peter
fe38dfbcca
The deep review of the branch raised 47 findings, 18 of which survived adversarial verification. Grouped by what they actually were: **The size ceiling inverted at its boundary.** `remaining_bytes` clamped to 0 for a user already at their storage cap, and `build_ydl_opts` reads 0 as "no limit" — so the one user over quota was the only one downloading with no ceiling at all. `check_enqueue` could not catch it: it ran while the job was queued and the user was still under the cap. The arithmetic moves into `quota.remaining_bytes` (where every other max_bytes decision lives, and where it can be tested), and the worker now fails the job outright rather than proceeding unbounded — as a non-retryable `quota_exceeded`, since retrying cannot help until space is freed. **Silent failures in the new account panel.** All three actions went through `quiet: true` endpoints, which suppress the global error dialog on the promise that the caller reports inline — with no `onError`, that promise was broken and a refusal rendered as nothing. On the broken-SMTP instance this panel exists for, an admin would read silence as "the mail went out". The co-invalidation set and the email-off predicate move to `lib/adminUsers`, shared with the pending-access queue, so the two copies of these mutations cannot drift apart again — which is how half of this was lost in the first place. **A rollback recipe that destroyed data without working.** `alembic downgrade -1` steps back one migration, but a release routinely ships several (0.80.0 shipped four): it drops the newest one's columns and leaves the schema at a revision the older image also cannot resolve, i.e. the crash loop it was meant to escape, minus the data. The dump restore is now the recommended path, and the alembic route asks the target version for its own head revision instead of counting backwards. Also: redirects named in the urlguard docstring beside the DNS-rebinding residual they share a fix with (SEC-17); a malformed port refused as `bad_port` instead of escaping as a 500; the pull cooldown extended to the sibling route spending the same QuotaAction; restore stops the app before dropping its tables; the PowerShell cleanup can no longer decide the script's verdict on 5.1, nor report the wrong exit code; the documented one-liners hardened to match the scripts; the registry's retention window stated where pinning is advertised; the two banners made mutually exclusive so neither can shadow the other; `hover:bg-hover` (a utility this project never generated) replaced by the `selectable` recipe; the clipboard helper reused; and the sync cooldown's copy swept to the two callers that discarded it. Verified: gate green (vitest 678, pytest 949), and the panel, the row hover and the reset banner UAT'd on localdev.
41 lines
2.0 KiB
Bash
41 lines
2.0 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/sh
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# Restores a Siftlode Postgres dump created by backup.sh into the running db container.
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# Usage: ./scripts/restore.sh backups/siftlode-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.dump
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#
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# Restoring the database does NOT restore the secrets that decrypt it. If this dump is from an
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# instance with a different TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY than the current .env, the encrypted sysconfig
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# values and refresh tokens will not be readable. See docs/self-hosting.md § Backups.
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set -e
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# See backup.sh: the documented self-host layout ships only docker-compose.selfhost.yml, so plain
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# `docker compose` has no configuration file to find there.
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if [ -z "${COMPOSE_FILE:-}" ] && [ ! -f docker-compose.yml ] && [ -f docker-compose.selfhost.yml ]; then
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COMPOSE_FILE=docker-compose.selfhost.yml
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export COMPOSE_FILE
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fi
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FILE="$1"
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if [ -z "$FILE" ]; then echo "Usage: restore.sh <dumpfile>"; exit 1; fi
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if [ ! -f "$FILE" ]; then echo "Dump file not found: $FILE"; exit 1; fi
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USER_NAME="${POSTGRES_USER:-siftlode}"
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DB_NAME="${POSTGRES_DB:-siftlode}"
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# Stop the app before dropping its tables. `--clean` DROPs each object in its own transaction, and a
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# running api (with its scheduler) holds locks that make those DROPs queue behind it — abort the wait
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# and the database is left half-dropped. It also keeps the app from writing into a schema that is
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# only partly back. The trap restarts it however this script ends, so a failed restore does not leave
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# the stack down.
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docker compose stop api worker
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restart_app() { docker compose start api worker >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
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trap restart_app EXIT
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# pg_restore exits non-zero for ignorable warnings too (--clean --if-exists on a fresh database
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# reports every missing object it tried to drop), so a non-zero code is reported as "check this",
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# not swallowed and not dressed up as success.
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if docker compose exec -T db pg_restore -U "$USER_NAME" -d "$DB_NAME" --clean --if-exists < "$FILE"; then
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echo "Restored $FILE"
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else
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echo "pg_restore reported errors while restoring $FILE — read the output above before treating this instance as restored." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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