Files
siftlode/backend/app
peter aa51644f5f fix(security): round 2 — the SEC-20 fix had four defects of its own
A second review round over the first round's fixes, which is where the remaining
real bugs usually are. All four are the same failure as the round it reviewed: a
claim stated in a comment that the code does not hold.

The middleware moved inside CORS, but the setup gate is registered LATER and is
therefore OUTSIDE it — so the comment's "the setup gate never runs for a body that
is already too large" was false the moment it was written. On an unconfigured
instance that gate opens a DB session per request, which is exactly the anonymous
pre-auth work SEC-20 exists to remove. The cap now sits between them, and the
order is asserted against `app.user_middleware` rather than described: prose about
a stack that `add_middleware` builds inside-out is how this got backwards.

The edge ceiling and the route's own cap were pinned EQUAL, but they measure
different things — the edge counts raw body bytes, the route counts the decoded
file. A file of exactly the advertised maximum was refused one layer before the
route that would have taken it. The edge now allows for the multipart envelope,
and the test asserts the relation and the gap instead of equality.

`sysconfig`'s new `max` was enforced on write only. That bound did not exist
before this epic, so a value that was legal when it was written can be sitting in
the database — served unclamped it produces exactly the drift the comment says is
impossible, with the admin page showing a number outside its own range. Int
overrides are clamped on read now, which also survives an env default being
lowered later.

And `DOWNLOAD_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=0` meant "no per-file cap" to the route but a hard
zero to the edge: every upload refused, including the admin page's own way back,
recoverable only by editing env and restarting. The setting takes `ge=1`.

Two test gaps from the same round: the header assertion that is the ONLY check of
the middleware's position was DB-gated and skipped on a host without Postgres, and
the headroom "ratio" the docblock calls load-bearing was held as `<=`, i.e. no
ratio at all. Both fixed, plus a sweep that every `capped_body` call site in the
routers is known and fits under its ceiling — the point of that list is the third
entry, not the two that exist today.
2026-09-21 23:59:45 +02:00
..
2026-06-14 04:40:22 +02:00

Backend conventions

The rules below are already followed across backend/app — they lived only in a few module docstrings (demo.py, userscope.py, routes/_common.py) until this file collected them (E3 S3, B-core-20). When you add code, match these so the next reader doesn't have to guess "which pattern do I copy".

Module layering

Three layers, by who runs the code — not by feature:

  1. routes/… — request-only. A route module holds HTTP concerns: auth dependencies, request/ response models, status-code mapping, serialization. It owns logic that runs only on a request. Business logic that a request happens to trigger does not live here if anything else runs it too.

  2. plex/, downloads/, sync/, issues/ — domain logic shared by more than one caller. Anything the scheduler or the worker runs (not just a request) lives in one of these domain packages, so the route, the worker, and the scheduler share one definition. Examples from this codebase: downloads/service.py owns enqueue + the job state transitions (routes call it); plex/sync.py is run by both the admin route and the scheduler; downloads/pipeline.py is the worker's child pipeline; issues/bundle.py is the one definition of a bug report's files, for the zip export and the tracker.

  3. Flat app/*.py core modules — cross-cutting primitives. auth, sysconfig, quota, audit, notifications, userscope, realtime, ratelimit, progress, logs (the one logging configuration), logsink (its log_events table), diagnostics (a user's consented log level) and debugsession (a recording that tags its user's lines, E16), … are single-file primitives many layers import. They depend on nothing above them (a core module must never import a routes/… module).

Extraction trigger: the SECOND consumer. Keep new logic inline in its first caller. The moment a second caller needs it (a worker as well as a route; a scheduler as well as a route), extract it down a layer — into the relevant domain package, or a flat core module if it's cross-cutting. Don't pre-abstract for a single caller; don't leave shared logic duplicated once there are two.

Transaction ownership

This follows CLAUDE.md's canonical rule verbatim — "the handler/job-wrapper commits; helpers flush (only quota owns its session)" — so read it that way, not as an exception to it. The commit belongs to the operation owner; anything called inside another transaction only stages its change (db.add / flush) and lets the owner commit, so the whole operation is one transaction. audit.record() is the reference: it adds the audit row and the caller commits it together with the mutation it records, so an audit entry can never exist without its change (or vice-versa).

  • The operation owner is usually the route handler. A service.* operation the handler delegates a whole transition to (e.g. service.cancel) is that owner and commits its one transition — it isn't a mid-operation helper. A helper that owns its OWN short-lived session (the worker's jobdb writes, the same carve-out CLAUDE.md grants quota) commits that session. Everything else flushes.
  • SessionLocal is expire_on_commit=False: after a raw UPDATE + commit, an ORM object you already loaded is stale. Read the fresh value from the row (RETURNING, or a re-SELECT), not the ORM attribute — see service.decr_ref_count.

Shared counters and status: do it atomically at the DB

  • Never read-modify-write a shared counter in Python (x.count = x.count + 1). Concurrent sessions lose an update. Use a DB-atomic statement — col = col + 1, or greatest(col - 1, 0) with RETURNING so the caller branches on the post-value under the row lock (service.incr_ref_count / decr_ref_count).
  • Download job status is a JobStatus StrEnum (downloads/status.py), not bare strings. The HOLDING set defines which states hold a MediaAsset (so release accounting stays correct); STOPPED_BY_ROUTE is the route-initiated stop set. A worker child's terminal write goes through service.finalize_if_running (an atomic UPDATE … WHERE status='running') so a finishing child can't resurrect a job a route just stopped.

Config: one home per kind

  • app.config.settings — boot/env config (DB URL, download root, worker concurrency): read once at startup, not user-tunable at runtime.
  • sysconfig.SPECS — the runtime admin knobs (DB-override-or-default). A new admin-tunable value goes in SPECS; don't invent a fourth store. (state.py's maintenance_batch predates this and is slated to fold into sysconfig — do not add more like it.)

The gate

Everything below must be green before a change is done (run via siftlode check): ruff (backend) · tsc ×3 + eslint + prettier + knip (frontend) · vitest · pytest. The pytest lane runs in backend/docker-compose.test.yml — an ephemeral Postgres + the backend tree bind-mounted — so the DB-backed integration tests (the db fixture) actually run; SIFTLODE_TEST_ REQUIRE_DB=1 there turns a would-be silent skip into a hard failure. See docs/development.md.