A second review round over the first round's fixes, which is where the remaining real bugs usually are. All four are the same failure as the round it reviewed: a claim stated in a comment that the code does not hold. The middleware moved inside CORS, but the setup gate is registered LATER and is therefore OUTSIDE it — so the comment's "the setup gate never runs for a body that is already too large" was false the moment it was written. On an unconfigured instance that gate opens a DB session per request, which is exactly the anonymous pre-auth work SEC-20 exists to remove. The cap now sits between them, and the order is asserted against `app.user_middleware` rather than described: prose about a stack that `add_middleware` builds inside-out is how this got backwards. The edge ceiling and the route's own cap were pinned EQUAL, but they measure different things — the edge counts raw body bytes, the route counts the decoded file. A file of exactly the advertised maximum was refused one layer before the route that would have taken it. The edge now allows for the multipart envelope, and the test asserts the relation and the gap instead of equality. `sysconfig`'s new `max` was enforced on write only. That bound did not exist before this epic, so a value that was legal when it was written can be sitting in the database — served unclamped it produces exactly the drift the comment says is impossible, with the admin page showing a number outside its own range. Int overrides are clamped on read now, which also survives an env default being lowered later. And `DOWNLOAD_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=0` meant "no per-file cap" to the route but a hard zero to the edge: every upload refused, including the admin page's own way back, recoverable only by editing env and restarting. The setting takes `ge=1`. Two test gaps from the same round: the header assertion that is the ONLY check of the middleware's position was DB-gated and skipped on a host without Postgres, and the headroom "ratio" the docblock calls load-bearing was held as `<=`, i.e. no ratio at all. Both fixed, plus a sweep that every `capped_body` call site in the routers is known and fits under its ceiling — the point of that list is the third entry, not the two that exist today.
413 lines
19 KiB
Python
413 lines
19 KiB
Python
"""Admin-editable system configuration: a DB-override layer over the env/config defaults.
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The registry (SPECS) is the single source of truth for which config keys can be overridden
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from the admin Configuration page, plus each key's type, admin-UI group, env/config default,
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bounds, and whether it's a secret. The resolver returns the DB override if one is set, else
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``settings.<default_attr>`` (same DB-override-or-default pattern as app.state). Secrets are
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stored Fernet-encrypted at rest (requires TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY; without it, secrets can't be
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stored in the DB and stay env-only).
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"""
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from app import logs, security
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from app.config import Settings, canonical_choice, choices_of, settings
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from app.models import SystemConfig
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log = logs.get_logger(__name__)
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# Config keys whose stored ciphertext failed to decrypt — tracked so the warning is logged once per
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# key, not once per request (bounded by the number of secret config keys).
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_decrypt_warned: set[str] = set()
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# The same for a stored value that no longer coerces (a choice list that shrank in a release): it
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# fails on EVERY read of a hot knob until someone saves it again. Keyed with the value, so saving a
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# different bad value is reported afresh (bounded by the keys times the values ever saved).
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_coerce_warned: set[tuple[str, str]] = set()
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class ConfigSpec:
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key: str
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type: str # "int" | "str" | "bool" | "choice"
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group: str # admin-UI grouping (logically related keys stay together)
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default_attr: str # attribute on `settings` holding the env/config default
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secret: bool = False
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min: int | None = None
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max: int | None = None
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allow_empty: bool = False # str keys: a stored "" is an explicit empty value, not "unset"
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@property
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def choices(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
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"""A choice key's allowed values, read from its setting's Literal type in config.py — the one
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place the list is written. The admin page renders them as a picker."""
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return choices_of(Settings.model_fields[self.default_attr].annotation)
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# Registry of DB-overridable keys. Add a key here + wire its read through get_*() to move it
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# off env into the admin UI; the admin page renders it automatically from this list. The ORDER is the
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# admin page's tab order (first appearance of each group), so keep a group's keys together.
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SPECS: tuple[ConfigSpec, ...] = (
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# --- Access / registration ---
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ConfigSpec("allow_registration", "bool", "access", "allow_registration"),
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# --- Email / SMTP (one logical group; the password is the only secret) ---
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ConfigSpec("smtp_host", "str", "email", "smtp_host"),
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ConfigSpec("smtp_port", "int", "email", "smtp_port", min=1, max=65535),
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ConfigSpec("smtp_user", "str", "email", "smtp_user", allow_empty=True),
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ConfigSpec("smtp_from", "str", "email", "smtp_from"),
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ConfigSpec("smtp_password", "str", "email", "smtp_password", secret=True),
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# --- YouTube Data API key (secret; optional — public reads prefer it over OAuth) ---
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ConfigSpec("youtube_api_key", "str", "youtube", "youtube_api_key", secret=True),
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# Optional egress proxy for YouTube API calls (fixed-IP host for an IP-restricted key).
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ConfigSpec("youtube_api_proxy", "str", "youtube", "youtube_api_proxy", allow_empty=True),
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# --- Google OAuth client (Sign in with Google; both encrypted, env fallback). Set from the
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# install wizard / Configuration page so no restart is needed when the creds change. ---
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ConfigSpec("google_client_id", "str", "google", "google_client_id", secret=True),
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ConfigSpec("google_client_secret", "str", "google", "google_client_secret", secret=True),
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# --- Quota (shared YouTube Data API daily budget) ---
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ConfigSpec("quota_daily_budget", "int", "quota", "quota_daily_budget", min=1, max=1_000_000),
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ConfigSpec(
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"backfill_quota_reserve", "int", "quota", "backfill_quota_reserve", min=0, max=1_000_000
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),
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ConfigSpec(
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"search_daily_limit_per_user",
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"int",
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"quota",
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"search_daily_limit_per_user",
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min=0,
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max=100_000,
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),
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# Live-search source: "scrape" (InnerTube, zero API quota) or "api" (search.list, 100u/page).
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ConfigSpec("search_source", "choice", "quota", "search_source"),
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# --- Backfill (recent-first first pass per channel) ---
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ConfigSpec(
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"backfill_recent_max_videos",
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"int",
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"backfill",
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"backfill_recent_max_videos",
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min=1,
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max=100_000,
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),
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ConfigSpec(
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"backfill_recent_max_days", "int", "backfill", "backfill_recent_max_days", min=1, max=36_500
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),
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ConfigSpec("rss_fallback_hours", "int", "backfill", "rss_fallback_hours", min=0, max=168),
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# --- Shorts probe ---
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ConfigSpec(
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"shorts_probe_max_seconds", "int", "shorts", "shorts_probe_max_seconds", min=1, max=3_600
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),
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ConfigSpec("shorts_probe_batch", "int", "shorts", "shorts_probe_batch", min=1, max=10_000),
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# --- Batch sizes ---
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ConfigSpec("enrich_batch_size", "int", "batch", "enrich_batch_size", min=1, max=50),
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ConfigSpec("autotag_title_sample", "int", "batch", "autotag_title_sample", min=1, max=1_000),
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# --- Maintenance (rolling re-validation of already-known videos) ---
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# Videos re-checked per maintenance run. Folded here from app_state (B-core-11) so every admin
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# knob lives in one store; read by sync/maintenance.py, tuned from the Scheduler dashboard.
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ConfigSpec(
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"maintenance_revalidate_batch",
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"int",
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"maintenance",
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"maintenance_revalidate_batch",
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min=100,
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max=100_000,
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),
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# --- Discovery cleanup (search + explore ephemeral content) ---
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# Days an explored-but-unsubscribed channel is kept before the cleanup job purges it.
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ConfigSpec("explore_grace_days", "int", "explore", "explore_grace_days", min=0, max=3_650),
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# Days an un-kept live-search result video is kept before the cleanup job removes it.
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ConfigSpec("search_grace_days", "int", "explore", "search_grace_days", min=0, max=3_650),
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# --- Download center (yt-dlp) — per-user defaults + retention/GC + layout ---
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ConfigSpec("download_total_max_bytes", "int", "downloads", "download_total_max_bytes", min=0),
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ConfigSpec(
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"download_default_max_bytes", "int", "downloads", "download_default_max_bytes", min=0
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),
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ConfigSpec(
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"download_default_max_concurrent",
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"int",
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"downloads",
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"download_default_max_concurrent",
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min=1,
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max=20,
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),
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ConfigSpec(
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"download_default_max_jobs",
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"int",
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"downloads",
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"download_default_max_jobs",
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min=1,
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max=100_000,
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),
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# min=1, NOT 0: the per-file cap is enforced as `if cap and size > cap`, so a stored 0 would read
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# as falsy and SILENTLY disable the limit (an unbounded streamed write to the volume). Floor it at
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# 1 so the cap is always active; the overall footprint is separately bounded by the byte quota.
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# `max` is not cosmetic: `bodylimit.ROUTE_MAX_BODY_BYTES` refuses an upload body over roughly
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# this number at the edge, before the route's own check ever sees it. An admin allowed to raise
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# the knob past the edge would get 413s from a layer the admin page never mentions, so the two
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# are pinned together here and `tests/test_body_limit.py` holds them that way. `_coerce` clamps
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# a stored value to this on READ too — this bound did not always exist, so a legal-when-written
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# override can be sitting in the database already.
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ConfigSpec(
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"download_upload_max_bytes",
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"int",
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"downloads",
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"download_upload_max_bytes",
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min=1,
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max=settings.download_upload_max_bytes,
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),
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ConfigSpec(
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"download_retention_days", "int", "downloads", "download_retention_days", min=0, max=3_650
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),
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ConfigSpec(
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"download_gc_grace_days", "int", "downloads", "download_gc_grace_days", min=0, max=3_650
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),
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ConfigSpec("download_layout", "choice", "downloads", "download_layout"),
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ConfigSpec(
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"download_worker_concurrency",
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"int",
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"downloads",
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"download_worker_concurrency",
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min=1,
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max=16,
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),
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ConfigSpec("sponsorblock_default", "bool", "downloads", "sponsorblock_default"),
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# --- Audit log ---
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# Days to keep admin audit-log rows before the audit_gc job prunes them (0 = keep forever).
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ConfigSpec("audit_retention_days", "int", "audit", "audit_retention_days", min=0, max=3650),
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# --- Diagnostics (E22) ---
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# Runtime log level for the API process. Applied without a restart — see routes/config.py and
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# main.py's lifespan.
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ConfigSpec("log_level", "choice", "diagnostics", "log_level"),
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# Days the log_events table keeps a row (the log_gc job prunes). No "0 = forever": stored logs
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# carry account-linked request history, and the privacy policy names a limit.
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ConfigSpec("log_retention_days", "int", "diagnostics", "log_retention_days", min=1, max=90),
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# --- Plex integration (optional; local-file playback + Plex metadata) ---
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ConfigSpec("plex_enabled", "bool", "plex", "plex_enabled"),
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ConfigSpec("plex_server_url", "str", "plex", "plex_server_url"),
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ConfigSpec("plex_server_token", "str", "plex", "plex_server_token", secret=True),
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ConfigSpec("plex_path_map", "str", "plex", "plex_path_map"),
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ConfigSpec("plex_libraries", "str", "plex", "plex_libraries"),
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ConfigSpec("plex_overlay_map", "str", "plex", "plex_overlay_map"),
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# (plex_sync_interval_min is tuned from the Scheduler dashboard, not here — it's a scheduler job.)
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ConfigSpec("plex_max_transcodes", "int", "plex", "plex_max_transcodes", min=0, max=16),
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ConfigSpec("plex_max_sessions", "int", "plex", "plex_max_sessions", min=1, max=64),
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# Transcode re-encode tuning (E6 S1). The libx264 knobs apply only to the software fallback.
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# crf 0–51 (x264 range); max_height 0 = source.
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ConfigSpec("plex_transcode_hw", "choice", "plex", "plex_transcode_hw"),
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ConfigSpec("plex_transcode_preset", "choice", "plex", "plex_transcode_preset"),
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ConfigSpec("plex_transcode_crf", "int", "plex", "plex_transcode_crf", min=0, max=51),
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ConfigSpec(
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"plex_transcode_max_height", "int", "plex", "plex_transcode_max_height", min=0, max=4320
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),
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# Audio loudness normalisation on the HLS path (remux + transcode alike, not direct play).
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ConfigSpec("plex_audio_loudnorm", "bool", "plex", "plex_audio_loudnorm"),
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# NOTE: plex_watch_sync_interval_min is a config.py default read by the watch-sync scheduler job
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# (scheduler.py); it is intentionally NOT a runtime admin knob, so it stays out of SPECS.
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# --- TMDB enrichment (E5 S2; optional) — the API key is the only secret ---
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ConfigSpec("tmdb_api_key", "str", "tmdb", "tmdb_api_key", secret=True),
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ConfigSpec("tmdb_language", "str", "tmdb", "tmdb_language"),
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# --- Bug reports (E16): the Gitea issue tracker a debug session's issue goes to ---
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ConfigSpec("issues_gitea_url", "str", "issues", "issues_gitea_url"),
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ConfigSpec("issues_gitea_repo", "str", "issues", "issues_gitea_repo"),
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ConfigSpec("issues_gitea_token", "str", "issues", "issues_gitea_token", secret=True),
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# (tmdb_enrich_interval_min is a scheduler job, tuned from the Scheduler dashboard; tmdb_enrich_batch
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# is a config.py default — both stay out of SPECS, like plex_sync_interval_min.)
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)
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_BY_KEY: dict[str, ConfigSpec] = {s.key: s for s in SPECS}
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def spec(key: str) -> ConfigSpec | None:
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return _BY_KEY.get(key)
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def secrets_manageable() -> bool:
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"""Secret values can only be stored when Fernet is configured (TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY)."""
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return bool(settings.token_encryption_key)
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def _default(s: ConfigSpec):
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return getattr(settings, s.default_attr)
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class InvalidSetting(ValueError):
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"""A value `set_value` refuses, as a reason the UI translates (`errors.refused.setting_<reason>`)
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plus what the sentence needs — the English message is for logs only. A ValueError still, so a
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caller that only needs "refused or not" keeps working."""
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def __init__(self, key: str, reason: str, **params: object):
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super().__init__(f"{key}: {reason} {params}")
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self.key = key
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self.reason = reason
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self.params = params
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def _choice(s: ConfigSpec, raw: object) -> str:
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"""The canonical spelling of `raw` among the key's choices (any letter case), or InvalidSetting."""
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option = canonical_choice(s.choices, raw)
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if option is None:
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raise InvalidSetting(s.key, "not_a_choice", choices=", ".join(s.choices))
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return option
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def _coerce(s: ConfigSpec, raw: str):
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if s.type == "int":
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# CLAMPED, not merely validated. `set_value` rejects an out-of-range int, but bounds get
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# ADDED to a spec (download_upload_max_bytes gained a max when SEC-20 started enforcing the
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# same number at the edge) and env defaults get LOWERED, and either leaves a stored value
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# that was legal when it was written. Serving it unclamped is how one layer ends up acting
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# on a number another layer refuses — with the admin page happily showing a value outside
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# the range it renders. Clamping keeps the promise the bounds make rather than restating it.
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v = int(raw)
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if s.min is not None:
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v = max(v, s.min)
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if s.max is not None:
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v = min(v, s.max)
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return v
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if s.type == "bool":
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return raw == "true"
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if s.type == "choice":
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# A stored value that is no longer a choice (the list shrank) reads as the default, like a
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# non-numeric int override does — see get().
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return _choice(s, raw)
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return raw
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def _raw_override(db: Session, key: str) -> str | None:
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"""Stored (decrypted) override string for `key`, or None if no override is set.
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A decrypt failure — a rotated or removed ``TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY`` vs the key the value was written
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with — must NOT crash the caller. `_raw_override` sits on hot paths (`/api/me` via `google_enabled`,
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login, every YouTube scheduler job, account purge), so a raw ``InvalidToken`` here would 500 the
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whole app and the SPA wouldn't even boot. Fall back to the env/config default instead, and warn once
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per key so the operator gets a real signal without a per-request traceback. Recovery is documented in
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docs/self-hosting.md: the key must never change once secrets are stored. (B-core-2)
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"""
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row = db.get(SystemConfig, key)
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if row is None or row.value is None:
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return None
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if not row.encrypted:
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return row.value
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try:
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return security.decrypt(row.value)
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — Fernet InvalidToken / malformed ciphertext (key mismatch)
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if key not in _decrypt_warned:
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_decrypt_warned.add(key)
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log.warning(
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"config %r could not be decrypted (TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY changed or missing?) — falling "
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"back to the env/config default; the key must not change once secrets are stored",
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key,
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)
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return None
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def get(db: Session, key: str):
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"""Effective value: the DB override (typed) if set, else the env/config default."""
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s = _BY_KEY[key]
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raw = _raw_override(db, key)
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if raw is None:
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return _default(s)
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if raw == "" and not s.allow_empty:
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# For most keys an empty override means "fall back to the env default". Keys that opt
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# into allow_empty (e.g. smtp_user, youtube_api_proxy) treat "" as a real value — so an
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# admin can blank one to DISABLE it rather than being stuck with the env default.
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return _default(s)
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try:
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return _coerce(s, raw)
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except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
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# The admin set this in the UI and it is quietly not in force: the app runs on the env
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# default while the settings page goes on showing the value that was saved.
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if (s.key, raw) not in _coerce_warned:
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_coerce_warned.add((s.key, raw))
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log.warning(
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"a stored setting could not be coerced; the default is used instead",
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extra=logs.event(
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"sysconfig.override_uncoercible", key=s.key, reason=type(exc).__name__
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),
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)
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return _default(s)
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def get_str(db: Session, key: str) -> str:
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v = get(db, key)
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return "" if v is None else str(v)
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def get_int(db: Session, key: str) -> int:
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return int(get(db, key))
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def get_bool(db: Session, key: str) -> bool:
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return bool(get(db, key))
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def set_value(db: Session, key: str, value) -> None:
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"""Validate, coerce, and stage a DB override for `key` (secrets are encrypted). Flushes but does
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NOT commit — the caller owns the transaction, so the change lands together with its audit row
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(B-core-10). The staged value is visible to a same-session `get()` before the commit."""
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s = _BY_KEY[key]
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if s.type == "int":
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try:
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v = int(value)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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raise InvalidSetting(key, "not_a_number") from None
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if s.min is not None and v < s.min:
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raise InvalidSetting(key, "too_low", min=s.min)
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if s.max is not None and v > s.max:
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raise InvalidSetting(key, "too_high", max=s.max)
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raw = str(v)
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elif s.type == "bool":
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raw = "true" if value else "false"
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elif s.type == "choice":
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raw = _choice(s, value)
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else:
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raw = "" if value is None else str(value)
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stored, encrypted = raw, False
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if s.secret:
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if not secrets_manageable():
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raise InvalidSetting(key, "no_encryption_key")
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stored, encrypted = security.encrypt(raw) or "", True
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|
||
row = db.get(SystemConfig, key)
|
||
if row is None:
|
||
row = SystemConfig(key=key)
|
||
db.add(row)
|
||
row.value = stored
|
||
row.encrypted = encrypted
|
||
db.flush()
|
||
|
||
|
||
def reset(db: Session, key: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Remove the DB override for `key` (fall back to the env/config default). Flushes but does NOT
|
||
commit — the caller owns the transaction (B-core-10)."""
|
||
row = db.get(SystemConfig, key)
|
||
if row is not None:
|
||
db.delete(row)
|
||
db.flush()
|
||
|
||
|
||
def describe(db: Session) -> dict:
|
||
"""Admin-UI metadata + current values, grouped. Secret values are never echoed —
|
||
only whether an override is set and whether an env default exists."""
|
||
groups: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
|
||
for s in SPECS:
|
||
is_set = db.get(SystemConfig, s.key) is not None
|
||
item: dict = {
|
||
"key": s.key,
|
||
"type": s.type,
|
||
"group": s.group,
|
||
"secret": s.secret,
|
||
"min": s.min,
|
||
"max": s.max,
|
||
"is_set": is_set, # an override row exists
|
||
"allow_empty": s.allow_empty, # if true, the UI stores "" rather than deleting the row
|
||
"choices": list(s.choices), # the picker's options; [] for any other type
|
||
}
|
||
if s.secret:
|
||
item["default_is_set"] = bool(_default(s))
|
||
else:
|
||
item["value"] = get(db, s.key)
|
||
item["default"] = _default(s)
|
||
groups.setdefault(s.group, []).append(item)
|
||
return {"groups": groups, "secrets_manageable": secrets_manageable()}
|