The send, the draft and the screenshots take the session's row lock, so an
autosave or a paste during a send waits for it and then sees it, and two sends
cannot open two issues. A save keeps the delivery's progress; a failed edit
that shows the screenshots is finished by the retry; an answer that is not the
tracker's API (a redirect, a proxy page) is refused, not a crash that loses the
issue's record. Only an attempt that opened an issue counts toward the pace.
Screenshots: deleting one after the send is refused, a user's storage is
capped across sessions, new sessions and zip exports are paced, images are
stored uncompressed in the zip. One liveness rule, one session view, one image
type table.
Logging: a session's elevation is tracked apart from the user's own, so the
browser's own requests (no header) no longer lower the floor a session needs;
Stop ends it at once.
Composer: an image pasted anywhere is taken; what is still unsaved is saved on
close, and "saved" is shown only when it is; the draft is held while it is
sent; a failed screenshot read says so instead of reading as none; focus moves
to what stays; the preview follows the text size. Pill: the step prompt and a
running Stop survive the pill moving between hosts, the prompt keeps the
dialog's Tab trap, the toast region lets clicks through, other tabs hear of a
Start or Stop, the last seconds are sent before the cap, a capture with no
frame is an error.
- admin config group "Bug reports": Gitea address, repository, token (secret),
and "Check the connection" — the repository must answer, take issues and
be PRIVATE (a report carries its reporter's log); checked on every send too
- POST /api/debug-sessions/{id}/issue sends the SAVED draft: create the issue,
upload each file on its own request (the measured API), then show the
screenshots inline; progress is kept in the draft, so a send that stops
half-way keeps its issue and the retry sends only what is missing; 5 new
issues an hour per user; audited as issue_create
- the composer: Create issue (only where a tracker is set up, naming the
repository), a partial-send banner with retry, and a Preview — the tracker's
own rendering in a sandboxed frame, or the zip's markdown without one
- the recorder's refusals answer in the localized family (debug_session_*,
screenshot_*, issue(s)_*), not bare codes the UI could only call generic
- a tracker refusal logs the status only: its message can quote the title back
A session is one recording, capped at 60 minutes by the server. While it is
open, a request naming the caller's own session in X-Debug-Session is logged
at the session's level with every line tagged; a header naming anything else
is ignored. The browser's batches count a session as consent to its level and
keep the tag only on its own events. Screenshots are judged by their bytes,
capped in size and count, and served back to their owner only.
- debug_sessions / debug_screenshots tables, one open session per user
(partial unique index), log_events.debug_session_id indexed
- /api/debug-sessions: start (joins a running one), stop, list, get, events,
screenshots; /api/me reports the live session
- the hourly log job closes expired sessions and drops them with the logs
- logsink.serialize and routes._common.capped_body shared by their readers
Two rows of the canonical-patterns table had drifted, found while closing the roadmap audit:
- 63 mutation responses carried no `ok` — `{"unsubscribed": true}`, `{"status": "ok"}`,
`{"added": 3, …}` and so on. Each now leads with `"ok": true` (additive: every field a client
reads is still there).
- Twelve route helpers committed on their own. Six were just the end of their handler's work and now
flush: the playlist item add/remove and Watch later get-or-create, the Plex series/season bulk
mark, and the invite decision + account activation — which an approval used to land in separate
transactions. The other six commit on purpose (a token durable before its link is mailed, a
single-use token burned as its own unit, the Google callback's tail, a background registration
with its own session, the staged search ingest around YouTube calls), each listed with its reason.
`tests/test_route_conventions.py` holds both rules in code; CLAUDE.md's two rows point at it.
~150 HTTPExceptions carried a hand-written English sentence as their detail,
shown verbatim under the Hungarian UI — in the blocking error dialog and on
every inline surface that printed HttpError.detail (sign-in, setup wizard,
change password, the passphrase gate, live search). Four also quoted an
upstream exception's text back to the user.
- app/refusal.py: `refused(status, reason, **params)` → {code: "refused",
reason, …params}; localizeDetail translates errors.refused.<reason> with the
params interpolated. "Unknown X" 404s use the existing not_found(what).
- sysconfig.set_value raises InvalidSetting (reason + bounds) instead of an
English ValueError; the three writers answer it through setting_refused.
- The Plex connection/write/image failures log what the upstream said and
answer a reason; the search scraper's failure is logged and answered as
youtube/unavailable (it crashed refusal_reason before).
- HttpError.detail now only ever holds a translated reason: a string detail
(only the framework's own can remain) is left out, so reading .detail is
safe everywhere — including destructured, the hole the raw-detail source
scan could not see. That scan and its five-file exception list are gone.
- Enforced: test_http_details.py fails on any HTTPException with a sentence
for a detail; the contract test requires every refused reason and every
not_found "what" in both languages, and no key for one that is gone.
- local/jsx-comment-text: a // inside JSX children renders as text; the rule
is ten lines in eslint.config.js rather than eslint-plugin-react's ~1800
lockfile lines.
Settings → Account names the latest sign-in on any device (only the
admin's user list did, though the 0.88 notes said otherwise), and the role
in the reader's language instead of the raw `user`.
A user can raise their diagnostics level to Részletes (DEBUG) or Teljes (TRACE) for 24 hours from a
new Settings tab, after a consent box that says what is recorded, that the server keeps it and for
how long (the instance's own retention), and that it lapses. Alap is the base and needs no consent.
- users.diagnostics_level/_until (migration 0087), written only by PUT /api/me/diagnostics, which
computes the expiry itself; the demo account cannot raise it. /api/me reports the level in force.
- The server logs an elevated user's requests at that level and stores every line of them
(logs.LevelGate on the stdout handler and the sink; the root is lowered only while an elevation
is active). Teljes adds the redacted query string to the request line.
- POST /api/diagnostics/events stores the browser's log as source=web rows: account from the
session, body capped while streaming, events/attrs capped, re-redacted, events under the
consented level dropped, timestamps clamped, 30 batches a minute, 409 once the level lapsed.
- lib/diagnostics.ts applies the level to the tab and streams only what happens after consent, in
batches, never its own request lines, with a keepalive flush on pagehide; stops on lapse (its
own timer), on withdrawal and on 409.
- Detail hooks at DEBUG: which control was clicked (test id, icon, app copy in English — never user
text, input values or a link's query), visibility/bfcache/resize, filter changes
(lib/filterLog.ts; typed search only at TRACE), player events (lib/mediaLog.ts; media errors are
warnings at every level). Offline/online at the base level.
- "Saját napló" viewer: live, newest first, level groups with counts, search, row details, copy
the filtered events as JSON lines, clear.
- Privacy policy and Terms exist in Hungarian and English (a contract test holds both languages to
the same sections); the policy now describes the server logs and diagnostic logging, self-service
deletion and password sign-in.
Fixed on the way:
- A sync auth dependency ran logs.set_user on a copied context, so the account never reached a
handler's own log lines (measured); a per-request mutable scope carries it now.
- The Settings tab rail left a phone no room (clipped labels, buttons over text): below `sm` it is
a scrolling row above the content.
- PUT /api/me/preferences took a bare dict body; it is a Pydantic model now.
Deep-review round 4, targeted at round 3's changes (f569b19c..e7f38396).
Accounts
- Switching, adding or signing out an account moved the tab's pin before
the page unloaded, so the players' resume beacons fired on the way out
under the NEW account: one account's playback position saved into the
other. The pin is now handed to the next page (pinOnNextPage) and taken
over at import; clearActiveAccount is gone.
- Switching to a suspended account was refused but left it in the
switcher, refused on every click; a deactivated one was not refused at
all, and made the default it signed every account in the browser out on
the next request. Every account _session_user would refuse — gone,
deactivated, suspended, revoked — is refused and dropped from the list.
Share page (/watch)
- An IPv6 client is limited by its /64 (client_ip becomes client_key, for
every limiter): keyed on the full address, one subscriber could rotate
through endless identities. The comments now state what the per-link
ceiling costs: guessing from five networks can keep a link shut for its
window, and guesses already running when it fills are still checked.
- The link is looked up before the limiter records the attempt, so made-up
tokens no longer grow it by an entry each.
Forms
- Failing the same way twice is announced again: the sign-in, passphrase
and setup errors are keyed on the attempt (a clear and a set in one
handler left the alert node untouched).
- The install wizard's own validation showed the generic error — it threw
plain objects its catch did not read. It sets the step's message.
Tests: a re-pin leaving the previous account's notices behind; the pin
hand-over; switching to an ended account; the /64 viewer; made-up tokens;
the repeated alerts. Each mutation-checked RED for its own reason.
Deep-review round 3 over main..improvement/watch-background-audio.
Account boot
- The notification history and settings, and the hints toggle, are read
when their modules load, which in a new tab (bookmark, typed URL) is
before BootGate pins the account: they read as nobody's, and the tab's
first notice replaced the account's stored history (up to 100 entries)
with a one-item list. They now read again when the tab is pinned
(onAccountPinned, run by setActiveAccount); a notice raised before the
pin stays, after the history.
- A tab pinned to an account still in this browser's wallet but whose
session ended (suspended, deleted, or revoked by "log out everywhere")
got "signed out" from /api/me while the default account was still
signed in, and signing in again as anyone else left it there. A refused
per-tab account now leaves the wallet, and the probe answers as the
default, so the tab reloads onto it.
Share page (/watch)
- The password unlock is limited per viewer (link + client IP), under a
per-link ceiling that counts only wrong passwords. Keyed on the link
alone, ten wrong guesses every five minutes locked out every viewer,
the ones with the password included. client_ip moves to app.ratelimit
so the public routes can key on it.
- Its failure messages and the load-failure screen are announced
(role=alert, the password input described by its error). The sign-in,
passphrase, password-change and setup form errors get role=alert too.
Comments that still described removed machinery are corrected: App's
collapse flags, SettingsPanel's Save bar, ConfigPanel, authed_format_sig.
Tests: the account's history and hints across the pin; a revoked and a
suspended pinned account; the per-viewer limit and the ceiling; the
limiter's exhausted(); the share page's announced failures; a share
link's feed filters persisted. Each mutation-checked RED for its own
reason.
Round 6 converted three of four `is_demo` 403s to a structured detail and wrote a docstring saying it
had converted all the sites there are. The account-delete route in `routes/me.py` still answered a
hand-written English sentence, which `notifyActionError` discards in favour of the caller's
translated fallback — so the demo user gets no hint that the demo account is the reason. It is
UI-gated today, so the string is unreachable; what was reachable was the false completeness claim,
which is precisely what stops the next reader from looking. The site is converted, and the list is
now DERIVED from the source: a new test walks `app/` for every `is_demo`-guarded 403, asserts each
raises a structured detail, and fails when the count moves — so this file cannot fall behind the code
the way it just did.
The same round's frontend contract guard was failing open. Its pattern required a bare identifier
before `.detail` and excluded `.detail` used as a last call argument, so `setErr(e.detail)`,
`(e as HttpError).detail`, `String(e.detail)` and four more idiomatic forms were invisible — and
because the file set is compared with `toEqual`, a file the pattern cannot see is simply never listed
and the gate stays green over a fresh copy of the contract. Widened to cover cast receivers, optional
chains and call-argument reads; the pinned set is unchanged, so the narrowing had removed no false
positive. A destructured `detail` stays out of reach (a pattern loose enough for it fires on
react-query's own `const { data: detail }`), and that hole is written into the test rather than
papered over with two innocent files.
Its anti-vacuity guard also did not guard anything: the comment says the glob must have matched
something, but the assertion under it read a sibling file by its own URL, which resolves whether or
not the glob enumerated anything. That only mattered while the pinned list was non-empty — the moment
the deferral sweep lands and it becomes [], the whole file would pass over a glob matching zero
files. The scan size is asserted now.
Approve an address BEFORE the person registers and their sign-up produces no queue row at all —
`_decide` only takes a still-pending invite — so the Access-requests screen sat empty, the tab badge
read zero, and the only working move was re-typing the address into the whitelist box. Nobody would
guess that, and on 2026-09-03 nobody did.
This is roadmap UX-25, where two earlier attempts were reverted after review. Both moved AUTHORITY:
auto-activating on registration turns a standing whitelist entry into a bearer grant for whoever
registers the address first, and reopening the approved invite to `pending` lets an anonymous sign-up
REVOKE a standing approval. What was actually missing was visibility, so this changes nothing about
what an unauthenticated caller can cause — the admin could already do exactly this by re-entering the
address; they just had no way to know they had to.
The section lists every account that cannot sign in yet and says WHICH gate is shut, because the two
dead ends look the same from the admin's chair: waiting for activation, or waiting on a confirmation
mail. Naming the unconfirmed ones is not decoration — on a no-SMTP instance that is the difference
between the owner and whoever registered the address first (SEC-15), and an admin about to let
someone in should see it. A person the queue above already covers is deliberately NOT listed here;
two buttons for one person is worse than one.
Activate is gated on `is_allowed` — the same function the sign-in paths consult, in core, so the
button that appears and the badge that counts cannot disagree. Without that gate it would
manufacture an inconsistent account: password sign-in only checks `is_active` and would let them in,
while their Google sign-in would be turned away and silently reopened as a fresh access request.
Letting in someone with no approved invite stays the whitelist box's job, which says so out loud.
The badge counts activations SEPARATELY from pending invites rather than widening an existing
field's meaning, and only counts what genuinely waits on the admin: an unconfirmed account waits on
its owner, so it is listed with a re-send but does not nag. The admin-side resend says plainly what
happened, including refusing when the instance has no working SMTP — mail is fail-soft everywhere
else, and that silence is exactly what left the 0.78.5 sign-ups with nothing to fall back on.
`send_verification_link` is now one function with three callers (registration, the public resend,
this one), so the link's shape and TTL cannot drift by who triggered it.
UAT on localdev, both languages: the UX-25 shape reproduced end to end (approve the address, then
register), the badge counting it, Activate letting them in and dropping the badge, the row losing
its Activate but keeping the re-send, a fresh token issued by the re-send, and both actions in the
audit log. Test data removed.
An account can now hold two true addresses: the one its owner typed, which a Google
sign-in no longer overwrites, and the one Google answers with. Only the first was
stored, so Settings could say 'Connected' without saying connected AS WHOM -- exactly
what someone who registered with a +tag needs to know.
users.google_email (migration 0080) records Google's answer at sign-in and at an
in-app link. /api/me exposes it ONLY when it differs from the account address, so the
comparison lives in one place and the majority, whose two addresses are the same
string, see no change at all. Rendered in the account menu as a muted third line under
the identity, and in the Settings sign-in row under the existing hint.
A short 'Google' label rather than a brand glyph: the app draws one icon set (lucide),
and a generic mail icon next to an email address says nothing. It also reads to a
screen reader, which an unlabelled logo would not.
No backfill is possible -- Google's answer is only known at sign-in -- so accounts
linked earlier stay NULL until their owner next signs in with Google.
Round 1 on the feature diff found 15; the substantive ones:
- The delete control VANISHED on any invite whose address had registered, which
is the ordinary sign-up shape (register writes the User and the pending invite
together). The guard stays broad — that row is the account's approval gate, and
orphaning it strands someone who can then neither sign in nor be approved — but
the control is now a disabled button carrying the reason, on both lists, so an
admin never sees a row silently missing a button its neighbours have.
- Deleting an entry is not always a revoke: is_allowed falls back to the env
ALLOWED_EMAILS / ADMIN_EMAILS lists once no row exists, and an ADMIN_EMAILS
address is force-promoted on its next Google sign-in. The route now reports
still_allowed_by_env and the UI says so instead of claiming access was removed.
- "Deny keeps the row so they can't immediately re-ask" was simply false —
upsert_pending_invite reopens a denied row. Corrected everywhere it was stated.
- The Configuration warning reads me.email_configured, which save() did not
invalidate, so it kept warning about fields the admin had just filled in.
- The read-only variant was an aria-hidden span explained only by a Tooltip that
the hints toggle can switch off; now a disabled button with title + aria-label.
- The delete error path threw away the 409's reason (the stale-list case) and
left the stale row on screen.
- The throttle window was spent even when no notice was written, silencing the
next hour on the path whose job is to stop silent drops.
- email_enabled() opened a second session and decrypted the SMTP password on
every /api/me poll; it now takes the caller's session.
- welcomeMode.dom.test.ts never rendered the card, so reverting the history
wiring to useState left it green. A render test now drives the real links and
fails on that revert (verified).
Plus /api/me flag tests, the registration-shaped pending case, the env-allowlist
case, and a release note that matches what the code does.
Three operator gaps, all found the same way — a person could not sign up and the
app showed nobody anything.
- DELETE /api/admin/invites/{id} with a delete control on both the pending
requests and the previously-decided list. Deny keeps the row so the person
cannot immediately re-ask; delete forgets the address. Refused with 409 while
a User row exists for it, because is_allowed reads that row and removing it
would revoke a live user's access with no other sign — the list ships
has_account so the UI withholds the button instead of offering one that fails.
- Email is fail-soft by design, which had come to mean invisible. _send() now
records an email_undelivered notification for every admin when a message is
skipped or rejected, naming the message that was lost, throttled to one an
hour. /api/me carries email_configured, driving a standing warning on
Configuration → Email / SMTP and above the access-request list.
- The sign-in card's Create account / Forgot password / Didn't get the email
views are history entries (useHistorySubview), so Back returns to the previous
view instead of only moving the address bar.
Also: the per-test rate-limiter reset sweeps every loaded app.* module rather
than a hand-kept list of three — this change added a limiter outside it.
POST /api/me/switch validated wallet membership, access and suspension but not
the target account's session epoch. Switching to an account revoked elsewhere (a
password reset/change or "log out everywhere" bumped its epoch) made it the
session default, so the next request's current_user hit the epoch mismatch on
the default identity and cleared the WHOLE wallet session — logging out every
account in the browser. Mirror the suspend guard: drop the stale account from
the switch list and return 403 instead of switching.
From the auth /security-review (contained fixes; architectural SA3 proxy-trust +
SA4 session-revocation deferred to the user):
- SB1: encrypt the OAuth access_token at rest (was plaintext while refresh_token
was encrypted) — a ~1h Google bearer credential. New security.decrypt_optional()
falls back to a refresh for legacy plaintext tokens; column is unbounded String.
E2E-verified: token refreshed → stored as Fernet ciphertext → 319-subscription
YouTube sync succeeded.
- SA5: password_login is no longer a timing/enumeration oracle — it always runs
argon2 (against a decoy hash for unknown/passwordless emails), so response time
can't reveal whether an account exists.
- SB2: Google login only ADOPTS+activates a pre-existing password account when
Google actually attests email_verified (defense-in-depth against takeover); and
the email sync won't overwrite with a value another account owns (avoids a 500).
- demo_login clears the wallet first (demo can't switch to / act as a real account
via the multi-account header); switch_account rejects a suspended target (which
would otherwise clear the whole session on the next request).
Re-review clean; ruff clean; localdev boots; YouTube auth path E2E-verified.
- PlexBrowse.tsx: self-contained Plex mode (library scope tabs, own search +
sort, poster-card grid with watch state + playability tint, paged; show →
seasons/episodes drill-down). Playback announces (P2 wires the real player).
- Feed source dropdown gains a 'Plex' option (gated on me.plex_enabled); App
swaps <Feed> for <PlexBrowse> when librarySource==='plex' so the video-feed
hooks don't run in Plex mode. me exposes plex_enabled.
- api client (plexLibraries/plexBrowse/plexShow/plexImageUrl) + types; librarySource
union + share-URL restore gain 'plex'; new plex i18n namespace en/hu/de.
- Verified over HTTP (authed): libraries, browse+FTS, image proxy 200 image/jpeg.
The logged-out landing probed /api/me, which 401'd, and the browser logs every
non-2xx fetch as a console error regardless of how the app handles it. The
bootstrap probe now returns 200 with {authenticated:false} via a new
optional_current_user dependency; api.me() maps that to null. The render gate
treats no-data as 'signed out' -> the landing, and a thrown error as a real
network/5xx failure. Other protected endpoints still 401, so mid-session expiry
is still caught by the global handler. Lighthouse (dev): Best Practices 96->100.
- app/utils.py: shared valid_email() + now_utc() (one email regex, was duplicated
in auth.py and admin.py with a looser "@"-in check elsewhere).
- security.hash_token(): one SHA-256 token hasher (was duplicated in auth.py + state.py).
- auth.admin_user dependency + count_admins() helper, replacing the inline role
checks and the last-admin count query repeated across admin.py/me.py/tags.py.
- /api/me exposes instance-wide google_enabled. The onboarding nudge no longer auto-opens, and
Settings hides the YouTube-access section + the 'Connect Google' option, when the instance has
no Google OAuth configured (e.g. an email+password-only self-host). A linked account still shows
its 'Connected' status.
- Link a Google account to a password account, and adopt the Google identity onto a matching
email account instead of 500ing on a duplicate; set or change a password from Settings.
- Expose has_google/has_password on /api/me for the Sign-in methods UI.
- Mark Google logins email-verified (backfill existing rows, migration 0024); stop a routine
login from clobbering an admin-assigned role (env ADMIN_EMAILS stays the bootstrap admin).
- Suspension login-gates (password + Google callback + current_user) with a rate-limited
'suspended' notice; shared purge_user (cascade delete + access-request cleanup + Google-grant
revoke) behind self- and admin-deletion; single app_base source for user-facing email links.
Add DELETE /api/me/account: permanently erases the signed-in account and all its
personal data — OAuth tokens, subscriptions, tags, video states, playlists,
notifications all cascade on the users row (FK ON DELETE CASCADE); quota-audit
events are kept but anonymised (SET NULL); the email's invite/whitelist row is
removed too. Guards: the shared demo account can't be deleted, and the last
remaining admin can't delete itself. Frontend: a Danger zone in Settings -> Account
(non-demo) with a danger-confirm; on success the session clears and the app lands
on the welcome page. EN/HU/DE. Verified via curl: self-delete + session clear +
demo 403.
Whitelisted emails enter the shared demo user via /auth/demo (lazily
created, no OAuth token/scope), rate-limited per IP and answering
uniformly so it can't be hammered as an enumeration oracle. Add a
require_human dependency that blocks the demo account from quota-spending
sync endpoints and the OAuth upgrade flow, and surface is_demo on /api/me.
Track every account that completes OAuth in a browser session (session 'account_ids',
~14-day cookie), so the user can switch between them without another Google round-trip.
New GET /api/me/accounts (switchable accounts, active flagged) and POST /api/me/switch
(guarded: target must be in the session list — proof it signed in here — and re-checked
against is_allowed in case the invite was revoked). Logout now signs out the active
account and falls back to the most recent remaining one, else clears the session. UI: the
account popover lists the other signed-in accounts (click to switch, reloads) plus an
'Add another account' action (-> /auth/login, which uses prompt=select_account).
Trilingual. Third step of Epic N.
Base login now requests only openid/email/profile (non-sensitive), so a new user
gets a clean Google consent with no "unverified app" warning and no 7-day refresh
token expiry. YouTube read (youtube.readonly) and write (youtube) are granted later
by the onboarding wizard via a parameterized /auth/upgrade?access=read|write.
Security fixes folded in from the baseline audit:
- config: refuse to boot in production (https OAUTH_REDIRECT_URL) with the
placeholder/short SECRET_KEY or a missing TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY, closing a
session-forgery / admin-impersonation hole.
- main: mark the session cookie Secure when served over HTTPS.
- me: expose can_read; sync/subscriptions returns a friendly 403 (not a 500)
until YouTube read access is granted.
Move the access whitelist from the ALLOWED_EMAILS env var into a DB Invite table
(env kept as bootstrap fallback), and add a self-service request + admin approval
flow with fail-soft email.
- models: Invite(email, status pending|approved|denied, requested_at, decided_*)
- migration 0008: invites table; seed env ALLOWED_EMAILS u ADMIN_EMAILS as approved
- auth: is_allowed() (DB-first, env fallback); a denied Google login records a pending
request and bounces to /?access=requested instead of a raw 403; public POST
/auth/request-access; upsert is idempotent so repeats don't re-spam admins
- routes/admin.py (admin-only): list/approve/deny invites + manual add
- email.py: smtplib + Gmail App Password, fail-soft (skips if SMTP unset)
- /api/me exposes pending_invites; config + .env.example gain SMTP_*
- UI: Login 'Request access' form + access=requested/denied handling; Settings ->
Access requests (approve/deny + add); admin nudge toast on pending requests
Verified locally: request-access creates a pending invite and emails the admin;
seed approved npeter83; guinea-pig yt.trash2023 denied until approved.
peter