f7faa19ee26b7b5ba6c785d50787fc118ae7d155
6
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 peter
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5bfcf5d83a |
refactor(e10): move the platform components into components/ui/ and enforce the boundary
The app HAS a platform layer -- AnchoredPopover (22 importers, with arrows/typeahead/Escape/anchor-flip), QueryState (21), Modal (17), PageShell, DataTable, Tabs, Tooltip and ~26 more -- but it sat flat among ~160 feature components with nothing marking it as one. Several of those files describe themselves as 'the one place' or 'canonical' and were still bypassed by hand-rolled markup, because a layer nobody can see is a layer nobody uses; three separate inventory passes of this codebase misread it the same way. Moves the 33 domain-free modules into components/ui/, rewrites the imports in 89 files, and makes the boundary a lint rule rather than a convention: inside ui/ a one-level-up import (a feature component) and any lib/api slice are errors. The rule was verified to fire on both and to leave generic lib/ helpers alone. README.md states which side of the line a component belongs on and why. No behaviour change: 3x tsc, eslint, knip, prettier and 687 vitest tests all green; no backend file touched. |
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peter
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10c0ca4cf7 |
feat(email): write to people in their own language (E9.5 S7)
Twelve mails carried hardcoded English while the app itself has enforced HU/EN parity since E5.
A mail is the one user-facing surface nobody can re-render by switching the UI language: it arrives
once, in whatever language we picked, and stays that way. That made the epic's own headline mail —
"one mail, one click" — English for a Hungarian reader.
The text moved to a catalog (`mailtext.py`) with a `text(key, lang, **vars)` renderer, and the parity
rule is now a test rather than a habit: every key must carry both languages AND the same
`{placeholders}`. A translation that drops `{link}` sends a mail with no link in it; one that invents
a placeholder raises inside a background task nobody is watching. Both are silent in production.
Every `send_*` takes the language as its second argument, resolved by the REQUEST handler and never
inside the mail — these all run as background tasks, after the request's session is gone, which is
the same reason the approval mail computes its link in the handler.
Where the language comes from, in order: the account's own preference; failing that, the language the
person asked us in; failing that, English. The middle one is new — `invites.lang`, migration `0082` —
because the mails an access request produces go to an address that usually has no account yet, and
the signal does exist: the page their form was submitted from, or the locale Google reported for a
sign-in we refused. Captured rather than derived, for the third time in this epic (`google_email` in
S3, `preferences.language` in S6 taught the same lesson): a signal that exists only in one moment
cannot be backfilled later. So the admin is asked in exactly one place — the invitation to an address
they typed in themselves, where nobody has ever told us anything.
That send is now a dialog rather than a bare click, which is also where the "you already wrote to
them" warning belongs — it used to live only in a tooltip the admin may never hover, guarding the one
action whose failure mode is mailing a real person twice.
S6's registration `lang` field turned out to be dead on arrival: the backend accepted it, the
frontend never sent it, so every account has been storing nothing. The request builders now stamp the
UI language themselves — a signal that has to be passed in by every caller is one every caller can
forget, which is exactly how it shipped unset.
Admins are notified one mail per language group instead of one blast to everyone. They are people
with their own UI language; a single message would have to pick one of them and be wrong for the rest.
Also removes a duplicated `invited_at` column declaration on `Invite` (two identical definitions
landed in S6).
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peter
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a76bab9b34 |
feat(auth): one mail, one click — the approval mail carries the confirmation link (E9.5 S6)
The funnel's common ordering made a person open TWO messages: one saying their access was approved, another asking them to confirm their address. The approval mail now branches on what they actually still have to do — carry the confirmation link, point at sign-in, or say a confirmation mail follows once they register — so the usual case is one mail and one click. A mail that guesses wrong is worse than a plain one: telling someone to sign in while their address is unconfirmed contradicts the screen that will refuse them. That embedded link lives 7 days rather than the usual 24 hours. Nobody sits waiting for an approval — it can easily be read on Monday after a weekend, and an expired link spends the one-mail promise and puts them back on two. The risk is small: the token only ever confirms an address; it signs nobody in and sets no password. The most likely root cause of the 2026-09-03 report that a confirmation mail "never arrived" is here too, and it was never a delivery failure: re-registering an address that already had an unconfirmed account returned in SILENCE — same cheerful "check your inbox", no mail sent at all. It now re-sends the link. Nothing new leaks: the response and its timing are unchanged, and the public verify/resend already does exactly this for the same input. Whitelisting stays silent, and that is a decision, not an omission. The operator opens a door as a possibility — usually already agreed with the person — and a row can sit approved for weeks with nobody registering; a mail fired automatically there would be nudging someone who never asked. Telling them is its own act on its own button, `invited_at` records it so a second click is a decision rather than an accident, and the button only appears where nobody is behind the address yet: "the door is open, come in" is meaningless to someone already inside. Two things UAT caught that no test would have. Every fresh registration appeared in BOTH admin lists at once, because the stuck-sign-ups filter keyed on "unconfirmed" — the rule is now "the address may sign in, and this account still can't", which leaves an undecided request with the queue that owns it. And the invitation button was offered on every approved row, half of which are existing users. Also: the confirmation mail finally says what its link's rules are (once, 24 hours) — the reset mail always has, while this one left the reader to discover both by meeting a dead link. The card's "didn't get the email?" moves up under the form, and the three waiting messages name the spam folder, which is where a first message to a fresh recipient sometimes lands. Registration now records the language the sign-up page was in. Nothing reads it yet — the bilingual templates are S7 — but it is the only moment that choice exists anywhere the server can see, and a preference nobody recorded cannot be backfilled later. UAT on localdev: re-registering re-sent the link (one token became two, one account); approval issued a 7-day token and moved the account into the stuck list with only a re-send; whitelisting mailed nobody; the invitation recorded itself and the row then warned that sending again would write twice. Test data removed. |
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peter
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7acdf5d577 |
feat(admin): surface the sign-ups that are stuck outside, and let an admin finish letting them in (E9.5 S5)
Approve an address BEFORE the person registers and their sign-up produces no queue row at all — `_decide` only takes a still-pending invite — so the Access-requests screen sat empty, the tab badge read zero, and the only working move was re-typing the address into the whitelist box. Nobody would guess that, and on 2026-09-03 nobody did. This is roadmap UX-25, where two earlier attempts were reverted after review. Both moved AUTHORITY: auto-activating on registration turns a standing whitelist entry into a bearer grant for whoever registers the address first, and reopening the approved invite to `pending` lets an anonymous sign-up REVOKE a standing approval. What was actually missing was visibility, so this changes nothing about what an unauthenticated caller can cause — the admin could already do exactly this by re-entering the address; they just had no way to know they had to. The section lists every account that cannot sign in yet and says WHICH gate is shut, because the two dead ends look the same from the admin's chair: waiting for activation, or waiting on a confirmation mail. Naming the unconfirmed ones is not decoration — on a no-SMTP instance that is the difference between the owner and whoever registered the address first (SEC-15), and an admin about to let someone in should see it. A person the queue above already covers is deliberately NOT listed here; two buttons for one person is worse than one. Activate is gated on `is_allowed` — the same function the sign-in paths consult, in core, so the button that appears and the badge that counts cannot disagree. Without that gate it would manufacture an inconsistent account: password sign-in only checks `is_active` and would let them in, while their Google sign-in would be turned away and silently reopened as a fresh access request. Letting in someone with no approved invite stays the whitelist box's job, which says so out loud. The badge counts activations SEPARATELY from pending invites rather than widening an existing field's meaning, and only counts what genuinely waits on the admin: an unconfirmed account waits on its owner, so it is listed with a re-send but does not nag. The admin-side resend says plainly what happened, including refusing when the instance has no working SMTP — mail is fail-soft everywhere else, and that silence is exactly what left the 0.78.5 sign-ups with nothing to fall back on. `send_verification_link` is now one function with three callers (registration, the public resend, this one), so the link's shape and TTL cannot drift by who triggered it. UAT on localdev, both languages: the UX-25 shape reproduced end to end (approve the address, then register), the badge counting it, Activate letting them in and dropping the badge, the row losing its Activate but keeping the re-send, a fresh token issued by the re-send, and both actions in the audit log. Test data removed. |
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peter
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2cba6b9fca |
docs: round-3 copy corrections, and pin the two behaviours nothing was guarding
Round 3's correctness/security pass came back clean; what was left said more than the code does. - emailOff promised the access-request list is where sign-ups show up. A sign-up on an address that is already approved or already pending adds nothing to it (roadmap UX-25), and "only" was falsified by this release's own inbox notice. - deleteConfirm claimed the admin was dropping "an approval you already gave" — it is the confirmation for pending and denied rows too. - sendFailed blamed the mail server for rejecting a message; the reason covers connect, DNS, TLS and login failures alike, so it now describes the symptom and leaves the diagnosis to the log. - ADMIN_EMAILS re-promotion happens in the Google callback only, not on any sign-in. Tests: the decided-list copy of the delete affordance was never rendered (both new cases fail if that branch is dropped), and the throttle release — a deliberate behaviour the notes advertise — was asserted by nothing; a drop with no admin yet, or with a failing write, must not silence the following hour. |
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peter
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8d7aaad9a8 |
fix: warn before the delete, not after — plus round-2 copy and a11y corrections
Round 2 on the feature diff (15 → 12): - still_allowed_by_env now rides the invite LIST as well as the delete response, so the confirmation warns while the admin can still change their mind. It mattered most for a DENIED row on an env-allow-listed address: deleting it silently converted a refusal into a grant, and the only warning arrived after the irreversible click. - Both inbox bodies claimed to name "the most recent" dropped message. The throttle records the FIRST of each hour and never updates it, so they now say "one of them", and the not-configured body finally names where to fix it. - settings.invites.emailOff told the admin they "get no notice when someone signs up" — rendered directly above the queue that shows exactly that. Only the email is lost, and it now says so. - The disabled delete buttons put their reason out of reach: `disabled` drops a control from the tab order and suppresses its title. Switched to aria-disabled + preventDefault, the pattern Playlists.tsx already established for the same reason. - deleteInvite is quiet, so the 409 the UI handles with a translated toast no longer also raises the server's English detail as a modal. - After a completed password reset, Back landed on the reset form again with a consumed token — the history change made that state reachable. The token is cleared on success so the reset view stops being the card's root. - The hu deleteHasAccount named a tab that renders under a different label. Tests: a dom test for the Access-requests panel covering both has_account variants and all three delete outcomes, /api/me flag cases, an ADMIN_EMAILS case, and the env-allowlist test now patches the raw setting so the parsing stays under test. |