stored 0 can't silently disable the per-file cap.
- Dedupe the ffprobe-JSON invocation into edit.run_ffprobe_json (shared by probe_codecs and
upload._probe) and the upload extension into storage._clean_upload_ext; drop the now-unused
parse_probe_streams.
Tests: public + authenticated force-download and the polyglot-not-served-as-HTML guard, the
real _probe classifier (image/cover-art/dims/duration), the ingest rollback/cleanup path, the
max_jobs branch, the cap-floor invariant, and run_ffprobe_json error handling.
Add the non-yt-dlp ingest path so a user-uploaded file joins the same download
library and inherits its function set. Any file type is accepted: media
(video/audio) gets the full set (metadata, share, play/edit), a generic file
(pdf/zip/docx/…) is download-only.
- MediaAsset.media_kind ("video"|"audio"|"file") — the stored discriminator that
gates library actions. Set at every finalize (download probe, editor carries the
source's kind, upload probe); consolidates the ad-hoc audio-detect that lived only
in links.py into one invariant (downloads.mediakind.derive). Migration 0076 adds
the column + backfills existing rows.
- downloads/upload.py: ingest_upload probes the file (ffprobe → codecs/dims/duration),
places it in a per-user .uploads tree, and creates an already-ready asset + done job
(the same cache-hit shortcut enqueue uses). Uploads never expire (irreplaceable).
- POST /api/downloads/upload: streaming multipart with the per-file cap
(download_upload_max_bytes, default 500 MiB) enforced on actual bytes read; quota
charges the known size up front (quota.check_upload).
- Security: a generic file is always served force-download (attachment +
application/octet-stream) on both the in-app and public endpoints, so uploaded
HTML/SVG can't execute inline. Edit + redownload reject non-media / upload sources.
- python-multipart added (first multipart endpoint in the app).
peter