peter
733b41fd86
- C-3.7: fold a per-link password_version into the signed watch grant (migration
0059 adds the column) and bump it on every password change, so rotating a share
link's password invalidates outstanding grants at once instead of letting them
live out the 6h TTL. make_grant/check_grant take the version; update_link bumps.
- C-3.8: the share recipient picker and share-by-email now reuse the messageable
filter (not-demo AND active AND not-suspended) instead of only excluding demo,
so suspended/deactivated addresses aren't leaked or reachable as targets.
- C-3.9: GET /keys/{user_id} adopts get_thread's MB2 guard — a non-messageable
target with no shared history returns the same "User not found" as a missing id,
so it can't be probed to enumerate users or fetch suspended users' keys.
- C-3.12: _register_account catches IntegrityError on the insert (the select-then-
insert TOCTOU) and treats it as the already-registered no-op.
- C-3.13: trigger_job claims the running flag atomically under _activity_lock
(compare-and-set) instead of a bare check, closing the double-start window.
- Move _messageable/is_messageable_user into a shared app/userscope.py so downloads
doesn't import the messages route module.
61 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
61 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
"""Signed-grant HMAC for password-protected share links: a grant proves the viewer unlocked a
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token, rides in the file URL (a <video src> can't send a header), and expires."""
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from types import SimpleNamespace
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from app.downloads.links import _GRANT_TTL, check_grant, is_expired, make_grant, new_token
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def test_new_token_is_unguessable_and_unique():
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a, b = new_token(), new_token()
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assert a != b
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assert len(a) >= 30 # token_urlsafe(24) → ~32 chars
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class TestGrant:
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def test_a_fresh_grant_verifies_for_its_own_token(self):
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grant = make_grant("tok", 0)
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assert check_grant("tok", grant, 0) is True
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def test_a_grant_does_not_verify_for_a_different_token(self):
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# The signature binds the token, so a grant minted for one link can't unlock another.
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assert check_grant("other", make_grant("tok", 0), 0) is False
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def test_a_tampered_signature_is_rejected(self):
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exp, _sig = make_grant("tok", 0).split(".", 1)
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assert check_grant("tok", f"{exp}.deadbeef", 0) is False
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def test_a_tampered_expiry_is_rejected(self):
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# Extending the exp field invalidates the signature (which covers token.exp.version).
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_exp, sig = make_grant("tok", 0).split(".", 1)
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future = int(datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp()) + 10 * _GRANT_TTL
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assert check_grant("tok", f"{future}.{sig}", 0) is False
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def test_an_expired_grant_is_rejected(self):
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past = datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp() - 2 * _GRANT_TTL
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assert check_grant("tok", make_grant("tok", 0, now=past), 0) is False
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def test_a_password_rotation_invalidates_an_old_grant(self):
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# A grant minted at version 0 must fail once the link's password_version has been bumped —
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# this is what makes changing a link password revoke outstanding grants immediately.
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grant = make_grant("tok", 0)
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assert check_grant("tok", grant, 0) is True
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assert check_grant("tok", grant, 1) is False
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def test_malformed_grants_are_rejected_not_crashed(self):
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for bad in [None, "", "no-dot", "notanumber.sig"]:
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assert check_grant("tok", bad, 0) is False
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class TestIsExpired:
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def test_none_expiry_never_expires(self):
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assert is_expired(SimpleNamespace(expires_at=None)) is False
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def test_a_future_expiry_is_live(self):
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future = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)
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assert is_expired(SimpleNamespace(expires_at=future)) is False
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def test_a_past_expiry_is_expired(self):
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past = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=1)
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assert is_expired(SimpleNamespace(expires_at=past)) is True
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