The demo account — one shared user that whitelisted emails entered from
the login page, reset on a schedule — goes end to end (owner decision,
E34): demo.py and the reset job, users.is_demo and demo_whitelist
(migration 0098 deletes the demo user, its audit rows, the reset job's
override and notices, then drops the column and table; the downgrade
restores the empty schema), the /auth/demo entry, the admin whitelist and
reset, the Demo tab, the banner, the login page's "Try the demo", and
every is_demo branch in routes, userscope, scheduler and the UI.
require_human only ever refused the demo account, so its 87 uses become
current_user (owner-approved); require_write_scope keeps its own check.
The login page's "or" divider now shows only beside the Google button:
without the demo entry under it, an instance without Google would have
said "or" to nothing.
A contract test (removedFeatures) fails on the word anywhere in the
backend, frontend, e2e or scripts — seen red on a planted hit. Size
ceilings tightened for the modules that shrank; admin.py is back under
the limit.
E2EE direct messages, the chat dock, the Messages module, the message
WebSocket and its realtime registry, and the messages / message_keys
tables (migration 0097; the downgrade restores the empty schema). Prod
held two welcome notes, no message between people and one key — never
used (owner decision, E34). WebSocket now has no owner module: the lint
bans it everywhere. Privacy policy updated: it no longer promises E2EE
for a feature that is gone.
The send no longer holds the session's row lock while it talks to the tracker:
it claims the session, gives the lock back, and checkpoints each step. A Stop
is never held behind a send, while a draft, a screenshot or a second send are
refused at once instead of queueing. The claim ages out, so a request that
died mid-send does not strand the session.
What the composer says is what happened: an attachment that went is no longer
named as one that did not (the missing body edit is its own line), and the
issue's screenshot count comes from the server when the list cannot be read,
so a failed read no longer blocks saving the draft. The zip is fetched as a
request, so its pace is a message and not a saved error page. Screenshots of a
finished report can be removed again; only one still being sent is held.
A recording's log elevation can no longer outlive it. The step prompt keeps
the keyboard (the page's keys stay quiet) and traps Tab itself. An image
pasted into a dialog opened over the composer stays that dialog's.
Round 2 of the deep review, on round 1's own fixes:
- `ORDER BY position … FOR UPDATE` sorts before it locks, so the reorder that waited got the
fresh rows in its STALE order and dealt the pins it left out (a tab with Plex off) back to their
old slots. It locks in id order — one global order, so two reorders cannot deadlock — and sorts
the fresh rows itself. The race test now sends that partial list and fails unless tab B really
blocked.
- The request check saw only writes the handler flushed: a `db.delete` left staged, or a flush
followed by a released savepoint, passed. Staged changes count at the end of the request, and
only the ROOT transaction's end clears it (a savepoint test drives the dependency directly).
- The `ok` test exempted every call as a serializer, hiding four domain REPORTS (YouTube sync,
revert, push; Plex sync) without `ok`. They are spread into `{"ok": True, …}`; the exemption is a
named list of real serializers.
Deep review of the debt burn:
- `refusal_reason` told the user to reconnect on ANY token-endpoint failure — a 5xx, a 429, a
misconfigured client — while the grant stayed and the account still read as connected, with no
connect button. Only `invalid_grant` (the one that drops the grant) means reconnect now.
- `pins.reorder` writes only the rows that change, so two overlapping reorders each skipped rows
that matched in their own stale snapshot and interleaved into two pins on one slot. It locks the
user's pins first; the second waits and deals from the first's result.
- Adding a whitelist entry committed the invite and the activation it implies separately, and its
audit row was written before a new invite had an id (target NULL). One transaction, flushed for
the id.
- The mutation convention test skipped async routes and dicts returned by name: request-access,
purge-discovery and the subscription sync answered without `ok`. They do now, and the test
covers both. The helper-commit check looked only at `_`-names; it reads every non-route
function, which listed two deliberate committers (upsert_pending_invite, ensure_welcome) — now
allowlisted with their reasons.
Two rows of the canonical-patterns table had drifted, found while closing the roadmap audit:
- 63 mutation responses carried no `ok` — `{"unsubscribed": true}`, `{"status": "ok"}`,
`{"added": 3, …}` and so on. Each now leads with `"ok": true` (additive: every field a client
reads is still there).
- Twelve route helpers committed on their own. Six were just the end of their handler's work and now
flush: the playlist item add/remove and Watch later get-or-create, the Plex series/season bulk
mark, and the invite decision + account activation — which an approval used to land in separate
transactions. The other six commit on purpose (a token durable before its link is mailed, a
single-use token burned as its own unit, the Google callback's tail, a background registration
with its own session, the staged search ingest around YouTube calls), each listed with its reason.
`tests/test_route_conventions.py` holds both rules in code; CLAUDE.md's two rows point at it.
peter